Outside of Canada, the last year has not really been kind to progressive politics and ... even in Canada ... there are signs of worry. No one is going to defend -- or, no one who thinks of themselves as a progressive individual (see earlier blogs for what this might mean) -- can or should defend the British Conservative Party nor the current incarnation of American Republicanism. Both have become more stridently extreme. Both have stripped away the veneer of respectability in politics to pander to very base ideas. And, if left in power very long, both will wind up causing just tonnes of problems.
This said, one might ask: what can we learn from these developments? There are, I want to contend, important lessons for progressive (or, leftist) thinkers in these developments because the success of more extreme right wing politics is, simultaneously, the failure of progressive politics. Most commentary -- at least the stuff I have read -- has focused on explaining why Trump or Brexit occurred. The general conclusion -- for good or ill -- involves a combination of factors that amount to strategic miscalculations one the part of party establishments or moderates or the general public. I strongly suspect that large sections of the US and UK population will, very shortly, have a serious case of buyer's remorse but in the meantime learning only this lesson is detrimental to progressive politics because it is about how to win elections. And, again for good or ill, progressive movements have been not bad at this. I know ... I know ... progressives have not gotten all they wanted. But, they managed to elect Obama to two terms despite intense reactive racism in the US; they got rid of Harper; kept the Labour Party in power in Britain for years. The record, overall, is not all that bad.
The problem progressives have is that they often don't know what to do with power when they get it. (Now, to be honest, it seems the British Conservative Party has the same problem. They didn't like Labour governments but once they had settled in ... well ... what came next never seemed very clear. There is a standard script -- cut taxes, talk about people getting soft, say environmentalism has "gone too far" -- but, we have all heard that a bunch of time and ... seriously ... how much lower you gonna cut taxes on the wealthy? How much less can they pay? How much less environmental protection can one actually have?) And, this is where the left can learn from Trump and Brexit.
One of the odd things about the election of Trump and about Brexit is that the left was left (ha ha) holding the bad of the old right. The left never supported neo-liberalism and campaigned long and hard against it. Organized labour railed against free trade, said that the working class would pay the price for multinational corporation super profits, indicated that mobile capital created a race to the bottom in terms of environmental protection, etc. Said differently, progressives were always the ones who said that government needed to rethink (or, renegotiate) NAFTA and who said that there was nothing wrong with protecting domestic markets to ensure high employment rates, and that one did not need to embrace globalization (in the form of the EU or of NAFTA or the TPP) in order to have a vibrant economy. So ... how did progressives end up fighting a rearguard action in favour of the very policies they opposed while right-wing populists scooped up victories adopting leftist ideas about putting big business in its place?
I recognize that this right-wing populism was mixed with a lot of racism. Said differently, right-wing populists were able to mobilize a racist language about (in the US) Mexican "stealing jobs" (when in reality it was American corporations in their quest for super profits who were creating the rust belt) but ... you see the point. One need not embrace racism to be concerned about the fate of working people and to raise questions about neo-liberalism. Indeed, most progressives I know raised precisely these questions and were vibrantly anti-racist. And, here is the thing, in theory, progressive thinkers raise concerns about neo-liberalism all the time. In practice, in government, running the show, they tend to make their peace with it. This is the lesson that progressives need to learn. Why make peace with the very thing that you oppose? Is this a case of "only Nixon could go to China"?
Maybe. Right-wing populists can talk tough to big business in a way that progressives no longer can (and, in the US, maybe have not since the days of Kennedy) because they know that the right-wing media will not mobilize against them, in the US Tea Party activists will stay silent, Fox News hosts will have nothing to say, and that the moderate mainstream media won't do a very good job reporting this and so will do one of their standard "some people say this; some people say that" reports. Progressive politicians, in other words, have been worried about a bad media, about protest, and about business reaction. If Obama or a Labour PM had raised questions about NAFTA or the EU, the right would have been all over them. Fox would have predicated a disastrous recession; would have talked about "government over-reach", would have explained the price consumers would pay for "special interests." I recall FTA reporting of US Democrats who raised questions about free trade. One right-wing journalist calmly explained that if Democrats had been in charge of lightbulbs, we would still be using candles to protect unionized candle makers. Nothing of this sort has gone on in opposition to British Conservatives and American Republicans raising similar types of concerns.
But, there is more than biased, two standards media spin going on here. For a variety of complicated reasons progressive, moderate, reformist, and leftwing thinkers embraced internationalism and globalization but in the process became heavily confused about it. They embraced it because they wanted to win elections and felt that they wouldn't without it, but they embraced it because they really were committed to internationalism and, on one level, you can see why. Progressive internationalism involved evening out standards of living (improving economic development) in marginalized economies; diversity at home, respect for difference and acceptance of refugees, among other things, including finding ways to address common international problems (human rights, climate change, e.g.). Said differently, moderate (Democrat) and progressive (Labour) leaders confused neo-liberal globalization (bringing down barriers to business) with a different form of globalization that approached issues from a humanistic and ecological perspective. Defending the latter became defending the former but ... it actually ain't really so. And, in the process, in the wake of this confusion, centrist and left-wing politicians were left holding the bag for policies about which they were -- or, should have been -- deeply suspicious.
Let me give you an example: Hilary Clinton was, more or less, silent on the issue of NAFTA. Instead, she focused on another job-creation strategy. This strategy might have made sense. I don't actually know because I didn't investigate it. She could have maintained this strategy but she also should have taken aim at NAFTA and, I think, she could have done so in a way that did not "scapegoat" Mexicans. I think a lot of Bernie Saunders' popularity arose from the fact that he did precisely this. The Democrats could, for instance, have pointed out that Mexicans did not "steal" jobs, rich people elected to move companies south of the border. They could have argued that this is a reason to strengthen the labour and environmental side agreements to NAFTA. They could have argued that this is a reason to better regulate business. Said differently, instead of keeping (more or less) silent on the issue while taking about the importance of international openness (which is a good but vague thing), Clinton and other Democrats could have pointed out that it is the very weakness of these agreements that harms both Mexican and American workers. Strengthening them would allow for higher wage rates and better environmental protection. Regulating business -- say, the mobility of plant and capital -- would allow for public good assessments of relocation and whether or not they are actually needed. It would have allowed and open and needed discussion on this issue: how much profit is enough? After all, if a company is leaving Ohio or Michigan or Missouri to make *more* money elsewhere ... should one not discuss exactly how much money one should be making? Surely, in a day and age of widening income gaps such a question is of some importance?
Said differently, the new right (let's call them that) has caught moderate, progressive, leftist politicians by surprise. The new right is deeply unpopular with some sections of the old right but that does not matter too much. Perhaps, in fact, moderates and leftists made too much of the dislike of, say, Republicans for Trump or British Tories for Brexit. The success of this new right, however, highlighted a problem with the political centre and left. Instead of demanding changes to international trade agreements, they missed an opportunity to shape discourse and, in the process, it took on nasty racist tones. As Labour and the Democratic Party rethink their politics, they would do well to bear these points in mind.
Showing posts with label Conservative. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conservative. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 01, 2017
Wednesday, January 06, 2016
Let That Be Your Last Battlefield: Bigotry and Conservatism
As the CPC and its intellectual allies grapple with their defeat, they have a number of options, two of which I have already highlighted. It appears that the Parliamentary caucus is ambiguously settling on a Tea Party like opposition mode, which is both their right and their job ... in some ways. I'd advice them against it because even though it will play well with their base, I'm skeptical that it will play well with the rest of the country. I'm sure, of course, that this is not their only plan. I'm sure they have already worked out the details of a multi-pronged oppositional strategy that includes their own efforts to re-brand progressive policies in a negative way that casts them as political manipulation or corruption, in the same way that Republicans in the US seem to have convinced a large section of the US population that health care is actually not good for you and the US Government is evil for providing it.
Where the Conservatives run into problems, however, is in the loose mishmash that makes up their party. All political parties have core supporters. One becomes concerned about a party and its future only when -- or, well, seriously concerned -- you start to lose your core supporters. That is: the people who have hung in there, voted for you, put signs on their lawns, donated, come to meetings (or, perhaps protests), encouraged friends and family to turn out, etc. This core group is what carries a party through opposition or a minority position in Parliament or the legislature. One's core group is, by definition, not amenable to much change (hence, the term "core"). They are not easily swayed by the shifting winds of politics. They may or may not be a party members (my grandfather, for instance, was an on-again-off-again member of the PCs here in NB but whether or not he was officially a member, he always voted Tory) but that is less important than their votes and support.
When there is a shift in core supporters, that signals a wide change in what political scientists call "the party system." For instance, the demise of Social Credit in Alberta and the rise of the PC dynasty was such a shift ... of sorts. Likewise, the collapse of the Conservatives and, for a while, Liberals in BC (replaced by SoCred and CCF-NDP) is another example. And, a third might be the demise of the old PC party federally which, for a while, left the Liberals without any serious challenger as a national political party. Instead, the Liberals fought a series of regionalized battles against other parties (NDP and PC in the Atlantic, BQ in QC, Reform and then CA in the west). Reform and the Bloc sucked away core PC supporters in their regions of the country, forcing the demise of the PCs as a viable political alternative.
Viability, as you can tell, is a key issue. Parties and independents periodically win local elections for a variety of reasons that can include the popularity of local candidates, the temporary demise of another political party (say, CoR's brief foray into NB politics), or isolated and localized support among a relatively small core group (Quebec solidaire in QC and the Greens in PEI, NB, and BC might be examples). But, viability means something other than winning a seat or a few seats. Joe Clark and Jean Charest no doubt helped win a few seats here and their for the old PCs as they struggled on after the 1993 debacle. But, that did not make the party viable as a national alternative to the Liberals because they had lost core support in QC and the west. To be a viable political party, you need to have people who you can count on to turn out and vote for you, sign your petitions, donate money, come to events, etc., time after time after time. This is what differentiates parties that have a brief moment in the sun (Bloc populaire, Cape Breton Labour, PANB ... well, almost) from even smaller parties with a core group of supporters. Without this group, the party will disappear.
What does this have to do with the Conservatives and with bigotry? Or, even with my oblique Star Trek reference in the title of this blog? Bigotry is a dilemma for the conservatives and highlights, in fact, the problems of that party (all parties, of course, have problems). The CPC wants and needs the support of people who call themselves "social conservatives," or "traditionalists" or even "real Canadians." If it is going to win, it needs those votes. It needs the votes of people who want to ban the niquab, who want to restrict immigration, who would -- if they could -- turn back the clock on gay and lesbian equality, who want to find ways to limit women's control of their bodies, and who want to ignore environmental problems because deep down they don't really believe that there are environmental problems (its all exaggerated, etc.). Now, I hasten to add that I am not accusing anyone in the CPC or its Parliamentary caucus of holding such views. Truth is, I've not looked up all these people and likely will not since its not on point to the point I am making (and, would be incredibly time consuming). What is on point is that these people (a) don't vote Liberal or NDP or Green and (b) have found a home over the years in various conservatives parties. The old Reform Party, you will remember, had a serious problem with bigotry when it started out (Preston Manning used the metaphor of finding bugs when you turn over rocks to explain this away). They find their home there because (a) the conservatives recognize that they need these votes, (b) seem to share *some* of these views (Harper, as well know, encouraged Islamophobia through his bizarre campaign against the niquab, or at least what The Globe found bizarre -- see previous blog), and (c) other parties clearly will not have them (racists, I am guessing, would be quickly forced out of the NDP and Green Parties and I assume would be told to go away in the Liberal Party as well).
The problem with this group of people and their views is not that they have them or that they vote Conservative but that having them and having them in the CPC creates problems for other voters. More exactly, it creates problems attracting other voters. I met Reformers -- and CoR members! -- who just could not understand why their anti-Francophone rhetoric stopped French Canadians from voting for them. Just another sign, I recall one person say, of the problems with French Canadians. But, more astute conservative politicians understand the problem right away. I'll go out on a limb and state this bluntly: most Canadians don't agree with bigotry, most believe in equality, and most think that the state should not tell individuals what to do with their bodies (that is, that the regulation of the body should be as limited as possible). Most, it appears, want to help Syrian refugees; most believe that climate change is a problem, and most embrace diversity. What "most" means is fluid, but you get my drift. By themselves, the core group of CPC voters is a minority (larger than we might like but smaller than that core believes), not large enough to win elections -- except in unusual circumstances -- and the views of their core supporters drive away other potential voters who just cannot accept the views of core Tories.
One lesson of the 2015 election for Tories (whether they want to learn it or not) is precisely the above: core voters can stand behind you and be energized by your campaign, say the anti-niquab, but ... well ... its not a winning formula. In fact, its a recipe for defeat.
Over the years, conservative parties have tried a range of approaches to address this problem. The old Red Tories, for instance, in Canada simply exiled the bigots (this was Stanfield's approach, at least): you might have support but you are no longer welcome in our party. This is a principled and ethical stand. Others have simply accepted the fact of their eventual demise (CoR), perhaps railing against it but not really contesting elections. Some have accepted their place on the fringe (say, Christian Heritage), because they believe a bigger principle is at stake. The approach of Reform, the CA, and then CPC, however, was different. It tried to keep these votes but silence the voters.
Now, I've overstated that point. I don't think -- to give him his due -- Preston Manning tried to silence anyone and Stockwell Day was incapable of silencing dissidents in his own party. The issue was not censorship but an effort to keep people who hold particular views quiet while disavowing their statements or chocking it up to internal debate, free speech, a "lone wolf," etc. Harper, for instance, did not impede discussion of anti-abortion laws but he simply said that the CPC under his watch would not bring forward such legislation (even if members of his party might support a private members bill ... that was their business).
Another strategy has been to try to recast particular views as good and noble and consistent with the best conceptions of freedom and democracy. Thus, Harper avoided actually talking about the fact that his campaign against the niquab was an instance of him -- as PM -- telling women what they could and could not wear. In this way, a policy aimed at limiting the rights of an incredibly small minority group was transformed into a campaign for women's freedom, an anti-Islamic stance was made to sound like "freedom of religion." Harper said that no women should be made to cover her face but the irony -- that he was involved in precisely the same activity (telling women how they should dress and threatening to make it a matter of law) -- seemed to be lost in the shuffle. Likewise, the opponents of gay marriage went to incredibly length to explain that they were not bigoted but merely "defending the family" (even though equality was not a threat and that there other important concerns -- say, daycare -- that should have been addressed if one really was concerned about the family).
