Burn the House II: Or, how you know when your team ain't good

How do you know when the baseball team for which you cheer is not good? Well, sometimes, teams just tell you. I was listening to Blair and Barker a few weeks ago and they interviewed one of the White Sox announcers. Perhaps to be nice, perhaps to generate some excitement, Blair (I think ... might be misremembering) complemented the Sox and asked what was ahead for that team, were they expecting a good second half as the team improved? Whomever he was interviewing immediately said "no" and went on to state the self evident fact that the Sox were not a good team. There was no chance that they would be even close to the mix this year. 

I liked it. With exceptions, the Jays media is only now coming around to this view about the Jays. They are not stating it outright (on Sportsnet this AM, there was talk about June being pivotal month!), but in retrospect there were signs and a lot of them. What were those signs?

Sign Number One: "if" syndrome. As the season started there were a lot of people talking in "if" language: if Manoah is back to form, if Vladdy plays better, if Jano is not injured, if Schneider can play even close to the way he finished the season, if Romano is healthy .... There is always an if or two for every team but if a team's season is depending on just about everything going right, that is too many ifs. The plexiglass principle (an old Bill James idea) suggests that luck evens out over the longer run. Thus, if some things go right, one needs to figure that other things are going to go wrong. 

Sign Number Two: hoping players are better than they are. There are a lot of seasonal ups and downs in baseball.  That is part of the game, but to begin the season counting on players who have not demonstrated an ability to play at a certain level is hope; not strategy. I cheer for Ernie Clement and Bowden Francis, too. I do. If one of them makes it, that is a good news story by itself. But, what are the realistic chances that they will be a core part of the team (say, an every day starter or playing third base)? Francis entered this year as a 28 year old rookie who had pitched a grand total of less than forty innings in the majors. Clement, likewise, is 28 with less than 500 career MLB plate appearances and an OPS (a measure of offensive ability) of 66. That is not good. What this means is that the Jays were counting on players who they had no reason to believe they could count on. I'd love them to succeed. I would. This is not about them. It is about something else: how we know our team is not good. And, counting on performance from players who have not demonstrated that they can play at an MLB level -- let alone a good MLB level -- is another of those ways. 

Sign Number Three: jargon. Baseball has its jargon and that jargon can be hard for new fans. "Protect the plate," "cutter," "turn two" ... there is a baseball language one learns as one watches the game. However, when commentators start using words as if they were magical weapons, that is a sign that "the owls are not what they seem." The year's jargon word was "flexibility."  With the ability of Biggio, Schneider, Clement, IKF, perhaps even Turner ... to play multiple positions, the team had a lot of "flexibility." 

You see the problem? Flexibility does not win games if your players aren't good. Flexible players -- players who play more than one position -- can be good. All teams are looking for them. But, there is a difference between Mookie Betts' flexibility and Craig Biggio's. The ability to move weak offensive players around does not score runs. 

What is more: this is a misunderstanding of flexibility. The Jays are actually not all that flexible. As I pointed out in another post, the way the Jays have designed their team is actually pretty standard and brings with it built-in constraints. The number of pitchers the Jays carry, for example, forces them to look for flexible fielders and to play players out of position (which carries a defensive downside). The Jays under Bobby Cox, back in the day, were flexible. Using an extensive platoon system, they were almost impervious to injury, for instance, while the smaller pitching staff allowed them to keep extra players to expand overall team flexibility. 

Finally, flexibility is not just something to have, it needs to be a strategy. I will confess that I don't see that strategy, other than to try to ride the hot hand and ... well ... you can see how well that is working. 

Sign Number Four: hope and patience. As the Jays limped through the first quarter of the season, commentary from coaches, team official, commentators, went something like this: we know our team is good. We just have to wait until we get hot. The key to a really good team, of course, is to win when they are not hot. But, hoping to get hot is the baseball equivalent of praying for rain. 

There may be other signs, too. But, when we hears these things being said and see these decisions being made, they suggest that the team we're cheering for may not be as good as predicted. We heard these things and saw these decisions.

PS: Confidence

One thing I find personally annoying is the talk about confidence as the key to success. I don't doubt that confidence is better than insecurity. And, a sense that you are going to fail is a recipe for stagnation (why try if you are not going to succeed?). But listening to the game last night, it struck me that this is another point of confusion. Dan and Buck, in commenting on Baltimore, mentioned over and over again that they were "confident" and "free and easy" (or, words to that effect). The intimation was that this was the root of their success (this was linked to a discussion about Turner and supposed lack of confidence right now). It seems to me that this is actually the reverse of what is going on. Baltimore is confident because they are winning; not winning because they are confident. 

The Jays: The End of the Season

The Jays season did not turn out the way we hoped.  I don't think it was a horrible season but it was a frustrating one.  I know all teams hype themselves in the pre-season (few teams go into a season saying to their fans "we are going to play poorly this year"), but, the Jays hype certainly set high expectations. Exactly what those expectations were remained a bit unclear but at a minimum they involved reversing the previous season's narrow miss of the playoffs and, potentially, making a deep run. On paper (and, I know the problems with "on paper"), the Jays looked like a contender. They certainly talked like one. 

For me, what was frustrating about the season was that the Jays never really seemed to get on track, never really realized their potential. Why was that? I think several factors played a role. Much discussion has been devoted to Schneider's decision to pull Gausman in the second playoff game against Seattle and that may have been the wrong decision but I also think it would be wrong to believe that seasonal disappointment hinged on one decision a manager made in one game (however important that game was). Instead of focusing on individual decisions, let's look at some more systemic issues. 

First, injuries: everyone suffers from injuries and depth is a big buzz word but some injuries are more predictable than others. Key injuries to Ryu (who was pitching poorly before this injury and at the end of last year anyway), Springer, Hernandez, and Gurriel were not 100% going to happen but they were more predictable because of age or injury history. Springer is a good player, but any time you enter a season with a 32 year old outfielder with an injury history, you have to imagine that this is a potential problem. Hernandez and Gurriel are not as old as Springer, but they have their own injury histories. I liked the key replacement outfielder -- Tapia -- because I think he was asked to do more than was expected of him. That said, according to Baseball Reference (where I get all my data) he has a sub .700 OPS and a 91 OPS+. What this means is that the Jays sent a 9% offensively worse than average outfielder up to bat 433 times.  

Second: their defence was shaky. You would not notice this listening to Jays commentators, but Bichette had a negative defensive WAR ( or dWAR, a measure of defensive). This means he cost the Jays runs playing short stop verse an average replacement shortstop. Vladdy -- despite winning a Gold Glove (the sad a bitter truth is that there are no defensively strong first basemen in the AL, almost all starting first basemen were defensive liabilities) -- had a negative dWAR, as did Gurriel, Tapia, and Hernandez, and Chapman's dWAR was nowhere near as good as people might think (and dramatically lower than his best seasons before joining the Jays). The Jays do have good fielders (Kirk at catcher), but as a team they don't play good D. I watched players give up on balls or throw to the wrong base.  

This is frustrating because it is something other than the booted ball mistake that every player makes over the span of a season. These are fixable problems. During the season I listened to announcers rave about the Jays taking fielding practice (some version of "they are out every day ..."). But, they are professional ball players. They are supposed to be practicing. That is their job. I teach for a living. Raving about a professional baseball player taking fielding practice is like saying "Andrew should be rewarded for doing class prep." If you have a teacher who does not do class prep that is a different and more serious problem but you don't get a reward for doing it. It is simply a requirement of the job. Likewise, suggesting that a professional baseball player should be acclaimed for taking fielding practice seems more like a smokescreen than a serious comment and it begs a further question. If the Jays are practicing, why are they not getting better? 

