According to news stories Gilles Duceppe is making a comeback. Politicians, it seems, are as prone to comebacks as athletes and aging rock and roll acts. Exactly why comebacks are so popular is a matter of conjecture. Some athletes -- and, one suspects, some musicians -- burn through their money so quickly and have so few other marketable skills that a comeback looks good. And, people are often willing to put a lot of cash on the table to see, say, an aging rock star that you might have missed in your youth. Some might like the roar of the crowd, something that might motivate politicians as well.
In the case of Mr. Duceppe, the issue seems to be name brand recognition. The BQ is in trouble. Current polling suggests, in fact, it could get wiped out in the next federal election. More likely, it will cling to a seat or two, hanging on like the old Social Credit party or Progressives ... without much purpose, organization, or chance of victory. Because of his name brand recognition Mr. Duceppe gives the BQ a fighting chance. Their vote would be concentrated but they'd be fighting deeply and multiply divided federalist parties. If they could secure even 30% of the vote ... well, that would stave off the doom of electoral demise.
Like Mr. Parizeau, however, Mr. Duceppe might be more important for what he represents than for what he might actually accomplish. He is widely respected ... or, at least that is what people keep saying. He's a good public speaker. I'm not certain he's better than Trudeau, Jr., but he's as good as Mulcair and Harper. The problem, however, for the independence movement is precisely the same thing that gives Mr. Duceppe appeal. His name brand recognition also makes him a man of the past and whether or no that is good enough for today is another issue.
Why? It is not that Mr. Duceppe is, himself, out of date. He might be. I don't know. The problem is that electoral success for the BQ, even modest success, would stave off a process of rethinking that the independence movement in Quebec desperately needs if it is to be anything more than a footnote in current politics. I say this because it is important to recognize that we have moved on. The history that Mr. Duceppe represented and the history that he helped to build has become something else. We have, as it were, entered a different era in history. I've commented on this with regard to Canada as a whole in the past (under the rubric of the demise of civic nationalism). I'll take the opportunity here to follow up my comments on Jacques Parizeau and use the cover of a quick commentary on a Duceppe comeback to say a few words about what it means for Quebec.
Here is the history: since the late 1960s, perhaps a bit before, Quebec politics have been polarized between separatists and federalists. The demise of the Union nationale and the rise of the Parti quebecois both made and symbolized this era. The Liberal Party transitioned through both. It came to represent all those who supported federalism and positioned itself as a centre/centre-right party that did not abandon the legacy of the Quiet Revolution but was not in a hurry to extend it either. Where the Union nationale, of a previous era, had been a conservative, provincial rights-type party, the PQ represented a left-nationalist opposition that saw the Liberals as emblematic not just of a federalism they disliked but of a power structure they wanted to reorient. The PQ made common cause with Quebec's unions, supported progressive policies regarding access to post-secondary education and women's rights, among other things. Leading figures in the PQ identified with the left, and Lévesque used the word social democratic to describe himself. The leftism of the PQ was not honoured by all its leading figures and not honoured in all policies, but that discourse which drew together leftist progressivism, independence, and modernity appealed to a lot of Quebecers. It lent the independence movements a progressive politics connected to the union movement.
From the late 1960s and then more concertedly in the 1970s, these two political forces battled each other. The Quebec electorate indicated that they were willing to trust the PQ with government but ultimately rejected its cause. Even more importantly, the conflict between the PQ and the Liberals worked in both their favours by allowing them to mobilize voting blocks and keeping potential challengers to their own hegemony at bay. The result was an oddly skewed political spectrum in which it proved difficult for alternative voices to find space on a sustained level. The Equality Party and the ADQ made some splash but not enough to make a sustained dent in provincial political life. Likewise, at the federal level, over time the Liberals and BQ battled each other. Brian Mulroney's PCs made more of a dent but evaporated quickly and, it seems, relatively quietly leaving few traces at the federal level after Jean Charest exited the scene and jumped the conservative ship.
Mr. Duceppe symbolizes the triumph of this particular era in Quebec politics as much as other political figures we might name (Jean Chretien springs to mind or Brian Mulroney as a failed mirror image looking to develop a different way of thinking about Quebec politics). He began his life on the left, a communist of sorts and student activist cum union organizer who emerged on the federal political scene as the first elected member of the BQ (the others had been elected but for different parties, crossing the floor as it were). He became a leading figure in a party whose growth, in fact, helped to destroy conservative efforts to build an alternative to the Liberal-federalist/Independentiste political axis. It is, in this sense, appropriate that it was the failure of the Meech Lake Accord (a political deal that looked to build -- for right or wrong -- an alternative image of Quebec in Canada) that led to the rise of the BQ. In this sense, the rise of the BQ symbolized the "return of the repressed": separatists who had briefly supported the Conservatives because of their position on Quebec autonomy within Canada, abandoned the Party and left it with little popular or political support in the province. The BQ decimated its opponents in its early days, leaving only the Liberals standing as potential alternatives to it, confirming the binary structure of Quebec politics and, with Duceppe as one of its key figures, discursively building connections between leftist-progressivism and independence. Many of my friends (most of whom would describe themselves as progressives) actually liked most BQ policies, excepting separatism.
Mr. Duceppe's movement into leadership in the BQ was appropriate. And, the fact that the BQ was an opposition party -- and would never be anything but an opposition party, by design -- meant that it could maintain its ideological position. The provincial PQ, in government, did not. It looked to build connections to the business community, to find ways to balance the books and address taxes, to both support and mollify student protesters at the same time. Duceppe was supposed to jump to the PQ but he never did and, in my view, he never could. If he had, his progressive ideas would have been tested by the realities of power, by a different and more pressing political economy, and by the tax policies and diversity issues that pressed the PQ in government and pushed it, bit-by-bit away from the left wing of spectrum. In might have made a nice story: Mr. Duceppe jumping into provincial politics and becoming premier (as had Bouchard before him), but he himself did not seem to want to move in that direction, I suspect for the same reasons I have laid out. He himself realized that he'd need to consider policies that ran deeply against his personal beliefs, deeply against the type of Quebec he wanted to see become an independent country, and deeply against the grain of the people who supported him.
