The Burden of My Ethics: Responding to Paris

I was asked in class this morning for my thoughts on what has happened in Paris. I was unprepared for the question, although perhaps I should not have been, and offered a response as best I could that I hoped was something other than the responses we have seen so far. I thought I would -- perhaps for my own sake, but I hope not -- take the time to jot down my thinking in an effort to contribute to the discourse of a response. Ultimately, I will steal a page from J.S. Woodsworth and suggest that whatever response I feel appropriate, I should be careful *not* to impose my ethics on others as if I alone had the right answer. Indeed, at my age, I can call for just about any response that I want to -- any response that I feel appropriate -- because my response is almost gratuitous. The truth is that I will never have to implement whatever response I call for; someone else will. For instance, if I call for a renewed offensive against ISIS, someone else will have to engineer that response; someone else will drop the bombs; someone else will have to bear the burden of knowing that the response brought with it  collateral damage; someone else will, as it were, have to bear the burden of my ethics. This is a burden, I will say, very unwilling to make others bear.

All this sounds, confusing, what do I actually mean? This: if we ask the question "how should we respond to the terrorist attacks in Paris?" there are four points we should bear in mind.

First,  we need to remember that our response is structured by reality and by our context. A proper response to this tragedy begins from the perspective of the real world. We live in Canada and so we are dealing not with an abstract response but with a question of how Canada and Canadians should respond. We should avoid asking questions that work on abstract levels, such as: if we don't have a military response are we, in fact, doing nothing? This might a fair enough question for a classroom where we are teaching some type of thinking or reasoning but it is too detached from reality to be of practical use. Why? Because the issues before us are not abstract issues. They are practical issues that involve real human beings who lived and died. We need to be concerned about how Canada and Canadians should respond because we live in Canada and are Canadians. We are not concerned about how the US or the UK or some other country responds -- unless we have some interest in them -- because that is not our context and so becomes meaningless in terms of generating a proper response. I cannot, for instance, no matter how much I might want to, influence public policy in the UK because I am a citizen of another country. The first thing we need to do, then, is to bear in mind that whatever we do will take place in the real world and so should begin from that perspective.

Second, from our context in Canada, I believe we should resist the effort to politicize this issue and we should, in fact, as a first order of response, not politicize it. We should not call for any particular action as a first response, but we should instead, mark the memories of those who died and their families, friends, and loved ones. In other words, these terrorist acts were amazingly inhumane. Let us not complicate matters by denying humanity further. Instead, let us counter inhumanity by re-affirming the humanity of those how died, were injured, or are grieving. This is something we can all do and thousands have done this already. They have attended vigils, prayed, offered minutes of silence, taken some time quietly to send messages to friends in France or console those in distress. It is easy, I know, to toss around words about terrorists: to call them monsters, and inhumane, and criminal. And, these all might be true. But, their inhumanity should not become license for more inhumanity. We confront and contest inhumanity by responding with humaneness and, in the first instance, that means memory and support and caring for those who need to be cared for. Even in the midst of this horrible situation, to say this in other words, we can respond to this tragedy by denying the logic of terror and respond with the values that represent the higher ideals of care and compassion and humanity.

Third, we need, as well, to do what we can but we need to temper that action with a longer-range plan and with caring for those who will actually have to carry out our aims and ideals. I understand the calls for military action in the wake of these terrorist attacks. I expect that there will be concerted military action against ISIS in the weeks and months ahead and I fully expect this response to be a multi-pronged response that attacks ISIS not just in Syria and Iraq but wherever else that organization or its affiliates may be. The question we have to ask is not "is this response right" because, as I said, that is too abstract a question for us in Canada. I am not willing to pass judgement against those who call for military action because I "get it." I understand that many people feel that one way to be safe is to militarily eliminate threats. There is nothing wrong with safety or the desire to be safe. The French government and its allies will all determine courses of action which will include arrests, military action, and -- in extreme cases -- the suspension of civil rights. It is easy to offer a quick soundbite in support or opposition to these actions. I think we should refuse to do so, one way or the other.

Instead, I think what we need to ask as Canadians is this: what should Canada's response be? And, we need to understand that the range of possible, good, and effective responses is far broader than a lot of current discourse might make it seem. Our options, in other words, are not "bomb or do nothing." Still less is it: "not bombing is doing nothing."  There are all kinds of things that Canada can do. Our response should be mature. Neither you, nor I, nor the PM can snap our fingers and make a problem go away. We should not take the logic of instant-gratification consumerism and make believe that it can work in international affairs, against ISIS, or against terrorism. It can't and anyone who tells you differently is, in fact, politicizing tragedy to their own ends (or, to serve their own agenda) and is, thus, doing an amazing disservice to the people who died, those who were injured, and to the grieving family and friends. Said differently, if someone says "I am not certain that bombing ISIS is the right response" no one should then say "tell me right now what we should do." Media is set up this way. Pundit panels thrive on this kind of "oh, yeah, well what should we do and if you can't say right now what we should do, well, then that is bad"-types of discourse.

In yet other terms: one proper response to this horrible tragedy might be to say "you know, before we go and do anything, perhaps we should think about what we should do." Considered and intentional actions -- actions I have supported before in this blog -- are not bad things. In fact, they likely have a greater chance of proving to be right in the longer run than knee-jerk reactions. I prefer that my country take its time and generate a good and effective and humane response than have the current government say "OK, because of Paris, we will reverse our decision to stop bombing ISIS." If this is a longer run decision ... well ... so be it. I'm not certain I would agree but at least it is a decision that we could say was made intentionally and with consideration.

Understanding the full range of options in front of us, however, might be better way to proceed before determining on any one action. The issue before us, in my view, is how can Canada play a positive role in world affairs? What is the best use of the resources Canada puts into international affairs? Are we better off bombing ISIS -- that is, are we making a difference? -- or are we better doing other things. And, have no doubts, there are many other things that can be done. We can, and should, help some countries develop better policing as a response to their domestic human insecurity. We can and should become involved in international ecological protection. We can, and should, ratify the UN declaration of rights on indigenous peoples and help other countries (as well as our own) meet their objectives in that regard. We can aid in disaster relief and provide medical aid, and education for girls, and offer more -- many more -- spaces in post-secondary education in Canada for people from other countries. And, those are just "off the top of my head." If I took some time to google the matter, I'd almost certainly be able to produce a very long list. You may have your own ideas about what should be done. Send them in. I'll put them in the comments.