Third, the Jays base running was not good. It was not horrible, but it shouldn't earn any celebrations. They were tied for the second lowest stolen base percent in the majors (that is, they were getting caught attempting to steal more frequently than all but one team), and their other base running metrics are middle of the pack. They were middle of the pack on getting picked off and slightly better than middle of the pack (top third, say) on Outs On Base (that is when a player made a base running mistake that lead to an out).  Only Tapia and Springer had good stolen base ratios.  Bichette led the team with 13 steals but was caught 8 times. This means that his base running likely cost the team runs. It is a marked difference from the year before when Bichette, Semien, and Hernandez had really good stolen base ratios.  

Finally, a more subjective point. There were times where it seemed something was wrong with the team. I don't think the "boys will be boys" bench atmosphere served the Jays well. It is better --  much better -- than the toxic atmosphere that pervaded the Jays a few years ago. If I had to choose, I'd pick this iteration of the Jays over what we saw a few years back. But why do we have to choose? The on-going party atmosphere seems good but it also seems to distract from the kind of discipline that winning teams seem to have. In my view, the Jays were not well served by celebrating homers in games they ultimately lost or in games that they won by wide margins. One instance I found telling relates to Vladdy.  I recall a game where, between innings, he sat with the bullpen, as opposed to sitting on the bench. He was obviously upset at the Jays poor play but that is not the kind of leadership the Jays need. 

I recognize that this concern is not something that relates only to the Jays. Every team seems to have their version of a home run jacket (a chain, a hat, a cart, etc.), and stat inflation is nothing new. I remember Bill James, years ago, trying to figure out a way to delineate meaningful RBIs from tack ons in games where the end result had already been decided (the baseball equivalent of garbage time points in basketball). I believe he gave up. 

What is my point? My point is that the Jays have problems but those problems are fixable. Defence and base running are skills players can learn. There is no inherent reason why Bichette, for instance, should not be an outstanding base runner. There is no inherent reason why Gurriel needs to throw to the wrong base. I will be interested to see what the Jays do in the off season. I suspect they will be involved in some sort of trade, perhaps involving the surplus of catching that they have and maybe one of the extra middle infielders they have kicking around. I also think they have a good crack at the division next year. I can't see the Yankees getting any better. They were not a good team in the second half. Nor Boston. The Oriels may take another step forward but their team is young and has pronounced weaknesses. TB is always there but sooner or later the smoke and mirrors that sustains that team (by which I mean incredibly good field level management) will not be able to cover over the talent deficit. The Jays should begin next season as the favourite to win their division. I think they can but addressing these problems would help. 

Rumours of Infielders (or, the Blue Jays off season Part II)

How can a baseball team know that they have made the right decisions? How do they know that signing a certain free agent or making a trade or promoting a new player from the minors will work out? That was the question on which I left my last post, which involved thinking about the pros and cons of two the big names in baseball that the Jays were supposedly pursuing: Francisco Lindor and George Springer. I tried to indicate that there were down sides to securing either of those players (along with others in whom the Jays supposedly had interest such as Justin Turner and D.J. LeMahieu). None of these players are bad. In fact, they are all really good. But, they also all come with drawbacks for the Jays. Said differently, there are risks involved in acquiring players. It is not simply a matter of adding to one's team as if there were no down side.  In fact, let me suggest that just about any player acquisition runs risks. So, how do you know if you made the right decision or not? 

A lot of it depends on three things: 

• What you are trying to do
• How you build your team
• The degree of risk you are willing to take

Let's look at each of these in turn because of each of them has an effect on the decisions teams make with regard to trades, minor league player development, changing the position players play, signing a player to a longer-term contract, or free agent signings. 

Objectives: 

On the one hand, this seems like a silly issue to address. Every team's goal is the same: to win. That is true, but only in the broader, long-term sense. Everyone would like to win *this year* but realistically that is not going to happen for at least some teams and, in my view, realistic teams tend to be well managed teams. There is a lot of "win now" rhetoric and it seems almost like treason to say "we are not going to win" but I have never understood the problem with an honest evaluation of one's talent. The longer-term goal remains in place but it is redefined. For most teams (excepting those with realistic chances of winning), the goal is actually this: we want to build a team that will have a realistic chance of winning. For instance, only the most pie-eyed dreamer could have argued that the Jays had a realistic chance at the World Series in 2019. Their record that year 67-95, not the worst in baseball but among the worst.  So, realistically, their goal could not be to win because that was not possible. A team that bad will not even be close to making the playoffs. 

So, what was their goal? Their goals were good: they had a slew of talented young players and their aim was to get them major league playing experience, moving them from the minors to majors. And, they did: Jansen, Bichette, Biggio, Thornton, Waguespack, Guerrero, Tellez, and Gouriel (who had already been playing in the majors) got extensive playing experience that year. They also needed to "audition" other potential players who were not slated to be regulars but who might be bench players (Drury, McKinney). And, overall, they did not do poorly. Bichette, Biggio, Guerrero and Guriel all demonstrated that they were major league calibre players and were capable of already playing the game at a high level. Biggio showed he was am amazing baserunner, good in the field, and had great bat control. I won't go through the rest because you get my drift. Even in instances where player struggled or had ups and downs, team management learnt things (for instance, that McKinney and Drury were likely not key bench players in the future).  Despite, at times playing horrible ball, the Jays season was a success because their player development was a success. They could enter the next season (Covid's 2020) knowing that they had the basis of a good -- and potentially really good -- team. 

This causes a shift in goals. Player development remains a key objective (more major league playing experience, for instance), but knowing that you have the basis of a good team allows you to set the next reasonable goal: making the playoffs. Hence, goals are unstable. They can shift from year to year. In 2018, the Jays key goal was trying to find ways to rebuild their farm system, gain some prospects, and let their minor league system bring new talent along while not embarrassing themselves on the field. They had a different goal in 2019 and different again in 2020. 

Player and Team Development:

Knowing what your team's specific goals are for the year is important because it affects the way in which you make decisions about player development. Player development is fancy term used to describe the way in which teams go about developing talent and getting better. The person finally responsible for this might be the Team president, but it also involves scouts, minor league coaches, major league coaching staff, consults, analysts, and host of others. Major league baseball teams will have an entire coaching bureaucracy devoted to player development. Player development is the way you team gets better, competes, and ultimately wins (allowing that they win). 

Different teams have different player development strategies.  This is important because it affects the kinds of players you think will be good and who can play together to become a winning team. In recent years, Tampa Bay is one of the more interesting teams with regard to player development. They look for specific types of players who will fit in their system, which has fairly successful track record. The Tampa Bay system looks to compensate for its relative lack of resources (aka money) -- which means they cannot afford to sign high priced free agents or even offer their own players large contracts to stay with the team -- (compared to other major league teams) by very effective on-field management, defensive flexibility (but not across the lineup), analytics, unusual use of pitching staff, and making the most effective use of the talent that they have -- as opposed to looking for supposedly better baseball players.  Tampa Bay makes a lot of in-game line up changes, moves players around in the order, uses a lot of pitchers and so needs bench players who can play a number of different positions (in fact, there might be little difference between the bench and the starting lineup in Tampa). They also need players who are not very expensive: younger players or players on whom other teams have given up. 