In the meantime, not only did the PQ change but Quebec changed as well. The PQ's inability to hold together its mix of nationalism and leftist progressivism is, in my view, hardly surprising. We don't need to get into why that is the case here (perhaps I'll address it in another blog on Plan B Nationalism) and the policy shifts in the PQ were likely over-determined: the 2010s are not the 1970s. The key point is this: as the PQ moved to the right it was able to disguise this movement for a while by virtue of the fact that the Liberals were further to the right and by mobilizing the discourse of the Quiet Revolution and its legacy. The problem with this was that no matter how ideologically important the Quiet Revolution is as touchstone of Quebecois history ... it was long time ago. I was born as it was ending. It no longer marked a great divide in the same way as it did for previous generations and appealing to it seemed to ring a bit hollow to the students on the streets protesting current policies.
At the same time, the PQ seemed beset on all fronts. It drifted to the political right and this drift did several things. It allowed the worst face of nationalism to come to the surface in the so-called "secular charter." The thinly disguised legalized prejudice that this bill would have mandated cost the PQ its progressive bona fides. The PQ leadership did their best to dress the secular charter up as a defense of women's rights and as a progressive piece of legislation but there was actually little way to disguise what would have been its true effects, particular to urban and suburban progressive voters who abandoned the PQ in droves. Thus, the PQ found itself in a classic dilemma -- to appeal to voters it needed to modify its policies but that same modification drove off people who might otherwise be committed supporters.
On economic issues, the drift of the PQ to the right undercut its support among unionists. The trumpeting of union-busting Pierre Karl Péladeau as a star candidate and then leader seriously cut into the PQ's left wing bona fides with the result that the PQ bled votes on the left to a new socialist and nationalist political party Quebec solidaire. Right now, Quebec solidaire is a force only in a handful of Montreal riding but these are riding the PQ would otherwise have won. The fact is that the PQ's victory must now be won against other separatists.
There is little doubt that the declining popularity of the separatism hurt the PQ as well. This much is self evident but the effect might be more unusual than most people realize. The declining popularity of separatism normalized Quebec politics in a way that removed the immediate pressing need to vote for federalism or separatism. In other words, since separatism was going down to defeat anyway, why not vote on other grounds and for someone else? The evidence for this view was oddly provided by the PQ itself in the degree to which the PQ tried to avoid the issue of separatism when in power since they had no desire to play a losing hand. In other words, voting for the PQ meant voting for a government; not a political project. Since the PQ itself conceded that that project was off the table ... well ... why vote PQ or Liberal? Why not vote ADQ or CAQ or QS? On the federal level ... why not vote NDP? It is progressive, no? It has a leadership that is committed to supporting Quebecers and defending their rights? And, it has connections to progressives in other parts of the country.
The question Gilles Duceppe needs to answer before he makes a comeback is this: is he equipped to deal with this situation. To be sure, there are a lot of old-time politicos "out there" -- not least in the Canadian anglophone media -- who will love to see him coming. He will, in the short run, boost the votes of the BQ. What the BQ needs to address, however, is a diverse situation if it wants to be more than an opposition party. In Quebec it no longer has the progressive political ground to itself. Both the NDP and the Liberals will run campaigns that try to stake out the same ground. It will have the independence ground to itself but whether or not that is the trigger voting issue is an open question. People like Duceppe and some will vote for him. In my view, however, that will be more nostalgia than good politics.
Showing posts with label Quebec. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Quebec. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Remembering Parizeau: Marking Time and Politics
Jacques Parizeau's death marks an era of history. I never met the man and, to be honest, have what must be the exact opposite vision of Canada. I am not writing an obituary, or a commemoration; nor do I want to transform his death into a moment of national self-reflection. I feel for his family: they have lost someone they love and we should respect that. Parizeau's death means, as well, a great deal to those with whom he made common cause or who supported the idea of Quebec independence. What I have to say about Parizeau is not an insult. Instead, what I want to suggest is that Parizeau's own dynamics, his own ideas, and his own contradictions marked out an era in time and a debate, and one side of that debate. Parizeau, in other words, is being honoured for many things. Perhaps rightly so. What I want to address is what he and his era and politics represented. It is, I want to suggest, the very contradictory tendencies that Parizeau represented that encapsulate an era.
First, Parizeau is being honoured by everyone as a builder of modern Quebec. Here, Parizeau is honoured as a person who helped create the fiscal and policy infrastructure of the Quebec that has allowed the provincial state to act, effectively in many instances, in that province. Good, but why honour Parizeau in this way and would he be happy with this acknowledgement? Honouring Parizeau as an architect of the state de-politicizes his message and, frankly, his politics. It is an odd form of honouring because it places Parizeau in a company he might not otherwise want to keep. Modern Quebec was built by a great many people. It is not simply attached to the independence project. Indeed, the same claim can be made about many federalist leaders. What this type of honouring does is actually to strip Parizeau of his controversy and his goal. It makes for a safe form of remembering, one that avoids the political conflicts he was so intimately attached to in his life and that, as a cabinet minister and Premier, he helped to create. I don't want to be too hard on people making these types of statements about Parizeau. I get it. We should reflect on the best of a person after they pass. I actually don't disagree with that. But, there is something inaccurate about trying to remember Parizeau without separatism. It is, as if, the goal and objectives for which he fought were edited from history by the very people honouring him.
