Keystone Redux: Biden, Environmentalism, and Energy Policy

Why did Biden cancel US commitments to Keystone XL? In Canada, Jason Kenney tried to brand this as an attack on Canada that deserved the a swift and extreme response. It wasn't an attack on Canada and, as I will explain, even if there were a swift and extreme response, the chances that the decision can be overturned are slim. Why? There are a large number of reasons and these reasons are worth considering as we think about the character and nature of the Canadian response. Here are what I see as some of the key factors that weighed on Biden's mind before he took office. 

• Biden is committed to establishing better American environmental policies. There is a scientific consensus on the problems of carbon-based energy for the environment, particularly but not exclusively with regard to climate change. 
• I don't think we should see this as a shallow commitment, but if we did -- even if you argued that Biden's commitment to the environment is cynical politics -- you'd still have to ask why his made this decision. The answer is that his voters at best lukewarm to Keystone XL and at most in opposition to it. Said differently, a different government if it were behaving cynically, might talk the talk but ignore Keystone. Biden can't because his supporters won't. They want him to take action and so he will take it. 
• Taking action is made easier because the US is awash in energy. Back in the 1980s, when Canada and the US were negotiating free trade, a key goal of the American negotiators was to secure access to Canadian energy. There could be all sorts of reasons for this but the key reason is that the American government was concerned about the state of American energy reserves and with the "oil shock" and the Iranian revolution still fresh on American minds, making sure that the US had easy access to Canadian energy was particularly important. Hence, the proportionality clause which, in effect, forces Canada to sell oil to the US. How different things now are. A series of changes means that the US has less need of Canadian energy than at any time since, say, the 1980s. The factors include:  
• Green energy will continue to develop as a viable alternative to carbon energy.
• The US reversed policy under Trump and brought back older forms of carbon-based energy production (coal) that are in competition with oil.
• Other countries have pushed production of oil to new levels. Increased political stability in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Libya will likely see continued advances in production. Despite cut production cut backs by some countries in order to try to maintain higher energy prices, there will likely continue to be increases in energy supply.
• The US has increased its own supply thanks to widespread fracking in Montana, the Dakotas, and Oklahoma. 
• There are some short term measure that can be included as well. Covid-19 has depressed all sorts of travel lessening the demand for oil and thus lowering prices and need. 
• A wild card is the American commitment to cleaner energy. I don't know how significant this factor is, although I suspect it much more significant among Democrats who voted for Biden than Republicans. If American are taking steps to use less energy as part of their personal commitment to the environment, that will have an effect as well. 
• I suspect American oil companies are not sad to have less competition from Canadian oil. While the oil (bitumen) moved through Keystone may never have been for American domestic consumption (which raises another issue), why would American energy producers elect to negatively effect their own bottom lines by encouraging the US government to facilitate the shipment of Canadian oil to the US? Does it not make more sense that they would, at the least, say nothing and at most actually encourage Keystone's cancelation? 
• There are shockingly limited spinoff effects in the US for Keystone. The jobs that were to be created by it were largely in construction. Once the pipeline is up and running, the number of permanent jobs it creates in the US is limited. There is, thus, no groundswell of "Keystone will get us jobs" in the US because ... people know it is not true. 
• There are other issues that the Biden administration also wants to address that are tied up with Keystone, not the least of which is relate to the Standing Rock protests and the opposition of American Indigenous peoples to the pipeline. Going forward with Keystone would have forced the Biden government into on-going confrontations with Indigenous peoples and their allies and likely ended costing millions of dollars in legal fees as battles waged in the courts. 

When one puts this all together and what is evident is that Keystone was dead anyway.  It was only the Trump administration's ideological commitment that kept it alive. Canadian oil is also expensive, compared to its alternatives. The Canadian oil patch had begun to experience series problems several years ago that date back to the time of the previous NDP government in Alberta and stand at the root of Alberta's pipeline conflicts with BC and Canadian First Nations. What is interesting, of course, is that Kenney's response to the concerns in BC were basically similar to what he is suggesting now.  BC, the UPC and even members of the NDP argued, should be forced to let Alberta transport oil over its territory. Now what we have is the Premier of Alberta saying that Canada should find a way to force the US to accept Canadian oil that it does not want, does not need, creates internal conflicts in the US, and stands in the way of other domestic policy initiatives. What would we, as Canadians, think if the US adopted this approach to Canada? 