This is a very different team development strategy than most other teams use (Maddon brought some but not all of this approach with him to the Cubs, Oakland makes use of some but not all of these strategies). And, it is part of a conscious and intentional approach to development that effects their entire system. Their players, for instance, are taught to be very at the selective at the plate from day one. Rays teams don't, as a rule, swing at bad pitches.  Instead, they drive up pitch counts, forcing opposing managers deeper into their bullpens (that is, forcing other managers to use up their pitching staff). 

Why recite these well known facts? Because it shows that building a team is something more than paying a lot of money for the best free agents on the market. Indeed, it is counter intuitive but if you sign players that don't fit with your team, you may be doing more harm than good no matter how good the player is. For instance, Francisco Lindor is a really good shortstop, but the Jays already have a really good young shortstop and they drafted a shortstop with their number one pick last year. The Jays may trade for Lindor but doing so, as I tried to point out in my previous post, might end up forcing players into new positions in a sort of domino effect that could defensively de-stabilize the team. Player and team development are about more than spending money and before you spend that money, you need to know how that player fits in your development scheme and will fit with the rest of your team and its approach to the game. 

My concern with the Jays off season so far is that the names to which they are linked seem to suggest a change in the managerial and developmental direction of the team. For the last several years, the Jays have been focused -- rightly, in my view -- on finding good young players and developing them within their system while they look to bring in more potential prospects by trading away older players. The effect has been to make the Jays a younger team. The Jays seemed to have a long-term plan and good reason to believe that the long-term plan was working.  That plan was organized around a specific goal that was not putting the best team on the field that was possible *this* year. It was organized, for right or wrong but I think right, around the idea of building a consistent contender. In my view, they are almost there but the names to which they are linked suggest a different approach seems to be emerging and, in my view, if implemented that could set the Jays back, rather than making them better. 

Risk:

A lot of people talk about baseball teams spending money on higher priced players as a test of team owner's seriousness and willingness to spend money to win. This applies to some teams, particularly those teams with really deep pockets.  This is important because teams with deep pockets (in short rich teams) can spend more money than poorer teams simply because they have more money. The more money you have, the less your risk in spending some of that money.  For instance, imagine that you have 10$ and you need to buy (sign a free agent) new shortstop for the upcoming seasons. There is a really good shortstop but his salary demand is 10$. That is your entire budget and you might shy away from that not because you are cheap but because you might want to save some of that money in case a new pitcher comes on the market at the trade deadline or something like that. On the other hand, if you have 100$, then the 10$ layout for a shortstop is far less risky. You can buy that shortstop and still have money in the bank to get a new pitcher or trade for an outfielder or offer a longer-term contract to one of your star players.  

You can see that reducing this issue to seriousness and willingness is simplifying the matter. This is important because this is actually the way in which Major League Baseball functions. Teams like the Yankees, Red Sox, Dodgers (and a few others) fall into the 100$ situation. Teams like the As and Rays fall into the 10$ situation. Now the As and Rays are still good, well managed teams who play exciting baseball and who are usually in playoff race year after year. What it means is that their resource have an effect on the risk they are willing to take and so affect how they build their team. The Yankees and Red Sox, as examples, can sign players to large contracts (say, a free agent or say one of their own players who has improved) and not worry too much about it. If they make a mistake, they will be out a lot of money but they have a lot more money to begin with. The result is actually rather odd: the Yankees don't have to be good judges of talent. They can sign players who have good reputations or who look good without worrying too too much about longer term cost issues. The Rays don't have this luxury. The Jays fall somewhere in between. 

What are the risks that Jays are willing to take? Well, right now, we don't know since all we have is rumours. For the past several years, however, the Jays have been trying to limit risk by cutting payroll, freeing up roster spots for younger players (who by definition don't cost very much but who have a much bigger upside than veterans), signing low priced free agents, and trading them for younger prospects where possible. They then use the back end of the season, and the season thereafter, to try to sort through those prospects to figure out who might be useful and who might not be. 

I would argue that this approach has worked.  Knowing that they have good young talent in the tubes, the Jays have shed payroll, ditched older players, gotten rid of players who were -- it appears -- problems in clubhouse, and accumulated a bunch of new mid-range prospects while renewing their farm system through drafts. They have hoarded their prospects and, with one exception, not really put a lot on table in terms of free agents or trades. 

Making Decisions: 

How do you know these are the right decisions? Well, you don't for sure but you know that they weren't wrong and that is important. In 2017, the Jays were an old, expensive team, with a farm system that had been sent packing in trades to accumulate players to get them over the hump, as it were. Team management had, previously, talked about a five year window but it was evident that that window was closing.  Their starting catcher was 34; their starting right fielder was 36; a 31 year old played 2B for them and they had a 34 year old in LF. Three of their top four starters were 33 or older. They finished 4th, with a record below .500 and had team payroll north of 100$ million. 

I have heard sportscasters argue that that team was a success because it brought excitement back to Toronto with regard to baseball. That could be true.  Toronto is a pretty good market, however, with fans that have long been devoted to their teams and can take advantage of a national market, but it could be true. Still ... was that the goal? If the goal was simply to play a more exciting brand of baseball that attracted fans, that is not at all a bad goal, but what I remember is that the goal was to win and, on that level the Jays did not succeed. They got close and I liked watching the games but ultimately, they were defeated. 

So, the decision the Jays have to make with regard to the off season is not just about bringing in more talent. It is about the development of their team, their specific goals, and how those different aspirations and processes come together. 

Rumours of Outfielders: The Blue Jays Off Season (Part I)

The Blue Jays have been linked to just about every possible significant deal in the major leagues. Last night, I saw another story, suggesting that George Springer would sign with either the Jays or the Mets. It is, of course, difficult to know what to make of off season trade rumours. Some of them might be exploratory meetings ... just seeing if we are on the same page? No, OK, no harm, no foul. Some of them might be pure media speculation. Some of them might be wish fulfillment. And, still others, appear to be planted with the aim of driving up market values. Generally, I try to not pay too much attention to specific trade rumours or potential free agent signings for precisely these reasons. It is better to wait and see what shakes down than waste a lot of time speculating on something that never really was in the first place.  This said, I find some of the players to whom the Jays have been linked odd, even if they eventually do pan out. Let me take a couple of examples.

First, Francisco Lindor who would supposedly be traded for a package of players that could include Loudres Gouriel. Lindor is an amazing player. He's a gold glove shortstop, has an .854 OPS, which translates into 100 rums (give or take) per year. He is not the best base runner but he is good and he has far better than mid-range power. At 27, you basically know what you are going to get with him -- although he could take one further step forward -- and what you get is good. And, while one can never say for sure, it is likely that he will maintain this level of production for another 4-5 years.  He has only one year left on his contact that will pay him 21$ million and I read somewhere (although I can't find the reference) that the Jays wanted a sign and trade deal before they traded. Said differently, if they would trade for Lindor, it would not be for a one-year rental.