The point I want to make, of course, is this: to refuse the binary of bomb or not bomb is *not* doing nothing. One might elect military action -- again, I'd likely argue against this -- but we should elect it out of consideration for the range of options we have that can make a difference; not because of a false binary.

Finally, we in Canada should not allow these acts of terrorism to derail the good things that Canada was going to do. I've heard a few -- thankfully very few -- calls for Canada to not take Syrian refugees as a result of this tragedy. Sask Premier Brad Wall, for instance, said some ... dumb things. Heck, sorry, no other way to put it. He played the "even if one terrorist slips through" discourse, which we have all heard a thousand times before. But, in what I will take to be a real sign of national maturity, the general consensus seems to be that one should not blame the victims of ISIS for the actions of ISIS. Now, in fact, is the time to make a stand against ISIS by saying "we will look after the people you have scattered. We will stand up for humanity when you will not. We will be counted."

This will not, of course, derail ISIS. We should have no illusions about that. But it will stand as testimony of our values and the fact that we will do things differently. And, this is indeed part of a longer-run strategy to confront terrorism.

I mentioned at the beginning that I did not want to burden other people with my ethics. I don't. I am here not trying to articulate the "right" position but to be part of a discussion about how Canada should respond. It should, I suppose, go without saying that Canada's response will be different from other countries' and that, as a Canadian, my concerns are with Canada. They do not lie in judging others. But, the burden of my ethics is something else, as well. Years ago, J.S. Woodsworth refused to vote with everyone else in the House on a declaration of war against Nazi Germany. And, make no bones about it,  the war against Nazi Germany was a just war if there ever was one. Woodsworth knew this. His reason for not voting for war was not obstinance or some love of the Nazis. If you have studied your Canadian history, you know Woodsworth was the polar opposite of a Nazi. Instead, his argument ran something like this: I will not send one person to kill another person.

Let us be clear: if military action is taken, that is what we are doing. It is really easy for me, an almost 50 year old man sitting safely behind a desk, to call for military action because I will never have to live with the consequences of my call to arms. I will, for instance, never have to kill anyone. I'll never drop a bomb on anyone. I'll never have to know that the bomb I dropped killed some kid who just happened to be playing while an attack was going on. I will never have to live with the reality that my intentional actions caused the deaths of others, including (and, there is no way around this in a way) the deaths of ordinary people who had nothing to do with ISIS and might even have been their opponents. That is what  I mean by the burden of my ethics. I get to make an ethical statement -- for example, we can protect innocent life by using military force against ISIS -- but I never have to bear the burden of my own ethics. Someone else has to.

I know that this is a situation that happens all the time. But, in my view, it is also a situation that we should do our best to limit. It is one thing for me to make a statement. Another for me to believe that someone else should carry out my ethics, particularly if those involve disturbing things.

How should we respond to Paris? There are many things we can do. I've listed a number. I don't imagine they will all appeal to everyone but I am hopeful, in these first days after the terrorist attacks, that the responses will be mature, considered, and done with an understanding of building a positive role for Canada in world affairs.

Choices V: Good Arguments

In this blog I have been trying to provide a sound ethical basis for humane decision making. I won't review all the arguments I have been making because you can easily look back on this blog and I provide a brief summary in my last entry. What I want to say is that I have been trying to suggest that many of the reasons people use for *not* making humane decisions just don't hold up to ethical or empirical, for that matter, analysis. One might not be a humanist but in that case ... well ... that is another problem. But, if you find yourself quickly saying "well, I don't want to be a humanist, then, if I have to make humane decisions ..." you might want to think again and about the company you keep.

Most people, I think, want to be considered humane.  They make wrong decisions -- that is decisions that are not really humane -- because they make mistakes. They logic and ethics are faulty; not their intentions. After all, we laud humanism in our culture all the time. We congratulate those who make big donations to charities, applaud those who coach the minor sports team or run the youth group, admire those who work in soup kitchens. In other words, most people both admire humanism and want to be considered humanistic (sports figures start charities, political leaders join international relief efforts, celebrities have their causes).  If you don't want to be humanistic, pause and consider those ideologies that are not. Fascism and Soviet Communism spring to mind. Part of the reason I am writing this series of blogs is not simply to propagate my perspective but because I believe my perspective is widely shared but runs into problems because people don't think through the decisions that they are making and so end up making the wrong ones.

To close off this line of argument, let me suggest, too, that my arguments are not saying "we should all be soft bleeding-heart liberals." I am not even certain what that means, but I am not trying to say that one needs to help everyone who asks. There are good reasons -- as I said in my last entry -- to not help someone. For instance, we don't have to crowd fund a new TV for someone who is filthy rich. They can afford the new TV themselves. So, to close off, let me suggest some other things we might want to bear in mind as we make decisions.

First, context is important (filthy rich-TV example above). You might give your lunch to a homeless person and that is the right decision because (a) you can afford another lunch and (b) they cannot. But, you are not bound to give your lunch to anyone who walks up to you and asks for it.

Second, we do need to prioritize. I rejected the slippery slope argument in my last entry but I should expand upon it. The argument "because I cannot help everyone, I should help no one" is an ethical a fallacy for the reasons I enumerated in my last entry but that does not mean that we cannot establish priorities. Those priorities should, I would argue, relate (a) to our abilities and (b) to needs.

Abilities: I can help more people than my students. Hence, I should because I have more ability to do so. You could look at the matter this way: should we raise money for new hospital equipment from the poorest members of society? I'd answer yes, but I would then quickly add that the richer members of society should contribute more because they have the ability to do so. Abilities need not just be money. It could be time. Years ago, when I was on a previous sabbatical, my church asked if I could help someone. It required several afternoons working around their house  because they were ill and could not get the normal things done that they wanted to get done. I complained about this: who are these people wasting my sabbatical. But, they were not. They knew I had more time -- or, what I might call more flexible time -- and so called on me. I would not have made sense to call on my wife who was in her work in the afternoons.  She could not come. I could.

Abilities can also involve skills. As much as many of us might hate to admit this, there are simply things we cannot do. The person I was helping on my last sabbatical eventually got to a point where they were asking me to do things I could not do, or could do only if I took a great deal of time to do them. I soldiered through for one afternoon but told the secretary at the church ... you should get another person (I had an example) because they can do this quickly. What times me several hours, will take them 15 minutes. Abilities should not be used as an excuse to not do something ("oh, I am no good at cooking and so I waited for my wife/husband to come home from work and cook me supper even though they worked ten hours and I was watching TV"), but it is an important consideration. If a decision involves you doing something you cannot do or would just make worse ... that is something you should bear in mind. I can coach certain sports, but not others, for example. Thus, I have coached those sports I could and not those about which I know nothing.