The final strategy is trans-formative as well, but in a different way. It involves arguing that the issue that is being discussed is not actually the issue that is important. For example, conservative apologists tell us that they are not defending bigotry which, they assure us, they themselves oppose. But, they also reject "censorship" because it is a greater problem and so must, reluctantly they assure us, support the "rights" of bigots to campaign publicly to subvert the very rights they claim to uphold. (In fact, a few years ago we saw an odd group called "Journalists for Free Speech," or something like that, argue that if they were not allowed to stage offensive and racist public lectures on someone else's private property -- that is, on the property of a private institution, meaning that they were arguing that even private institutions should be forced to accept racist lectures; they have no free choice or ability to control themselves -- censorship was occurring!) It is an odd circular reasoning, to be sure, but the key problem is that it creates a stalking horse. It makes it seem like free speech is somehow under threat in Canada when the only threat that has really reared its head in recent years is the Conservative federal government itself.
There is a real problem, of course, with this reconstruction of bigoted views as somehow about democracy, freedom, etc. Well, likely more than one but one on which I will comment right now: what happens is that bigotry is given the veneer of respectability. Indeed, the CPC helps to create arguments that seem to make some level of intellectual sense (see my blog on the idea of a referendum) or which seem to be about higher principles, as opposed to the crass views they dress up. In this way, the CPC, may, in fact, be helping to perpetuate views that otherwise would be consigned to the margins as inconsistent with freedom and democracy. For instance, if the government came out and said "we are prejudiced against Mexicans and so are going to introduce new rules that make their entry into the country more difficult" ... well ... most Canadians would have pause. But, if we dress this up as "illegal immigration" or a "security threat" ... well, we have something else (because we all know that there is no way a Mexican got to Canada, legally, right?). After Harper began his anti-niquab campaign I heard more people who had never given a fig about women's rights -- and, to the best of my knowledge still don't -- talk as if they were defending women's rights. Ideally, of course, women's rights could be best defended by keeping "them" (aka niquab-wearing women) out, too.
To say this in different words: the CPC tries to walk a thin line. It does not want to lose votes it know it needs but it does not want the views of those voters to dominate party policy or scare off other potential voters that it also needs. This is the dilemma and the electoral implications of it. To avoid this dilemma, the party adopts a number of strategies that includes asking party members to stay silent (with, one presumes, the promise that something will be done in the future), transforming the issue from what it is into a point of principles (this is not about Islam, its about ... women's rights!), or distracting attention from the matter at hand by claiming that a greater issue is at stake (I'm not a bigot but I won't stand for censorship). The effect is twofold. First, the CPC has to deal with views that, sooner or later, come home to roost. Sooner or later, someone in the party will make manifest what it has been trying to keep silent, as Harper himself did in the last federal election. Second, the CPC becomes complicit in the perpetuation of bigotry. Its dilemma, in this way, feeds into and becomes another dilemma, but for all of Canada, and not just it.
Where the Conservatives run into problems, however, is in the loose mishmash that makes up their party. All political parties have core supporters. One becomes concerned about a party and its future only when -- or, well, seriously concerned -- you start to lose your core supporters. That is: the people who have hung in there, voted for you, put signs on their lawns, donated, come to meetings (or, perhaps protests), encouraged friends and family to turn out, etc. This core group is what carries a party through opposition or a minority position in Parliament or the legislature. One's core group is, by definition, not amenable to much change (hence, the term "core"). They are not easily swayed by the shifting winds of politics. They may or may not be a party members (my grandfather, for instance, was an on-again-off-again member of the PCs here in NB but whether or not he was officially a member, he always voted Tory) but that is less important than their votes and support.
When there is a shift in core supporters, that signals a wide change in what political scientists call "the party system." For instance, the demise of Social Credit in Alberta and the rise of the PC dynasty was such a shift ... of sorts. Likewise, the collapse of the Conservatives and, for a while, Liberals in BC (replaced by SoCred and CCF-NDP) is another example. And, a third might be the demise of the old PC party federally which, for a while, left the Liberals without any serious challenger as a national political party. Instead, the Liberals fought a series of regionalized battles against other parties (NDP and PC in the Atlantic, BQ in QC, Reform and then CA in the west). Reform and the Bloc sucked away core PC supporters in their regions of the country, forcing the demise of the PCs as a viable political alternative.
Viability, as you can tell, is a key issue. Parties and independents periodically win local elections for a variety of reasons that can include the popularity of local candidates, the temporary demise of another political party (say, CoR's brief foray into NB politics), or isolated and localized support among a relatively small core group (Quebec solidaire in QC and the Greens in PEI, NB, and BC might be examples). But, viability means something other than winning a seat or a few seats. Joe Clark and Jean Charest no doubt helped win a few seats here and their for the old PCs as they struggled on after the 1993 debacle. But, that did not make the party viable as a national alternative to the Liberals because they had lost core support in QC and the west. To be a viable political party, you need to have people who you can count on to turn out and vote for you, sign your petitions, donate money, come to events, etc., time after time after time. This is what differentiates parties that have a brief moment in the sun (Bloc populaire, Cape Breton Labour, PANB ... well, almost) from even smaller parties with a core group of supporters. Without this group, the party will disappear.
What does this have to do with the Conservatives and with bigotry? Or, even with my oblique Star Trek reference in the title of this blog? Bigotry is a dilemma for the conservatives and highlights, in fact, the problems of that party (all parties, of course, have problems). The CPC wants and needs the support of people who call themselves "social conservatives," or "traditionalists" or even "real Canadians." If it is going to win, it needs those votes. It needs the votes of people who want to ban the niquab, who want to restrict immigration, who would -- if they could -- turn back the clock on gay and lesbian equality, who want to find ways to limit women's control of their bodies, and who want to ignore environmental problems because deep down they don't really believe that there are environmental problems (its all exaggerated, etc.). Now, I hasten to add that I am not accusing anyone in the CPC or its Parliamentary caucus of holding such views. Truth is, I've not looked up all these people and likely will not since its not on point to the point I am making (and, would be incredibly time consuming). What is on point is that these people (a) don't vote Liberal or NDP or Green and (b) have found a home over the years in various conservatives parties. The old Reform Party, you will remember, had a serious problem with bigotry when it started out (Preston Manning used the metaphor of finding bugs when you turn over rocks to explain this away). They find their home there because (a) the conservatives recognize that they need these votes, (b) seem to share *some* of these views (Harper, as well know, encouraged Islamophobia through his bizarre campaign against the niquab, or at least what The Globe found bizarre -- see previous blog), and (c) other parties clearly will not have them (racists, I am guessing, would be quickly forced out of the NDP and Green Parties and I assume would be told to go away in the Liberal Party as well).
The problem with this group of people and their views is not that they have them or that they vote Conservative but that having them and having them in the CPC creates problems for other voters. More exactly, it creates problems attracting other voters. I met Reformers -- and CoR members! -- who just could not understand why their anti-Francophone rhetoric stopped French Canadians from voting for them. Just another sign, I recall one person say, of the problems with French Canadians. But, more astute conservative politicians understand the problem right away. I'll go out on a limb and state this bluntly: most Canadians don't agree with bigotry, most believe in equality, and most think that the state should not tell individuals what to do with their bodies (that is, that the regulation of the body should be as limited as possible). Most, it appears, want to help Syrian refugees; most believe that climate change is a problem, and most embrace diversity. What "most" means is fluid, but you get my drift. By themselves, the core group of CPC voters is a minority (larger than we might like but smaller than that core believes), not large enough to win elections -- except in unusual circumstances -- and the views of their core supporters drive away other potential voters who just cannot accept the views of core Tories.
One lesson of the 2015 election for Tories (whether they want to learn it or not) is precisely the above: core voters can stand behind you and be energized by your campaign, say the anti-niquab, but ... well ... its not a winning formula. In fact, its a recipe for defeat.
Over the years, conservative parties have tried a range of approaches to address this problem. The old Red Tories, for instance, in Canada simply exiled the bigots (this was Stanfield's approach, at least): you might have support but you are no longer welcome in our party. This is a principled and ethical stand. Others have simply accepted the fact of their eventual demise (CoR), perhaps railing against it but not really contesting elections. Some have accepted their place on the fringe (say, Christian Heritage), because they believe a bigger principle is at stake. The approach of Reform, the CA, and then CPC, however, was different. It tried to keep these votes but silence the voters.
Now, I've overstated that point. I don't think -- to give him his due -- Preston Manning tried to silence anyone and Stockwell Day was incapable of silencing dissidents in his own party. The issue was not censorship but an effort to keep people who hold particular views quiet while disavowing their statements or chocking it up to internal debate, free speech, a "lone wolf," etc. Harper, for instance, did not impede discussion of anti-abortion laws but he simply said that the CPC under his watch would not bring forward such legislation (even if members of his party might support a private members bill ... that was their business).
Another strategy has been to try to recast particular views as good and noble and consistent with the best conceptions of freedom and democracy. Thus, Harper avoided actually talking about the fact that his campaign against the niquab was an instance of him -- as PM -- telling women what they could and could not wear. In this way, a policy aimed at limiting the rights of an incredibly small minority group was transformed into a campaign for women's freedom, an anti-Islamic stance was made to sound like "freedom of religion." Harper said that no women should be made to cover her face but the irony -- that he was involved in precisely the same activity (telling women how they should dress and threatening to make it a matter of law) -- seemed to be lost in the shuffle. Likewise, the opponents of gay marriage went to incredibly length to explain that they were not bigoted but merely "defending the family" (even though equality was not a threat and that there other important concerns -- say, daycare -- that should have been addressed if one really was concerned about the family).
The final strategy is trans-formative as well, but in a different way. It involves arguing that the issue that is being discussed is not actually the issue that is important. For example, conservative apologists tell us that they are not defending bigotry which, they assure us, they themselves oppose. But, they also reject "censorship" because it is a greater problem and so must, reluctantly they assure us, support the "rights" of bigots to campaign publicly to subvert the very rights they claim to uphold. (In fact, a few years ago we saw an odd group called "Journalists for Free Speech," or something like that, argue that if they were not allowed to stage offensive and racist public lectures on someone else's private property -- that is, on the property of a private institution, meaning that they were arguing that even private institutions should be forced to accept racist lectures; they have no free choice or ability to control themselves -- censorship was occurring!) It is an odd circular reasoning, to be sure, but the key problem is that it creates a stalking horse. It makes it seem like free speech is somehow under threat in Canada when the only threat that has really reared its head in recent years is the Conservative federal government itself.
There is a real problem, of course, with this reconstruction of bigoted views as somehow about democracy, freedom, etc. Well, likely more than one but one on which I will comment right now: what happens is that bigotry is given the veneer of respectability. Indeed, the CPC helps to create arguments that seem to make some level of intellectual sense (see my blog on the idea of a referendum) or which seem to be about higher principles, as opposed to the crass views they dress up. In this way, the CPC, may, in fact, be helping to perpetuate views that otherwise would be consigned to the margins as inconsistent with freedom and democracy. For instance, if the government came out and said "we are prejudiced against Mexicans and so are going to introduce new rules that make their entry into the country more difficult" ... well ... most Canadians would have pause. But, if we dress this up as "illegal immigration" or a "security threat" ... well, we have something else (because we all know that there is no way a Mexican got to Canada, legally, right?). After Harper began his anti-niquab campaign I heard more people who had never given a fig about women's rights -- and, to the best of my knowledge still don't -- talk as if they were defending women's rights. Ideally, of course, women's rights could be best defended by keeping "them" (aka niquab-wearing women) out, too.
To say this in different words: the CPC tries to walk a thin line. It does not want to lose votes it know it needs but it does not want the views of those voters to dominate party policy or scare off other potential voters that it also needs. This is the dilemma and the electoral implications of it. To avoid this dilemma, the party adopts a number of strategies that includes asking party members to stay silent (with, one presumes, the promise that something will be done in the future), transforming the issue from what it is into a point of principles (this is not about Islam, its about ... women's rights!), or distracting attention from the matter at hand by claiming that a greater issue is at stake (I'm not a bigot but I won't stand for censorship). The effect is twofold. First, the CPC has to deal with views that, sooner or later, come home to roost. Sooner or later, someone in the party will make manifest what it has been trying to keep silent, as Harper himself did in the last federal election. Second, the CPC becomes complicit in the perpetuation of bigotry. Its dilemma, in this way, feeds into and becomes another dilemma, but for all of Canada, and not just it.
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
Liberals, NDP and the Polls
Would joint Liberal/NDP candidates defeat the federal Conservatives if an election were held today? Or, more pointedly and more importantly, in three or four years time? This is the question pundits are now asking. The long and the short of it is that we don't know. Comparisons with the earlier CA/PC merger suggest not while raw numbers suggest that, in fact, they would. According to the Globe's reporting of an Angus Reid poll close to 50% of Canadians who are decided voters and likely to vote, would vote for an NDP/Liberal joint candidate if they had the option while the Globe is right to point out that the PC/CA merger into the Conservatives Party of Canada did not bring with it everyone who had voted PC or CA. In other words, the total CPC vote was less than the two parties received separately in the previous election. Two plus two, in other words, ended up not equally four.
This is an interesting academic puzzle and makes some fun as a discussion point. It is likely, however, no more than that because it treats political parties and ideologies in too broad and vague a way. I've complained about this before but I'll say it again: political parties are not like clothes that one puts on because on happens to like their look. There were significant ideological differences between the PCs and the CA; that is why they were two separate parties. They were not distinct political entities because their leaders disliked each other or because one or the other set of insiders clung to the nattered belief that they could win without the other. They were different and distinct from each other because they were different from each other. Their hard core supporters believed different things, thought about Canada in different ways, self-identified differently, and had different political heritages.
This is the problem with reporting political ideologies in broad strokes "centre-left" or "centre-right." It fails to capture the nuances of different ideological perspectives and different conceptions of the future of Canada, indeed, even different conceptions of Canada's past. To those who are outside of a particular ideology (or, political perspective), the views of others look like variations on a theme. If one is not particularly well informed about politics, then they differences can look very much less like differences. After all … right wing parties believe right wing party like things … do they not? If you want to understand the difference between the CA and the PCs read Bercusson and Cooper, Deconfederation and compare it to Grant's Lament for a Nation.