Second, there is another issue that I feel quite bad raising that relates to politics but it won't be the last time I wonder such things as I put this blog together. English-language media and public figures have a particularly difficult time figuring out how to address Parizeau. This is different from René Lévesque, with whom English-language media had a love/hate relationship that turned mainly to love after his death. I recall someone even talking about Lévesque as a "great Canadian." Parizeau presents a different challenge because he was not well liked. There was no love to go with the hate. This is complicated for federalists (perhaps English-language federalists like myself) because Parizeau failed at his key goal. Canada exists today, and we have this conundrum of memory today, because Parizeau did not succeed. If he had, I would not be writing this blog. This raises questions about how we commemorate failure?
Parizeau, importantly, had his own answer. He argued two things. First, failure occurred because of "money and the ethnic vote." I listened, sadly, to Gilles Duceppe trying to apologize for this comment on the news the other night. I wish he hadn't because, well, the minute we start apologizing for prejudice ... that is the minute we are starting to have serious problems. I won't get into the substance of what Duceppe had to say, but it amounted to arguing that there was in fact an "ethnic vote" that was consciously put together to oppose separatism and that the ethnic vote leaders now admit this. In Canada we are all well aware of voting patterns. We study these all the time. We have them with regard to language, gender, class, ethnicity, region, etc. But, Duceppe was not making this point. He was coming very close to "blaming the victims." He did not use precisely these words but he came very close to arguing that Parizeau was right. The ethnic vote is to blame and the ethnic vote is something a bit different -- even if in an unspecified way -- from a Quebecer vote. How should we commemorate this way of thinking? Indeed, even to raise the question, as I have done, introduces a host of problems and uneasy feelings. Someone could accuse me of trying to make my own political hay. If that is you ... well ... sorry. I'm trying to focus on the analytic issue. How can we, should we, do we, remember things about people and politics of the past (even the recent past) that we don't really want to? They are part of history, part of the record, part of a person ... do we send them out? Do we recall them even when they seem to point to a disturbing and marginalizing cultural trends?
Parizeau's other answer was that the supporters of independence needed to ask a straight question. On this point, I have a world of respect for his philosophy because politically, a straight question was a non-starter. When asked clearly and directly "do you want to separate from Canada" Quebecers said "no" in overwhelming numbers. The fact that Parizeau continually argued that independence forces should ask a straight question shows his commitment to transparency and democracy ....
except ... he didn't actually do that when he was in power. And, here is another odd contradictory characteristic. When he was out of power, Parizeau was a man of his principles. When he was in power, he wasn't. I listened to a CBC discussion the other night about how Parizeau was a man who did not accept "Plan B" (I can blog on what this actually means in another entry because "Plan B nationalism" actually has a specific meaning.) Lévesque or Bouchard may have opted for some version of sovereignty-association, but not Parizeau, so this story went, he embraced outright independence. A line from the story went something like "for Parizeau, there was no Plan B."
But, there was ... and in both referenda. Parizeau was one of the leading cabinet ministers in the historic first PQ administration. He was a member of the cabinet that made up the first referendum question that asked Quebecers not about independence but about whether or not the government had a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, with any results put before the electorate in a subsequent referendum. The 1995 question was as follows:
I don't mean to belabour the point, but neither of these propositions asks a direct question. In 1995, you have, in fact, to know something about other legislation that was passed by the National Assembly. The question is also, if I might offer my own views, not a little disingenuous. I listed to a PQ supporter years ago, during the referendum, say "everyone knows what this means." This is not an exact quote. My memory is not that good but the substance of the discussion that ensued was as follows. The journalist (an Anglo) said "so it is a referendum on independence." The supporter said "no. It is about this question." "So," the journalist said, "you are not asking Quebecers for independence?" "Of course we are," was the response. "We are Pequistes." The question, in other words, seemed broad enough and had enough wiggle room that it could masquerade as more than one thing. It could be interpreted both as support for independence at the same time that it could be interpreted as a mandate to renew the relationship between Quebec and Canada within some form of federalism.
My point is both these specific questions and Parizeau's supposed refusal of Plan B. He refused it only when he was out of office. In office, and in practice, he embraced it. Even if he did not like it, his Quebec was a Quebec that never asked Quebecers directly if they wanted to be independent.
This is an interesting characteristic that permeates an era in Quebec political history and that is, ultimately, what I think it is important about it. This was an era in Quebec and in Canada, that talked continuously about independence. But, shied away from asking the question directly. Strong talk, strong words, were evident on all sides; but direct talk to the electorate ... when it really, really counted, for one reason or another at that point leaders shied away; even the most committed Plan A advocates (and, we can take Parizeau to be one) backed down and instead asked about Plan B. In effect, they soft sold their own goals.
Finally, we should note that there is much more that could be said but I want to return to the "money and the ethnic vote" comment. I don't want to belabour this comment; I really do not. Everyones says dumb things now and then and I am sure that Mr. Parizeau, if he could have had those words back, would not have said them. What is important here is not to tar Mr. Parizeau with a racist brush. I never knew the man but let us grant him honesty and integrity. My comment is cultural. The PQ was never able to succeed where other nationalisms have failed. All nationalisms, in one way or another, ultimately end up playing with fire because they are about divisions in society. No matter how much we spin it, ethnically-based nationalism divides the world up in ethnic and/or linguistic groups; it divides the world up into "us" (members of the nation) and "them" (others). The nation, in other words, cannot embrace everyone; otherwise, there would be no cause for separatism.