Needs: I don't in any way mean to sound neo-con here. I know that the opponents of the welfare state frequently underestimate the level of need in society and I am not trying to do that. What I am saying is that we might have to prioritize and that there is nothing wrong with that. Let me use some examples I've previously used to illustrate this point. My house needs repairs: the roof and plumbing. I only have so much money. I might, therefore, start with my roof (because without it ... nothing else much matters for my house) and then, after I have saved more money, I address my plumbing. I have two cars that need repairs. I get one repaired while I save money for the other recognizing that this might mean I need to drive family members around some evenings because we only have one car and they each have things they do at night to which they need a drive.

In assessing needs we don't want to become prisoners of fad. Some charities, I am sure you have noticed, jump into the spotlight. There might be good reasons to disregard some of these charities (particularly if you have not checked them out). The latest fad is not the most pressing need.

Third, don't lose track of the human being. In other words, don't use shaky ethical foundations to allow you to avoid doing something good for someone. It is those ethics that I've tried to look at and illustrate their fallacies in the last several entries. Think about how you would like someone to treat you. Sometimes people say to me "I don't want to do X but I don't want to feel guilty." No one does, but if you feel guilty, about something you might want to think about why. In other words, if you are asked to do something and you say "no" and you feel bad about saying no, reconsider, using sound ethics. You might still end up saying "no" but you likely will not feel guilty. If you feel guilty all the time about everything ... well ... that is something about which we should talk. But, if you feel guilty when someone has a request of you and you've turned them down, that just might be a sign that you are, in fact, doing the wrong thing and some part of you knows it (hence, the guilt).

Fourth, think about what you would tell your children. Would you say "it is good to be greedy," "yes, fighting is fine as long as you win," or "I break the law when I know I won't be caught so you should do the same."

Finally, remember that most of the things we do where decisions are needed are collective actions. You are not being asked, for instance, to solve world hunger by yourself so don't pretend that you are to avoid contributing to the local food bank. You are not being asked to run the new school library by yourself so don't use that as a rationale to *not* contribute some books to it. Because we do things collectively, we can also call on others to help us out. Let me return to the Bob and Mary example I used in my previous entry. Bob and Mary are both hungry and need good. You only have enough food for one person. Do you spend your time trying to figure out to whom you should give the food or do you call a friend and ask "got any extra food?" Most of us do the former whereas we should do the latter. The fact that you need to make decisions does not mean that the decision you make cannot or should not include efforts to change others minds to get them making the right decision. The fiver you book in the kids hospital charity rubber boot (at least it is a rubber boot at Mont A) does not solve children's health problems but a whole bunch of loose change from a whole bunch of other people does.

To conclude: the decisions we make, make a different to other people. Rather than just making them, we should make them in an intentional way and with sound ethics. If we start making better decisions, our society will be better. And, surely that should be our goal.

Choices IV: The Slippery Slope

I'm writing a series of posts on the ethics of how we make choices. I've tried to argue that not all options are created equal: some choices are better than others and we can be guided in how we make these  choices by a set of ethical imperatives. I suppose that if one disagreed with my ethics (say, my humanism), than a great deal of what I have been saying does not make a great deal of sense. For instance, I tried to argue that inclusion is better than exclusion. If we  can make choices that include more people than otherwise would have been the case -- all other things being equal -- than we should adopt that approach. Likewise, I have tried to argue that arguments for exclusion based on tradition (we have always done things this way), don't actually hold up well and cannot provide a sound ethical basis for, say, excluding someone from a club or team. Tradition can be a guide to action but it cannot serve as an excuse (if there are other options) for harming someone. Finally, I also tried to argue against the "the word is a hard place" type of thinking. We hear this a fair bit, particularly with regard to children. I argued that this basis for decision-making failed because it fulfilled its own prophecy and was grounded in metaphysics (the "world is hard" perspective is grounded in unprovable perspective; not demonstrable fact.)

What is important here is that we are each of us confronted with the opportunity to make decisions most days. "Will I can so-and-so and see if they want to come to the movie with us?" "Should I drop so-and-so a line and see how they are doing?" "Should we see if so-and-so needs help with their homework?" Making these decisions most of the time is pretty easy for us but they all involve an ethics. Every time, for instance, that we believe the worst of someone without checking the facts ("Why is Bob late for work?"), we run the risk of making the wrong decision because our ethics are messed up. We all know that we should check our facts before making a decision ("I'm going to fire that guy because he is late!") because otherwise we could mess up ("Oh, you were in a traffic accident? You were hit by a semi?"). So decisions really are not all that important ("shall I have a cookie or ice cream for desert?"), but my point is that in the normal run of our lives we have the opportunity -- through our decisions -- to make the world better or worse for other people. How should we make those decisions?

The argument  I have been putting forward is that saying "we should do things in a humane way" is not good enough. What I need to show is that other modes of decision-making (hence, what I was discussing above) are not good enough; they have problems because if they did not my perspective would not have much to recommend it. It can be recommended, however, if it can be show to have (a) positive results that other modes of decision making do not have and (b) that other modes of decision making are flawed in such a way as to prescribe their general use (even if they might serve some uses in some  contexts).

To continue this argument, I want to point to another mode of flawed decision making. Periodically, myself and members of my family or friends will discuss some sort of decision. Sometimes, it will involve a financial outlay. You know what I am talking about "if we all throw in some money, we can do X." In these decisions someone will, sooner or later, use what we might call the "slippery slope" argument. If we do X, we will be asked to do Y, and then Z, A, B, C ... where will it end?" In other words, the decision that we will make will need to a never-ending stream of requests to continue to do the same thing (say, donate money to some worthwhile cause -- to donate the cause, I'd suggest, should be worthwhile as a beginning point of consideration!) for others. If I give Bob some money, I'll have to give Mary some, and then Jane and Steve ... and ... and ... and.

There is also an ethical component to this argument. Without coming right out and saying it, this argument implies a decision to help one person and not  another is a bit hypocritical. At the least it would be arbitrary. Thus, one is better of not helping anyone (and helping someone, from what I can tell, is the context within which this type of slippery slope argument generally arises).

Let me quickly address each of these objections because I think they are inter-related.