By contrast, Gouriel has never quite lived up to expectations. He is good. His OPS is, in fact, higher than Lindor's (I get my. data from Baseball Reference) and he is a year younger. In addition, he's handled the move to left field well. His defensive WAR (dWAR, a measure of defensive value)  is not gold glove quality and I doubt it ever will be, but he's breaking even and if he can maintain that OPS or take a step forward offensively (which is not a pipe dream), that is more than good enough to keep him in the lineup even with a slight negative dWAR.  

So, what are his problems? Gouriel's key problems strike me as twofold (1) he has had a hard time staying in the lineup (I'll come back to this when we look at George Springer). That is an issue for the Jays particularly since the team is not loaded with capable outfielders. And (2) his is a really streaky hitter. On the surface of it, then, a trade seem to make sense for the Jays. 

Except: 

• Getting rid of Gouriel does not solve the Jays' outfield problems. If anything it magnifies them. Hernandez really can't play the outfield and the range of things Grichuk does well is limited (and, apparently, the Jays are considering trading him).
• Lindor is not going to play the outfield so trading Gouriel means that the Jays will need to make another deal for an outfielder or consider relocating someone from the infield there. The truth is that the only candidate is really Biggio, but he may be the best defensive infielder the Jays have (Bichette's are actually a bit better but the sample is small).  To my eye, he has not shown the same capacity in the outfield and so why one would trade your left fielder to move your second baseman to the outfield is not clear to me, particularly when there is no evidence he would play that position well. Moreover, left field is an offensive position. Biggio's numbers -- and skill range -- is very good if his position is second base. Exactly how they stack up in the outfield (one's abilities relative the rest of the players at your position is measured by a stat called OPS+) at a position with which he is far less familiar, which he has not played well in the past, and which is far more offensively oriented than his current position, is not at all clear. You see what I am saying, starting to move him around to accommodate Lindor and address a speculative Gouriel departure could wind up creating a real mess. 
• Trading for Lindor would, of necessity, involve moving current shortstop (Bichette) to another position, a reality he acknowledges, presumably to second base to cover the space left by Biggio's hypothetical move to LF.  The same situation recurs except that now it is not just Biggio learning a new position, but Biggio and Bichette. 

Other rumours to which the Jays are linked involve the same kind of convoluted moves, including the Jays supposed interest in Justin Turner and DJ LeMahieu (see MLB Trade Rumours). Both are established stars but they also bring with them the same need to move players around. LeMahieu might be easiest to accommodation because he could play first base if Vladi is moved back to third. This likely leaves Tellez without a job as one is going to guess that Hernandez will become the every day DM in the relatively near future.  But, the other issue is age. Turner is 35 with a history of injuries and plays 3B, supposedly the position to which Guerrero wants to return next year. LeMahieu is 31, which is getting old for an infielder. He can play a number of positions but he has also spent his life playing in some of the most hitter friendly parks in the game. It is difficult to see him replicating his Yankees numbers wherever Toronto ends up playing and it is difficult to see him replicating those numbers over several years.  To get him, the Jays would supposedly have put about 125$ million on the line in a multiyear contract. 

George Springer is the other player in whom the Jays are supposedly seriously interested. I won't repeat comments I've made earlier about free agent signings not being "sweepstakes" but calculation and contract except to say that this kind of discourse (sweepstakes) really gives a false impression of what baseball teams should be trying to with free agent signings. Springer is 30 years old and, I gather, is looking for a five-year contract that would take him to 35. If you wonder why I keep noting age, it is that age is an important consideration in assessing talent. Springer's numbers are good -- really, really good -- but they come with two significant qualifications.  The Jays are short on outfielders and they are short on good outfielders and so this kind of addition makes more sense. It is simpler, cleaner, does not require moving players around and does not require trading younger talent. What are the qualifications:

1. He has an injury history and it is significant.  Last year was last year. He played regularly and that is a good thing but we can't really use it because of the condensed schedule. Throwing out last year, Springer has not played a full season since 2016, when he was 26. IOW, in 2017, 2018, and 2019 Springer missed significant playing time. 
2. His talent base is difficult to assess because of the Astros cheating scandal. We still don't know how far and how deep this scandal went and Springer is not usually associated with those players who were knee deep in it. It does not disqualify him as a free agent signing (although, if it were me, it would raise questions). What it does is add an unknown to the picture, making it a bit murkier.

I want to be clear on this. I am not saying that the Jays should not sign Springer. What I am saying is that as a longer-term investment designed to win baseball games, there are some negatives. All players have these and this is what management needs to assess when it signs players. Longer-term contracts to players over 30 tend to mean, for instance, that one will overpay on the back end. While you might, for instance, get good 2020 and 2021 seasons, all other things being equal, the value of that player will begin to decline after that despite the fact that his salary will remain really high or might even get higher. There are a few players that buck the trend, of course, and that is another consideration. 

In the same way, injuries are an issue because you are paying a player not to play. The key example here, for the Jays, was Tulo. According to Baseball Reference the Jays paid (or, will pay) Tulo 118$ million. He was their regular shortstop for one season (2016) after joining the team for its 2015 playoff run. He was a serious upgrade at short both offensively and defensively but he was not stellar.  In 2016 he had an OPS+ rating of 102. What this means is that he was 2% better (a 100 score is even) than other players at his position. He has a 0.6 dWAR that year which means he also made a defensive contribution. What the Jays need to ask, however, is this: was he worth 118$ million?  The Jays still owe about 4$ million of that this year coming as a buy out. Thus from 2018 to 2021 (which has not yet happened), the Jays have been paying a player who has not only not been on the field for them but who is no longer on their team. I like to let this sink in, from 2018 forward, the Jays have paid 58$ million to a player who has not played a single inning for them. In total, the Jays paid 118$ million for what amounts to a season of average baseball. 

I mention this because it is important context before one goes out and signs free agents or makes trades for high priced players. There are a range of considerations. The Tulo deal really hampered the Jays ability to field a team in 2018 and 2019 because they hand spent so much money on player a player who was not on the field. Tulo is not the only cause of this, of course, and he really was an amazing player in his prime. I don't want to sell him short.  What I am talking about here is the calculus of baseball. If you make the right decision, you are in great shape. If you make the wrong decision, it can haunt you for years. 

How do you know if you have made the right or wrong decision? That might not be as easy to assess as we think and I will pick that up in my next blog. 

A Blue Off Season?

The Blue Jays have had an interesting off season ... sort of. I guess all teams have interesting off seasons, or most of them, but what is interesting about the Jays is what the specific things they have done illustrate about how their upper management (Shapiro and Atkins) think about their team and what we might be able to expect as time goes by in terms of development and competitiveness. I think we have learnt two important things.

First, we have learnt that the word "aggressive" seems to have a specific meaning.  The Jays did not, of course, opt in on any top name free agents ... sort of (more on this in my next blog). No one expected them to sign Cole or Rendon but, we were assured, they were being aggressive. The problem was that this word --  "aggressive" -- seemed to be more of a talking point than an description of what was actually going on and it was only a short period of time until someone asked "what do you actually mean?" Does aggressive mean that you are actually trying to sign players or does it mean that you are just sort of kicking the tires and taking the odd second hand model out for a test drive?