This is the point where I say "I get it" and ... I do. I understand and sympathize with people wanting jobs and good jobs. The problem with the approach taken by Kenney is that it can't provide precisely the thing he is promising. The carbon economy is past its best before date. That does not mean that there will not be energy production and that Canadians won't drill for oil. What it means is that we need to think about what the next stage for the Alberta economy is and begin to work on that. Biden's rejection of Keystone XL was not an attack on Canada. It was a policy decision overdetermined by a broad range of factors and it is unlikely that that broad range of factors will change in even the medium term. Rather than trying to find a way to revive a dead project and a flagging economic sector, we need to find ways to promote alternative economies. 

Facing Enemies: BC, Alberta, and the Ethics of Moving Oil

In my last post, I argued that there were serious problems with disregarding the rule of law to build pipelines more rapidly.  I think there are other serious problems with the Kenney "turn off the taps" strategy. Let us be clear, this is a political strategy. It is just not a good one. Why? I'll get into that an another post.  What the turn of the taps strategy also does is raise a series of important issues of law and ethics that have been drastically simplified to the point where they lose their meaning and import. What are these issues?

Kenney and the UPC campaigned on a get Alberta back to work by "taking on" "our enemies." On one level, I argued in my last post, this discourse runs their government afoul of the rule of law and that is not a place that anyone should want to be. Whatever the failings of the rule of law in Canada -- and there have been more than a few -- what are the alternatives to it? But rhetoric is not reality and political strategy is precisely that. There are, to be sure, true believers among the UPC who view the courts in much the same way as Tea Party Republicans in the US: as so much political BS. But, there are others who don't and who recognize the problems of trying to use politics to influence the courts. They have, however, gambled that as political strategy this might work and so even while they are not true believers, they go along for the ride.

The same thing with turning off the taps (or artificially inducing an energy crisis in BC). This is a piece of rhetoric designed to get BC to reconsider its opposition to a pipeline that the government of Alberta says it needs. Yes, I expected Kenney to move quickly on this. I suspect he will try to force the issue because he wants to (a) confirm his position, (b) because he is a true believer, and (c) because this is the most effective way to ratchet up the heat, as it were, while actually not ratcheting up the heat. Right now, with summer coming on, the need for oil for things like heating is not pressing. So the political calculation is this: the Alberta government will, in effect, fire a warning shot across the bow of BC to see if they can convince the provincial government to blink.

Leaving aside, for now, the merits of this particular political strategy, let's think about the BC side of the equation. What is it that the BC government is asserting? Why? And what does the government of Alberta want?

The issue at hand is whether or not Alberta can run a pipeline across BC to see oil to Asian markets via supertankers loaded on the coast of BC. Alberta says "yes" and BC says "no." The Alberta position is that because they are a landlocked province they have something approximating a right to transport goods to market over other provinces (if need be) and that the federal government should enforce this right. To do otherwise would create an undue harm to Alberta, severely (in this case) damaging its economy, creating manifest material harm (layoffs, unpaid bills, family hardship, and the like).

This is an interesting argument and it is one that should not be lightly dismissed. The federal government has not agreed with it, but has instead taken a different approach. They are trying to get the government of BC to agree to an oil pipeline by assuring the population of BC that the pipeline can be made safe.

From the perspective of inter-provincial politics and federalism, the question is this: can the federal government force one province to accept something it does not want so that people in another province benefit? Could they, for instance, argue that a particular policy is in the national interest and so provinces may need to be forced into line.

Comparative cases are slim. The Newfoundland/Quebec Churchill Falls squabble does not fit the bill because the issue is the contract Newfoundland signed to transport hydroelectricity across Quebec to the US and whether or not that contract should have legal force (in this case, Newfoundland says "no, it should be up for renegotiation" and Quebec says "yes." So far, the balance of arguments have gone to Quebec: contracts do have legal force even if one of the signatories ends up getting the short end of the stick). Quebec is not opposed to energy moving across Quebec to the US from Churchill Falls. Here he debate is about levels of compensation so it is not the same thing. Likewise, the NS/NB squabble over natural gas moving across NB to New England was again not a case of NB rejecting the gas. NB just wanted a cut rate on NS gas as the price of seeing it moved through NB. Again, the balance of arguments there is that NB was not entitled to a cut rate (and, to tell you the truth, because NS gas is so limited, this case has become largely irrelevant now anyway).

Other instances are equally difficult to use as precedents. The case of rail transport of grain out of prairie provinces was not an issue because no one was opposed to grain and all provinces benefited from the rail links. Indeed, all provinces could agree that the feds should subsidize rail transportation.