First, the fact that one cannot help everyone is not a reason to help no one. The two propositions don't, in fact, connect to each other at all. In the first place, one might not be being asked to help everyone. Imagine a scenario where someone says "let us help Bob." The counter -- slippery slope -- argument is "No because then we would have help Mary." The truth of the matter is that we don't know whether we would have the help Mary. Maybe she has solved her own problems. Maybe she does not want our help. Maybe the context is radically different (maybe Bob has fallen on hard times because the plant laid him off. Mary got laid off, too, but she might be filthy rich to begin with and so does not really need help). In other words, the argument that we cannot help Bob because Mary might also want help works with an unproven assumption: that Bob's and Mary's cases are exactly alike. Since that is an assumption, the fact that we would deny help to Bob on the basis of an assumption about Mary's life ... seems a tad odd.  Mary might be getting help from other people! In that case, we would be denying help to Bob on the basis of an unproven assumption that turns out to be wrong.

The other issue that is connected to this point but not inherently logically connected to it is: no one has asked you to help Mary. It might be for the reasons given above, it might be fore some other reason. Or, perhaps, it might be true that Mary needs help as well (I'll get to this point below). But, the issue under consideration is Bob. The issue under consideration, then, is should we allow another issue to detract from making the right decision with regard to Bob. Let me use an example to illustrate my point. Imagine that your house needed plumbing repairs. Would you say "gee, my electrical might also be shot so I guess I won't repair my plumbing." Would that make any sense? Instead of solving one problem about which you know, you elect to ignore that problem because you cannot address another issue that might not even be a problem?

What is also pertinent here is that the argument against helping Bob is not based on the merits of Bob's situation -- as with my plumbing analogy.  In fact, the "we cannot help Bob because we might also have to help Mary" argument avoids any engagement with the merits of Bob's case. And, it is at this point that I start to become a bit suspicious of those who are arguing against helping Bob. After all, there many ethically sound reasons not to help Bob. By trying to help him we might, for instance, create a bigger mess. The help we are proposing might not be the help he needs. His problems are not all that grave and it might help his maturity to solve them for himself. And, we could go on. In other words, the slippery slope argument is notable for its avoidance of the issues at hand. It distracts from those issues ("what about Mary') while avoiding any consideration of the merits of Bob's case. Any time someone does not engage a specific case ... I start to wonder about their commitment to that case in the first place.

Second, let's turn to the implied hypocrisy argument because this one, in my view, is stronger. Double standards are generally things we seek to avoid and for good reason. Ultimately, I think, I'd argue that we can be far too concerned with double standards because I am not at all convinced that there is that much symmetry in the world, but that is an argument for another day. Let us accept, for the sake of argument, that some level of consistency is good thing in our interaction with others. As an instructor, for instance, I tend go give my students the same types of assignments because it would be arbitrary for me to pick some students (in the same class) and give them more or less work than others for the same grade. I think, therefore, that the implied hypocrisy argument is one that merits consideration.

Yet, I also think it tends to fail because it is amenable to a weird logic. It assume that because you cannot do everything, you should do nothing. Now ... pause and think about that. Do you use that logic in any other realm of your life? I can't repair both my roof and my plumbing so I repair neither? That is a recipe for your house to fall down and in short order. Imagine you have two cars. Both need repairs so you repair neither? Would that make any sense? I am hungry but I can't eat  both donuts and a salad so I'll eat neither?

What is even more problematic about this argument from an ethical perspective is that it provides a recipe for inaction. If we cannot help Bob because Mary also needs help, we cannot help Mary because Bob also needs help. We could use an economic argument to show the facile nature of this proposition from a practical perspective. Imagine that there is some utility (some good) that comes from helping someone. Just to put a number of it, let us say that good could be measures. We get 100 units of goodness for helping someone. If I help Bob, I get 100 units of goodness. If I help Mary, I  get 100 units of goodness. But if I help no one, I get no units of goodness. Hence, helping no one actually does not make mathematical sense either. In economic terms, inaction reduces the amount of goodness in the world under the guide of being fair. Instead of having 100 units of goodness, we have none.

Another good point I want to make from an ethical perspective is that old proposition: do unto others. Generally, this proposition is good ethics. That is why, a friend of mine tells me, it exists in virtually all ethical and religious systems in the world. Instead of imagining this question from our perspective, let us try to understand it from Bob's perspective. Bob asks for help. We  turn him down because Mary needs help too. Would you want to be in Bob's shoes? Imagine yourself in that situation. Imagine that you really are in need. You are hungry and have not eaten. Do you want to be told "no I will give you no food because there is someone else who is hungry?"

The final ethical proposition to make is that the slippery slope argument fails because it limits possibilities. It begins from the assumption that we cannot help both Bob and Mary but what if we could? Let us go back to hungry situation. Bob and Mary are both hungry and we have one meal to give them. Should we give it to neither or divide it between them? In other words, the slippery slope argument does not address the problem, it *stops" us from thinking creatively about how to address the problem. In this example, neither Bob nor Mary might have everything that they want but they have something and they are no longer hungry. There are other options (we could pool all our food, each taking a bit less and feeding Bob, Mary, and us well).

So, the upshot is that this argument -- the slippery slope argument -- is worth considering and its worth thinking about but ultimately it fails and so does not refute the humane argument for decision-making that I have been making.

Choices III: The Way Things Have Always Been Done?

Another argument I periodically here people use for making bad choices is: it has always been done this way. I will confess that this argument confuses me because it begins by conceding the point that I am trying to make: that the decision someone is taking is wrong. Have you ever thought of that. Imagine you say "we should do X" and the person to whom you are speaking says "we have always done Y." They have not said X is wrong, have they? I've noticed that when I speak to people using this -- we have always done things this way -- line of reasoning they are, often, more than willing to come right out and say "you know that is not a bad idea but ... we have always done things another way." Or, "that is a good idea, but ... we have always done things another way." I find this line of argument odd because when someone has a good idea, I try to *not* cut them off. I try to hear them out and then, if their idea is good (say, better than mine), I start to look for ways to implement that idea as opposed to finding reasons not to.

I think, therefore, that when people say "but we have always done things another way" that they are actually trying to say something  different, but before we get to that, let's think about this argument. It strikes me that it is based in a semi-traditionalist way of looking at the world: if it ain't broke, don't fix it; the devil we know, etc. There is actually much to recommend this way of thinking. As anyone who has read this blog knows, I am no fan of change for its own sake. But, this argument becomes problematic on a number of grounds. 