Quebec nationalists -- because of their history, because of their beliefs, because of their politics, because they were smart people -- tried as hard as anyone, I suspect, has ever tried to build a progressive and encompassing nationalism. And, they may have succeeded to a much greater extent than any other nationalism. But, failures mixed with their successes and this is what the "ethnic vote" comment signifies. It does not signify anything inherently evil lurking in Parizeau's character. It signifies, however, how difficult it is create distance between nationalism and prejudice.
This difficulty is complicated on the economic front by a transition that Parizeau was also part of: the transition in the independence movement from social democratic (words Lévesque liked) to neo-liberal. Parizeau supported the independence of Quebec but one always had the suspicion that his Quebec was not a Scandinavian-type social democracy but a more-or-less capitalist country: Quebec, Inc. In some ways, that transition is now fully complete. The PQ is bleeding votes on its left to Quebec Solidaire and its key voting base seems increasingly rural. There may be many socialists and social democrats left in the PQ, but they do not rule the roost in a party that has turned increasingly to the right.
Parizeau's death is a moment of memory and sadness for his family. I hope they can celebrate his life and his love of them. Parizeau's death did not cause the end of an ear but, I suspect, it symbolizes one. The transitions through which Quebec and Canada have moved over the last generation and of which Parizeau were multiple, contradiction, and tension filled. That, it seems to me, is not Parizeau's legacy but the themes his history marks out.
First, Parizeau is being honoured by everyone as a builder of modern Quebec. Here, Parizeau is honoured as a person who helped create the fiscal and policy infrastructure of the Quebec that has allowed the provincial state to act, effectively in many instances, in that province. Good, but why honour Parizeau in this way and would he be happy with this acknowledgement? Honouring Parizeau as an architect of the state de-politicizes his message and, frankly, his politics. It is an odd form of honouring because it places Parizeau in a company he might not otherwise want to keep. Modern Quebec was built by a great many people. It is not simply attached to the independence project. Indeed, the same claim can be made about many federalist leaders. What this type of honouring does is actually to strip Parizeau of his controversy and his goal. It makes for a safe form of remembering, one that avoids the political conflicts he was so intimately attached to in his life and that, as a cabinet minister and Premier, he helped to create. I don't want to be too hard on people making these types of statements about Parizeau. I get it. We should reflect on the best of a person after they pass. I actually don't disagree with that. But, there is something inaccurate about trying to remember Parizeau without separatism. It is, as if, the goal and objectives for which he fought were edited from history by the very people honouring him.
Second, there is another issue that I feel quite bad raising that relates to politics but it won't be the last time I wonder such things as I put this blog together. English-language media and public figures have a particularly difficult time figuring out how to address Parizeau. This is different from René Lévesque, with whom English-language media had a love/hate relationship that turned mainly to love after his death. I recall someone even talking about Lévesque as a "great Canadian." Parizeau presents a different challenge because he was not well liked. There was no love to go with the hate. This is complicated for federalists (perhaps English-language federalists like myself) because Parizeau failed at his key goal. Canada exists today, and we have this conundrum of memory today, because Parizeau did not succeed. If he had, I would not be writing this blog. This raises questions about how we commemorate failure?
Parizeau, importantly, had his own answer. He argued two things. First, failure occurred because of "money and the ethnic vote." I listened, sadly, to Gilles Duceppe trying to apologize for this comment on the news the other night. I wish he hadn't because, well, the minute we start apologizing for prejudice ... that is the minute we are starting to have serious problems. I won't get into the substance of what Duceppe had to say, but it amounted to arguing that there was in fact an "ethnic vote" that was consciously put together to oppose separatism and that the ethnic vote leaders now admit this. In Canada we are all well aware of voting patterns. We study these all the time. We have them with regard to language, gender, class, ethnicity, region, etc. But, Duceppe was not making this point. He was coming very close to "blaming the victims." He did not use precisely these words but he came very close to arguing that Parizeau was right. The ethnic vote is to blame and the ethnic vote is something a bit different -- even if in an unspecified way -- from a Quebecer vote. How should we commemorate this way of thinking? Indeed, even to raise the question, as I have done, introduces a host of problems and uneasy feelings. Someone could accuse me of trying to make my own political hay. If that is you ... well ... sorry. I'm trying to focus on the analytic issue. How can we, should we, do we, remember things about people and politics of the past (even the recent past) that we don't really want to? They are part of history, part of the record, part of a person ... do we send them out? Do we recall them even when they seem to point to a disturbing and marginalizing cultural trends?
Parizeau's other answer was that the supporters of independence needed to ask a straight question. On this point, I have a world of respect for his philosophy because politically, a straight question was a non-starter. When asked clearly and directly "do you want to separate from Canada" Quebecers said "no" in overwhelming numbers. The fact that Parizeau continually argued that independence forces should ask a straight question shows his commitment to transparency and democracy ....
except ... he didn't actually do that when he was in power. And, here is another odd contradictory characteristic. When he was out of power, Parizeau was a man of his principles. When he was in power, he wasn't. I listened to a CBC discussion the other night about how Parizeau was a man who did not accept "Plan B" (I can blog on what this actually means in another entry because "Plan B nationalism" actually has a specific meaning.) Lévesque or Bouchard may have opted for some version of sovereignty-association, but not Parizeau, so this story went, he embraced outright independence. A line from the story went something like "for Parizeau, there was no Plan B."
But, there was ... and in both referenda. Parizeau was one of the leading cabinet ministers in the historic first PQ administration. He was a member of the cabinet that made up the first referendum question that asked Quebecers not about independence but about whether or not the government had a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, with any results put before the electorate in a subsequent referendum. The 1995 question was as follows:
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?