From what I can tell this seemed to take Shapiro and others aback because ... well ... it exposed the fact that their efforts to reassure fans through the media were a bit of smoke and mirrors. It also exposed the fact that media commentators were willing to start asking tougher -- and perhaps better -- questions. The real problem, however, occurred because concern over the exact meaning of the word "aggressive" merged with concern over another metaphor: "waves of talent," whereby the minor league system will be supposedly producing new talent ready for the major league level every year or two. The problem was that at least some commentators were having a difficult time understanding where this talent was, say, with regard to the outfield or bullpen or the starting rotation. In the wake of this concern, speculation, then became rife that a fair number of players were, or might be, on the block with the exceptions of Grichuk, Biggio, Bichette, and Guerrero. Said differently, if there were no waves of talent (at least at specific positions), might not the Jays turn to trades to make their team competitive? And, if so, who would be traded?

What we learnt, then, was that the Jays were approaching this off season in basically the same way they had approached other off seasons: they were looking for bargains, but they were trying to disguise that fact by using words like "aggressive." When pressed on the word and its meaning, Jays sources clarified that what they meant was that they had been more aggressive in talking to free agents. This is something different than actually being aggressive in the market and attempting to sign free agents. In reality, their approach was basically the same as it had been and, in relatively short order, the Jays signed (or completed the deals, which are not quite the same thing, with) Tanner Roark, Chase Anderson, and Shun Yamaguchi (three 30+ pitchers).

This fits the same patterns as the last couple of years. It is no more or less aggressive. The contracts were relatively low in terms of cost and for relatively short durations. In the short term, they help the Jays address problems with their pitching staff. In the medium term, if one of these guys, say along with Giles, gets hot, they can be flipped at the All Star break for a prospect or two, likely middle range and perhaps someone who has worn out their welcome with elsewhere. Said differently, this was not aggression, but more of the same: Jays management was shopping for bargains or players that could be traded for prospects.

Let me be clear: I am not objecting to bargain shopping. I have some questions about the "more of the same" approach of the Jays, but I also thought the complaints last year that the Jays should have been in on the top level free agent market were horribly misplaced and displayed only a misunderstanding of the talent level that the Jays had on the field. They also mistook early season good play by the Phillies and Padres -- who had signed high priced free agents -- for dramatic improvement, something that did not really pan out over the entire season. What I object to is the semi-dishonesty of the matter.  In fact, I find the whole "we are doing all we can to improve the Jays" discourse troubling because it begs a question: isn't that what you are paid to do? Are there team presidents and GMs out there who are *not* doing everything they can to improve their teams? And, if so, how long to they remain presidents and GMs?

The second and related point is that I am not certain how well more of the same will serve the Jays in the near future. In my view, Shapiro and Atkins found themselves in a mess when they took over the Jays. They had an old and expensive team, whose best prospects were in the low minors. The team was years away from being competitive, was saddled with large contracts, and old players who were spending a lot of time on the DL. They didn't have an option but to bargain shop. They needed to rid the Jays of salary (which included the reality that the team was going to eat a lot of it, but again that was not their fault), needed to see if any of the low prospects were good, and needed implement their own draft philosophy. In this context, picking up and flipping good low cost veterans was a legit strategy while allowing time to develop and draft younger players.

I wonder, however, if this strategy is coming close to the limits of its effectiveness and I wonder if the Jays management is starting to think the say way. One problem is that everyone is doing it and that is making those bargains ... well ... less bargainful than they were a couple of years ago. The other thing is that if we assess where the Jays are now, they are a team with remarkable strengths and considerable weaknesses. I am going to guess that the Jays are going to play close to .500 ball by the time the season is done. I expect the Yankees and Red Sox to lead the way with Tampa continuing to play good ball.  What this means is that the Jays can play good and exciting ball but they are not going to be in the hunt and may be more than even this year away for being seriously competitive. I think that is how the Jays think about it, too, hence, their bevy of stop-gap contacts.

With regard to pitching, I suspect that the Jays will start the season with a rotation that looks something like this:

• Anderson
• Shoemaker (or Kay)
• Roark
• Ryu
• Thornton

I suspect they will end of year with a rotation that looks much more like this:

• Zeuch
• Pearson
• Thornton (or Kay) 
• Borucki
• Ryu

And, I don't mind this at all because, truth be told, with the possible exception of a free agent signing down the road, this is likely the staff that will be pitching for the Jays when the are competitive, perhaps in two years time. For this year, Shoemaker, Anderson and Roark could be traded or transitioned to the bullpen, where they might be good and able to extend their careers for another two or three years. The bullpen is a bit of a mess but my guess is that the Jays will try to figure that out as the season goes along. Giles, Yamaguchi, Kay (if he is not in the rotation), Pannone, Gaviglio, Romano and Font are all likely to get long looks and I expect Reid-Foley will as well as Waguespack, who might sub in for Thornton if he does not go forward. 

If this is the Jays approach, it is not a bad one. In fact, it has much to recommend it. What I can't figure out, then, is why the spin? What the Jays management has done over the last several years might not be everyone's cup of tea, but it has a logic to it, it made use of the resources that they could make use of, and accomplished a number of goals. 

There is a third and final thing that we have learnt about the Jays that relates to the outlier in all this: the Ryu signing. I'll address that in a later blog. 

Second Guessing Free Agency, or yet more on the Jays

In my last post, I tried to argue that signing big name free agents may be a good idea or it may be a bad idea, but for the Jays signing the big name free agents who were available last year was not a good idea. In other words, the specific case is important. I argued that, at least so far, neither Machado nor Harper would have helped much; that the turn around the Phillies is not due simply to Harper and so assuming that something similar would have gone on with the Jays is misplaced thinking, and that the Jays, in fact, have no place to play Machado if they are serious about rebuilding. Not only, in this case, would have signing Machado not helped much, but it might actually have set back the process by taking at bats away from developing players who should be getting them.  What I would like to do here is touch on a series of other consideration.

First, some folks (see my last post for the citation) argue that the failure to spend money on free agents is cheapness guided by profit motive. That might be true. In fact, I would not argue against it. But, there are also reasons for wanting to control salary growth, particularly when talking about high priced free agents. What are those reasons? The key reason is that one is committing a lot of money over a long time.  While one my say, legitimately, "gee the Jays are being cheap" this year, no one would argue that they were cheap in the past. The doled out big contracts to Martin, Bautista, Tulo, and others with the effect of weighing their team down with a lot of money that was being given to players who, well, were not really that good any more or, in the case of Tulo, have barely played in the last couple of years and are now on the IL for another team.

Such long-term obligations can limit a team's freedom to maneuver, that is: to sign other players to long term contracts because one has so much money on the table, as it were, already. Some teams (the Dodgers, the Yankees, the Red Sox, eg.) don't have to worry about making money because they are money machines. Other teams do. I am sure the Jays are making money but there is a point where they don't. You cannot, in other words, spend forever and, unless you are the Sox or Yankees or Dodgers (and perhaps a couple of other teams), all teams need to limit their longer-term financial outlay mistakes.

What do I mean by this? If the Sox sign someone to a boat load of money and they turn out not to be all that good (think most of their starters right now) ... it doesn't matter. The Sox can almost print their own money. If they go over the MLB soft cap and have to pay a luxury tax ... it doesn't matter.

For just about everyone else, it does.

Why does it matter for the Jays? Big name free agents want long term contracts. Harper has 13 years; Machado has 10. That is a lot of cheddar for a long time. Even if I am wrong and they are better than I am allowing ... will they be that good for that long? They are young for free agents of this quality. There is no doubt about that. But where will they be in 10 or 13 years. Harper will be 39, well past the prime of just about every ball player ever. Yet, if you sign him, you will still have him. What about that injury history? Well, it could cut his playing career short and dramatically so. Even the shorter period of 10 years for Machado puts him into 36, again if we think that the average player is in decline by 32 or 33, this means that you are on the hook for several years of salary where a player might, in effect, be doing nothing.