The one potential precedent I could think of follows from rail, however. Could one argue that moving oil is just another form of transportation? After all, oil is moved by truck and rail and that has not stopped. Could one argue that a pipeline is akin to transportation by other means and, hence, can indeed be regulated by the federal government.

The problem, of course, is that oil is not just another good that is being transported.  No one had any problems with grain because grain is, frankly, not a problem. It causes no pollution. It is easy to clean up if it spills; heck, you can just leave it lying around and it causes no harm. Oil is different in a number of senses: it is polarizing (its opponents are deeply opposed to it and to the oil sands in particular); it is dangerous (there are spills and leaks all the time and explosions that can and have killed scores of people). If it gets in waterways (from tankers) it causes serious pollution for fragile ecologies.  And, it creates pollution that is harming the planet at a record pace and on this there is no scientific debate.

So, now the question is different. From the BC perspective, the issue is does one province have the right transport dangerous materials across another province in a way that enriches the first province by sticking the second province with the problem if something goes wrong? What happens if, for example, there is a serious leak in the pipeline? The first answer is "there will not be" but that does not really answer the question, does it? In fact, it denies the legitimacy of the question by making it seem like it is just silly. But, if someone were going to transport something dangerous across ... well ... my province, don't I have the right to have my questions answered before the transportation begins?

Said differently, the question is not silly because the context in which it is asked is important. It would, for instance, be silly to worry about the potential harm from grain because there is none and creating an argument that there is would require a series of unusual acts of faith; whereas, there is a great deal of evidence that transporting oil via pipelines and other mechanisms have established dangers associated with them that seem to be unavoidable. That is: problems from oil transportation are not a fantasy. They occur regularly and can be shockingly serious when they occur (witness BP in the Gulf of Mexico, the train explosion in Quebec in Canada, the Exxon Valdez).

With this in mind, our question shifts a bit, and, in fact, becomes twofold:

• Is it reasonable to be concerned about the transport of potentially dangerous materials across a given territory? 
• Does the government of that territory have the right to take action to protect its environment and people? 

I am going to say yes to the first one and that is easy. In fact, we might wonder about someone who was not concerned. I suspect, even those people who say "it is safe" demonstrate their concern in some way.  For example, they would be upset if someone were moving something potentially dangerous across their kids' school ground or baseball field. 

To answer the second question, imagine a different situation. Imagine your neighbour wanted to move something across your lawn to sell to the neighbour on the other side. "Its cool," she tells you, but you have doubts. There have been problems with the transport of these goods in the past. If it gets lose it is harmful to the environment, dangerous to wildlife, really really expensive to clean up, and the taxpayers (aka, you) often have to foot at least part of the bill because the settling of accounts can take years and years and end up in the courts. Your neighbour's guarantee -- "there will be no problems" -- seems to ring a hollow because it is not at all clear that this is a fair trade. In fact, it is not clear that this is a trade at all. You seem to be bearing the risk for your neighbour's profit. Your neighbour assures you its safe and says she will help if a problem occurs, but what if she doesn't? What is she sells her house (metaphor: there is an election) and the new neighbour decides they don't want to help and don't feel they have to. In fact, your current neighbour has already shows a bit of disregard for the law (see previous post) ... so, what happens even if they are found legally responsible and just disregard what you have to say and the damage to your property? What happens if you disagree on the amount of damage to your property and she (or some future occupant of the house) low ball you? 

The point is that, even if you want to help your neighbour, there are a lot of unanswered questions and your neighbour has been quick with guarantees but slow on details.  Then another problem occurs. The town bylaw officer (yes, we have one of those in Sackville) shows up and tells you that your town has a law regulating the transport of dangerous goods and your neighbour has not completed the required assessment to ensure that the transport of her good is safe. The bylaw officer does not know whether it is safe to move this good or not. That is, he says, not his job. What he knows is that there is a list of things that need to be done before the good can be moved and your neighbour has not completed that list. 

In that situation ... who is right? Are you wrong to not only start to ask questions, but to say something like "heck, this is my property. You don't have a right to move potentially dangerous goods across it. We need to stop and think about this?" Now, after you do this, your neighbour has a fit.  She starts talking about taking revenge on you, calling you an "enemy," threatening you with harm. Is this going to win you over? Your neighbour thinks so but ... well ... let me as you folks? Would your concerns suddenly disappear because you asked reasonable questions and your neighbour started insulting and threatening you?  I would go in the opposite direction. If someone responded irrationally and aggressively to my reasonable questions, I'd start to wonder what they were up to. 

