Reconfiguring Progressive Politics Part I: Something Other than Socialism

In Reds, Rebels, Radicals, Ian McKay argues that there are a variety of ways to be a leftist in Canada. Leftism is less a specific and unchanging set of doctrines than an historically evolving political philosophy that moves to address different issues at different times as these gain importance because of changed circumstances. This much, one supposes, might be said about all political movements but McKay's point is a useful reminder because of the tendency in the media to treat the left as a single perspective that never changes: once a socialist, always a socialist. Exactly what it means to be "on the left" these days is, however, a matter of discussion (although not necessarily debate), the changed historical circumstances in which the political left finds itself operating, and its own efforts to define a meaningful politics and set of public policies that can produce stable alternatives to what it sees at the misguided policies that have reigned over Canada for longer than a decade.

A few blogs ago, I tried to address the confusing mish-mash of Canadian conservatism and what it means as a political option for Canadians. In this blog, I'd like to look more directly the NDP, and to some extent the Liberal Party, to try to engage the other options Canadians will have before them when they turn to the polls this fall. One of the mistakes that the political right has made, has been to assume that the Liberals and NDP are basically the same. Taking a page from American conservatives, Canadian conservatives got into the habit of referring to everyone who was not conservative as "left." Indeed, there was even some discursive connection of the liberalism with socialism.  No less a figure that Stephen Harper, in fact, made such statements. It would be difficult to overstate how wrong this perspective actually is. What I want to do here is trace the development of what I will ultimately call "progressive" politics to set the stage for a further consideration of its current manifestations, which I'll likely address in a blog after this one.

Socialism and Civic Nationalism

Part of this connection of liberalism with socialism (the Liberal Party with the NDP) was political.  It was a cheap effort to get votes by calling opponents names. Deployed against liberals, it became an odd sort of red baiting. Another part of it was political blindness. For a variety of reasons, commentators on the left simply did not understand the distinctions between post-WW II Canadian liberalism and the socialism (or, social democracy, if one prefers that term) of the NDP. There were, in fact, important and appreciative difference on the level of policy and philosophy even if individual supporters of one party or the other could periodically move fluidly between them. The distinction between liberals and socialists was not who was more progressive (or, who was the "real" progressive, or words to that effect) but distinctions of ideology that were, on some level, fundamental.

In the past, I have called the liberalism that came to dominate Canada after WW II "civic nationalism" and the name remains as  good as any name. It was organized around a series of beliefs that focused on the individual and its protection in society. This included equality of opportunity, Charter rights, regional development programmes, a commitment to accepting diversity, and other measures, such as bilingualism. I am not saying that all these different policies fit together seamlessly, but they were, more or less, a coherent policy framework that was implemented in a reformist measure with the broad support of middle-class Canadians and which served to re-tool Canada. Voting Liberal, in other words (and I will have more to say on this later), meant something specific. It meant supporting a specific vision of the country and its future.

Voting NDP (or, for a socialist or social-democratic option) meant something else. Again, for purposes of analysis, we should put our views as to which perspective is better on hold. In other words, we should not be partisan and array a hierarchy of ideological perspectives.  Canadian socialists -- who by and large inhabited the NDP -- did not reject diversity politics or oppose bilingualism or Charter rights, but were, simply, interested in different matters. These included labour codes, workplace health and safety, industrial democracy, limiting connections between the state and big business, finding mechanisms to address the social inequalities of power in Canadian society, working-class wages. In other words, they were different; not better; not worse. Different.

The confusion between the NDP and Liberals, between socialism and civic nationalism, then, arose from a variety of factors including: conservative politics and an effort to win votes by lumping their opponents together; an inability of right-wing commentators to understand the distinction between civil nationalism and socialism; an imported American rhetorical framework that divided all politics up into "left" and "right" in a way that broached no further diversity. And, I would also argue that they NDP confused matters themselves because they fished off the same pier, as it were, as the Liberals. For example, they were passionate defenders of minority groups. Indeed, they were likely more passionate than the civic nationalists who looked to find means to protect minorities as individuals who faced discrimination. And, they could use the same mechanisms (Charter rights) as liberals to make their defence. Economically, Canadian socialists -- sometime after WW II -- stopped talking about supplanting capitalism, made their peace with it, and looked to modify and manage it. There were important differences between the civic nationalist and socialist view of the economy but both believed in some form of management via the state. If liberals continued to believe in capitalism (which they did) ... oddly, so too did the NDP in practice. Theoretically, Canadian socialists argued against capitalism; in practice they accepted it and used liberal economic management tools.

Progressive Politics in Practice

What did this mean? A number of things:

1. Canadians who were looking to cast non-conservative, more progressive (for lack of a better word)  votes had different options and those options were not a question of who was more progressive than the other. They were different visions of the future.

2. In practice, however, this difference could be confused and compromised both because of the politics of manipulation and because of some degree of convergence on means (even if the ends remained distinct).