First, and most evidently, just because something has been done a certain way in the past does not mean that it should continue to be done that way in the present or future. Just because something has, in fact, been done a certain way in the past does not mean that it was done right. The weight of history can be important, but it is not a guarantee that the course of action people followed in the past was the right course of action. We can think, I am sure, of a number of important public policy issues where this type of argument has been used. The one that springs to my head is same-sex marriage. Those people who opposed same-sex marriage (or, more accurately, equality in marriage) often used an argument from tradition. "Discrimination is the way things have always been done in Canada." OK, they did not use those words. You got me. They used words more like "tradition," "historically," "in the past." The effect, however, was the same: why should we change the way we have been doing things because it worked well and reflected our values. 

It turns out that things did not necessarily work well at all. It depended who you asked. There were a bunch of people -- particularly in the GLBT community -- for whom things were not working well at all. The reason to make a different decision lay precisely in this: to escape the past. Moreover, it placed Canada in an odd position: a nation that supposedly committed itself to equality and individual rights and freedom of conscience was in a position of denying these to a defined section of the national community and, as it turned out, a whole bunch of non-GLBT Canadians felt very odd about this. Thus, the argument, "this is the way things have been done" disguised the fact that the way things have been done was not right. In the case ... why would you stick to something that is not right or, in other circumstances, not working. 

Imagine a different scenario. The French government felt it was a good idea to keep its troops in their brightly coloured uniforms when World War I began. That was, after all, the way things had always been done. But, it turned out that that was a very bad idea indeed. 

Second, the statement "that is the way things have always been done" is, in fact, almost always inaccurate. Let's look at the same-sex marriage argument again as an example. People who opposed same-sex marriage often said something like "I defend the traditional family. It is the way things have always been done." But, it wasn't. The traditional family time of Canadian history did indeed legally prohibit same-sex marriage, but it prohibited other things, legally and by social stigma as well, that no one in their right mind (not the most determined defender of the so-called "traditional family") would defend. Stigma prohibited marriage across ethnic and religious groups. Law permitted husbands to beat their wives; it allowed husbands to rape their wives; it deprived women of property. No one defending the traditional family was defending these things. That is not my point. My point is that their traditional family was an imagined traditional family. It existed as an ideal type. No one was arguing for the legalization of rape but that was, in fact, permitted under law. 

The problem is a lack of historical knowledge. If we knew more about the way things had been done, we would be less likely to defend that way. When people talk about the way things have been done, what they are actually doing is talking about institutions, ideals,  values, etc., that have already changed. Thus, the defenders of the so-called "traditional family" accepted some changes to it (they accepted the idea that married women could own property, that husbands should not beat their wives, that husbands should not rape their wives, and that people should be allowed to marry across ethnocultural or religious groups. In other words, they did not accept "the way things have been done" at all, but they embraced change. And, rightly so, those changes were good. But, to admit this would undercut their arguments by making them proponents of change as opposed to tradition. The point I am making is this: the problem with this argument (things have always been done this way) is that the people making it often don't know how things have been done in the past. They might be dealing with a modern institution -- the family, say  -- that has benefited from embracing change and might further benefit from continuing to embrace change; not a static institution. 

Third, the way thing have been done fails as a necessarily solid basis on which to make decisions because it assumes that contexts don't change. Let us allow, for instance, that there has been some institution, club, organization, etc., that has been relatively static and that worked well in the past. But, we don't live in the past. A friend of mine likes to say we live in the moment because the rest has either disappeared or has not happened so we can't live there. I'll say we live in the present and need to make plans for the future. Part of living in the modern world means that things change. We don't live in a static society and we need to respond to that change. Now, part of our response can be to say "look, this is a change I don't like and so I'm going to minimize it in my life." That would be fair enough. But, that needs to be a decision based on an understanding of context and it is different if we are making that decision (to not change) for ourselves versus decision that affect others.  

I'll give you an example. The way things are done at my church is different now than they were when I went to church as a kid. The sermon has powerpoint accompanying it, there are handouts, "homework", the music is different, its governance structure is different. Our pastor has a blog, there is a Facebook page, some sermons are recorded so they can be downloaded and listened to. Some people don't like these changes. They like the old hymn books, for instance. Fair enough. The people who ran my church, however, decided that we cannot stand pat. We cannot pass up something that is potentially useful just because it is new. We need to respond to our context. The people who don't like this say "we have always done things another way." Others said, perhaps but that is not a good reason to ignore the world around us and to take a pass on useful adaptions. 

Finally, there is a bit of a more ethical argument. I'll phrase it as a question. Should the fact that one does -- or has done -- things a certain way become a legitimate justification for hurting another person? I'll give you an example. Years ago I was a member of an amateur soccer organization. It was fun and I got to feel good about contributing to minor sport in my community. One night, we were meeting to discuss the budget and I noticed that the rep teams were having an unusually large amount of money spent on them. They got new uniforms -- and snazzy ones -- each year while the house league kids (of which there were many more) had to make do with the same old moth eaten uniforms year after year. When I asked why was this because it did not seem fair. The house league kids were paying the same fees as the rep league kids, the answer I was given was "it has always been done this way." I said, to the shock of one father whose son played rep, "that  is not a good enough reason to keep doing it that way." The kids getting the least out of this association -- less playing time, lower certification coaches, fewer tournaments and trips away, shorter season -- are subsidizing the kids getting the most out of it."

The association did eventually change and introduce new rules that stopped this type of thing but you see the point. The way things had been done was causing an economic transfer from those deriving the least benefit to those deriving the most. Does it make sense to keep doing something that way if it is not fair or is causing some level of harm? We could pick more serious examples, I suppose, but the point would remain the same. Is the weight of tradition suffice to sustain an injustice? I can't answer that easily for other people. For me, it is not. I prefer to address the injustice and make the changes to tradition in the same way that Canadians over time modified the traditional family to try to take the violence, prejudice in injustice of out of it so as to preserve what was valuable in it. 

As always there is more to say and I'll have more in the future. In the meantime ... feel free to chime in. 