A counter to this is: you could trade him.  To whom? The Jays traded Tulo, right? Why not some other under-performing high priced vet? Well, the Jays did not trade Tulo. They gave him away and agreed to pick up the tab for his cost. They are picking up virtually his entire salary this year, which is 19.5$ million this year. They pay him another 14$ million next year and 4$ million the year after that. Put together that is 37.5$ million the Jays are paying Tulo to *not* play for them. That is a lot of money that, in my view, could have been better directed.

So, you see the problem for a trade. How do you trade a player no one wants? The Jays would have to make the deal worthwhile by shipping salary with the player and that salary doesn't clear the books. The longer-run financial obligations are still there: paying a player who is no longer on your team with money that could have been used to pay players or your team or to sign some other free agent is not, in my view, a road map to success -- teamwise or otherwise.

Financial flexibility might be a bit of a dodge for greedy owners. It really might be. But, there is also a good reason -- regardless of owners' greed -- if I were running a team that I would not want to load my team down with salaries for players that I no longer have on the team or who are preforming at such a sub-par level, they are hurting the team. Right now, in fact, the Jays are paying out over 49$ million to players that are not playing for them. You can find the data here.

That reason, as implied above, is that it limits the choices you have as team. And, those choices are particularly important in a period of rebuilding. You may want to lock of good young players with longer-term contracts of your own; you may want to add that missing piece after you are moving into contention -- say, like the  Phillies. You may not want to price your tickets out of the market of a lot of fans (although this is a complicated calculation in which we will not engage here). You may want to redirect money internally to international scouting and player development or winter ball. There are all kind of things you may want to do rather than paying players who are not contributing to your  team.

This is why most teams don't sign high priced free agents when they are rebuilding.  They might be chap and they might be profit driven. But, they might also be looking to build a good ball team and signing players who really will not make a great difference to the hear and now in order to mortgage the future just does not strike me as a good plan.

Bryce Harper's Free Agency: Legacy and Decision Making in Baseball

Update: Since I wrote my last blog, the Jays management have  "released" Tulo, a move that is consistent with the argument I was making. You can find information here.

In my last blog, I tried to argue that the signing of Bryce Harper -- whomever signs him -- tells us more about baseball than about Harper. Making decisions if one runs a baseball team is not an easy business and no one would contend it is. That is why the people who make those decisions are paid a lot of money, or one of the reasons, and I have very little time for people who complain about how difficult their job is ... if they have a job most of us would do for a lot less! Yes, baseball is hard but ... it is baseball. You get to watch the game, talk about the game, analyze the game ... and get paid for it. I'd take that job.

What we need to bear in mind, however, is that not all baseball decisions are made for the same reasons. Someone will sign Bryce Harper for a lot of money and that is something I would not do. The truth is that most GMs won't either.  A few will enter into negotiations, kick the tires, as it were, and a smaller number will be serious but only a few teams when it comes right down to it will decide that Harper is their man. Most -- the vast majority -- will drop out because of the costs, because of concerns the team might have about him, because their plan for team development lies elsewhere. Much of the speculation this time of the year in baseball journalism is about who will do more than kick the tires.

I tried to argue that there are a lot of reasons why I would not sign him and I want to pick up this line of reasoning in this blog. This does not mean that he is not a good ball player. It just means that he is not the best player in MLB and I think the cost might outweigh the benefits. How so?

Let's start with how good Harper is. He's good. He does more than pass the eyeball test.  He will be 26 next season -- still not in his prime -- and already has an MVP, Rookie of the Year, and 6 all-star selections. I don't mean to make light of those because they are significant accomplishments. I am not looking to explain them away because I don't think they can or should be explained away. Over 7 years in baseball he has a .900 OPS (an overall measure of offensive ability), which is indeed well in the all-star range. So, what is the downside. Let's look at the record:

1. Like Troy Tulowitzki (the example I used in my previous blog), he has had injury issues. They are no where near as grave as Tulo's but he missed time in 2013, 2014 and 2017.  Injury histories worry me, particularly if one is going to be asked to sign a long-term deal because the issue is not health next year or the year after but a number of years down the road. 
2. Harper's numbers are good but they are not as good as his reputation might suggest. He has, for instance, topped the mythical 100 RBI line once and that only in his contract year (another thing I worry about is players who put up higher than average numbers in the year before they become free agents. Harper did not really do this except in the RBI category). He's topped the 100 runs scored number twice. He's in the 90s on both RBI and runs scored on other occasions but these numbers are more in the way of very good than spectacular. 
3. When we drill deeper, we find other issues. For instance, Harper's WAR (wins above replacement, a way of measuring the number of wins an individual player contributes to their team versus a replacement level player, or how much better a player is than their average competition), was great in his MVP year. At 10.0 this meant that by himself Harper contributed 10 extra wins to his team versus what a replacement level player would have contributed. This is spectacular and it won Harper and MVP, as it should have. Before and after he won this award, however, his WAR has been not nearly as good. Injuries played a role in these numbers but his pre-MVP year WAR was 1.1 and his post-MVP WAR numbers were: 1.5, 4.7 (very good), 1.3.  Last year his defensive WAR (a measure of how much he contributed on defense to his team) was -3.4. Two years ago it was 0.0; the year before that -0.9. What this means is that last year Harper contributed a total 1.5 wins to his team (v a replacement level player) but his defense actually cost nearly three-and-one-half wins. His offense was really good but his defense was really bad, making his overall value mediocre.  

These numbers are not horrible, by any stretch ... well, the defensive WAR last year was bad. Neither, however, are they best player in the game type of numbers. Harper was not, for instance, in the top 10 in WAR in the National League last year, nor the year before that. In fact, he has been in the top 10 in the National League in WAR only one time in the last five years (his MVP year).  These numbers, in fact, compare unfavourably to the other players with whom one might compare Harper. Harper's total WAR for his team since his career started is 27.4. This is more than good. But Mike Trout's is 64.3. Trout is older than Harper by a year and a half (give or take) but that does not explain a difference this wide. It is about the same as Christian Yelich (26.4), about the same per year as Freddie Freeman, lower than but in the same ball park as Nolan Arenado. It is not as good as Mookie Betts, and I could go on but my point I think is made. Harper is a good baseball player but he's not an outstanding baseball -- so far at least -- like Trout and he's behind Betts both offensively and defensively.

What this amounts to involves me telling another story: a number of years ago the Nationals (Harper's team until he signs with someone else) signed Jayson Werth to a seven year contract, worth north of 120$ million. It was a huge contract for the time and my bet is that the Nationals knew they were overpaying. Werth was a pretty good player. Not as good as Harper but his record was good. His defensive metrics were, shaky, despite his reputation as a good defensive outfielder but he also did a fair number of things well. In addition to what now seems like an undeserved defensive reputation, he was a good base runner, he hit for power and scored runs (46 doubles, and ... 27 perhaps HR the year before he was signed by the Nats). He had, the year before he was signed, a .921 OPS, higher than Harper's this past year. The difference was that Harper is 26 and Werth was 31. At 31, the career of most baseball players is starting to -- or, going to start to -- decline. Injuries start to occur, and one naturally slows down. 