3. Long-term success for the federal Liberal Party of Canada. As is well known, the federal Liberals ruled the roost for most of the last half of the twentieth century. If we begin after WW II, we have Liberal governments in power from 1945-57; 1963-84 (with the Clark interregnum), and 1993-2006.  We don't need to get into this history. Civic nationalism did not "win over" Canada. It was clearly buoyed by the idiosyncrasies of the First Past the Post System. This allow it translate its support among a plurality of Canadians ... into majorities of working minorities in Parliament.

4. NDP -- socialism -- remained a minority option for Canadians. While drawing committed support from an not insignificant number of people, the NDP tended to succeed provincially in areas where liberalism was weak, class politics increased political polarization, and  the middle class tended to look to conservatism (as opposed the liberalism) as its political home.

Implications

I mention all of these points because, for a long time, I was rather down on the idea that the NDP and the Liberals could be anything other than temporary allies, which, historically, has been precisely the case. Even when they might have competed over the same voters, they saw the world differently. They could cooperate, now and then, because they each saw the politics of conservatism as something to be avoided, but this did not mean that they parties could or would merge or even work together (say, via strategic voting).  The reason for this was patently evident to most of the activists in both parties: they could not merge because they were different. Resistance to abandoning the NDP, for instance, was not just a dislike of Liberals (say, Martin or Chretien, each of whom could talk a progressive game) or personal political ambition. It was a sense that there was a fundamental incompatibility to the parties.

And, I think, by and large this was right. This is what I have tried to explain above. Supporting the NDP meant something different form supporting the Liberals.

A question that we have to ask, I think, and an important one, is this: is this any longer the case? If there was, say, a fundamental incompatibility between, say, industrial democracy and civil nationalism, does this type of incompatibility still exist today. Is the NDP a socialist political party any longer or ... if it is ... what is 21st century Canadian socialism? Can -- will? -- the civic nationalism of the Trudeau-Chretien era still appeal to Canadians? Are the political circumstances of today so different that its appeal might be more or less moot, as the need to address other issues and different problems becomes more pressing for the electorate?

There are no easy answers to this question. I will argue in my next blog, however, that the NDP is moving toward trying to address them by defining what we might call (and, what they do call) a "progressive" agenda for Canada. What this entails, is what I'll next address.

Wildroses Ramblings

So ... most of the Alberta Wildrose Party is calling it a day ... not from politics but from opposition. Two MLAs defected a short while ago and now it looks like up to seven more are on the move. Speculation is rampant, of course. If seven more MLAs go, this will leave Wildrose with a rump caucus that is still the second largest in the Alberta legislature. They would remain the official opposition, ahead of the Liberals (who hold five seats). The PCs have something like 63 right now, a number that will, of course, increase in the days ahead.

What is one to make of this? From what I've read, there are a number of interpretations. There is the Danielle Smith abandoned the farm theory; in effect that she was bought off (which might have some truth to it). There is the closely aligned PC conspiracy theory: that the Tories worked to do in Wildrose by moving to the right (that is, further to the right!) and torpedoed the opposition in the run up to an election next yer (which might have some truth to it). But, I think there might be other dynamics and implications here that should be explored because this is an event of some sort in Canadian public life.

A couple of years ago, I was lecturing to my intro class on Quebec. In that lecture, I spent some time explaining that Quebec politics might be more "normal" (that is, similar to the Rest of Canada) than most people think. There was, I suggested, nothing particularly unusual about having a provincial political party or two (PQ, CAQ). Other provinces seemed to be going this way or had gone that way in the past. I cited historical examples (United Farmers of Alberta, for instance) and current examples: Saskatchewan Party, Yukon Party, Wildrose and the "poor cousins" in the Maritimes (Atlantic Party in NS and People's Alliance in NB). I might be stubborn but I don't think I'll give up on that thesis right away, since the jury is still out on the other parties (excepting the fringe Maritime parties, which likely won't go anywhere). Does Wildrose's impending collapse, however, throw a wrench in my thesis?

Maybe ... it is possible that we have moved through an era of semi-autonomous provincial political parties and into another era but the implications might be even broader than that. Several points are important/

First, we need to ask why did Wildrose MLAs leave their party? The truth of the matter was that Wildrose never had particularly solid ground in which to grow. It drew strong regionalized support is southern Alberta, but was unable to make a serious dent elsewhere in the province. The weak character of the other political parties (and their similarly regionalized bases of support) meant that, in truth, Wildrose had little chance of forming a  government in the near future, if at all. In that instance, those people who are interested in power -- in being on the "in" -- will look around for a party in which they can fulfill their personal objectives. What Wildrose shows us, then, might be something different than what I told my intro class. It might not show us that provincial parties are about to sprout up all over the place but it might tell us something about how  difficult it actually is get a third party into government. They are relatively easy to start and we have a slew of them now and have in the past. But, starting a party and getting people elected and then moving to government are altogether different things.