This is the issue we face in Canada and with regard to Alberta/BC relations. Does BC have the right to regulate the transportation of potentially dangerous goods across its territory? Provinces certainly already regulate the transport of goods so this is not a new power BC is claiming. The weigh scales you see by the side of the road for big trucks is an example and there are a host of other regulations as well. We could go one step further: does the state not have a responsibility to ensure the security of the person? There is not, in Canada, a constitutional protection for the environment. We can debate the merits of that another day but the fact is that this would be something new and would be a real stretch to argue that it is somehow implied under the analogous grounds principle. Security of the person, by contrast, is guaranteed (you can find it in Section 7 of the Charter). And, even if the province of BC does not have a constitutional obligation to protect the environment, they have the constitutional right to do so if they so choose. IOW, under the division of powers in Canadian federalism, provinces can regulate land within the province. 

This is complicated, to be sure, by federal jurisdiction over inter-provincial commerce but that complication does not, as far as I can tell, amount to a trump card.  Under Canadian federalism, federal jurisdiction is not superior to provincial jurisdictions. Both levels of government are sovereign in their own areas. 

Personally, I think it would be a mess of a court case if it actually went to court. But, my goal is not to look at that. It is to state the following: 

• The government of BC is doing nothing wrong in attempting to regulate land and its use within BC
• The government of BC's concerns are legitimate and should be answered. Playing power politics merely makes it seem like the UCP is trying to pass over the issue without addressing it; that is: that there is something they are hiding. 

The Bones of Conservatism

Before picking over the bones of the Alberta PC Party, we might pause to think about what this election means from a broader perspective. The easy issue is the demise of the PC dynasty ... but that is the easy issue and it was going to happen, one way or the other, sometime because the PCs have been on shakier popular ground than a lot of people realize ... for a long time. Looking at the electoral map (or, party standings) and stating that this is an "historic" vote because does not, then, tell us anything that we do not already know.  The more important question that follows from this -- how? -- might also be self-evident. What it implies, however, is worth reflecting on.

The character and nature of Alberta politics have long been a matter of scholarly interest. As everyone knows, the province has been subject to long terms of one-party rule (Liberal, United Farmers, Social Credit, PC) in which the party in power dominates the legislature and is eventually replaced by another party. Because the Social Credit ended its days as  vibrantly right-wing party and because conservatives in Canada have been drifting further to the left over the years, this is often viewed as a right wing province. This is reflected federally, as well, where the Conservatives (and before them Canadian Alliance, Reform, and PCs) dominated the province: the Liberals and NDP getting little traction outside of urban Edmonton, and even here ... not a lot (most of the time).

This political dominance gives rise to a mythology: let's call it Alberta the right. The idea here is that Alberta is somehow culturally right wing in a way that other provinces are not. On the surface, this holds up (particularly when Klein was premier and because Harper and Co are based, more or less, in the province). But, the myth disguises considerable political diversity. In other words, there is no singular Alberta political culture or ideological drift. There are a range. The myth of Alberta the right gained hold because (a) it seemed self-evident looking at the political map (and so could be easily repeated without the trouble of actually having to investigate Alberta politics), (b) it was in the interests of conservatives in the province (whether PC, or Reform, or Cons., etc.) to state that because it helped to solidify their popular base and allowed them to lay claim, as it were, the heart and soul of the province (separatists in Quebec try a similar strategy), and (c) it was in the interest of opposition parties (Liberals, NDP, etc.) because they could console themselves on their losses and explain them away. It allowed them to avoid the tough work of thinking about what Alberta politics were all about and building alternatives to conservatism in the province.

These ideological underpinnings of this myth were reinforced, at different points in history, by material and social patterns. Harry Hiller's fabulous book Second Promised Land, for example, indicates that Alberta attracted a broad range of migrants from other provinces, over time, but the myth of a right wing Alberta became a bit of a self-perpetuating myth because it could attract people who were ideologically disposed to right wing values; those who rejected unions and/or disliked diversity, for example. Further in the past, the character of Alberta's social structure -- while by no means monolithic -- served to create a broad social class linked to primary commodity production and dependent on it. This dependency was first evident in the triumph of the United Farmers, then Social Credit, and then, in modified form, the PCs. Said differently, there is nothing odd or metaphysical about Alberta political culture.  It has been subject particularly strong mythologizing discourses that build on some socio-economic foundations. But, we should not allow that to distract from a deeper consideration of Alberta politics that can clear away some of this myth.