These are dramatically different ways of thinking about Canada and its future, the nature of the economy, the place of morality in politics, the role of the state. This is what makes Harper's ability to forge an alliance between the PCs and the CA an event of historic importance. He did not bring together like minded people. Any dimwit can do that. He brought together people who saw eye-to-eye on some things but not on others. He built, in other words, a new historic bloc that was neither CA nor PC. He drew on provincial conservative parties and ideologues. In the process, he lost some PCs (Danny Williams anyone) but attracted others (Bernard Lord). He marginalized some old Reformers but drew in others and brought in new people who were neither Reform, CA, or PC. He did not just simply ask for compromise (in the manner of Mulroney) but -- along with many others -- forged a new political movement whose goal was to do more than win an election, whose goal was to refashion Canada (drawing heavily on the Republican election handbook in the process).
The NDP/Lliberals face the same types of issues. The truth of the matter is that the NDP and the Liberals are not and should not be the same political party. They are different because one (the NDP) is a socialist political party that, theoretically at least, aims -- like the CPC -- to build a different type of country. The other (Liberals) are civic nationalists who, in fact, built the country Harper and his crew are trying to dismantle. Civic nationalists have had a significant influence on Canadian socialists (and, oddly, on Conservatives as well) but they hold different views (civic nationalists are, for instance, capitalists who look askance at ethno-linguistic nationalists). Socialists, theoretically at least, want to replace capitalism with something else and are willing to discuss the merits of ethno-linguistic nationalism if it represents an oppressed people.
What pushed the CA and PCs together was like mindedness. Indeed, as the numbers show, a lot of PCs stayed away from the new CPC (a number joining the Liberals and some dropping out of politics all together). Instead, what contributed to the merger and its eventual success were two things. First, the spectre of electoral destruction. It is hard to remember this but the pre-sponsorship scandal Liberals looked like they were poised (under Martin) for a victory of historic (Mulroneyesque) proportions. the PCs, in particular, were faced the possibility of being finally wiped out. The CA was going to be rolled back to a rural rump with extremist views. It was only in the face of this type of massive defeat that merger was seriously considered, that the PCs and the CA were willing to put some water with their wine and modify their ideological positions. Second, times changed. The PCs no longer represented what we can think of as a broad ideology. Toryism had long been in opposition in Canada but it represented the views of a significant minority of Canadians, perhaps 25% perhaps 30%. By the early 2000s, this was no longer the case. The number of committed Tories -- people committed to Toryism as a way of seeing the country -- had shrunk to perhaps 10-15%. And, new ideological perspectives (neo-conservatism) that had only a loose connection to Toryism had popped up.
For the Liberals and the NDP, the question is do these same circumstances apply. One reason that I'd suggest that a Liberal/NDP merger might be successful is that the ideological perspectives represented by each of these parties have changed. Their opposition to Harperesque neo-conservatism does not make them mirror reflections of each other (the centre-left is a big, big, big political space occupied by the Greens and the Bloc as well). But, the old battles of Trudeauvian liberalism are no longer battles and Canadian socialism, as I've pointed out before, is not really socialism. It's sort of a vague progressive reformism. What this means is that there is an opening for some type of electoral cooperation in the sense that what divided the parties in the past has been, in part, overcome by history. We have, right now, a civic nationalist Liberal Party led (comfortably it seems) by a former socialist and socialist NDP led (perhaps slightly less comfortably) by a former Liberal civic nationalist. Both are pragmatists (unlike, say, Trudeau and Broadbent or Pearson and Douglas) who are committed to the Canada that Trudeau and company built (multiculturalism, bilingualism, charter rights, regional equalization, autonomy in foreign affairs) with some twists and turns. Moreover, the Liberals face the same question the PCs faced a decade ago: is our ideological perspective relevant any longer in the sense that Canadians are willing to commit themselves to it. I don't know for sure, but my guess is that the number of true believers is considerably less than it was. For most people civic nationalism is the background of Canada; the goal. Hence … a merger of some sort just might work.
This is an interesting academic puzzle and makes some fun as a discussion point. It is likely, however, no more than that because it treats political parties and ideologies in too broad and vague a way. I've complained about this before but I'll say it again: political parties are not like clothes that one puts on because on happens to like their look. There were significant ideological differences between the PCs and the CA; that is why they were two separate parties. They were not distinct political entities because their leaders disliked each other or because one or the other set of insiders clung to the nattered belief that they could win without the other. They were different and distinct from each other because they were different from each other. Their hard core supporters believed different things, thought about Canada in different ways, self-identified differently, and had different political heritages.
This is the problem with reporting political ideologies in broad strokes "centre-left" or "centre-right." It fails to capture the nuances of different ideological perspectives and different conceptions of the future of Canada, indeed, even different conceptions of Canada's past. To those who are outside of a particular ideology (or, political perspective), the views of others look like variations on a theme. If one is not particularly well informed about politics, then they differences can look very much less like differences. After all … right wing parties believe right wing party like things … do they not? If you want to understand the difference between the CA and the PCs read Bercusson and Cooper, Deconfederation and compare it to Grant's Lament for a Nation.
These are dramatically different ways of thinking about Canada and its future, the nature of the economy, the place of morality in politics, the role of the state. This is what makes Harper's ability to forge an alliance between the PCs and the CA an event of historic importance. He did not bring together like minded people. Any dimwit can do that. He brought together people who saw eye-to-eye on some things but not on others. He built, in other words, a new historic bloc that was neither CA nor PC. He drew on provincial conservative parties and ideologues. In the process, he lost some PCs (Danny Williams anyone) but attracted others (Bernard Lord). He marginalized some old Reformers but drew in others and brought in new people who were neither Reform, CA, or PC. He did not just simply ask for compromise (in the manner of Mulroney) but -- along with many others -- forged a new political movement whose goal was to do more than win an election, whose goal was to refashion Canada (drawing heavily on the Republican election handbook in the process).
The NDP/Lliberals face the same types of issues. The truth of the matter is that the NDP and the Liberals are not and should not be the same political party. They are different because one (the NDP) is a socialist political party that, theoretically at least, aims -- like the CPC -- to build a different type of country. The other (Liberals) are civic nationalists who, in fact, built the country Harper and his crew are trying to dismantle. Civic nationalists have had a significant influence on Canadian socialists (and, oddly, on Conservatives as well) but they hold different views (civic nationalists are, for instance, capitalists who look askance at ethno-linguistic nationalists). Socialists, theoretically at least, want to replace capitalism with something else and are willing to discuss the merits of ethno-linguistic nationalism if it represents an oppressed people.
What pushed the CA and PCs together was like mindedness. Indeed, as the numbers show, a lot of PCs stayed away from the new CPC (a number joining the Liberals and some dropping out of politics all together). Instead, what contributed to the merger and its eventual success were two things. First, the spectre of electoral destruction. It is hard to remember this but the pre-sponsorship scandal Liberals looked like they were poised (under Martin) for a victory of historic (Mulroneyesque) proportions. the PCs, in particular, were faced the possibility of being finally wiped out. The CA was going to be rolled back to a rural rump with extremist views. It was only in the face of this type of massive defeat that merger was seriously considered, that the PCs and the CA were willing to put some water with their wine and modify their ideological positions. Second, times changed. The PCs no longer represented what we can think of as a broad ideology. Toryism had long been in opposition in Canada but it represented the views of a significant minority of Canadians, perhaps 25% perhaps 30%. By the early 2000s, this was no longer the case. The number of committed Tories -- people committed to Toryism as a way of seeing the country -- had shrunk to perhaps 10-15%. And, new ideological perspectives (neo-conservatism) that had only a loose connection to Toryism had popped up.
For the Liberals and the NDP, the question is do these same circumstances apply. One reason that I'd suggest that a Liberal/NDP merger might be successful is that the ideological perspectives represented by each of these parties have changed. Their opposition to Harperesque neo-conservatism does not make them mirror reflections of each other (the centre-left is a big, big, big political space occupied by the Greens and the Bloc as well). But, the old battles of Trudeauvian liberalism are no longer battles and Canadian socialism, as I've pointed out before, is not really socialism. It's sort of a vague progressive reformism. What this means is that there is an opening for some type of electoral cooperation in the sense that what divided the parties in the past has been, in part, overcome by history. We have, right now, a civic nationalist Liberal Party led (comfortably it seems) by a former socialist and socialist NDP led (perhaps slightly less comfortably) by a former Liberal civic nationalist. Both are pragmatists (unlike, say, Trudeau and Broadbent or Pearson and Douglas) who are committed to the Canada that Trudeau and company built (multiculturalism, bilingualism, charter rights, regional equalization, autonomy in foreign affairs) with some twists and turns. Moreover, the Liberals face the same question the PCs faced a decade ago: is our ideological perspective relevant any longer in the sense that Canadians are willing to commit themselves to it. I don't know for sure, but my guess is that the number of true believers is considerably less than it was. For most people civic nationalism is the background of Canada; the goal. Hence … a merger of some sort just might work.
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Corruption and Politics
Corruption and Politics
So, the Conservatives are involved in an election scandal. For a great many Canadians, this is hardly shocking. Canadians, we know, are amazingly skeptical about their political leaders and believe they are all corrupt. I’ve argued against this position in this blog on at least a couple of occasions. I doubt, too, that Conservative electoral shenanigans will come as any surprise to Liberals, New Democrats, or Bloquistes because they are predisposed to believe that there must be some reason – other than themselves – that the Conservatives won the last federal election and they lost.
Even more seasoned observers are likely far from surprised. The Conservatives had been playing fast and loose with the Elections Act – and likely violating it – in the past. The fact that they appear to have stepped over the line in a serious way this time, was just one more step in their no holds barred approach to winning elections (about which I’ve also blogged in the past).
For me, this corruption raises a different issue and one that I have only really begun to consider. I’ve argued that people vote for specific political parties (and support those parties) because, generally, they agree with what the party stands for: its vision of Canada. I know that people don’t always vote for a specific party out of a commitment to it, but perhaps 95% of those Canadians who vote do.
For me, what this latest scandal indicates is that I might need to take corruption more seriously as an aspect of political life in Canada. I will confess that I don’t want to. I’d like to treat Canadian public life with a high degree of dignity and, I suppose by disposition, I prefer to treat it philosophically: to discuss visions and platforms and policies. Sure, I argued, there was corruption but it was not grave and it did not – expecting significant scandals – play a role in the historical processes that define Canada. Heck, corruption is just not the kind of things I can work in easily to a lecture on a Conservative historic bloc or civic nationalism.
Was I wrong? So, where does electoral corruption fit into this discussion? I have no hard and fast ideas but it appears that I need to take corruption more seriously. The Tory historic bloc, for instance, is being created, in part, on the back of the First Past the Post electoral system (single member plurality) that transforms pluralities into majorities. This same system upheld the long Liberal/civic nationalist government and the class, social, and economic forces it represented. It is hardly surprising that Conservative supporters, looking to build their own historic bloc, would abandon the democracy promoted by the Reform Party back in the 1980s as ineffective in so doing. After all, the neo-liberal economic policies and social conservatism represented by the Conservative Party are not about democracy. They are about specific policies (tough on crime, opposition to women’s rights, retrenchment of the welfare state), whether these are democratic or not. Canadian historic blocs, then, are built gratis the First Past the Post system that alleviates the need to win majority support.
The Conservatives, it seems, have taken this built in systemic bias one step further. Perhaps the Liberals did before them, as well, but I have some other thoughts on that issue that I’ll get to sometime. It appears that the Conservatives decided that even with this built in bias, even with their huge electoral war chest, and even with disorganized opposition parties, that they could not win a general election or at least could not garner a majority in Parliament.
This would have left them vulnerable and likely would have derailed key elements of their vision of the country. It is unlikely that their re-militarization of Canada could have proceeded at the same pace. Their commitment to increasing incarceration would have died on the order paper. And the cuts to the welfare state that are coming down the tubes would have had to have been negotiated with political parties committed to the welfare state. In other words, the full realization of Conservative policy needed a majority and that majority was not to be found even with all the advantages the Conservatives had. In this situation, they turned to the only thing they had left: dirty tricks.
The key question here is this: is corruption an inherent element of building and sustaining an historic bloc? If you want to use more a more liberal language, a governing political coalition? If one were more leftist, one might ask the question this way: does one need corruption to build and maintain a capitalist historic bloc since this historic bloc cannot win majority (or, unconditional) support?
I have no easy answer to this question but I am starting to think that I, at least, need to take corruption more seriously. I don’t think we should fall into a “one lot is as bad as the next” or “all politicians are corrupt” type of discourse. I think what we need to do is to interrogate the rise and maintenance of governing coalitions (historic blocs) to find out what role corruption has played in them. I suspect, then, that when this interrogation is done, I might discover that corruption is an inherent element of politics in a Canada precisely because it is an effective tool to building and maintaining an historic bloc. however distasteful it might be to those of us who want to talk politics as policy and vision, we might need to look at corruption as a technology of power.
So, the Conservatives are involved in an election scandal. For a great many Canadians, this is hardly shocking. Canadians, we know, are amazingly skeptical about their political leaders and believe they are all corrupt. I’ve argued against this position in this blog on at least a couple of occasions. I doubt, too, that Conservative electoral shenanigans will come as any surprise to Liberals, New Democrats, or Bloquistes because they are predisposed to believe that there must be some reason – other than themselves – that the Conservatives won the last federal election and they lost.
Even more seasoned observers are likely far from surprised. The Conservatives had been playing fast and loose with the Elections Act – and likely violating it – in the past. The fact that they appear to have stepped over the line in a serious way this time, was just one more step in their no holds barred approach to winning elections (about which I’ve also blogged in the past).
For me, this corruption raises a different issue and one that I have only really begun to consider. I’ve argued that people vote for specific political parties (and support those parties) because, generally, they agree with what the party stands for: its vision of Canada. I know that people don’t always vote for a specific party out of a commitment to it, but perhaps 95% of those Canadians who vote do.
For me, what this latest scandal indicates is that I might need to take corruption more seriously as an aspect of political life in Canada. I will confess that I don’t want to. I’d like to treat Canadian public life with a high degree of dignity and, I suppose by disposition, I prefer to treat it philosophically: to discuss visions and platforms and policies. Sure, I argued, there was corruption but it was not grave and it did not – expecting significant scandals – play a role in the historical processes that define Canada. Heck, corruption is just not the kind of things I can work in easily to a lecture on a Conservative historic bloc or civic nationalism.