What would be really interesting is a comparative analysis of "third" parties. We might keep third in air quotes here because the Saskatchewan Party and the PQ can hardly be called "third parties" since both have been in government or currently are. Let's call them alternative parties. A comparative analysis might look at the importance of a strong regionalized base of support within a province to ensure MLAs (or MPPs or MNAs) while the party moves toward government. This is one of the problems that the Atlantic Party has. (It has others, to be sure) and the PANB. They really have no place in the province that they "call home," where they know they will be able to elect representatives time after time. Wildrose had this. It was that next step that seemed to cause it problems.

Second, our comparative analysis of alternative parties at the provincial level might also look the space that party seeks to occupy on the political spectrum. What made the Saskatchewan Party and the PQ successful was not just a base of support -- however crucial that is -- but that they occupied a political space that other significant party at that time occupied. The PQ occupied a separatist and social democratic space that was occupied very weakly by small independence parties (RIN, for instance). The SP occupied the right wing of the political spectrum after the collapse of the Saskatchewan PCs. Again, no other party in that space. CAQ in Quebec, again, had a regionalized base of support and occupied a space (conservatism) that no one else had occupied (this has been enough to get it seats but where it goes from here ...?).

Here again, what is going on in the Maritimes might speak to this issue. In NS and NB, the small fringe parties do occupy a space no one else occupies. They are almost Wildrose like in their conservatism despite efforts to appear moderate. The problem they have is that they occupy a space that no one else wants to occupy with them. Hence, my second point requires nuance. One needs to occupy unoccupied space but that space must be some place where voters want to stand as well. Communists, for instance, have long occupied a space no one else does in Canada but they have been remarkably unsuccessful in elections. In the past, parties at the provincial level that were successful seemed to have done the same thing. The UFA and UFO occupied a populist small-town space that was in demand and not occupied by other parties. In Saskatchewan, the same time, the provincial Liberal Party moved into that space and so no equivalent of the UFA developed in that province. Conversely, the CCF occupied  the left space in that province successfully. And, one could go on.

Wildrose fits into this picture because their space -- an extreme right wing space -- was re-gobbled up by the PCs. Hence, their defecting MLAs -- rightly -- said that they liked the direction of the current PC government. Why shouldn't they? It was what they campaigned on in the last election. Once the Tories back-tracked on their moderate right-centre perspective that they had been developing and moved to full scale support for carbon energy production and other right wing measures ... the Wildrose was left without a space on the political spectrum.

And ... why would anyone vote for Wildrose if they could get Wildrose-like policies from an experienced government? This is my third point. The PQ and the SP moved into government only after some time in opposition and after they had been able to recruit candidates about whom a reasonable claim to good governmentability could be made. In other words, they could claim -- rightly -- that they could run a province. We might not like how they ran it, but they had the talent on the front benches, as it were, to form a government and administer the complex machinery of the modern state. Wildrose simply could not make this claim. Because it is easy to start political parties in Canada, people do. This does not mean that those parties are ready or fit to govern. Even if I were a right winger ... Wildrose would worry me and I'd likely not support them for precisely this reason. They had not demonstrated that they were -- or, could be -- a government in waiting. Our point three, then, is that successful alternative parties need to have a talent (CAQ in QC had gone out of its way in this regard to try to attract candidates that allow it to make a reasonable claim to being able to govern). An inability to do this ... will not trick the voters, particularly if one is competing for space on the political spectrum.

Fourth, and finally, we need to think voter turnout and how this effects alternative parties.  The Wildrose Party -- like all parties in Alberta -- is seriously affected by declining voter turnout and there is no evidence that this is likely to change in the future. I am not entirely certain of the effects of declining voter turnout but I suspect that the effect is complicated. In brief, it is more difficult right now to mobilize people to vote. It can be done, if the right circumstances are met. But, those circumstances are important because otherwise those votes will not translate into seats and the party will wither and die unless staffed by a core of die-hard committed members will to suffer defeat after defeat after defeat because of their commitment to the cause (read NDP in NB).

To sum up, I think there is surely a lot of crass opposition shattering and personal ambition that has gone into the collapse of the Wildrose. Its collapse, however, tells us other things that are important to note for Canadian public life. One commentator -- in the linked newspaper article -- said that this was a sad day for democracy in Alberta. I'm not convinced of that. In fact, the natural working of democracy might bring the natural death of political parties (say, like the Union nationale in QC, UFA and Social Credit in Alberta; Social Credit in BC; farmer-labour in NS, etc.). But, failing democracy -- in the sense evident in declining voter turnout -- might be a serious hindrance to alternative parties in that the constituency that they seek to mobilize will not go to the polls.

The collapse of Wildrose tells us other things, too. Set in a comparative analysis, it tells us important things about why some alternative parties are successful and others are not. As a Green Party member ... this might be a lesson for me to learn.