Choices II

In my last blog I tried to show that there were was to make better or worse choices. Most people, I argued, simply understood this and this was why they took such time to explain the rationale for their choices. By looking at my objectives, assessing possible circumstances, and comparing courses of decision with my objectives, I could arrive at conclusions that made some choices better than others. Now, my argument fails, as I intimated, if one does not give a fig about other people. If one is purely greedy and does not care if their wealth is built on child slave labour ... well ... that person and I are having a different conversation. Most people, I would argue, however, don't think that way. Have you ever noticed how people who want to be wealthy -- or, who are wealthy -- will justify their wealth by (a) explaining the good they will do with it ("I just want to help people") or (b) with reference to personal character ("I worked hard"). They never say, "I'm just a greedy bastard and I'll sell my mother's oxygen tent if I can get a few bucks out of it." What this shows is that most people feel that purely self-interested perspective will not work: it will make them look bad and will cause people to question their morals. Hence, they try to justify their wealth on other grounds which, they believe (and, it seems, rightly) are more acceptable. In other words, other people's views matter to them. This is what their words indicate, whether we believe them or not.

In my previous blog, I tried to sketch out a humanistic approach to decision make with an example. What I'd like to do here is to address a couple of common objections to that decision-making process in order to show that they do not hold water. I have set my self a hard task. Someone could say "Andrew, I get your perspective and it works for you but it is just one perspective and other perspectives are equally valid". To make my case, I have to show other perspectives are *not* equally valid. I have to show that they have problems because otherwise the argument -- this is just your perspective -- would be correct. So, if my argument is to hold, there must be some sort of problem with other arguments. What are these? Let us look at a one of common objections to my arguments.

The first argument I periodically here to hear (in fact, far too often for my liking) to the humanistic approach to decision making I’ve sketched out is the “the world is hard” argument.  I’ll give you a variant of this argument. A coach is about to make a decision on whether or not to cut a player (see my previous example in my last blog). One thing they might say is that “I can’t take everyone and kids have to learn that the world is a hard place. You don’t always get what you want.” I’m pretty certain you’ve heard some variant of this type of explanation as well.  What is wrong with this type of argument? Several things.

First, it takes a debatable fact as a self-evident truth. Is the world a “hard place?” That is a matter of perspective that is, quite simply, not amenable to one-line statements. It is an ontological assumption; not a demonstrable fact. There is nothing inherently wrong with making assumptions about the character and nature of the world. I suspect that most of us do it every day. I assume that most people are rational and will respond to argument in reason. Hence, this blog. If I did not believe that ... there would be no good reason to write it. The problem occurs when we start to justify our actions on the basis of unproven assumptions. It is one thing to say “I will try to argue in reason.” It is another thing to say “I will have no military force for my country because everyone is rational.” However much we might like that to be the case, a government that made that decision would be imprudent. When we start to make decisions that affect other people on the basis of our assumptions about the world, our decisions start to be separated from the world. Since this assumption is neither provable nor inprovable, we cannot state for sure that the assumption is wrong but it is an assumption; not something we can demonstrate and here, to turn to my example, do we want to hurt someone because of our assumptions when we have other options available? 

The second concern I have with this line of reasoning — the world is hard — is that it is subject to what we might call the logic of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Again, consider my example. For the kid trying out for the team the world is neither hard nor soft and fuzzy. It is neither good nor bad at the time they are trying out for the team. It is the action of cutting the player (again, when other options are available) that makes the world good or bad. In this way, the assumption that has been made (“there is nothing wrong with cutting players when I have other options and it teaches them an important lessons that the world is hard”) actually creates the effect that was the initial unproven and unprovable assumption.  Thus, the rationale becomes the effect. The decision-making process has called into being the very condition that it assumed in the first place. The world indeed becomes hard but it is the result of a decision made by a real person (again, in my example, who had other options) and not some pre-existing condition. 

Third, I have heard people say “kids have to learn that not everyone gets a trophy.” This is a variant of the “world is hard” argument. This seems self evident but one might pause to ask: why? Why do we need to differentiate for kids? If having a trophy — or, some other award — accomplishes good things ... what is the problem? I know this sounds like a wishy-washy bleeding heart argument but bear with me. Why deny a kid a trophy or an award when there is no inherently good reason to do so? What does it accomplish? It isolates kids and makes them feel bad. Whereas giving them as award, can serve to help a kid commit to improving, it makes them part of the team (or, some other organization) where they can learn more and improve. If cutting the kid for no good reason teaches them that the world is hard, giving the award teaches them the opposite: the world is good, we support you, and we want you to succeed. Which approach do you think contributes the most to creating the conditions for succeess. 

But, there are other negative affects to the anti-award approach. One thing it does is that it creates “glory days” ... like the Bruce Springsteen song. It creates a situation where the high point of a person’s life was that moment that they won the trophy and beat everyone else. They were the best (which is what the anti-trophy for everyone argument seeks, in fact, to demonstrate: that we will honour this best person). But, glory days, as the song demonstrates, grow old. Does anyone want their glory day to occur when they are 18 or 15 or 21? Does anyone want that to be the high point of their life and what is left is only reliving those days? For kids this might be difficult to understand but as adults, we have all encountered this horrible moment at the class reunion or a chance meeting with old friends where we realize that someone is living in the past. Most of us, I think, really want our best days to lie before us, depending on our age, I suppose. Many people I have encountered find it sad when they meet someone who is 45 and still thinking about when they were 18. 

The other negative thing that occurs from the award for only the best approach is that it creates negative squabbling conflicts to win that award. I see this with academic awards all the time when I visit my kids teachers on those dreaded parent-teacher nights. The one that sticks in my mind were parents who were in front of me — and, hence, slowing me down. They had a list of all their daughter’s assignments, tests, projects, etc., and her grades and they were going through these one by one, questioning each grade trying to get more points for their child. I am not saying they are bad parents. Indeed, I suspect they are good parents who deeply love their children. What they were trying to do was to get the award for their child. Because the award was important — only the best got it — they lost track of what was important in school (that is, learning!) and focused on the award. They were not really concerned about whether or not their daughter learnt; they were looking for an explanation for each and every point their daughter “lost” and if there was no explanation, they her grade was going to go up. They were establishing, they believed, a track record of success for their daughter. Awards beget awards. If my daughter is the best student in Grade X; she has a better chance of being the best student in Grade Y, perceptions being what they are. The problem, of course, is this: this might get their daughter the award but it does not help her learn. Hence, there is a demising marginal utility because sooner or later, you encounter someone — usually at university — who will not budge on the grade. 