Was I wrong? So, where does electoral corruption fit into this discussion? I have no hard and fast ideas but it appears that I need to take corruption more seriously. The Tory historic bloc, for instance, is being created, in part, on the back of the First Past the Post electoral system (single member plurality) that transforms pluralities into majorities. This same system upheld the long Liberal/civic nationalist government and the class, social, and economic forces it represented. It is hardly surprising that Conservative supporters, looking to build their own historic bloc, would abandon the democracy promoted by the Reform Party back in the 1980s as ineffective in so doing. After all, the neo-liberal economic policies and social conservatism represented by the Conservative Party are not about democracy. They are about specific policies (tough on crime, opposition to women’s rights, retrenchment of the welfare state), whether these are democratic or not. Canadian historic blocs, then, are built gratis the First Past the Post system that alleviates the need to win majority support.
The Conservatives, it seems, have taken this built in systemic bias one step further. Perhaps the Liberals did before them, as well, but I have some other thoughts on that issue that I’ll get to sometime. It appears that the Conservatives decided that even with this built in bias, even with their huge electoral war chest, and even with disorganized opposition parties, that they could not win a general election or at least could not garner a majority in Parliament.
This would have left them vulnerable and likely would have derailed key elements of their vision of the country. It is unlikely that their re-militarization of Canada could have proceeded at the same pace. Their commitment to increasing incarceration would have died on the order paper. And the cuts to the welfare state that are coming down the tubes would have had to have been negotiated with political parties committed to the welfare state. In other words, the full realization of Conservative policy needed a majority and that majority was not to be found even with all the advantages the Conservatives had. In this situation, they turned to the only thing they had left: dirty tricks.
The key question here is this: is corruption an inherent element of building and sustaining an historic bloc? If you want to use more a more liberal language, a governing political coalition? If one were more leftist, one might ask the question this way: does one need corruption to build and maintain a capitalist historic bloc since this historic bloc cannot win majority (or, unconditional) support?
I have no easy answer to this question but I am starting to think that I, at least, need to take corruption more seriously. I don’t think we should fall into a “one lot is as bad as the next” or “all politicians are corrupt” type of discourse. I think what we need to do is to interrogate the rise and maintenance of governing coalitions (historic blocs) to find out what role corruption has played in them. I suspect, then, that when this interrogation is done, I might discover that corruption is an inherent element of politics in a Canada precisely because it is an effective tool to building and maintaining an historic bloc. however distasteful it might be to those of us who want to talk politics as policy and vision, we might need to look at corruption as a technology of power.
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Free Speech Yet Again
Is this protected by free speech?
The story is simple: members of the Conservative party called people in one of the few remaining Liberal held ridings and told them that their MP (the respected Irwin Cotler) was stepping down. Exactly why someone would do this is not at all clear. The Conservatives in question did not deny the fact that they made the calls but argued that they were testing the ground to see where voters might fall if Cotler were not running and that their actions are protected by free speech. Are they?
The short answer is "it depends." I hate to sound like a broken record but an honest mistake is an honest mistake. If the Conservatives in question believed a sitting MP were stepping down and they were trying to assess their level of support, then calling people -- in effect campaigning before the election -- does not strike me as a problem. I do have problems with the "permanent campaign" approach to politics but if the above were the situation ... well ... there is nothing wrong with what they did.
In addition, one could argue "no harm, no foul." This is not a hard and fast legal rule but it comes pretty close under Canadian law. If there is no injury that results from an action, then there is no particular reason to be overly concerned. We (rightly) use the police and courts in incidences where there is harm. If I rob someone's home, as an example, then there is harm and hence a foul. I've deprived someone of their property. Likewise, in my line of work, plagiarism constitutes a foul: it is an effort to pretend gain an unfair advantage (among other things) over other students. In this case, one could argue along the following lines: "yes, I called people in Cotler's riding and told them he was retiring and this was inaccurate but he will someday retire and in the interim, how have I harmed him? He does not lose his job. His reputation is not damaged because my inaccuracy is easily corrected [and, it is difficult to measure reputation anyway]." This might smack of being unethical -- I would contend it is and it would raise questions in my mind about the ethics of a political party that would use this kind of argument -- but it is likely not illegal, even if it is not free speech per se.
But, if someone knowingly lies, that is another story and free speech -- as I have said before -- does not protect intentional deceit. You can easily see why. Imagine a person who wants to sell his car. This car has serious problems that make it dangerous. I come by and ask about the car and the owner says "it is in perfect condition." Now, I, as the buyer, do have some responsibility to check things out but, imagine that the car explodes as I test drive it. Here we have clear foul and deceit. Free speech will not protect that. Likewise if I slander someone, that is not protected. In other words, free speech is not the right to lie publicly about someone. Never has been; never will be.
I concede that this line is fractured in the political realm. Some of the attack adverts we saw in the last federal election were pretty close to outright lies. That is: they were not matters of disagreement on policy whereby one thought that grave problems would follow from campaign promise X or Y, but very close to lies. It is one thing, for instance, for a Conservative to believe that an NDP person might make a bad leader, which they might say publicly. This is what we would expect and it is an interpretation. It is another thing to knowingly say something that is not true, say to run an advert that says "Stephen Harper is a Devil worshipper." The one - questioning the leadership abilities of one's opponent -- is OK; the other is a knowing lie designed to deceive.
Interestingly Defence Minister Peter MacKay is using precisely this argument in threatening to sue people over criticism of his helicopter flight. He is arguing that the criticism amounts to slander and that he will avail himself of any legal means in his authority to obtain redress. I might disagree with MacKay but he is within his legal rights. (There is a complication relating to free speech in Parliament but we can leave that off so as not to unduly complicated what I am saying.)
Moreover, this is a pretty clear line. Free speech is not -- and never has been -- endangered by making slander actionable. In other words, the slippery slope argument -- if we stop people from lying free speech on other matters is in danger -- does not hold because we have a way to adjudicate the distinction between the two: their veracity and the believe of the person speaking.
This does not seem to be a case of slander, but it does seem -- based on their excuse -- that the Conservatives in question intended to lie. That lie is not protected by a Charter right anymore than a dishonest advertisement or slander is protected. On the narrow issue, then, the conclusion seems to me pretty clear: this is not a case of the right to free speech. And, we coud go further: it should not be. If it were accepted as free speech it would create untold damage because, say, consumers could no longer trust advertisers. There are, in other words, spin off negative effects to business of which we should be aware.
Even if this is not protected by Charter rights, then, is there anything that should be done about it. Cotler wanted the Speaker to intervene andI don't think that can be done, and this is what he concluded. I also think that this is not a serious issue, yet. The simple fact that it was brought to light will likely discourage others from doing this and I cannot see how it harmed Cotler. Thus, even while lying is not a protected right ... it might not be an actionable in this case.
Wednesday, November 16, 2011
A Conservative Canada
A Conservative Canada
For those of us in Canadian Studies, the electoral success of the Harper Conservatives raises important issues. The long period of Liberal domination of Canada gave us, in fact, a luxury. We were able to see and judge and unfolding national project and to teach and research that project. Moreover, because the Liberals were so successful, we could devote sustained attention to it year after year. Canada, in other words, steered a course, perhaps since before WW II and stuck, more or less, to that course. The details changed and there were, to be sure, policy shifts. The country changed (demographically, in terms of gender relations, for example) but none of these changes either fundamentally challenged or were incompatible with the Liberal vision for Canada. The success of Harper is the first real challenge to this post WW II vision (which elsewhere I have called “civic nationalism” following Michael Ignatieff). What does this challenge look like? Will it retool Canada? Will it bring in (as Harper has suggested he wants to do) a new national vision? How different will that national vision be from what preceded it. These are complex questions that cannot be addressed in a blog. Let’s take a few key issues, then, to address and see if the discussion can be extended over time (that is, in other blog entries) or through discussion/comments if you want to send them in.
First, let’s begin with the Liberal vision for Canada. A great deal has been said about this so we can just hit the highlights. This vision for Canada was never a majority vision. Instead, it represented a particular “historic bloc”: a particular alliance of social classes, groups and forces, led by a set of “organic intellectuals,” as it were, who provided the philosophical arguments driving institutional, legal, and constitutional reform. The intellectuals are well known: Pierre Trudeau would, of course, have been the most prominent. The ideas that formed the basis of the Liberal reform project are also well know. They constitute the “common sense” of Canada today for a great many Canadians: the social welfare state (particularly socialized medicine), regional economic development strategies, human rights codes and the Charter, opposition to ethnic nationalism in Quebec, formal equality under the law, equality of opportunity, multiculturalism, the Official Languages Act, the decriminalization of homosexuality and abortion, the creation of new icons of Canadian-ness (the Maple Leaf flag, for instance). To a greater or lesser extent, all these reforms were intended to rebuild Canada: to push Canada away from its British (or, dualist) heritage and construct a new type of nation that was organized around the ideal of the “just society.”
The political/economic alliance that supported these reforms is less well considered. This might be because more time is needed for historical analysis, but the Liberal ideal of Canada drew together largely middle-class federalist Quebecers, new Canadians, and middle-class English-speaking Canadians in Ontario, some parts of Western Canada, and the Maritimes. The alliance included sections of big business (particularly but not exclusively finance capital) along with advocates for gender equity. These people’s allegiance to the Liberal vision of Canada was not “false consciousness;” they recognized themselves in this vision and subscribed to a Canada committed to these ideals. Some of them are powerful ideals. For instance, equality of opportunity and the decriminalization of abortion spoke to those people who believed in equality and that the state should not be in the business of regulating women’s bodies.
A key point to note, however, is that this alliance did not include all Canadians. Sections of capital involved in resource extraction, the supporters of Quebec independence, and many small-town and rural Canadians could not identify with this vision and were, in fact, hostile to it. Those who held different visions of Canada gravitated to other political parties. The Conservatives, for example, spent a great deal of time wondering about bilingualism and multiculturalism, questioned the meaning and implications of equality, and defended older symbols of Canadian-ness. They spent most of the time after the 1960s trying to find an alternative conception of Canada that could be as encompassing as the Liberal vision but which provided an alternative to it. The PQ clearly had a different conception of the country, while supporters of the NDP argued initially for something called industrial democracy and suggested that the Liberal commitment to capitalism (however modified) compromised their fundamental commitment to justice. The nature of the Canadian political system (the first past the post system), ensure that the Liberals could translate what was in fact plurality support into a majority in the Commons.
The people who constitute the Harper Conservatives (by and large) are people who never reconciled themselves to the Liberal vision of Canada. They represented, at least initially, a different alliance of class and social forces united to a large extent only by their opposition to Liberalism. And, make not mistake, Harper and his supporters as well as the intellectuals of contemporary Conservatism see/saw Liberalism as the enemy. Who made up this coalition? A diverse lot. It includes conservative soft-nationalists in Quebec, primary resource capital, the remnants of the rural and small-town petty bourgeoisie, disaffected sections of the English-speaking working class, and the western Canadian middle class. More recently, the Conservatives have taken steps to draw in more conservative sections of immigrant communities and the suburban middle class in Ontario (with some measure of success). Like the Liberals before them, the Conservatives have benefited from a fragmented political spectrum and the FPP electoral system, translating a plurality into a Commons majority. In addition, the Conservatives have also represent a westward shift in Canadian political, intellectual, and economic power. The key intellectuals of Conservatism, for example, are based in Western Canadian universities.
What does this tell us? Well, at this point, one might say not very much. But, I’d suggest couple of things are important to note. The first thing to note is that the rise of a Conservative Canada represents not simply an electoral triumph (shrewd politicking) or the changing views of Canadians but a new “historic bloc”: a new political-economic alliance, as it were, that differs from that which sustained the Liberals is in power. Notable in this regard is the Conservatives lack of support among middle-class Quebecers, the tentative halting support they have among middle class English Canadians outside of western Canada, and concern voiced by those in the arts community as well as the advocates of equality. We need to understand a Conservative Canada, then, through the same analytic lens used to understand a Liberal Canada. We need to look at the balance of class forces, the vision it represents, and that we have entered into a different historic era, not because of an election but because of the shifting balance of class and social power in Canada. Moreover, those who do not recognize themselves in the Conservative vision of Canada need to understand that this is likely not a lacunae. They really are on the “outs.”
The other thing to recognize is that the Conservatives are interested in reforming Canada. After all … if they were not, why would they bother to run for office? The question is what form will this reform take. Will it amount to a fundamental change in Canada? Who will benefit from this change and who will not. These are questions that we need to address. In future blogs, I’ll make a first effort in this regard.
For those of us in Canadian Studies, the electoral success of the Harper Conservatives raises important issues. The long period of Liberal domination of Canada gave us, in fact, a luxury. We were able to see and judge and unfolding national project and to teach and research that project. Moreover, because the Liberals were so successful, we could devote sustained attention to it year after year. Canada, in other words, steered a course, perhaps since before WW II and stuck, more or less, to that course. The details changed and there were, to be sure, policy shifts. The country changed (demographically, in terms of gender relations, for example) but none of these changes either fundamentally challenged or were incompatible with the Liberal vision for Canada. The success of Harper is the first real challenge to this post WW II vision (which elsewhere I have called “civic nationalism” following Michael Ignatieff). What does this challenge look like? Will it retool Canada? Will it bring in (as Harper has suggested he wants to do) a new national vision? How different will that national vision be from what preceded it. These are complex questions that cannot be addressed in a blog. Let’s take a few key issues, then, to address and see if the discussion can be extended over time (that is, in other blog entries) or through discussion/comments if you want to send them in.
First, let’s begin with the Liberal vision for Canada. A great deal has been said about this so we can just hit the highlights. This vision for Canada was never a majority vision. Instead, it represented a particular “historic bloc”: a particular alliance of social classes, groups and forces, led by a set of “organic intellectuals,” as it were, who provided the philosophical arguments driving institutional, legal, and constitutional reform. The intellectuals are well known: Pierre Trudeau would, of course, have been the most prominent. The ideas that formed the basis of the Liberal reform project are also well know. They constitute the “common sense” of Canada today for a great many Canadians: the social welfare state (particularly socialized medicine), regional economic development strategies, human rights codes and the Charter, opposition to ethnic nationalism in Quebec, formal equality under the law, equality of opportunity, multiculturalism, the Official Languages Act, the decriminalization of homosexuality and abortion, the creation of new icons of Canadian-ness (the Maple Leaf flag, for instance). To a greater or lesser extent, all these reforms were intended to rebuild Canada: to push Canada away from its British (or, dualist) heritage and construct a new type of nation that was organized around the ideal of the “just society.”