The first thing that is important to note is that Alberta governments have been moving into the centre of the political spectrum in a halting way for some time. Lougheed -- the first Alberta PC Premier in the early 1970s -- was right wing but he represented a centre-right mirror of the federal Liberals centre-left technocracy. There were significant divisions between Lougheed PCs and Trudeau Liberals, but each drew support from the same broad pool of middle class, university educated voters. Lougheed relied on rural (former Social Credit) voters for support, too, because he had to, but he was no redneck. Lougheed's successor (Getty) was a centrist, the trajectory, however, was interrupted by Klein who was representative of North American neo-conservatism at its most vehement.  Stelmach and Redford, though, were centre right and Redford (for all her problems) was moderate on a range of issues (including  -- more or less -- making peace with unions).

Likewise, at the federal level, right-wingers have long dominated Alberta politics but there is a mate of diversity among them. Diefenbaker was a Red Tory who would hardly fit with the right wing agenda of today; Clark was a moderate centre-right Tory who supported progressive causes at different points in his career.  The Reformers were right wing, to be sure, as was the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party.

What this means, however, is this: one party (or, more exactly, one label) dominance does not mean that there everyone who fell under that label thought and acted the exactly the same way.

The second thing that is important to note is that Alberta has, traditionally, had a very low voter turnout rate. What does this mean? Likely, it means a range of things but I suspect it meant that those who were opposed to the government were not voting. In other words, what we were getting was not support for conservatism in Alberta but ... support for conservatism mixed with diversity and alienation. The voter turnout in this last election was the highest it has been (correct me if I am wrong) since 1993. I'll get back to this in a minute, but here are the voter turnout rates for the last several elections in Alberta:

 YEAR        %

 2012 54.4
 2008 40.6
 2004 44.7
 2001 52.8
 1997 52.8

What we have here is something less that a popular embrace of conservatism. What we have here, in fact, is a situation where the popular view is alienation (whatever that precisely means). The largest vote getter, in other words, in all provincial elections in Alberta since 1993 was "none of the above." It is amazingly difficult to know what "none of the above" means in practical voting terms but what we can say with some certainty is that it is something less than core conservative vote. It might be indifference; it might be apathy; it might be frustration; it might be all matter of things, but core vote ... votes.

It is interesting that in 1993, there was a (by current standards) relatively high voting turnout and the Alberta political spectrum looked ... more normal. The Liberals won almost 40% of the popular vote (of those who voted) and over 30 seats; the NDP got no seats but about 11% of the vote. The higher the voter turnout, it seems, the more diverse the political spectrum. This election, with about 60% turnout, has created the broadest political spectrum (in terms of presentation) in the Alberta legislature in a very long time, with five different parties (it appears) having won seats and three with reasonable to solid to good numbers.

What changed? My argument is that there was no sudden change in Alberta but rather a series of processes going on at the same time. These include, the fracturing of conservatism (evident in the old Reform/PC federal split after 1993) . In office, it is easy to cover over these the divisions in political parties. Once they run into problems, however, those divisions start to pop up. This is because all Canadian political parties are coalitions of one sort or another (some stronger; some weaker) that, to be successful, must appeal to diverse constituencies. (There is nothing wrong or horrible or corrupt about this.) Coalitions or voting blocks or diverse supporters (or, whatever you want to call them) will try to find common ground on which to meet for a variety of reasons and one of those reasons is to maintain power. Out of power -- or, if a party is failing or if the interests of one part of the coalition is coming to dominate versus others -- in these circumstances, maintaining solidarity in diversity is more difficult to do.

This is what happened to the PCs. The moderating centre and the rural populist right pulled away from each other.

This happened because of social changes. If, in the past, back in the days of the United Farmers and Social Credit, the social structure of Alberta created conditions favourable to one-party dominance, this is no longer the case. Edmonton and Calgary are modern large cities populated by working and middle class citizens. These are centres of research and development, HQP places, with vibrant cultural scenes. In other words, the social structure has diversified. A diversified social structure does not ipso facto make a more diversified political spectrum but it does broaden the collective range of options for which people are prepared to seriously consider voting. In other words, it does not make an NDP government but, in Alberta, it made an NDP government a possibility.