Werth did not have a horrible career with the Nats. His first year with them (2011) was bad, but his next three seasons were good, with +.800 OPS in all three. His time with the Nats was injury plagued, but that is what one would expect. From 2015-17 his career was in decline and ended in 2017 at the age of 38, You can check out his numbers at baseball-reference.com -- where I get my numbers -- but his career was not bad.  He is not going to be on anyone's Hall of Fame ballot, but it is not a bad career. Indeed, if the Nats had not elected to seriously overpay him at the age of 31, most people would have concluded that his career was really quite good. Many people think it is not because he never could do the job that he was paid a lot of money to do: win. The Nats were perpetual contenders, to be sure, but never got over the hump to win the World Series. 

The lesson is this: if I were going to build a team I'd look at Harper only if a specific number of conditions were met. For instance, my team would need to be good already. Harper would need to be the missing piece. I'd need everyone to understand that in the longer run, we were probably about to overpay. And, we'd need a clear understanding of Harper's weaknesses as well as his strengths. And, I'd need to be sure that the money I was about to spend could not be better spent elsewhere. For instance, I was watching a Winter Meetings update on TSN and there are something like a ba-zillion good bullpen arms. Would I want one or several of those? Would I want to devote money to player development (I am sure most teams would prefer a Vald, Jr. or Bo Bichette)? Would Harper be willing to work on his weaknesses? Would he work on his defense, for instance, so it does not become a serious liability (it is at the point of becoming that if it does not change)?

Harper leaves the Nats (if he leaves the Nats) with a mixed legacy. Like Werth he never succeeded in what fans see as the main goal: winning. We are not, of course, simply talking about a winning season. After all, as Tampa Bay and Oakland have demonstrated, you don't need to pay someone 400$ million to have a winning season. He leaves (if he leaves) as a remarkably talented player but not so far as a generational player. He's not Mike Trout and I don't think he's Mookie Betts either. Statistically, as I said in the previous blog, he has not even been the best player on his own team. I like him and I'd love to have him on my team but his legacy suggests that his price is going to be too high.

"A Better Loss": Updated Thoughts on the Jays

With due credit to Tom Dakers at BlueBirdBanter for the headline.  One thing I like about Dakers reporting is that he continually searches for an upside. We need that because, well, there has not been a lot of upside to the Jays, at least this last month. People might recall that I was optimistic at the start of the year. I thought that the Jays upper management had done a good job letting salary clear and keeping prospects. I thought they had done a good job piecing together a low cost team that could be in the hunt -- winning somewhere between 78 and 86 games, putting the Jays on the margins of the playoff race -- while not taking on any further longer-term salary commitments. There were "ifs" in my equation and things started out well and then .... So, what do we make of what is going on with the Jays right now? Is there reason to change my assessment?

No ... the Jays may not be in the playoff hunt but I don't see any reason that they cannot look to a .500 season. Right now they are playing horrible ball -- and some of their problems are telling -- but the team, overall, is still OK. Injuries have hurt, as has age, and this is one of the reasons I continue to be optimistic about this season: the Jays may not win but we know more about what the future might hold with each passing day.  How so?

Well, we know that Devon Travis has been seriously harmed by three years of injuries. I feel bad for him. Three years ago, he was 24 years old (perhaps a bit older than we would like a guy who was basically a AA player becoming a rookie) but when in the lineup he played well. His defence was better than average, he seemed like he could swipe 20 bags a year given the chance (that is, he seemed like an intelligent baserunner even if he was not blessed, say, with Pillar's speed), and his offence seemed to have a real upside. Three injury-plagued seasons later, he is struggling, and struggling is generous. Eyeballing him, he seems to have trouble getting to balls, he never walked a lot but he is not walking *at all.* No walks + truly horrible batting average = an on-base percentage so low that it makes one ill. Again, I feel bad for him. He seems like a really nice guy who works hard and his current situation is not his fault. It is made worse, however, by the fact that he does not have a lot of versatility.  It seems unlikely, in other words, that he could become a utility player to keep his job.  With a number of good looking middle infielders in the minors, he will be pressed for playing time by September, if not before.  He's got his job back only because the roster madness and tryout like approach at short after Diaz went down did not allow anyone to take control of the job.

So, what do we know: we know Travis is not our second baseman of the future. Knowing that is good because it allows the Jays to think about who is (Biggio, Bichette?)

We also know that Russ Martin's career is truly over, baring some sort of Devine intervention.  One of Martin's appreciable strengths is that he takes a lot of walks and so, theoretically, gets on base, but this is compromised by another truly horrible batting average. And, his defence behind the plate remains slightly -- just slightly -- better than average.  The Jays seem to be looking for a way to keep him the lineup, although exactly why has confused a variety of commentators (the guys on Blue Jays Central claim to not be able to figure out what is going on). Martin has started at 3rd, short, and left field this year as well as at Catcher. My view is that he is done and both he and the Jays know it. They are not trying to transition him to a utility player (although there might be more merit in this than one might think if one reconstructed the lineup), but instead letting him engage in a bit of a swan song before he steps aside.

It would be great if he did step aside. The Jays should give him an office job -- a consultant, roving ambassador, bullpen coach or catcher or something like that. Keep him in the public eye because he's a good face for the Jays: he speaks well, gets along with reporters, seems to really love and respect the fans and that Canadian thing means he is popular with the fans. I don't lament that his career is done. I think it Joe Siddall (on Blue Jays Central) said that the Jays knew this was coming when they signed him as a free agent 3+ years ago. They knew they were going to eat salary on the back end of his contract and were paying him anyway as the price of getting to the playoffs. That was my thinking, too. The chickens have now come home to roost. Pay the man and see who the future catcher is.

It ain't Luke Maile either but he might be the back up. The way the Jays construct their roster creates problems with call ups -- as we have seen -- but we will likely see Danny Jansen after the all-star break (or, earlier if the "right" injury occurs). I read some dingbat saying that they thought Max Pentacost was major-league ready!! He ain't (and I feel bad for him too because this is another story of injuries).  Keep expectations on Jansen limited. He's having a good year AAA and he is only 23, but his record this year is significantly better than his overall minor league record. Remember, this is a guy who spent three full years at various levels of A ball and who, last year, started the season at the A level (admittedly advanced A) and then just hit everything going for the first time in his pro career.  In other words, I hope he is good (for both him and the Jays), but don't over expect. Still, on the what do we know front ... we know Martin is on his way out, Maile is likely the back up of the future, and we will likely see Jansen as a starter this year.

We also know that Morales is done. The Jays will likely cut him this year. His offensive and defensive WAR (wins above replacement, a measure of how a player performs relative to an average replacement player) are both negative. This means that simply replacing Morales with an average player, say from AAA, will make the Jays better. Morales has really tried this year. He's gotten glasses and lost weight. I suspect age is the key factor so he might get on a hot streak, but don't be confused. We know the future and he is not in it.

There are some other things but I'd like to move on to a couple of less optimistic points:

Point #1:, we know there is a lot of pressure on the Jays to elevate Guerrero, Jr. More on this in another blog. I think rushing the kid to the majors would be a mistake, even though I think we should see him this year.