The political/economic alliance that supported these reforms is less well considered. This might be because more time is needed for historical analysis, but the Liberal ideal of Canada drew together largely middle-class federalist Quebecers, new Canadians, and middle-class English-speaking Canadians in Ontario, some parts of Western Canada, and the Maritimes. The alliance included sections of big business (particularly but not exclusively finance capital) along with advocates for gender equity. These people’s allegiance to the Liberal vision of Canada was not “false consciousness;” they recognized themselves in this vision and subscribed to a Canada committed to these ideals. Some of them are powerful ideals. For instance, equality of opportunity and the decriminalization of abortion spoke to those people who believed in equality and that the state should not be in the business of regulating women’s bodies.
A key point to note, however, is that this alliance did not include all Canadians. Sections of capital involved in resource extraction, the supporters of Quebec independence, and many small-town and rural Canadians could not identify with this vision and were, in fact, hostile to it. Those who held different visions of Canada gravitated to other political parties. The Conservatives, for example, spent a great deal of time wondering about bilingualism and multiculturalism, questioned the meaning and implications of equality, and defended older symbols of Canadian-ness. They spent most of the time after the 1960s trying to find an alternative conception of Canada that could be as encompassing as the Liberal vision but which provided an alternative to it. The PQ clearly had a different conception of the country, while supporters of the NDP argued initially for something called industrial democracy and suggested that the Liberal commitment to capitalism (however modified) compromised their fundamental commitment to justice. The nature of the Canadian political system (the first past the post system), ensure that the Liberals could translate what was in fact plurality support into a majority in the Commons.
The people who constitute the Harper Conservatives (by and large) are people who never reconciled themselves to the Liberal vision of Canada. They represented, at least initially, a different alliance of class and social forces united to a large extent only by their opposition to Liberalism. And, make not mistake, Harper and his supporters as well as the intellectuals of contemporary Conservatism see/saw Liberalism as the enemy. Who made up this coalition? A diverse lot. It includes conservative soft-nationalists in Quebec, primary resource capital, the remnants of the rural and small-town petty bourgeoisie, disaffected sections of the English-speaking working class, and the western Canadian middle class. More recently, the Conservatives have taken steps to draw in more conservative sections of immigrant communities and the suburban middle class in Ontario (with some measure of success). Like the Liberals before them, the Conservatives have benefited from a fragmented political spectrum and the FPP electoral system, translating a plurality into a Commons majority. In addition, the Conservatives have also represent a westward shift in Canadian political, intellectual, and economic power. The key intellectuals of Conservatism, for example, are based in Western Canadian universities.
What does this tell us? Well, at this point, one might say not very much. But, I’d suggest couple of things are important to note. The first thing to note is that the rise of a Conservative Canada represents not simply an electoral triumph (shrewd politicking) or the changing views of Canadians but a new “historic bloc”: a new political-economic alliance, as it were, that differs from that which sustained the Liberals is in power. Notable in this regard is the Conservatives lack of support among middle-class Quebecers, the tentative halting support they have among middle class English Canadians outside of western Canada, and concern voiced by those in the arts community as well as the advocates of equality. We need to understand a Conservative Canada, then, through the same analytic lens used to understand a Liberal Canada. We need to look at the balance of class forces, the vision it represents, and that we have entered into a different historic era, not because of an election but because of the shifting balance of class and social power in Canada. Moreover, those who do not recognize themselves in the Conservative vision of Canada need to understand that this is likely not a lacunae. They really are on the “outs.”
The other thing to recognize is that the Conservatives are interested in reforming Canada. After all … if they were not, why would they bother to run for office? The question is what form will this reform take. Will it amount to a fundamental change in Canada? Who will benefit from this change and who will not. These are questions that we need to address. In future blogs, I’ll make a first effort in this regard.
Friday, January 15, 2010
Polls and Conservatism
I spend a great deal of time speculating about Canadian liberalism. This is not out of any love of it, but out of an acknowledgment of its importance to Canada, particularly Canadian historical development. I spend less time speculating about conservatism because ... well, while conservatism is there, it has simply been less influential over the last century or so. There is no doubt that conservatism was vital to Confederation and the first generation of the Dominion of Canada and some of its legacies live on, say in the unelected Senate. My general take in scattered blogs is that Canadian conservatives are not really very conservative. They are fractured, divided group, some of whom are liberals who don't like specific elements of liberalism, some are honest-to-God conservatives (we might call these "red Tories"), others are populists who drifted into the Conservative party, others are refugees from old third parties (Reform, Social Credit) or connected to new ones (Wild Rose). Others hold strong religious views and still others -- a decided minority I think -- are bigots of various sorts (whom Conservative politicians try periodically to drive out of their party).
The latest polls are getting a lot of press because they show a free fall for the Conservative party. Various pundits have been quick to lay the blame at the feet of Stephen Harper with his odd penchant for proroguing Parliament; the dug and run, shoot the messenger on horrific news from Afghanistan, and the slower than hoped for recovery of the Canadian economy. Harper clearly deserves some of this blame. I personally think his government should be criticized for other reasons as well. But, we might ask: does this decline in the polls suggest that these events are having an effect on Canadian voting intentions? And, what does it matter?
One strategy to defeat a party in power is build up a bunch of different criticisms of it. This has been the strategy that the Liberals (and BQ and NDP) have taken with the CPC. We might call it the "death by a thousand cuts" approach to political transition. Go after everything, hold hearings to try to find more bad stuff lurking in closets, and grab every piece of potentially bad news in order to build up a long list of problems. The idea here seems to be that one of two things will happen. An increasing number of Canadians will conclude that this government is no good because it has done so many things wrong and vote for one of the opposition parties. Or, an increasing number of Canadians will conclude that this government is no good because one issue or another will appeal to them. It need not be the same issue for different people. If you can get some people upset at the treatment of POWs in Afghanistan and some people upset at economic management, and some people upset at anti-democratic practices then, together, you have a whole bunch of people upset.
Public commentators -- pundits -- often miss this strategy because they are so myopic. They focus on one issue at a time, rather than their cumulative effect. What is important to note here, however, is that for opposition parties, this is a long-run strategy, at least in terms of the way politics is practiced today. The goal is not to slam dunk over Harper's head, but take a lot of shots from the perimeter and play to win the game rather than get one highlight-of-the-night basket.
These same commentators, because they miss the point of this oppositional political strategy, also misinterpret polls. They suggest that CPC problems relate to immediate issues. In part they do but not in completely. The problems with the declining popularity of the Conservative government relates, in a large measure, to the fact that Canadians are not a particularly conservative people (prudent and believing in tradition are not the same as conservative. I like to think of myself as a prudent individual, for example. I try to budget carefully, check my kids homework, etc. I also like tradition. I my workplace and at my church I often argue to keep certain practices because they are traditions, even if those practices are not particularly useful). And, those Canadians who are conservative and fractured and divided. One can be a fiscal conservative, for instance (Paul Martin was as Finance Minister!) and reject social or cultural conservativism. This makes the CPC inherently unstable and its voting base has a lack of solidity. The election of the Harper government, I'd argue, did not represent an ideological or philosophical turn on the part of Canadians. Indeed, you'll recall that Harper expressly campaigned against this idea. He quieted social and cultural conservatives in his party and argued that the election was about "good government" not "ideology."
There are conservatives voting for the CPC and they will continue to do so. But, if Harper's election owes more to the implosion of the Liberal Party and to Canadians believing his good government message, then these recent polls need to be interpreted with care. They suggest that the issue for Canadians will continue to be good government and whether or not Harper can convince Canadians that he is the person to provide it, as opposed to whether or not this or that policy will shock or win the approval of Canadians. In other words, what the recent polls indicate is that to continue to government, Harper will have to continue to behave like a moderate and not a conservative. He'll need to avoid controversial issues, stall democratic fora, appeal to Canadians pocket books (even if that might not be the right policy decision), and keep his cabinet looking young and fresh. He'll also, I imagine, continue to sanction Karl Rovesque tactics in terms of attacking other parties.
From this longer run, perspective, then, there is nothing in the polls -- and this is the point I really want to make -- that spells danger for the Harper government. Parliament is prorogued, Canadians are not convinced that he cannot provide good government, and none of the opposition parties has much in the way of traction. There is nothing to be excited about, either, however, because they indicate that the factors that might spell longer run conservative dominance of Canada -- a return to the immediately post-Confederation era? -- are not in place. The conservatives have abandoned conservative ideology and become a collection of different groups opposing liberalism from the right.
The latest polls are getting a lot of press because they show a free fall for the Conservative party. Various pundits have been quick to lay the blame at the feet of Stephen Harper with his odd penchant for proroguing Parliament; the dug and run, shoot the messenger on horrific news from Afghanistan, and the slower than hoped for recovery of the Canadian economy. Harper clearly deserves some of this blame. I personally think his government should be criticized for other reasons as well. But, we might ask: does this decline in the polls suggest that these events are having an effect on Canadian voting intentions? And, what does it matter?
One strategy to defeat a party in power is build up a bunch of different criticisms of it. This has been the strategy that the Liberals (and BQ and NDP) have taken with the CPC. We might call it the "death by a thousand cuts" approach to political transition. Go after everything, hold hearings to try to find more bad stuff lurking in closets, and grab every piece of potentially bad news in order to build up a long list of problems. The idea here seems to be that one of two things will happen. An increasing number of Canadians will conclude that this government is no good because it has done so many things wrong and vote for one of the opposition parties. Or, an increasing number of Canadians will conclude that this government is no good because one issue or another will appeal to them. It need not be the same issue for different people. If you can get some people upset at the treatment of POWs in Afghanistan and some people upset at economic management, and some people upset at anti-democratic practices then, together, you have a whole bunch of people upset.
Public commentators -- pundits -- often miss this strategy because they are so myopic. They focus on one issue at a time, rather than their cumulative effect. What is important to note here, however, is that for opposition parties, this is a long-run strategy, at least in terms of the way politics is practiced today. The goal is not to slam dunk over Harper's head, but take a lot of shots from the perimeter and play to win the game rather than get one highlight-of-the-night basket.
These same commentators, because they miss the point of this oppositional political strategy, also misinterpret polls. They suggest that CPC problems relate to immediate issues. In part they do but not in completely. The problems with the declining popularity of the Conservative government relates, in a large measure, to the fact that Canadians are not a particularly conservative people (prudent and believing in tradition are not the same as conservative. I like to think of myself as a prudent individual, for example. I try to budget carefully, check my kids homework, etc. I also like tradition. I my workplace and at my church I often argue to keep certain practices because they are traditions, even if those practices are not particularly useful). And, those Canadians who are conservative and fractured and divided. One can be a fiscal conservative, for instance (Paul Martin was as Finance Minister!) and reject social or cultural conservativism. This makes the CPC inherently unstable and its voting base has a lack of solidity. The election of the Harper government, I'd argue, did not represent an ideological or philosophical turn on the part of Canadians. Indeed, you'll recall that Harper expressly campaigned against this idea. He quieted social and cultural conservatives in his party and argued that the election was about "good government" not "ideology."
There are conservatives voting for the CPC and they will continue to do so. But, if Harper's election owes more to the implosion of the Liberal Party and to Canadians believing his good government message, then these recent polls need to be interpreted with care. They suggest that the issue for Canadians will continue to be good government and whether or not Harper can convince Canadians that he is the person to provide it, as opposed to whether or not this or that policy will shock or win the approval of Canadians. In other words, what the recent polls indicate is that to continue to government, Harper will have to continue to behave like a moderate and not a conservative. He'll need to avoid controversial issues, stall democratic fora, appeal to Canadians pocket books (even if that might not be the right policy decision), and keep his cabinet looking young and fresh. He'll also, I imagine, continue to sanction Karl Rovesque tactics in terms of attacking other parties.
From this longer run, perspective, then, there is nothing in the polls -- and this is the point I really want to make -- that spells danger for the Harper government. Parliament is prorogued, Canadians are not convinced that he cannot provide good government, and none of the opposition parties has much in the way of traction. There is nothing to be excited about, either, however, because they indicate that the factors that might spell longer run conservative dominance of Canada -- a return to the immediately post-Confederation era? -- are not in place. The conservatives have abandoned conservative ideology and become a collection of different groups opposing liberalism from the right.
Monday, June 22, 2009
Economy 101
A great deal of attention has been devoted to Ignatieff and Harper's deal, which preserves -- at least for the summer -- Harper's government and allows the Ignatieff to claim some minor victories and devote more time to party building all the while trying not to look like the Liberals are propping up the Tories. This kind of politics -- who will take the blame for an election no one wants -- is interesting as are the behind the scenes manovering. If one likes this kind of speculative Ottawa-centric political discussion (and, I'll confess that I find it interesting), then this type of national-politics-as-soap-opera is making for good viewing. Is there anything more in it? Should we, as some are doing, debate Ignatieff's sincerity? Should we, as some are doing, try to tar the Liberals with the Tory brush?
I don't know, but there is something important to note in the political manovering that has followed in the wake of economic crisis; that is: the degree to which Harper at least is committed to the very free market, small state policies that created the economic crisis in the first place. Harper, for example, is busy rationalizing the huge public debt his government has run up (as did Mulroney before him) as a short term expediency. Within a year, maybe two, he says, things will return to normal, five years down the line, Canada will again be in the black and governments can resume the policy of cutting taxes and slashing programmes.
Hmmm .... wait, hasn't anything be learnt here? After all, the Canadian debt is remarkably higher then it needs to be because of cuts to the GST that did nothing to increase spending and hence address looming economic problems and -- as I believe I have mentioned before -- how could they? A 2 cent cut on GST does nothing -- and can do nothing -- to alter consumer behavour. This about it like this. Suppose you want to buy a chocolate bar. Does the fact that that chocolate bar is now worth $1.15 instead of $1.17 change your thinking on the purchase? Does the saving of two cents convince you to buy two chocolate bars instead of one? The only thing cuts to the GST did was impoverish the fiscal capacity of the state to address economic problems when these popped up, which is exactly what happened. The cuts to the GST did nothing to help the economy but the loss revenue that the state would have had if all these small two cent purchases had been pooled would have significantly reduced the level of debt Canada is now accuring and hence lessened the amount of time needed to pay it back, perhaps but a year or longer!