What happens next? Who knows? Those reading this blog will notice I have not talked about political leadership and that is a consideration that really does merit attention. Personally, I think it gets a bit too much press in the popular media because it is an easy thing to talk about that does not require too much careful research (although there is good work on this via Nanos). But, leadership will be a consideration for the Alberta NDP and how far and long they can go in government. They might ask their colleagues in the NS NDP about this. But,  I doubt the province is in for one-party NDP government. I suspect that the changing dynamics of its social structure, the character of urban and rural life, the issues that a resource economy needs to address in the 21st century, and other matters will ensure diversity in representation in the legislature. In other words, Alberta politics will more closely approximate those of other provinces.

The Meaning of Alberta Politics

I rarely agree with John Ibbitson. I don't think he's an idiot. Far from it; he's an intelligent commentator on public affairs. I just normally think he's wrong so this time I should note when I think he's right or at least close to the mark:

Smith learns hard lesson in Alberta: Intolerance doesn't win elections - The Globe and Mail:

Alberta politics are always fascinating for those of us who study public life in Canada. Its history of third parties, for instance, is something I mention in every intro Canadian Studies course I teach. What makes this last election really interesting is two things:

1) just how wrong the pollsters and pundits were
2) the implications of the PC victory

On both these points, Ibbitson has some words that are worth paying attention to, even if he's mocking pollsters and pundits.

Much of the public discussion in the 24 hours after the Alberta election involved pundits and pollsters asking themselves this question "how would we be so wrong?"  To a one, these people predicated a Wildrose government and very, very likely a majority (mea culpa).  The general conclusion of the pundits, however, and oddly, is this: we were not wrong. Our polls accurately reflected Alberta voting intentions. it is just that those intentions changed in the last few days of the election campaign.

The problem with this is that the polls were wrong because they did not capture the shifting sand of public life. Even if the polls were correct -- up to three days before the election (and, frankly, I seriously doubt this) -- the problem is that the polls presented a white/black image of the electorate. They did not present the ambiguities of the voters or the fact that voters in large numbers were still thinking about for whom they were going to vote.

Let me explain it this way: imagine that you ask ten people what they want for lunch.  Three say "hamburgers", two say "hot dogs" and one says "a salad". Four say "I don't know yet. I am leaning toward a hamburger but I am still thinking about it and I like the hotdogs at Bob's Diner and they do have a good salad too.  Moreover, one of those people who selected a hamburger overhears this conversation and says "you know, a hotdog or a salad does not actually sound bad. Could you hold up for a second, I might change my mind." And, at the same time, the person who picked a salad says  "you know, I like salads, but I don't want to be a pain in the butt. If I'm the only one picking salad and that makes an extra stop for you, I'll order to a hotdog."

If you were asked to report what people wanted for lunch, what would you say? Well, the pollsters came back and said "most people want hamburgers." Technically, that might be correct but it is not really correct, is it. The hamburger people had 50% of the decided menu option the first time people were asked about lunch but when people started talking about lunch, the orders quickly became messed up. The person picking salad was willing to change and one of the 50% of hamburger selectors was rethinking there choice while a number of people were still considering their options. What the pollsters and pundits did was forget about all this confusion. They assumed that the first pick people made for lunch was what they were going to stick with and that those people who had not yet decided, would decide in basically the same ratio as those who had decided.  Thus, they came and said, OK, here is what the lunch orders will be 6 hamburgers, 3 hotdogs, and a couple of salads.

But, you can see from my example that a different type of order would be easily possible, and indeed probable now that folks were talking about lunch instead of just making a decision on the spur of the moment. Instead of 6-3-2 ratio, you could just as easily get 3-6-1.

The problem, of course, is not that the pundits did not explain their methods and their reasoning. The problem is that they did not think deeply enough about what the numbers mean. I read a column that said, in effect, this: there is no way the poll numbers could have been wrong because everyone had the same numbers. Following that logic (in the words of the old Meatloaf song): "the world would still be flat." Our pollsters have good math. They can mathematically sift through data and draw correlations that are so far beyond my ability to do so that it is not funny. The problem is not that their math was bad. The problem is that they began their analysis with the wrong assumption: our math is so good, we don't need to look at this election from other directions. We don't need to think about the complexities, the details, the way in which thinking can change people's minds, the way in which a fairly intense public discussion can lead people to say "you know what ... I changed my mind. I'm not 100% certain but I am thinking about voting differently then  I was last week."

One thing we need to learn about punditry, then, is that you need to take that extra step.