I don't mean to belabour the point, but neither of these propositions asks a direct question. In 1995, you have, in fact, to know something about other legislation that was passed by the National Assembly. The question is also, if I might offer my own views, not a little disingenuous. I listed to a PQ supporter years ago, during the referendum, say "everyone knows what this means." This is not an exact quote. My memory is not that good but the substance of the discussion that ensued was as follows. The journalist (an Anglo) said "so it is a referendum on independence." The supporter said "no. It is about this question." "So," the journalist said, "you are not asking Quebecers for independence?" "Of course we are," was the response. "We are Pequistes." The question, in other words, seemed broad enough and had enough wiggle room that it could masquerade as more than one thing. It could be interpreted both as support for independence at the same time that it could be interpreted as a mandate to renew the relationship between Quebec and Canada within some form of federalism.
My point is both these specific questions and Parizeau's supposed refusal of Plan B. He refused it only when he was out of office. In office, and in practice, he embraced it. Even if he did not like it, his Quebec was a Quebec that never asked Quebecers directly if they wanted to be independent.
This is an interesting characteristic that permeates an era in Quebec political history and that is, ultimately, what I think it is important about it. This was an era in Quebec and in Canada, that talked continuously about independence. But, shied away from asking the question directly. Strong talk, strong words, were evident on all sides; but direct talk to the electorate ... when it really, really counted, for one reason or another at that point leaders shied away; even the most committed Plan A advocates (and, we can take Parizeau to be one) backed down and instead asked about Plan B. In effect, they soft sold their own goals.
Finally, we should note that there is much more that could be said but I want to return to the "money and the ethnic vote" comment. I don't want to belabour this comment; I really do not. Everyones says dumb things now and then and I am sure that Mr. Parizeau, if he could have had those words back, would not have said them. What is important here is not to tar Mr. Parizeau with a racist brush. I never knew the man but let us grant him honesty and integrity. My comment is cultural. The PQ was never able to succeed where other nationalisms have failed. All nationalisms, in one way or another, ultimately end up playing with fire because they are about divisions in society. No matter how much we spin it, ethnically-based nationalism divides the world up in ethnic and/or linguistic groups; it divides the world up into "us" (members of the nation) and "them" (others). The nation, in other words, cannot embrace everyone; otherwise, there would be no cause for separatism.
Quebec nationalists -- because of their history, because of their beliefs, because of their politics, because they were smart people -- tried as hard as anyone, I suspect, has ever tried to build a progressive and encompassing nationalism. And, they may have succeeded to a much greater extent than any other nationalism. But, failures mixed with their successes and this is what the "ethnic vote" comment signifies. It does not signify anything inherently evil lurking in Parizeau's character. It signifies, however, how difficult it is create distance between nationalism and prejudice.
This difficulty is complicated on the economic front by a transition that Parizeau was also part of: the transition in the independence movement from social democratic (words Lévesque liked) to neo-liberal. Parizeau supported the independence of Quebec but one always had the suspicion that his Quebec was not a Scandinavian-type social democracy but a more-or-less capitalist country: Quebec, Inc. In some ways, that transition is now fully complete. The PQ is bleeding votes on its left to Quebec Solidaire and its key voting base seems increasingly rural. There may be many socialists and social democrats left in the PQ, but they do not rule the roost in a party that has turned increasingly to the right.
Parizeau's death is a moment of memory and sadness for his family. I hope they can celebrate his life and his love of them. Parizeau's death did not cause the end of an ear but, I suspect, it symbolizes one. The transitions through which Quebec and Canada have moved over the last generation and of which Parizeau were multiple, contradiction, and tension filled. That, it seems to me, is not Parizeau's legacy but the themes his history marks out.
Friday, February 17, 2012
Religious Freedom
The Globe and Mail reports this interesting decision:
Quebec introduced a mandatory course on religion into its public schools in 2008. The course focuses on the French Canada's Catholic heritage but also includes consideration (as I understand it) of a broad range of other religious traditions, particularly those that have been important in Canada, such as Judaism and aboriginal religions. A couple challenged the fact that their children could not "opt out" of this course, again, as I understand it, because, they argued, the teaching of other religions was a threat to their own religious freedom. Here is more coverage of this issue:
Sunday, December 11, 2011
The Bloc’s new leader puts a positive spin on some grim numbers - The Globe and Mail
And, since I'm reading the Globe, I might as well note this story:
Let me say, first I don't feel bad for the new leader of the Bloc (Daniel Paillé). He has his work cut out for him but I suspect that the Bloc has some life left in it yet. And, he does have a committed core group of followers.
What I might says is that Paillé is a left over from the Parizeau PQ regime, a hard core separatist who uses a Parizeau type discourse. His election is not surprising. After all ... who else was the BQ going to elect? They really only have their hard core left. Historically, parties reduced to their hard core will often go with a proven product, someone whose public statements and politics are predictable. Politically, this is makes sense: a party looking to rebuild does not want to loose canon but someone who can stick to point and garner time to re-energize activists. This is true whether one is a supporter of independence for Quebec or not. The federal Liberals did the same thing in picking Bob Rae to lead the charge while they figure out what to do.
What interests me is the language he continues to mobilize about "insults" to Quebec values. Does this language of insulting Quebec "play" any more? Does it appeal to the disaffected voter in Three Rivers? Or, the under-employed university grad in Quebec City? He believes it and so does the hard core, but does anyone else?
Monday, July 18, 2011
History doesn’t bear out Harper’s hopes for brief NDP honeymoon in Quebec - The Globe and Mail
The analysis is this article is a bit simplistic but interesting:
If I had to guess ... I wouldn't. There are other examples that might be listed of failed honeymoons (United Farmers in Ontario, the ADQ in QC) and near miss honeymoons (the Liberal "resurgence in MN under Carstairs, COR in NB, Farmer-Labour in NS) and successful ones (United Farmers in Alberta, UN in QC) or near miss (the Creditistes hung on for 15 years, I'd need to check, as a minority group in QC). The issue is complex, but the author's overall point is correct. The history of the NDP -- when looked at dispassionately -- does not suggest that people elect them and run away shortly thereafter. Bob Rae was the exception; not the rule.