Point #2:  I think we now know why Teoscar Hernandez did not have a major league job. The guy can hit. In less than 400 major league at bats, he's whacked 20 HR and has a +.800 OPS. OPS is a measure of power and ability to get on base. +.800 is all star territory. But, his defence is ... well ... horribly horrible.  I can't say this for sure, but the Jays coaches don't seem to be doing anything about it either. They seem to be letting him to try to work the matter out. The commentary on him notes that he takes bad routes to balls and misplays balls he should be able to catch. It is just a subjective opinion, but my eyeballing of games tells me that he gives up on balls too easily, gets frustrated, and then gets distracted by his own frustration.  Maybe he could be moved to DH (replacing Morales). We do have outfielders (Smith, Alford, Pompey) in the minors or on the bench.

Finally, and I'll end this blog on this point, I think Gibby has lost the team. The number of mistakes they are making is truly outstanding. There is more to say on this point but the Jays are just not playing good baseball. This is frustrating because, in my view, some of their problems could be addressed through coaching.

Do I remain optimistic? Yes, in the long term. We finding things out and that is what this season, I think, was really all about.

Whither the Jays ... Thoughts on a Season about to Begin

Each new season opens with promise ... sometimes that promise is enjoyed by the other teams because, let's be honest, the Jays are *not* a favourite in the AL this year. The fans I've been talking to don't hold out much hope. The feeling is a lot different than last year, where we began the season thinking that if everything went right, the Jays would be in the playoffs again. It didn't happen for a range of reasons, but two stand out: injuries and the decline of some players (most particularly Bautista's decline to a negative WAR player and Pillar's increasingly shaky play both at the plate and in the field).  The Jays management did attempt to address these problems over the winter. In the talent-deep AL East, however, it is likely not enough. To be clear: I don't expect the Jays to be out of it. I don't think the season will be a right off. Instead, I think it will be one of those seasons that fans find so frustrating. The Jays will be on the margins of the race: never fully in it, never fully out of it. Enough to keep you watching but also enough to give you blood pressure problems.  Overall, however, I think there is actually a great deal to be upbeat about if you are a Jays fan.  Why say that?

First, the Jays did make what might be considered important strategic moves. They didn't fall for the pressure to go out and offer $140+ mil to a big name or throw money at an aging vet that might cripple their payroll for years to come. I have some serious problems with the nickel and dime game they played with Stroman but I like a bunch of other decisions ... at least I like them now before the start of the season. What ones?

I like the decision to *not* try to go after Hosmer or Cain or Darvish. They could all have great seasons but the Padres just signed Hosmer to a contract that will keep him with the team until he's 35 -- so this must have been the length he wanted -- and while it is front loaded (which is a good thing), the Padres will be paying Hosmer $13 million per year when he is 34 and 35, and, quite frankly, likely not their starting first baseman. So, they'll either have to find a way to unload him (which will involve eating part of the contract) or they will be paying a backup 1B/PH 13$ mil. Moreover, 144$ mil is a lot of loot for a guy whose primary value is defensive at the easiest to play defensive position in the baseball.  I also worry about players who have their best year in contract years. His age means that last year might not be a fluke but I'd have no desire to pay 144 $ million to find out and it appears the Jays did not either.

Likewise Darvish is a good pitcher. He had a good year and much has been made of his better play with LA, but for me that is a warning sign. LA has one of the best pitcher's parks in baseball. His numbers were inflated playing in that sandbox in Texas, to be sure, but he's 30 years old with a serious injury history and has pitched more than 200 innings once his career. The Cubs we willing to give him 126$ million and I honestly hope he has a good season because I like him and the Cubs, but the Jays are already have a couple of aging pitchers with injury histories. Is paying 126$ mil for another a good way to address starter depth?

So, the first thing I like is the moves the Jays did *not* make. They were sound financial and prudent baseball transactions. They continue a pattern of dramatically reducing the Jays long-term financial commitments, particularly to players who may not be playing (or, may not be playing well). The chart below, I borrow from Matt W's column at Blue Bird Banter:



As Matt W points out, the Jays post current season financial commitments are lower than they have been in ages. And, are lower than their current salary for the first time in something like 15 years.

The second thing I like is the transactions they did make. Bringing in Diaz, Grichuk, and Solarte addresses at least some problems and these were inexpensive players with a potential upside. I have a rule, never trade for a player that the Cards want to get rid of because the Cards are a good baseball organization and don't make mistakes. If they are giving up on someone ... there is a reason for that. Yet, for the Jays, each instance is a step up. Both players they got from the Cards have problems. But, the truth is that our middle infield and backup and right field (overall) last year was not good.

With regard to middle infield, I hate to say that because I like both Goins and Barney and I hope they land on their feet. Goins had a great RBI rate but has a 640ish OPS. Barney had a 600 OPS. Since there is a good chance that backup middle infielders for the Jays are going play a lot, those are just not offensive numbers with which one can live. There is also a problem with defense. Goins, in particular, more than passes the eyeball test, but his dWAR (his defensive value above a replacement player) actually works out to 0.2. That means he is 1/5 of one win better defensively than a player who would replace him, and that is not good enough to compensate for his overall bad offensive numbers, leaving him with a negative overall WAR (wins above replacement).  Goins WAR was close to zero -0.2 overall; what that means is that he did not contribute to the team and cost them oh so slightly it the wins column.

Barney was slightly worse, with Baseball Reference reporting a -0.7 war. Dias clearly had a bad year last year but his potential upside is, simply, a lot more than Goins or Barney. We don't know whether his 2016 numbers (.879 OPS) are accurate but we know that Barney and Goins are not going to get any better. Likewise Solarte's 1.3 war is an upgrade. I don't know if Grichuck is going to be good or bad but I know that Bautista had become a bad player by the end of the last season. Taking a chance on a low cost guy who has some tools is, in this situation, not a bad chance to take.

I don't have the reference with me but various mathematical projections for the upcoming season suggest that the Jays will win somewhere between 78 and 86 games. That is a wide range, likely because it is difficult to project who will actually be playing for the Jays come mid-season noting the injury history of some of their players. If Devon Travis can play a full seasons, if Smoak repeats what he did last year, if Donaldson does not get injured, if Pillar could finally take a step forward instead of another step back, if ... if ... if. There are a lot of ifs. And, generally, one should avoid a team with a lot of ifs. The projections suggestion, however, that there is talent on the team and the higher end projections suggest that the Jays could remain in the hunt for a playoff spot until late in the season.  From what I see, I agree with that.

There are players who are on the bump and the depth the Jays are developing will make those decisions easier. Last year, for instance, the Jays had little choice but to send Bautista out into right field (a position he could no longer really play) and bat him lead off, despite a negative offensive war. This year, I suspect several things:

• The Jays will be a surprisingly good team. Look for them to win more than 80 games and be on the margins of the race the entire season. 
• Pillar will lose his job and will, perhaps, be traded if he does not take a step forward
• Travis will lose his job with one more long-term injury
• Tulo is harder to ditch because of his big salary (accounting for over 40% of the Jays post-2018 salary commitment by himself) but the Jays might be willing to eat salary to deal him and clear at least some payroll if there is a suitor
• Donaldson will be trade bait if the Jays are not in the race since he seems ready to go free agent at the end of the season

Those are worst-case scenarios. I don't actually think they will happen. Instead, the Jays will go through the season surprising us with their competitiveness but frustrating us by never getting over the hump. 

Did anyone think that Gibbons would outlast Farrell?