Why would Harper and his government make such an elementary mistake? Why would they not want to have the capacity to address problems if they occurred? Why would they not, in other words, want to save for a rainy day, taking a prudent and cautious approach that would create options? After all, they are supposedly conservatives ... should they not love prudence, caution, and saving for a rainy day? The truth is that they don't seem to think of these things. Thus while they are willing to preach them as a recipe to address individual problems, they don't seem to think that it is good policy for the state to plan ahead wearing something other than rose-coloured glasses. What they are telling us is that as soon as they can they will reintroduce the exact same policies that helped make a mess of Canada's national finances in the first place.
Now, this is an important point and my wording here is important. I don't think Harper's government caused the national economic crisis. (Conservative friends of mine who are already saying Dexter's NDP government will hurt the economy ... same thing). The international economic crisis really is an international economic crisis. The issue is not did Harper cause it but ... how did he respond to it? Did his government put any forethought into policies? Did they adopt a cautious approach to finances that allowed the state to maintain capacity to address a problem if one popped up? Problems simply occur. That is the nature of life. The issue is not that they occur but that we learn from that occurence so we don't make the same mistakees again.
Unfortunately, this is where Harper and his government have fallen down. They don't seem to have learnt anything. If I made a set of assumptions that turned out to be wrong and those assumptions cost me a whole pile of money, I'd reconsider my assumptions. Harper and his government have not. And, for that reason alone, they are a dangerous national government. I don't know about you, but I want a government that is not so wedded to ideology that it refuses to consider lessons it can learn along the way.
I don't know, but there is something important to note in the political manovering that has followed in the wake of economic crisis; that is: the degree to which Harper at least is committed to the very free market, small state policies that created the economic crisis in the first place. Harper, for example, is busy rationalizing the huge public debt his government has run up (as did Mulroney before him) as a short term expediency. Within a year, maybe two, he says, things will return to normal, five years down the line, Canada will again be in the black and governments can resume the policy of cutting taxes and slashing programmes.
Hmmm .... wait, hasn't anything be learnt here? After all, the Canadian debt is remarkably higher then it needs to be because of cuts to the GST that did nothing to increase spending and hence address looming economic problems and -- as I believe I have mentioned before -- how could they? A 2 cent cut on GST does nothing -- and can do nothing -- to alter consumer behavour. This about it like this. Suppose you want to buy a chocolate bar. Does the fact that that chocolate bar is now worth $1.15 instead of $1.17 change your thinking on the purchase? Does the saving of two cents convince you to buy two chocolate bars instead of one? The only thing cuts to the GST did was impoverish the fiscal capacity of the state to address economic problems when these popped up, which is exactly what happened. The cuts to the GST did nothing to help the economy but the loss revenue that the state would have had if all these small two cent purchases had been pooled would have significantly reduced the level of debt Canada is now accuring and hence lessened the amount of time needed to pay it back, perhaps but a year or longer!
Why would Harper and his government make such an elementary mistake? Why would they not want to have the capacity to address problems if they occurred? Why would they not, in other words, want to save for a rainy day, taking a prudent and cautious approach that would create options? After all, they are supposedly conservatives ... should they not love prudence, caution, and saving for a rainy day? The truth is that they don't seem to think of these things. Thus while they are willing to preach them as a recipe to address individual problems, they don't seem to think that it is good policy for the state to plan ahead wearing something other than rose-coloured glasses. What they are telling us is that as soon as they can they will reintroduce the exact same policies that helped make a mess of Canada's national finances in the first place.
Now, this is an important point and my wording here is important. I don't think Harper's government caused the national economic crisis. (Conservative friends of mine who are already saying Dexter's NDP government will hurt the economy ... same thing). The international economic crisis really is an international economic crisis. The issue is not did Harper cause it but ... how did he respond to it? Did his government put any forethought into policies? Did they adopt a cautious approach to finances that allowed the state to maintain capacity to address a problem if one popped up? Problems simply occur. That is the nature of life. The issue is not that they occur but that we learn from that occurence so we don't make the same mistakees again.
Unfortunately, this is where Harper and his government have fallen down. They don't seem to have learnt anything. If I made a set of assumptions that turned out to be wrong and those assumptions cost me a whole pile of money, I'd reconsider my assumptions. Harper and his government have not. And, for that reason alone, they are a dangerous national government. I don't know about you, but I want a government that is not so wedded to ideology that it refuses to consider lessons it can learn along the way.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
$50 Billion Deficit but its OK, we've Got Iggy Attack Ads
The combination of Ignatieff attack ads and record setting deficits make for an on juxtaposition. On the one hand, we have a Conservative government that did not predict this recession, let alone its depth and seems ... well ... uncertain about how to proceed. On the other, in fact, it seems that the Conservatives have decided that the best way to proceed on the deficit is to go into permanent election mode and do what political parties seem to believe they are supposed to do: mystify. The new Conservative adverts, if you have not seen them, have very little to do with anything other than attempting to convince some voters that Michael Ignatieff is not a leader but a basely self-interested free rider.
I like to think of myself as not naive and so I know that politics intrudes on the actions of political parties. In that spirit, my aim here is not to criticize these blogs or express outrage about them. Instead, the important question should be: what does this tell us about Canada? What does this tell us about Canadian politics? What does this tell us about the state of Canadian conservatism?
Some time ago (and in different blogs), I wrote that two things had happened to Canadian conservatives: (1) they had lost their ideological way and were no longer conservatives but something else, and that (2) because of this, they were going to have a difficult time winning elections because they lacked an alternative vision of the country. In place of a real national project (as offered by, say, the old Progressive Conservatives or the CCF or even the Communist Party! but most particularly the Liberal Party), Conservative election strategy turned on: (1) an appeal to disparate constituencies on the basis of a thinly disguised self-interest (vote for us and we'll give you money, aka a "tax break") and (2) tearing a page out of the Rove playbook and aping the American Republican electoral strategy.
The merits of this approach is that it certainly got conservatives together (the PCs and CA might not have agreed on principles but they sure agreed they were tired of being on opposition), and in a position that they could move into at least minority status in government when the Liberal Party imploded (I would argue that the Liberals did more to drive themselves from power in then did the Conservatives, but that's a story for another day, my point being: the Conservatives did not win; the Liberals lost). Now there are merits to this, at least from a political point of view. From a policy point of view, what it creates is: (1) permanent election mode, (2) with that mode geared not on building a true national coalition but luring in just enough voters to win (in other words, the idea of establishing a "big tent" as even Mulroney tried to do is just no there), (3) and a dearth of serious policy analysis that allows for implementation -- regardless of what one thinks of them -- of effective public policies.
This is of course the problem that Bush ran into; its the problem that Paul Wells document in his study of Harper and the return of Canadian Conservatives; and its the problem that the Conservatives are running into now with this recession. The issue, to put this in too simple terms, is that the Conservatives run out of ideas. And, they run out of ideas because they are not really interested in ideas and so ... why bother to have them. After all, I'm not interested in broccoli and so I don't have any about. The Conservative response to the recession is a case in point: attack ads that try to convince someone that Ignatieff is really just a snake oil salesman combined with outright robbery of Liberal anti-recession economic policy. In other words: don't vote Liberal because: (1) they can't be trusted, and (2) we stole their ideas anyway.
I continue to lament the lost age of serious Conservatism in Canada. Not because I find attack adverts offensive. Perhaps they are; the task of this blog is to provide a different order of assessment on them. I lament it because -- even while I disagreed -- it offered an alternative vision of the future and in so doing provided Canadians with choices and choices, it seems to me, are necessary for democracy.
I like to think of myself as not naive and so I know that politics intrudes on the actions of political parties. In that spirit, my aim here is not to criticize these blogs or express outrage about them. Instead, the important question should be: what does this tell us about Canada? What does this tell us about Canadian politics? What does this tell us about the state of Canadian conservatism?
Some time ago (and in different blogs), I wrote that two things had happened to Canadian conservatives: (1) they had lost their ideological way and were no longer conservatives but something else, and that (2) because of this, they were going to have a difficult time winning elections because they lacked an alternative vision of the country. In place of a real national project (as offered by, say, the old Progressive Conservatives or the CCF or even the Communist Party! but most particularly the Liberal Party), Conservative election strategy turned on: (1) an appeal to disparate constituencies on the basis of a thinly disguised self-interest (vote for us and we'll give you money, aka a "tax break") and (2) tearing a page out of the Rove playbook and aping the American Republican electoral strategy.
The merits of this approach is that it certainly got conservatives together (the PCs and CA might not have agreed on principles but they sure agreed they were tired of being on opposition), and in a position that they could move into at least minority status in government when the Liberal Party imploded (I would argue that the Liberals did more to drive themselves from power in then did the Conservatives, but that's a story for another day, my point being: the Conservatives did not win; the Liberals lost). Now there are merits to this, at least from a political point of view. From a policy point of view, what it creates is: (1) permanent election mode, (2) with that mode geared not on building a true national coalition but luring in just enough voters to win (in other words, the idea of establishing a "big tent" as even Mulroney tried to do is just no there), (3) and a dearth of serious policy analysis that allows for implementation -- regardless of what one thinks of them -- of effective public policies.
This is of course the problem that Bush ran into; its the problem that Paul Wells document in his study of Harper and the return of Canadian Conservatives; and its the problem that the Conservatives are running into now with this recession. The issue, to put this in too simple terms, is that the Conservatives run out of ideas. And, they run out of ideas because they are not really interested in ideas and so ... why bother to have them. After all, I'm not interested in broccoli and so I don't have any about. The Conservative response to the recession is a case in point: attack ads that try to convince someone that Ignatieff is really just a snake oil salesman combined with outright robbery of Liberal anti-recession economic policy. In other words: don't vote Liberal because: (1) they can't be trusted, and (2) we stole their ideas anyway.
I continue to lament the lost age of serious Conservatism in Canada. Not because I find attack adverts offensive. Perhaps they are; the task of this blog is to provide a different order of assessment on them. I lament it because -- even while I disagreed -- it offered an alternative vision of the future and in so doing provided Canadians with choices and choices, it seems to me, are necessary for democracy.
Thursday, August 02, 2007
Saskatchewan
I am, I know, the last person "on the draw" on this one, but the government of Saskatchewan has announced its intentions to take Prime Minister Harper's government to court over what it sees as a broken election promise to exclude non-renewable natural resources reveneue from the federal equalizataion formula. This decision seems, at least in part, in response to the Prime Minister's goading of recalcitrant premiers who argued that Harper had broken election promises made to at least some "have not" provinces with regard to the way in which federal equalization grants to provinces were to be calculated. In my neck of the woods, most attention has been directed to the "Atlantic Accord" and whether or not the new equalization formula breaks with the letter or the spirit of the accord. Far more interesting, in my view, is Saskatchewan's decision to go to court. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland have followed tried and true methods of provincial protest with the federal union: calling in regional government MPs to vote against the budget, use of media, etc. The courts have, of course, been used by provinces in the past (the Clarity Bill, Patriation) and clearly these instances expressed -- in some measure and in combination with other things -- degrees of provincial protest. I could be wrong -- and someone can please correct me if I am -- but to the best of my knowledge Saskatchewan in making an innovative use of the courts. Rather than challenging federal jurisdictional authority (a traditional use of the courts), Saskatchewan is taking the Conservative government to court over what it sees as a broken promise.
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There might be some temptation to view Saskatchewan's action as political grandstanding. I have, in fact, little doubt that there is some measure of that in its government's decision. What is interesting about Saskatchewan's court challenge, however, is not the degree to which this is grandstanding, but what it might signify about electoral politics. Partisan politics to one side, one could argue that the Saskatchewan court challenge represents an effort to hold a government accountable for election promises. Canadians frequently complain about broken promises and we know that there is a great deal of popular distrust of "politicians" "out there." What the government of Saskatchewan is, in effect, saying is that a particular political party and leader made a promise in order to win an election. That promise contributed to their win and they are not bound to honour it. The promise has, in effect, the status of a law that that political party imposed on itself (as it were). If this case is successful -- and, I don't expect it to be -- it could help create a very powerful tool to force political parties and leaders to honour commitments they made in the election process. Broken promises could not be subject to legal action.
ﾠ
I hasten to add that I am not suggesting that every single promise is somehow the equivalent of a commandment. There are good reasons why a government might not honour a particular promise. For instance, I would accept a "the cupboard is bare"-type of argument as a reason to delay or revise an election promise. Opposition parties that win elections often discover that the public budget is in a lot worse shape than the former governing party let on. Because I'm no fan of Liberals, I'll use them as an example just to be fair. Dalton McGinty's Liberals in Ontario discovered that the provincial budget was in much worse shape than the former government had let on when they assumed power. In effect, their promises were based on someone else's deception and I don't think a party or a leader can be held accountable for someone else's deception. I know all new governing parties tend to claim the budget is in worse shape than they anticipated but the fact that some leaders might exaggerate this claim does not mean that the basic principle lacks legitimacy.
ﾠ
A political party might also discover upon assuming office that a promise they had made is not longer "on the table" because the context has change. For instance, a promise made to re-make Canadian foreign policy might need to be re-thought if the international situation changed. It seems to me that an effective and honest government would need to take the context of policy into account. A coup in another country, a new war, a natural disaster (requiring higher levels of emergency relief be directed somewhere), could all be legitimate reaons to reconsider promises. And, they are good reasons and there are undoubtedly others.
ﾠ
Finally, a new government or leader might discover that a promise they had made runs against the grain of the public good. In this case -- and while some people might not like it -- keeping the promise for the sake of keeping that promise would be tantamount to putting political good ahead of public good. In that case, the best the new government could do would be to apologize for its error, explain it, describe their new course of action and trust to Canadians as thinking and reasonable people to understand. The Harper government's slow backtrack away from any serious reconsideration of gay equality in Canada is a case in point. It is simply against Canada's national interest to promote inequality for some of its citizens. Harper would not put it in those words but my bet is that if he did, most Canadians would accept what he said.