I don't necessarily see why, Quebecers would back away from the NDP. Public opinion surveys suggest that Quebecers are as divided on political issues as other Canadians, but that the Quebec political spectrum (overall) is more amenable to the NDP then the Conservatives. And, Quebecers are aware that they have elected an opposition party. They are not looking for the NDP to "deliver the goods" but to represent a particular perspective. I expect the NDP will be able to do this and I suspect that phalanx of Quebecers elected under their banner will help them.
Monday, August 23, 2010
The Bloc
A lot of English-speaking political pundits don't like the Bloc or anything that keeps it winning seats in Quebec. The story in the Globe is a case in point. Here, the blame has been spread around so that the provincial Liberals are also under fire. The host of sins laid at the feat of the Bloc are many. Extreme comments paint them as a treasonous, and suggest that they should be dealt with in that way. Less extreme but still fairly strong views suggest that if only Quebec's political elites didn't play with separatism to get what they want out of federalism, the Bloc would have withered and died. John Ibbitson in Open and Shut goes so far to suggest that Canada cannot get a majority federal government as long as the Bloc is about and that maybe a test -- say, an oath of Loyalty to the constitution -- should be brought in for MPs.
My view is that this perspective is more an ill-considered expression of frustration that severely misses the mark in terms of what might be wrong with Canadian democracy, then it is a reasoned critique of the Bloc. Let me be clear: democracy is not about electing majorities. Democracy, as Rosa Luxemberg once said, is democracy for the other. It seems really easy and almost reasonable to limit other people's choices so that they might support yours. It is undemocratic. The people in Quebec are Canadian citizens; they have every right to form political parties like any other Canadian and vote for whom they please like any other Canadian. The fact that someone may not like their choices .... has little to do with anyway. To deny them their choices is to deny democracy. Or, to put this slightly differently, to cast aspersions on their choices or to try to find a sneaky way to eliminate their choices is no more democratic than to suggest that the folks in Saskatchewan are somehow doing something wrong by electing the Saskatchewan Party.
One can have reasoned disagreements with Saskatchewan Party policy (or, say Wildrose policies if one is in Alberta) and that is fair enough. Reasoned debate is the stuff of democracy. But, to suggest that a choice is illegitimate because one does not like it or because it impedes the abilities of one's favoured choice to gain a majority is not.
And, let us be clear, the Bloc is not a radical party. I don't support their aims. Anyone who has read this blog knows I'm a federalist. But, the Bloc's policies do not include ethnic cleansing, say, or something revolutionary. Indeed, in some ways, their policies are pretty staid, if one compares them to other ethnic or language based separatist movements in other parts of the world. They are responsible; do their job in Parliament, and play by the rules of the federal political game.
Finally, blaming the Bloc also misses the point. The Liberal majorities of the Chretien era were, potentially, artificial because of the nature of the first past the post electoral system. The Bloc did not stop the Liberals, however, from winning three straight majorities. The Conservatives have not been able to gain a majority because the majority of Canadians don't like their policies and don't want to see them in government. The same might have been true of the Chretien Liberals -- although I am less certain about this -- but what we can say is that a larger majority of Canadians don't like the Conservatives then did not like the Liberals. Canada, in other words, does not have a majority Conservative government because something close to 2/3rds of Canadians -- depending on which poll you read -- don't want the Conservatives in office. That is their problem; not the Bloc.
My view is that this perspective is more an ill-considered expression of frustration that severely misses the mark in terms of what might be wrong with Canadian democracy, then it is a reasoned critique of the Bloc. Let me be clear: democracy is not about electing majorities. Democracy, as Rosa Luxemberg once said, is democracy for the other. It seems really easy and almost reasonable to limit other people's choices so that they might support yours. It is undemocratic. The people in Quebec are Canadian citizens; they have every right to form political parties like any other Canadian and vote for whom they please like any other Canadian. The fact that someone may not like their choices .... has little to do with anyway. To deny them their choices is to deny democracy. Or, to put this slightly differently, to cast aspersions on their choices or to try to find a sneaky way to eliminate their choices is no more democratic than to suggest that the folks in Saskatchewan are somehow doing something wrong by electing the Saskatchewan Party.
One can have reasoned disagreements with Saskatchewan Party policy (or, say Wildrose policies if one is in Alberta) and that is fair enough. Reasoned debate is the stuff of democracy. But, to suggest that a choice is illegitimate because one does not like it or because it impedes the abilities of one's favoured choice to gain a majority is not.
And, let us be clear, the Bloc is not a radical party. I don't support their aims. Anyone who has read this blog knows I'm a federalist. But, the Bloc's policies do not include ethnic cleansing, say, or something revolutionary. Indeed, in some ways, their policies are pretty staid, if one compares them to other ethnic or language based separatist movements in other parts of the world. They are responsible; do their job in Parliament, and play by the rules of the federal political game.
Finally, blaming the Bloc also misses the point. The Liberal majorities of the Chretien era were, potentially, artificial because of the nature of the first past the post electoral system. The Bloc did not stop the Liberals, however, from winning three straight majorities. The Conservatives have not been able to gain a majority because the majority of Canadians don't like their policies and don't want to see them in government. The same might have been true of the Chretien Liberals -- although I am less certain about this -- but what we can say is that a larger majority of Canadians don't like the Conservatives then did not like the Liberals. Canada, in other words, does not have a majority Conservative government because something close to 2/3rds of Canadians -- depending on which poll you read -- don't want the Conservatives in office. That is their problem; not the Bloc.