This happens to me a number of times each year. Students come to my office and treat grades as a matter of negotiation; not a signifier of what they have learnt and what they can to learn more, or what skills they can better develop. They are often deeply hurt — a number of students cry in my office each year — when I explain that the grade is the grade. If I have made a mistake, point it out, I’ll change it. But, if not ... I can show you how to improve your grades by doing better work but I’m not going to put a grade up. I have a young woman last year in tears tell me that without an “A” in my intro class, her chosen career would never be realized. If she did not, in other words, win the price and demonstrate that she was the best, she would never get into grad school. I tried to explain to this student — that this was not the case; that a grade less than A in an intro course did not end her chosen career before it began. She would have non of it. It struck me then that this might be a personal matter but it also developed out a particular sense about awards and “being the best.” 

For these reasons, and perhaps others, I have a hard time with the “world is hard” argument. There is more to say here, but I’ll hold off because this blog is already getting too long. Feel free, as always, to disagree, modify, question, correct in the comments. 

Myths of Capitalism VI (or, self interest)

Last time, I explained how capitalists use the term efficiency and how it is different from productivity. Indeed, an efficient economy, according to capitalist theory, might not be the most productive. There is, of course, more to say about capitalism, but let's shift gears a bit look at the ethics that underscore capitalism. Capitalism is about economics, but that does not mean that it does not carry with it an ethics. Most people -- including a lot of advocates of capitalism - contend that capitalism is about money. If you've watched the Lang and O'Leary Exchange, you know what I mean. One of the hosts -- who is into money -- also defends capitalism as the way to go. Yet, properly understood capitalist economics is not actually about money. It is about, as I indicated in my last blog, the allocation of goods and services as opposed to just producing more goods and services. And, it is also about individualism.

This is the myth that we we need to explore: capitalists believe that everyone is self interested and that means that everyone is greedy (they want more stuff). Remember the movie Wall Street? I have no doubt that there are a lot of advocates of capitalism out there who think that it is all about self-interest defined as wanting more stuff (or, money). But, does this explanation for human behaviour actually work? Does it make sense?

The answer is no. In fact, there are a number of problems with this way of explaining human behaviour. First, in explaining everything -- all human beings are self-interested -- it explains nothing. Think about it. It tells us that we all react in exactly the same way. If that is the case … why are people so different? Why, when given a choice -- pick your issue, oil sands development, shale gas -- do people react in different ways. If we all supposedly just wanted more, there would be no controversies. Instead, there are controversies because people are different.

But, wait, someone might say, sure people are different but they are all reacting out of self-interest. OK, for the sake of argument, let's allow that to be the case … what explains their different reactions? In other words, even if it is true that people are self-interested (and, I'm pretty darned far from convinced that that is the case), it doesn't help us explain behavioural differences. Hence, its useless as an explanatory framework and, as a capitalist might say, therefore becomes inefficient and should be weeded out of the market.  In other words, material self-interest either explains behaviour, in which case it has problems explaining behavioural differences. Said differently, it is useless because all it tells us this that people are self-interested no matter what they do and so it cannot explain why there are differences between people. It is a weak explanation that does not allow us to grapple with the complexity of human behaviour.

What is more, economists don't actually think that everyone is self interested. Sure … we are all introduced to economic man in our Econ 101 text, but if you stop 100 economists in the street, they will tell you that economic man is a modeling device that, at best, allows economists to very conservatively predict specific economic actions if certain policies are followed. The vast, vast majority of economists accept the fact that there is a lot more to people than material self interest. This proposition (that everyone is self interested) is, in fact, not really scholarly economics. Its more in the way of adolescent philosophy.

That sounds insulting, but I hasten to add what I am insulting is not capitalist economists but pointing out the differences between what they say and what they are often reported as having said. The capitalist economists I know have far more sophisticated ethical propositions and conceptions of human nature. In other words, the idea that everyone is self interested is a myth. If we can clear this myth away, we can start to think about what capitalism actually has to say about human nature. And, what it has to say is actually not much. In other words, human nature is not a question that interests economists as economists very much. They use it for modeling but as a philosophy, capitalism is actually predicated on a neutral position on human nature. (You will recall that I mentioned in an earlier blog that capitalism was a-moral.)

What do I mean by this? I mean that capitalists are more than willing to leave choices up to the individual. Now, they clearly believe in human nature to the extent that they believe in individualism. There are people who reject individualism, but … frankly, not many. Individualism is complicated, to be sure, and I'm no anarchist. What I am saying, however, is that in Canada today, one needs to look pretty long and hard to find someone who does not believe in some form of individualism (say, freedom of expression or conscience or due process of law, etc.). Capitalists don't have a great deal to say about individualism except to say that choices about an individual's life are best left to that individual, provided that they are a legally competent adult.

I noted this point in an earlier blog in my comment on lazy workers.  Why a person is not working is, for a capitalist, not all that important because they have the right to make the decision for themselves. I can attempt to lure them into working by appealing for their help or by offering a bribe (more wages) but exactly why then do not want to work is no business of mine. They might have a sick child; they might be lazy. It is irrelevant because as a legally competent adult, they have the right to be lazy if they want. That is their decision to make and not mine. In effect, this form of individualism becomes a deal: I promise not to mess around with your life and you promise not to mess around with mine. We agree to leave each other to make up our own minds about what is best and most important to us. It might be relaxation (let's call it recreation to make it sound better) for me. It might be work for you. Each of us is making up our own minds.

[As a digression, btw, this is the basis for the argument for same-sex marriage (or, one of them). It is none of my business to tell someone else whom they should or should not marry. As long as the people entering that relationship are legally competent adults and are making their decisions freely … my job is precisely *not* to have a view on it because it is none of my affair, so to speak.]

As this is applied to the economy, this becomes a defense of markets in the following way. The market, we recall, is about matching desires and needs with goods and services. Each individual is their own judge about their own desires (needs, let us assume, are at some level fixed). We let the market make this determination not because it produces more stuff but because I should mind my own business. I have no right to tell another individual that they cannot buy, say, a green shirt because green is an ugly colour (I am wearing green right now). A capitalist supports the market, then, not because it makes more stuff but because it allows individuals great scope to make their own decisions. Again, its not about getting more but about efficient allocation. Since I cannot know what another person actually wants … my best option is to leave it up to them to make that decision, hence markets.

Where does this leave us? It leaves us, again, I hope, some distance from mythology. Capitalism is not about money and everyone being greedy but, in its best form, it is about individuals making up their own minds about what is and is not important for them, what they will and will not pay for. Because I cannot tell what an individual might want or desire, my best course of action is to leave it up to them to make their own decisions, which means making their own purchases or, on an individual level, matching their personal desires with their ability to pay for goods or services.

