Monday, September 04, 2023

Well ... this was predictable: More on Analytics, Boredom, and Baseball

I had set out to write post on the way analytics had made baseball boring.  And, I wanted to do that without sounding like an old timer railing against change for not other reason that he railed against change. Instead, it is boring because each team follows nearly exactly the same strategies. MLB is fighting against those strategies (expanding the bases, introducing pitch clocks and rules about pitcher disengagement). This is not because analytics failed. It is because it succeeded. Analytics worked, or at least seemed to. One could use massive amounts of data to position defenders, organize the pitching staff, and change the "launch angle" on swings to gain an edge on other teams. Tampa Bay might be the new poster child for this approach to baseball and it is hard to argue with success. The Rays are almost always in contention and almost always with a team that is among the least expensive (in terms of overall salary) in the majors. They have worked ideas such as the now outlawed shift, the starter+bulk pitcher, multiple substitutions, and pitch limits harder than just about any other team. 

The very problem is their success. Every team now has an analytics department and every team is using the same data. The result is that there is precious little variation in baseball strategy between teams. For instance, no one lets starters pitch deep into games any more. In fact, deep into games has been virtually redefined as getting through the fifth inning, the minimum number of innings a pitcher can pitch to record a win. The Jays have four starters who have been basically uninjured this year (I know Gausman has missed a couple of starts) and it is not clear any of them will get to 200 IP.  The point is not that the Jays are doing anything different or unusual. They are doing exactly what everyone else is doing. The only starter in the AL who looks like he will make it to 200 IP is Cole (as always data from Baseball Reference).  In the NL, three or four might make it. 

The addition of the universal DH has also created a a higher degree of homogeneity in baseball strategy across MLB. The absence of a DH forced NL teams in the past to adopt different strategies than AL teams (greater pinch hitting and using more small-ball, one base strategies).  I know we need to guard against nostalgia, but there were appreciable divisions of strategy between the baseball teams of my youth. Some were based on speed (KC, Oakland, the Expos, St. L). Some were based on power (Milwaukee). Some where based on platooning (the Jays, Orioles, and Tigers under Sparky). Some managers were quick hooks (Alou). Others expected their starters to work for their living (Vernon).  Said differently, when different teams played each other it was often a conflict of strategies as it was a conflict of players and teams. 

This is no longer the case. I was watching a Jays/Reds game a week or so ago and each team managed its pitching staff in exactly the same way. The only difference was that the Jays starter (Berrios) pitched 5.2 innings. The Reds (Kennedy), 5. There then followed a stream of pitchers pitching one inning (or, in the case of the Jays, the final out of the 6th).  The next game was as close to a repeat as you could get. The Jays needed to yank Richards faster than they wanted to because he was a bit off his mark, but that was it.  What minor differences there are, are a product of talent (Cleveland has to run because it lacks home run power) or taking advantage of particular situations (the Rockies were running on us because our catching is weak at throwing out runnings). Other coaches take advantage of situation but the overall strategies aren't varying. The result is that baseball fans basically know what is going to happen before it does and that does not make for a particularly exciting game, at least from a strategy perspective. 

Analytics have created two effects on the way baseball teams are organized. First, there has been an expansion of the bullpen. Most teams carry eight bullpen pitchers and five starters, taking up 13 roster spots, or half the team. Because there is almost no such thing as a complete game anymore (Lyles looks like he will lead the AL with 3; the Jays have a total of one complete game -- Bassitt -- this year), and because no one uses a reliever for more than an inning, more pitchers are needed. This leads to point two: because roster sports are needed for pitchers,  no one carries a dedicated DH any more (there are no Edgar Martinez, of Big Papi's, or Hal McRae's ... with the notable exceptions of the Dodgers but is anyone surprised Roberts is doing things differently? And, Phil as they try to get Harper into games). And, players are prized by the degree to which they can play more than one defensive position. 

For the Jays, the effect is periodically shaky outfield defence because we play infielders in the outfield (our backup or platoon outfielders are Biggio and Merrifeld, both infielders).  Throughout much of the year, our backup third basement and shortstop was Santiago Espinal, a player who was so not reliable as a short stop that the Jays traded (we really traded nothing so I am not all that concerned) for Paul DeJong.  I actually think Merrifield has done the job the Jays asked him to do this year and it has not an easy job. He makes the odd really good catch as an outfielder if he is moving forward but he has problems with balls over his head and tends -- as we would expect of an infielder -- to misjudge them. There were plays I've watched where Biggio, likewise, seemed completely miscast for the role he was asked to play. 

Is this a management issue? I'm argue that the heavy use of analytics creates this problem. Because the Jays are using up so many roster sports on pitchers, they can't carry a real back up outfielder. 

Likewise, the Jays have to suffer with Vladdy at first. I'll grant him Vladdy due. He did not come up playing first base, defence is not his primary value, and he does make some good plays. But, overall, his defence is hurting the team (it even hurt the team last year in his Gold Glove winning year, its just that all other first basement were worse).  The Jay would improve if they had even a break-even defensive first baseman and moved Vladdy F/T to DH. But, they can't because no one -- exceptions noted above -- carries an F/T DH anymore. Instead, it is used as place holder to give a player a rest. Because benches are so thin, there are just not a lot of backup players to fill in and so the DH spot is used to spell a player from fielding for a game. Or, for the same reason, to keep a player with a minor injury in the game. 

Not only does this homogenize strategies but, with regard to the Jays, it has made them a worse team. I am not saying Vladdy could be the Jays Big Papi, but I actually don't see any reason why he could't be. 

And, I have not even mentioned what "max effort" is doing to pitchers arms. 

In short, it is hard to complain about the Jays. I have and will. But, we also need to see that the problems with which the Jays grapple are inherent to this era of baseball (for instance, I know Hernandez had horrible defence. I said it. But, the response to that does not need to be to trade him, even while I think the trade worked out. Another alternative, would have been to teach him how to be an outfielder but, for whatever reason, that die not happen). 

I find myself drifting from baseball and have been trying to figure out why. This post, I guess, is in that spirit. 

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