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Quebec is a nation ....
Is Quebec a nation? The answer, according to Prime Minister Harper, is “yes”, within Canada. Others are less sure. Gilles Duceppe, a big fan of the “nation” designation for Quebec, waffled before agreeing to support a proposed resolution in the federal Parliament that would, in effect, say that Parliament recognizes Quebecers as a nation because the words “in a united Canada” were included in the resolution. Michael Ignatieff feels vindicated because he took a lot of hear earlier this year for suggesting something similar. Jack Layton and the NDP will support this resolution because they always have, or so Mr. Layton says. Claire Hoy, on the Michael Coran show (CTS), freaked out. Quebec, he said, is not a nation; its a province. According to Hoy, this resolution is the thin edge of the wedge. Pretty soon, he said, the Supreme Court will get hold of this designation and start doing horrible things. What horrible things? Well ... Hoy didn’t actually say but they will be truly, truly horrible .... So ... is Quebec a nation? Are Quebecois(es) a nation?
Well ... of course Quebec is a nation. The only thing Mr. Hoy demonstrated in rejecting this designation is that he has no idea what a nation actually is (he seems to have confused the term “nation” and “state”). This begs the far more important question: what does being a nation mean? If there is a merit to Mr. Harper’s it allows us to address this issue and understand its importance for Quebecers. This resolution is about how we define Quebec difference from the rest of Canada. What is missing in the discussion so far is three things: (1) an understanding of the importance of self-definition, (2) an understanding of the complex character of Quebec society, and (3) some consideration of the implications of collective definitions. A blog is too short a space to address these points systematically so let me say just a few words on each.
First, a resolution in Parliament that defines Quebec as a nation is about self-definition and having others accept that definition. Defining a group of people as a nation is not be about “making the grade”, as if this collective self-definition implied access to some sort of exclusive international club. The problem with public discourse on the “is Quebec a nation” question is that it proceeds as if we have not had the last generation of scholarship on the meaning of the term nation. It used to be the case -- when I was an undergraduate -- that the term “nation” was deployed in specific circumstances when a group of people met a series of pre-determined an abstract criteria. I can even remember a good part of the definition: a nation is a group of people sharing a coherent geographic territory and marked by a common culture, shared historical experience, and common language and/or religion. Moreover, there was an assumed equivalency between a nation and a state: where the nation existed so to did (or, should) the state.
Contemporary scholarship casts doubts on this static conception of nation. Nations, contemporary scholarship has it, are historical formations. They are “imaginative”, not in the sense that they are fantasy, but in the sense that they exist or do not exist on the basis of belief. A nation is called into being when people believe they are a nation and not because an intellectual or academic or political figure decides a nation exists. What all this means is that the ideal of nation is shifting. Contemporary definitions pay less attention to language as a spoken mode of communication and more attention to language as a shared system of signification. Older definitions of nation were one-shot deals: being a member of nation X meant that one could not be a member of nation Y (for example, one was either a Scot or a Briton; one could not be both). More recent conceptions of nation would lead us to question this zero sum approach to nationality. It is also now clear that the exact connection between nation and state is problematic, as opposed to direct. There are, in all likelihood, thousands of state-less nations in the world and no state contains only a single nation.
Does this mean that the designation “nation” is meaningless? Is it a cultural construction that has no trans-historical reality? Perhaps, but that does not mean it is meaningless. There are a variety of reasons why the designation “nation” is meaningful but, it seems to me, the most pressing is that it can involve a process of self-definition. In the past, denying a people the status of “nation” was held to be the equivalent of denying self-determination. Perhaps, but today the stakes are different. To deny a group of people a name they take on themselves is to reject their right to define themselves. For instance, if Quebecers wanted to be a considered a nation and if English Canadians rejected that, what English Canadians would be rejecting is not an international status, but a group of people’s conception of themselves. English Canadians would, in effect, be claiming the right to define who Quebecers were; to prescribe to Quebecers their sense of collective self. Infringing the right of a people to define themselves would, in my view, be deeply undemocratic. The stakes are not, therefore, meaningless. If Quebecers support this designation -- a nation within Canada -- and I think they clearly do, then recognition of this sense of self on the part of English Canada is a good thing. It shows respect for democracy and the right of self-definition.
This said, I also think it needs to be acknowledged that Quebec is not a monolithic entity. If most Quebecers support this conception of Quebec, then, there is reason, in a democratic society, to consider it seriously and, I believe, support it. Accepting Quebecers self-conception as a nation does not, of course, in a democratic society, mean that the debate is over. I suspect it is not over in Quebec. Folks who oppose this resolution and the idea that stands behind it, in a democracy, retain their right to speak in reason on the issue. Those who support it, in a democratic society, are obligated to listen in respect. Quebec is a diverse province; Quebecois(es) will be a diverse nation. Quebec will be no more monolithic than Canada. Designating Quebec as a nation within Canada will not change that. There will still be issues with First Nations to be addressed; issues of settlement and diversity within Quebec; the problems caused by socio-economic inequality go no where because of this designation. Whatever the exact wording of this resolution, English Canadians have to stop thinking about Quebec as a single entity. The longer they do, the longer they will not understanding Quebecois(es). This should be easy. After all: Canada is a pretty diverse place and its a nation. The same thing can and needs to be said for Quebec.