ﾠ
What is interesting about the Saskatchewan case is that none of these possible reasons to break a promise apply. The federal treasury is not bare. In fact, it has more in it than the Conservatives thought was there. The context has not changed and it would be difficult to argue that honouring this election promise to Saskatchewan was somehow destructive of the public interest. I can understand why Harper's government does not want to honour this promise. They are afraid (as Paul Martin's government discovered) of a provincial run on federal resources: if we meet Saskatchewan's demands ... what about Ontario's? BC's? etc. Yet, this is a "might be" rationale. In effect, this rationale states: we will not keep our promise to you because someone else might ask for something else. It is shaky logic.
ﾠ
The final argument that can be used against legal sanction employed to force governments to keep election promises is the "you can always vote them out" argument. This is the standard government-in-power argument. There is something to recommend this argument but I think it falls short of the mark in a couple of respects. First elections are not fought on single issues. The approach taken by the government of Saskatchewan provides a means to address a single issue. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the "you can always vote them out" argument deploys an after the fact logic. Using the Saskatchewan case as an example, one could argue that Conservatives made a promise and obtained the reward on the basis of a that promise. They won seats because of it (or, at least let's assume this for the sake of argument). Having already obtained their reward on the basis of a particular promise, voting someone out of office several years down the road after they have already benefitted from a broken promise does not seem right. Governments must be accountable. Retrospective accountability can be useful but it also has its drawbacks.
ﾠ
Consider the issue of a contract by way of comparison. If I promised to mow someone's lawn for $10.00 and they pay me the $10.00 and I then refuse to mow their law, I'm in breach of contract. I have already benefitted from my promise. If we follow the "you can vote them out later" argument, the person I have cheated of $10.00 (owing to my broken promise) has only the recourse of not hiring me the next time their lawn needs to be mowed. Legally, they should -- and do! -- have the right to get their $10.00 back if I fail to fulfill my promise. Should voters have any less of an option?
ﾠ
Finally, it is also possible that holding governments legally accountable for promises could restore some measure of faith in "the system." Voters could know that they have recourse other than waiting for the next election which might be fought on other issues. In addition, knowing that they can be held legally accountable could stop some of the wilder promises made by parties during elections and force them to think about and speak to what they can and will actually do.
ﾠ
None of this is to say that such a measure should be flippantly used or implemented. I have tried to argue that there can be good reasons why a particular government might not be able to fulfill a promise made during an election. Public finances, considerations public good, shifting contexts, and perhaps other matters can all make it impossible for a government to fulfill a promise. In that instance, the government should still have to explain why it has not fulfilled its promise. Some form of formal proceeding might make that communication clearer. It does not mean that a government will have to act against the public good or recklessly fulfill a promise that is not longer consistent with the context in which they govern. What it could do is open up a form of dialogue between governments and citizens in which such matters are subjected to reasoned discussed and evidence. I am not, therefore, saying that any old person should launch a law suit for any old reason (such a situation would almost certainly be open, as well, to partisan abuse).
ﾠ
What I am saying is that if different tests are met (public good, financial capacity, context), I see no reason why governments should not be held to account. I am. The legal process may not be the best place to do that but, in a democracy, it is one site where it can be done. We should not dismiss he possibility of holding governments to account through this mechanism out of hand. The Saskatchewan challenge provides an opportunity to debate this issue. Collectively, we should do so.
ﾠ
There might be some temptation to view Saskatchewan's action as political grandstanding. I have, in fact, little doubt that there is some measure of that in its government's decision. What is interesting about Saskatchewan's court challenge, however, is not the degree to which this is grandstanding, but what it might signify about electoral politics. Partisan politics to one side, one could argue that the Saskatchewan court challenge represents an effort to hold a government accountable for election promises. Canadians frequently complain about broken promises and we know that there is a great deal of popular distrust of "politicians" "out there." What the government of Saskatchewan is, in effect, saying is that a particular political party and leader made a promise in order to win an election. That promise contributed to their win and they are not bound to honour it. The promise has, in effect, the status of a law that that political party imposed on itself (as it were). If this case is successful -- and, I don't expect it to be -- it could help create a very powerful tool to force political parties and leaders to honour commitments they made in the election process. Broken promises could not be subject to legal action.
ﾠ
I hasten to add that I am not suggesting that every single promise is somehow the equivalent of a commandment. There are good reasons why a government might not honour a particular promise. For instance, I would accept a "the cupboard is bare"-type of argument as a reason to delay or revise an election promise. Opposition parties that win elections often discover that the public budget is in a lot worse shape than the former governing party let on. Because I'm no fan of Liberals, I'll use them as an example just to be fair. Dalton McGinty's Liberals in Ontario discovered that the provincial budget was in much worse shape than the former government had let on when they assumed power. In effect, their promises were based on someone else's deception and I don't think a party or a leader can be held accountable for someone else's deception. I know all new governing parties tend to claim the budget is in worse shape than they anticipated but the fact that some leaders might exaggerate this claim does not mean that the basic principle lacks legitimacy.
ﾠ
A political party might also discover upon assuming office that a promise they had made is not longer "on the table" because the context has change. For instance, a promise made to re-make Canadian foreign policy might need to be re-thought if the international situation changed. It seems to me that an effective and honest government would need to take the context of policy into account. A coup in another country, a new war, a natural disaster (requiring higher levels of emergency relief be directed somewhere), could all be legitimate reaons to reconsider promises. And, they are good reasons and there are undoubtedly others.
ﾠ
Finally, a new government or leader might discover that a promise they had made runs against the grain of the public good. In this case -- and while some people might not like it -- keeping the promise for the sake of keeping that promise would be tantamount to putting political good ahead of public good. In that case, the best the new government could do would be to apologize for its error, explain it, describe their new course of action and trust to Canadians as thinking and reasonable people to understand. The Harper government's slow backtrack away from any serious reconsideration of gay equality in Canada is a case in point. It is simply against Canada's national interest to promote inequality for some of its citizens. Harper would not put it in those words but my bet is that if he did, most Canadians would accept what he said.
ﾠ
What is interesting about the Saskatchewan case is that none of these possible reasons to break a promise apply. The federal treasury is not bare. In fact, it has more in it than the Conservatives thought was there. The context has not changed and it would be difficult to argue that honouring this election promise to Saskatchewan was somehow destructive of the public interest. I can understand why Harper's government does not want to honour this promise. They are afraid (as Paul Martin's government discovered) of a provincial run on federal resources: if we meet Saskatchewan's demands ... what about Ontario's? BC's? etc. Yet, this is a "might be" rationale. In effect, this rationale states: we will not keep our promise to you because someone else might ask for something else. It is shaky logic.
ﾠ
The final argument that can be used against legal sanction employed to force governments to keep election promises is the "you can always vote them out" argument. This is the standard government-in-power argument. There is something to recommend this argument but I think it falls short of the mark in a couple of respects. First elections are not fought on single issues. The approach taken by the government of Saskatchewan provides a means to address a single issue. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the "you can always vote them out" argument deploys an after the fact logic. Using the Saskatchewan case as an example, one could argue that Conservatives made a promise and obtained the reward on the basis of a that promise. They won seats because of it (or, at least let's assume this for the sake of argument). Having already obtained their reward on the basis of a particular promise, voting someone out of office several years down the road after they have already benefitted from a broken promise does not seem right. Governments must be accountable. Retrospective accountability can be useful but it also has its drawbacks.
ﾠ
Consider the issue of a contract by way of comparison. If I promised to mow someone's lawn for $10.00 and they pay me the $10.00 and I then refuse to mow their law, I'm in breach of contract. I have already benefitted from my promise. If we follow the "you can vote them out later" argument, the person I have cheated of $10.00 (owing to my broken promise) has only the recourse of not hiring me the next time their lawn needs to be mowed. Legally, they should -- and do! -- have the right to get their $10.00 back if I fail to fulfill my promise. Should voters have any less of an option?
ﾠ
Finally, it is also possible that holding governments legally accountable for promises could restore some measure of faith in "the system." Voters could know that they have recourse other than waiting for the next election which might be fought on other issues. In addition, knowing that they can be held legally accountable could stop some of the wilder promises made by parties during elections and force them to think about and speak to what they can and will actually do.
ﾠ
None of this is to say that such a measure should be flippantly used or implemented. I have tried to argue that there can be good reasons why a particular government might not be able to fulfill a promise made during an election. Public finances, considerations public good, shifting contexts, and perhaps other matters can all make it impossible for a government to fulfill a promise. In that instance, the government should still have to explain why it has not fulfilled its promise. Some form of formal proceeding might make that communication clearer. It does not mean that a government will have to act against the public good or recklessly fulfill a promise that is not longer consistent with the context in which they govern. What it could do is open up a form of dialogue between governments and citizens in which such matters are subjected to reasoned discussed and evidence. I am not, therefore, saying that any old person should launch a law suit for any old reason (such a situation would almost certainly be open, as well, to partisan abuse).
ﾠ
What I am saying is that if different tests are met (public good, financial capacity, context), I see no reason why governments should not be held to account. I am. The legal process may not be the best place to do that but, in a democracy, it is one site where it can be done. We should not dismiss he possibility of holding governments to account through this mechanism out of hand. The Saskatchewan challenge provides an opportunity to debate this issue. Collectively, we should do so.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
The Left and Liberal Hypocrisy
ﾠLiberals get blamed for a lot these days, at least in the circles I frequent. Conservatives, of course, have never been fans of l/Liberals. That is why they are c/Conservatives in the first place. We might expect, then, conservative ideologues, thinkers, politicians, etc., to unleash a continual stream of anti-liberal vendictive. This tendency is, of course, magnified by the fact that the Conservative Party has a well-stocked war chest. They can afford to take out anti-Liberal adverts whenever they perceive a slight shift in the polls.
ﾠ
Neither is NDP vindictive particularly surprising either. What is, of course, surprising, at least a little bit is the degree to which the NDP leadership seems to have decided that their best course of action is to be the Official Opposition's self-declared Official Opposition. The NDP leadership seems to spend more time attacking the Liberals than the Conservatives. In fact, at times -- as in the last federal election when the NDP helped to bring down the Liberal government of Paul Martin -- the NDP seemed almost blindly unconcerned with the Conservative policies. An example is seeming NDP shock that a Conservative government has abandoned the federal commitment to aboriginal rights enshrined in the Kelowna Accord, environmentalist commitments indicated by the Kyoto Accord, and the semblance of a national day-care programme worked out by the Liberals. Only a leadership unconcerned with Conservatism could be shocked by what the Conservatives have done. The NDP's lack of concern seems to relate to a political tactic: displace the Liberals as the national alternative to Conservatism. It appears that the NDP perspective is that only by taking down the Liberals will they be able to mobilize opposition to Conservatism "under their banner", as it were, and have a chance of attaining power. I'm not certain this is a good strategy and here is why.
ﾠ
First, in order to fulfill its plan, the NDP has adopted a Conservative anti-Liberal discourse: "by nature Liberals are hypocrites and incompetent." This discourse works well with Conservatives because it is how they see the world. They ascribe to Liberalism a series of moral weaknesses that have opened to the door to such supposedly nasty things as gay rights, de-criminalized pot, strong anti-harassment laws, a commitment to equality of opportunity through national child care, and the like. By contrast, the NDP actually does not see support for child care and gay rights, etc., as signs of moral weakness. On all these policy areas they much closer to the Liberals than the Conservatives. Like the Liberals, the NDP supports equality for gays, national child care, equality of opportunity for women, as well as gun control, regional economic development strategies, and a host of other things. There are -- or there should be -- points of opposition between NDPers (as socialists) and Liberals (as liberals). The NDP needs to spell these out. It hasn't done that. Instead, it has justified and rationalized a Conservative discourse that only ends up strengthening Conservativism in Canada. The first big problem with the NDP's anti-Liberal rhetoric, then, is that it ends up sounding very Conservative and, as such, ends up rationalizing a Conservative perspective.
ﾠ
Going along with this, NDP anti-Liberal discourse also misses the point. Listening to it, or reading it, one would get the feeling that the Liberals were a bunch of thieves and liars, morally decrepit people who can't do anything right. Again, this is the Conservative perspective but it should not be the NDP's perspective. It should not be the NDP's perspective because it fails to engage policy. What the NDP are saying, through their discourse, is, in effect, don't vote for them because they are morally bankrupt. Vote for us because we are honest and upright. Perhaps, but what is missing from this discourse is any reference to policy. In fact, the whole discourse of "vote for us because we are honest" is politically neutral. I'm a socialist politically but I have no illusions that socialists are any more honest then anyone else. Many of my friends are Liberals and Conservatives and they are good, well-meaning, hard-working and honest people. My concerns with Conservativism do not relate to any belief on my part that Stephen Harper is somehow dishonest. I don't think he is. (I do think he is a politician, which is something I will address in a future blog.) By focusing attention, then, on honesty, the NDP's discourse actually misses a chance to differentiate itself from Liberalism on key policy issues.
ﾠ
My point is this: the NDP's on-going war against Liberalism will necessarily fail to accomplish its ends. Its ends seem to be to displace the Liberals as the national official opposition to Conservatism and, from there one assumes, to make a run at becoming a governing party. It can't work because it ends up re-inforcing Conservatism and because it misses opportunities to actually do something that would allow Canadians to understand what voting NDP actually means. By adopting a Conservative rhetoric, what the NDP does is actually help Conservatives maintain power. This is a problem for the NDP -- regardless of what goes on electorally with regard to the Liberals -- because Conservative policies are antithetical to NDP policies. By re-inforcing Conservatism, the NDP actually succeeds in making Canada into precisely the type of country they do not want it to be. Likewise, it casts support for the NDP into the politically neutral realm of honesty that actually has nothing to do with policy or with our visions of what the future might should look like. In this regard, the NDP misses a chance to actually displace the Liberals through policy differentiation.
ﾠ
I'd suggest that the NDP has to follow a different route. It is supposed to be a different type of political party. It needs to take seriously the idea that political education is a fundamental aspect of a political party's work and that education is much more then saying "vote for me." It seems to engage society and articulate a different vision of the future. It cannot content itself with talking about Liberal hypocrisy and incompetence. It has to talk about society, political-economy, and itself. If it doesn't do that ... well ... its future will end up being more of the same old third party status, the very thing the party is now trying to desperately (but in such a misdirected way) to escape.