Minor Controversies

There has been a minor controversy in some of the local papers about Christianity, homosexuality, and salvation. I promised myself I wouldn't say/write anything about this but it is awfully hard not to. The reason I did not want to say/write anything is that this is an old debate. Anyone who engages in it needs to recognize that, by and large, they are not saying anything new. I appreciate the sincerity with which different people put their arguments forward; the seriousness of heir intent, the faith they express. I'm not about to bring some new insight to this debate and my argument is clear: there is no ground on which the state can enact laws the deny equality to gay and this includes marriage. If gays or lesbians want to marry no society that takes its commitment to equality seriously can stop that. To so do would be rank hypocrisy on a social level. Moreover, I suspect that in 10 or 20 years time no one will really care about this debate. Folks: gay and lesbian marriage will not cause the world to fall apart. Moreover, to use a religious rationale to try to stop gay marriage is to enter the potentially dangerous ground of fashioning the laws of state after a particular religious perspective. We've done this in Canada in the past and the results were not good. Let's not repeat a bad history.

The real point I want to make, however, has little to do with political philosophy. Instead, I want to say something about the opposition of some Christians to gay and lesbian marriage. I'm troubled by this and here is why: I hate to say this but I find the vocal opposition of some Christians to gay and lesbian marriage troubling because it comes very close to singling out gay and lesbian Canadians for special prejudicial treatment. It recycles a discourse of discrimination that I would like to see all Canadians put behind them. What I want to do is address this issue from my own perspective as a Christian. The argument some Christians put forward in opposition to gay and lesbian marriage (and, by extension, equality) is flawed for a number of reasons.

First, those who oppose equality (in the form of marriage) for gay people claim to be Christians. And, as Christians, they are fond of saying that their arguments are based on the word of God and the word of God is eternal and infallible. They imagine that their opponents are people who would modify the word of God by historically contextualizing it, or something of the sort. I'm in this camp and this not the case at all. I think the word of God is true, infallible and eternal. I don't question the word; I question human being ability to understand it. My issue is not with the word, my issue is with the spin some people put on the word. The opponents of gay marriage seem to think that stating that the Bible is the eternally true word of God is some sort of trump card. It ain't: its Christianity 101. It is the beginning point of Christianity spirituality; not its end point.

Second, I dislike the intense selectiveness of people who use the Bible to justify positions against equality for gay people. The Bible has a lot of rules in it. To single out gay and lesbian people for special commentary or to single out the institution of straight marriage as somehow deserving special comment or special protection is to suggest that some rules are more important than others. Some people who argue against gay and lesbian marriage suggest that homosexual relations are sinful. For the sake of argument, let's allow this. Even if we did, however, why would one sin be worse than others? I notice most of those who oppose gay and lesbian marriage fail to mention the Great Commission (Matt 26: 16-20). Those Christians who don't practice the Great Commission are violating one of God's laws -- as directly stated by Jesus -- and so are sinning. Why not focus on this? Yet, virtually no Christian who comments on public issues talks about the Great Commission. Why not; its really cool. Do they feel it unimportant? It is the very fact that some Christians single out gay and lesbian people that causes me pause. Instead of writing editorials about the problems of gay marriage, it seems to me that a better approach would be write editorials about love. Yet ....

Going along with this, it seems to me that singling out gay and lesbian people for special treatment could, in fact, violate the Great Commission. As well: Jesus tells us that the two greatest commandments are love God and love your neighbour. Failure to follow these commandments is, one would then assume, pretty distasteful in the eyes of God. How does singling out specific people express love? And, let's be clear on this: God does not say "love everybody except gay people." God's love is unconditional; it is the basis of salvation. Do those who campaign against equality for gay and lesbian people think they know more than God? Do they think they should define for Him the nature of His love? I wonder this: how can campaigning against equality for gay and lesbian people illustrate love? How can campaigning against equality for gay and lesbian people encourage them to be part of the Church? Will it not, instead, drive people out? I could be wrong. I don't have an easy answer to this and I don't think we are supposed to. It seems to me, however, that we should focus on that which brings people together in the Church as opposed to that which drives people out and can inspire animosity against definable groups of people.

A few other quick points:

* Jesus never mentions anything about gay and lesbian people. He mentions a lot of other stuff. He talks about a lot of other sins and speaks at length about the forms of behaviour Christians should follow. Do the opponents of gay marriage think this is an oversight? If gay and lesbian marriage is so important to warrant special commentary on their part, do they think that Jesus just forgot to mention it (because, as I said, He mentions a bunch of other stuff).
* I find the claims of opponents of gay marriage to following the word of God ring hollow because they are not talking about following the word of God. They choose to ignore huge sections of word. The opponents of gay marriage often quote the Old Testament, yet I notice they always ignore things like (I'll pick one example) the rules for dealing with a rebellious son (Deut 21: 18-21). Why? This shows incredible inconsistency.
* The civil society argument: gay marriage in no way threatens churches or the practice of Christianity. No church can, therefore, be forced to perform a marriage, really to anyone regardless of orientation. To state otherwise -- to claim that recognizing the legitimacy of gay and lesbian marriage will result is churches being forced to perform these marriages -- is just plain wrong. (Any one parishioner might or might not object to decisions individual churches have made on their own but that is a different matter.)


Let me sum up: there is no reason in civil society other than prejudice to justify the differential treatment of gay and lesbian people. And, prejudice is not a legitimate argument. Christians who single out gay and lesbian people or have been public and vocal in their opposition to gay and lesbian equality work with a dangerous discourse that naturalizes prejudice. Eventually, I strongly suspect, this entire issue will disappear (women's equality caused a lot of heated discourse as well and, yet, today is so normal no one would debate it). Christian arguments that assert the Bible as the word of God are not a trump card. Far from this, they are common sense to Christians. Telling a Christian that the Bible is the word of God is the equivalent of teling someone that they have to breath in order to live. IOW, it tells us nothing we don't already know. Jesus did not focus on homosexual relations as a matter of special concern. Opponents of gay equality are selective in their interpretation of the Bible. And, opponents of gay marriage tend to treat some sins (remember, I accepted this only for the sake of argument) as more important than others in that they single them out for special condemnation when there is no Biblical evidence (the word of God, remember) that this is what God wants us to do. And, they tend to ignore the message of love and the Great Commission and follow a social practice that is divisive and, from what I can tell, a threat to the Great Commission.

For all these reasons, I think there is good reason for Christians to approach this particular issue cautiously. We should avoid extreme statements, avoid divisiveness, remember the Sermon on the Mount, and get on with our work.