Finally, what are the implications of this. Is Hoy right? The resolution opens the door for Supreme Court meddling in political affairs that will bring disaster in their wake? Well ... the short answer is we don’t know. I’ve argued that this resolution is meaningful in a cultural and discursive sense and that culture and discourse are important. Is it meaningful in a constitutional sense. I suspect it is, but in ways that actually work with existing divisions of power in Canada and the already established differences (noted in the constitution) between Quebec and the Rest of Canada. In other words, there is a framework that the court will need to consider if it has to rule on anything that involves Quebec’s national status. But, prognostications of disaster are clearly premature and, in fact, irresponsible. The simple fact that Hoy could not tell us what disaster was about to happen is a mark of the fact that he’s just sowing discord. Let’s wait and see. There are implications to this resolution but they are not clear. And, if they are not clear, I see no reason to assume they will bring disaster in their wake. The opposite is just as possible.
Well ... of course Quebec is a nation. The only thing Mr. Hoy demonstrated in rejecting this designation is that he has no idea what a nation actually is (he seems to have confused the term “nation” and “state”). This begs the far more important question: what does being a nation mean? If there is a merit to Mr. Harper’s it allows us to address this issue and understand its importance for Quebecers. This resolution is about how we define Quebec difference from the rest of Canada. What is missing in the discussion so far is three things: (1) an understanding of the importance of self-definition, (2) an understanding of the complex character of Quebec society, and (3) some consideration of the implications of collective definitions. A blog is too short a space to address these points systematically so let me say just a few words on each.
First, a resolution in Parliament that defines Quebec as a nation is about self-definition and having others accept that definition. Defining a group of people as a nation is not be about “making the grade”, as if this collective self-definition implied access to some sort of exclusive international club. The problem with public discourse on the “is Quebec a nation” question is that it proceeds as if we have not had the last generation of scholarship on the meaning of the term nation. It used to be the case -- when I was an undergraduate -- that the term “nation” was deployed in specific circumstances when a group of people met a series of pre-determined an abstract criteria. I can even remember a good part of the definition: a nation is a group of people sharing a coherent geographic territory and marked by a common culture, shared historical experience, and common language and/or religion. Moreover, there was an assumed equivalency between a nation and a state: where the nation existed so to did (or, should) the state.
Contemporary scholarship casts doubts on this static conception of nation. Nations, contemporary scholarship has it, are historical formations. They are “imaginative”, not in the sense that they are fantasy, but in the sense that they exist or do not exist on the basis of belief. A nation is called into being when people believe they are a nation and not because an intellectual or academic or political figure decides a nation exists. What all this means is that the ideal of nation is shifting. Contemporary definitions pay less attention to language as a spoken mode of communication and more attention to language as a shared system of signification. Older definitions of nation were one-shot deals: being a member of nation X meant that one could not be a member of nation Y (for example, one was either a Scot or a Briton; one could not be both). More recent conceptions of nation would lead us to question this zero sum approach to nationality. It is also now clear that the exact connection between nation and state is problematic, as opposed to direct. There are, in all likelihood, thousands of state-less nations in the world and no state contains only a single nation.
Does this mean that the designation “nation” is meaningless? Is it a cultural construction that has no trans-historical reality? Perhaps, but that does not mean it is meaningless. There are a variety of reasons why the designation “nation” is meaningful but, it seems to me, the most pressing is that it can involve a process of self-definition. In the past, denying a people the status of “nation” was held to be the equivalent of denying self-determination. Perhaps, but today the stakes are different. To deny a group of people a name they take on themselves is to reject their right to define themselves. For instance, if Quebecers wanted to be a considered a nation and if English Canadians rejected that, what English Canadians would be rejecting is not an international status, but a group of people’s conception of themselves. English Canadians would, in effect, be claiming the right to define who Quebecers were; to prescribe to Quebecers their sense of collective self. Infringing the right of a people to define themselves would, in my view, be deeply undemocratic. The stakes are not, therefore, meaningless. If Quebecers support this designation -- a nation within Canada -- and I think they clearly do, then recognition of this sense of self on the part of English Canada is a good thing. It shows respect for democracy and the right of self-definition.
This said, I also think it needs to be acknowledged that Quebec is not a monolithic entity. If most Quebecers support this conception of Quebec, then, there is reason, in a democratic society, to consider it seriously and, I believe, support it. Accepting Quebecers self-conception as a nation does not, of course, in a democratic society, mean that the debate is over. I suspect it is not over in Quebec. Folks who oppose this resolution and the idea that stands behind it, in a democracy, retain their right to speak in reason on the issue. Those who support it, in a democratic society, are obligated to listen in respect. Quebec is a diverse province; Quebecois(es) will be a diverse nation. Quebec will be no more monolithic than Canada. Designating Quebec as a nation within Canada will not change that. There will still be issues with First Nations to be addressed; issues of settlement and diversity within Quebec; the problems caused by socio-economic inequality go no where because of this designation. Whatever the exact wording of this resolution, English Canadians have to stop thinking about Quebec as a single entity. The longer they do, the longer they will not understanding Quebecois(es). This should be easy. After all: Canada is a pretty diverse place and its a nation. The same thing can and needs to be said for Quebec.
Finally, what are the implications of this. Is Hoy right? The resolution opens the door for Supreme Court meddling in political affairs that will bring disaster in their wake? Well ... the short answer is we don’t know. I’ve argued that this resolution is meaningful in a cultural and discursive sense and that culture and discourse are important. Is it meaningful in a constitutional sense. I suspect it is, but in ways that actually work with existing divisions of power in Canada and the already established differences (noted in the constitution) between Quebec and the Rest of Canada. In other words, there is a framework that the court will need to consider if it has to rule on anything that involves Quebec’s national status. But, prognostications of disaster are clearly premature and, in fact, irresponsible. The simple fact that Hoy could not tell us what disaster was about to happen is a mark of the fact that he’s just sowing discord. Let’s wait and see. There are implications to this resolution but they are not clear. And, if they are not clear, I see no reason to assume they will bring disaster in their wake. The opposite is just as possible.
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