ﾠ
Neither is NDP vindictive particularly surprising either. What is, of course, surprising, at least a little bit is the degree to which the NDP leadership seems to have decided that their best course of action is to be the Official Opposition's self-declared Official Opposition. The NDP leadership seems to spend more time attacking the Liberals than the Conservatives. In fact, at times -- as in the last federal election when the NDP helped to bring down the Liberal government of Paul Martin -- the NDP seemed almost blindly unconcerned with the Conservative policies. An example is seeming NDP shock that a Conservative government has abandoned the federal commitment to aboriginal rights enshrined in the Kelowna Accord, environmentalist commitments indicated by the Kyoto Accord, and the semblance of a national day-care programme worked out by the Liberals. Only a leadership unconcerned with Conservatism could be shocked by what the Conservatives have done. The NDP's lack of concern seems to relate to a political tactic: displace the Liberals as the national alternative to Conservatism. It appears that the NDP perspective is that only by taking down the Liberals will they be able to mobilize opposition to Conservatism "under their banner", as it were, and have a chance of attaining power. I'm not certain this is a good strategy and here is why.
ﾠ
First, in order to fulfill its plan, the NDP has adopted a Conservative anti-Liberal discourse: "by nature Liberals are hypocrites and incompetent." This discourse works well with Conservatives because it is how they see the world. They ascribe to Liberalism a series of moral weaknesses that have opened to the door to such supposedly nasty things as gay rights, de-criminalized pot, strong anti-harassment laws, a commitment to equality of opportunity through national child care, and the like. By contrast, the NDP actually does not see support for child care and gay rights, etc., as signs of moral weakness. On all these policy areas they much closer to the Liberals than the Conservatives. Like the Liberals, the NDP supports equality for gays, national child care, equality of opportunity for women, as well as gun control, regional economic development strategies, and a host of other things. There are -- or there should be -- points of opposition between NDPers (as socialists) and Liberals (as liberals). The NDP needs to spell these out. It hasn't done that. Instead, it has justified and rationalized a Conservative discourse that only ends up strengthening Conservativism in Canada. The first big problem with the NDP's anti-Liberal rhetoric, then, is that it ends up sounding very Conservative and, as such, ends up rationalizing a Conservative perspective.
ﾠ
Going along with this, NDP anti-Liberal discourse also misses the point. Listening to it, or reading it, one would get the feeling that the Liberals were a bunch of thieves and liars, morally decrepit people who can't do anything right. Again, this is the Conservative perspective but it should not be the NDP's perspective. It should not be the NDP's perspective because it fails to engage policy. What the NDP are saying, through their discourse, is, in effect, don't vote for them because they are morally bankrupt. Vote for us because we are honest and upright. Perhaps, but what is missing from this discourse is any reference to policy. In fact, the whole discourse of "vote for us because we are honest" is politically neutral. I'm a socialist politically but I have no illusions that socialists are any more honest then anyone else. Many of my friends are Liberals and Conservatives and they are good, well-meaning, hard-working and honest people. My concerns with Conservativism do not relate to any belief on my part that Stephen Harper is somehow dishonest. I don't think he is. (I do think he is a politician, which is something I will address in a future blog.) By focusing attention, then, on honesty, the NDP's discourse actually misses a chance to differentiate itself from Liberalism on key policy issues.
ﾠ
My point is this: the NDP's on-going war against Liberalism will necessarily fail to accomplish its ends. Its ends seem to be to displace the Liberals as the national official opposition to Conservatism and, from there one assumes, to make a run at becoming a governing party. It can't work because it ends up re-inforcing Conservatism and because it misses opportunities to actually do something that would allow Canadians to understand what voting NDP actually means. By adopting a Conservative rhetoric, what the NDP does is actually help Conservatives maintain power. This is a problem for the NDP -- regardless of what goes on electorally with regard to the Liberals -- because Conservative policies are antithetical to NDP policies. By re-inforcing Conservatism, the NDP actually succeeds in making Canada into precisely the type of country they do not want it to be. Likewise, it casts support for the NDP into the politically neutral realm of honesty that actually has nothing to do with policy or with our visions of what the future might should look like. In this regard, the NDP misses a chance to actually displace the Liberals through policy differentiation.
ﾠ
I'd suggest that the NDP has to follow a different route. It is supposed to be a different type of political party. It needs to take seriously the idea that political education is a fundamental aspect of a political party's work and that education is much more then saying "vote for me." It seems to engage society and articulate a different vision of the future. It cannot content itself with talking about Liberal hypocrisy and incompetence. It has to talk about society, political-economy, and itself. If it doesn't do that ... well ... its future will end up being more of the same old third party status, the very thing the party is now trying to desperately (but in such a misdirected way) to escape.
Sunday, May 20, 2007
Revenge of the Outs
There is an old novel in which named political parties have disappeared. In their place are two broad groups: the ins (who hold office) and the outs (who forever campaign against the ins but never win). In Canada, one could argue that the ins of the twentieth century were the Liberals; the outs, conservatives of various sorts. Only periodically have conservatives been able to displace Liberals. And, they have done this only when they have been able to build a coalition across ideological lines that, in effect, unites a broad section of the outs behind them.
This is what Brian Mulroney did in the 1980s. His coalition was broad, including Bay Street conservative capitalist, western populists, social conservatives dismayed at Liberal support for gender equality, the welfare state, Charter rights, etc., Quebec “soft nationalists”, and Atlantic Canadian Red Tories, among others. Mulroney’s triumph was that he got this coalition to work for nine years despite the fact that these different groups of people don’t have a great deal in common, aside from their status as outs. Red Tories had little love of the Bay Street agenda; social conservatives did not see eye to eye with Quebec nationalists. Neo-cons were almost hyper individualists who maintained an unbounded faith in “the market”; Red Tories and social conservatives distrust the market and look to intervene in it for their own reasons ... and on down the line. Mulroney’s failure was that he could not transform this coalition of outs into a cohesive body. Ultimately, fractures on Quebec nationalism, free trade, social issues (like abortion and capital punishment), the democratic agenda so near to the heart of populists, scuttled the coalition.
Why is this a failure? It is not a failure just because the conservative party lost office. The Liberal party was out of office for nine years and in those nine years their commitment to their ideals did not waver. Intellectually, they responded to Mulroney coalition and its agenda with powerful re-assertions of the philosophical precepts underlying their policy agenda. Impressive bodies of work developed that defended the welfare state, multiculturalism, Charter rights, and a “progressive” conception of Canada. Liberals returned to office armed with a cost-cutting agenda but also armed with an ideology that allowed them to defend federalism, support diversity in society, accept advances in gay rights, and deflect the worst excesses of a waning neo-conservativism. In other words, the Liberals did not just get lucky in 1993. Indeed, their own political activism helped rip apart the Mulroney coalition. They were ready to take office. They had ideas and a vision of Canada that they could take to the Canadian public. You can like these ideas or dislike them (I’m no fan, to declare my bias) but that is what got the Liberals elected.
By contrast, Mulroney and his crew could never wield their coalition of outs into a coherent counter-vision of Canada: an alternative to the Canadian liberal project of nation. What held them in office was power. Disagreements will usually be blunted by the lure of power and one’s hold on it can soften most disagreements. What was the conservatives economic vision? Put Canada on a sound financial basis? If so, they failed miserably. What was their constitutional vision? A modified two nations? If so, they failed miserably. And, we could go on down the line. What is important here is that they did not fail just because they did not get their way. They failed because they did not convince Canadians that the had a vision of a future Canada that was worth accepting. By Mulroney’s second term, discontent was so rife it was ridiculous. The real problem was that Mulroney could not even convince disparate elements of his own coalition that he had a vision into which they should buy. Western populists rejected his efforts to accommodate Quebec distinctiveness and campaigned actively against it. Red Tories rejected his conception of continental integration and fought a civil war within Canadian conservatism -- that ended only recently -- against free trade. Bay Streeters were never willing to buy into the intolerance that seemed to come with the social conservative agenda.
Why write about this? Why tell us this history? Because this is precisely the same issue that Stephen Harper confronts today. Harper has been given an unusual opportunity. The Martin/Chretien civil war within the Liberal party combined with the sponsorship scandal and the intellectual exhaustion of the Quebec independence movement open up a space for the articulation of an alternative conception of Canada. (Personally, I would like the NDP to articulate that vision and I think they will have to, but that is the subject for another blog.) There is some indication that Harper and some conservatives (particularly provincial conservatives in Quebec) are willing to do this. Without some coherent ideal of Canada, some vision into which Canadians can buy, Canadian conservatives will be little more than a collection of outs held together by power. Their different and constituent basis of support of different sectors of his coalition will collapse into hostile factions. It might take a year, it might take three months, it might take four years, but it will happen if Canadian conservatism aspires only to “good government” and a “balanced budget” (to which, of course, all political parties in Canada aspire). This is the task before Stephen Harper, conservative leaders, and conservative intellectuals in Canada: they need to transform the Conservative Party of Canada from a collection of "outs" to a party tied to a social constituency that accepted a defined conservative vision of the country.
Will they do this? I don't know because the forces rending conservatism asunder are particularly strong. Moreover, the conservatives are vulnerable on certain policy areas where they shouldn't be, such as the environment (ideologically oriented conservatives should be able to mobilize the ideal of a collective public good that transcends individualism in support of an environmental policy that does not toady to big business). We have also, already, seen a break with the Newfoundland premier that will almost certainly cost the Conservatives their federal seats in that province in he next election. The real problem, however, is what a conservative vision actually means for Canada. So far, it is not clear but Harper seem to be assembling something akin to a go-easy liberalism and that, combined with the problems the Liberal Party is currently going through might be enough to keep him in power. I doubt, however, it will be enough (in the longer run) to satisfy the members of his own party.
This is what Brian Mulroney did in the 1980s. His coalition was broad, including Bay Street conservative capitalist, western populists, social conservatives dismayed at Liberal support for gender equality, the welfare state, Charter rights, etc., Quebec “soft nationalists”, and Atlantic Canadian Red Tories, among others. Mulroney’s triumph was that he got this coalition to work for nine years despite the fact that these different groups of people don’t have a great deal in common, aside from their status as outs. Red Tories had little love of the Bay Street agenda; social conservatives did not see eye to eye with Quebec nationalists. Neo-cons were almost hyper individualists who maintained an unbounded faith in “the market”; Red Tories and social conservatives distrust the market and look to intervene in it for their own reasons ... and on down the line. Mulroney’s failure was that he could not transform this coalition of outs into a cohesive body. Ultimately, fractures on Quebec nationalism, free trade, social issues (like abortion and capital punishment), the democratic agenda so near to the heart of populists, scuttled the coalition.
Why is this a failure? It is not a failure just because the conservative party lost office. The Liberal party was out of office for nine years and in those nine years their commitment to their ideals did not waver. Intellectually, they responded to Mulroney coalition and its agenda with powerful re-assertions of the philosophical precepts underlying their policy agenda. Impressive bodies of work developed that defended the welfare state, multiculturalism, Charter rights, and a “progressive” conception of Canada. Liberals returned to office armed with a cost-cutting agenda but also armed with an ideology that allowed them to defend federalism, support diversity in society, accept advances in gay rights, and deflect the worst excesses of a waning neo-conservativism. In other words, the Liberals did not just get lucky in 1993. Indeed, their own political activism helped rip apart the Mulroney coalition. They were ready to take office. They had ideas and a vision of Canada that they could take to the Canadian public. You can like these ideas or dislike them (I’m no fan, to declare my bias) but that is what got the Liberals elected.
By contrast, Mulroney and his crew could never wield their coalition of outs into a coherent counter-vision of Canada: an alternative to the Canadian liberal project of nation. What held them in office was power. Disagreements will usually be blunted by the lure of power and one’s hold on it can soften most disagreements. What was the conservatives economic vision? Put Canada on a sound financial basis? If so, they failed miserably. What was their constitutional vision? A modified two nations? If so, they failed miserably. And, we could go on down the line. What is important here is that they did not fail just because they did not get their way. They failed because they did not convince Canadians that the had a vision of a future Canada that was worth accepting. By Mulroney’s second term, discontent was so rife it was ridiculous. The real problem was that Mulroney could not even convince disparate elements of his own coalition that he had a vision into which they should buy. Western populists rejected his efforts to accommodate Quebec distinctiveness and campaigned actively against it. Red Tories rejected his conception of continental integration and fought a civil war within Canadian conservatism -- that ended only recently -- against free trade. Bay Streeters were never willing to buy into the intolerance that seemed to come with the social conservative agenda.
Why write about this? Why tell us this history? Because this is precisely the same issue that Stephen Harper confronts today. Harper has been given an unusual opportunity. The Martin/Chretien civil war within the Liberal party combined with the sponsorship scandal and the intellectual exhaustion of the Quebec independence movement open up a space for the articulation of an alternative conception of Canada. (Personally, I would like the NDP to articulate that vision and I think they will have to, but that is the subject for another blog.) There is some indication that Harper and some conservatives (particularly provincial conservatives in Quebec) are willing to do this. Without some coherent ideal of Canada, some vision into which Canadians can buy, Canadian conservatives will be little more than a collection of outs held together by power. Their different and constituent basis of support of different sectors of his coalition will collapse into hostile factions. It might take a year, it might take three months, it might take four years, but it will happen if Canadian conservatism aspires only to “good government” and a “balanced budget” (to which, of course, all political parties in Canada aspire). This is the task before Stephen Harper, conservative leaders, and conservative intellectuals in Canada: they need to transform the Conservative Party of Canada from a collection of "outs" to a party tied to a social constituency that accepted a defined conservative vision of the country.
Will they do this? I don't know because the forces rending conservatism asunder are particularly strong. Moreover, the conservatives are vulnerable on certain policy areas where they shouldn't be, such as the environment (ideologically oriented conservatives should be able to mobilize the ideal of a collective public good that transcends individualism in support of an environmental policy that does not toady to big business). We have also, already, seen a break with the Newfoundland premier that will almost certainly cost the Conservatives their federal seats in that province in he next election. The real problem, however, is what a conservative vision actually means for Canada. So far, it is not clear but Harper seem to be assembling something akin to a go-easy liberalism and that, combined with the problems the Liberal Party is currently going through might be enough to keep him in power. I doubt, however, it will be enough (in the longer run) to satisfy the members of his own party.
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