Electoral Cooperation (or, the NDP and the Liberals Part Two)

A blog or two ago I suggested that electoral mergers are not flags of convenience. They occur for specific historic reasons that involve more than people in opposition saying "hey, let's get together to win an election." Instead, they occur because the differences that organized people into different political perspectives are no longer relevant, because people come together for a new reason (say, as did Harper and his crew to fundamentally alter Canada).  There may be other reasons but my point is that we need to treat politics seriously. We can't see it just as bunch of win-the-election by hook or by crook; the one is the same as the other Ottawa soap opera. (Spin doctoring is important for politics, to be sure, but spin doctoring is part of how an historic bloc functions and has changed over time.)

The possibility of an NDP/Liberal merger or electoral coalition, I suggested, might be one of those "time is right" ideas not in the sense that it would ensure defeat of the Conservatives. It wouldn't. I won't predict who will win the Stanley Cup next year; I'm not going to predict who will in an election in three years time! Instead, the time is right because of historic changes. There has been a great deal of talk about these historic changes and, frankly, my own view is that they are easy to overestimate. In all the talk about changes (communications, technology, education, jobs, media), we might think about the things that have remained the same. We might get an oddly long list.

Historic change, then, is not some vague type of thing ("everything changes"). Instead, it is specific set of changes in the organization of society, the place of Canada in the global capitalist order, gender relations, etc. The rise of the CPC is one element of this change. It represents the views of a particular set of ideologues (what Gramsci called "organic intellectuals") and a specific organization of society. It signals the rise to power of a specific historic bloc (a particular formation of social classes) that imagines Canada's future in a specific way and looks to use government to attain that imagined future. It involves the articulation of the aspirations of subject classes through a dominant class. I need to do more work on this to be even more specific but you get the point. The rise of the CPC both is and is not the historic change to which the NDP and the Liberals need to respond.  It is not an historic change in the sense that losing an election is not necessarily an historic change. The PCs lost a bunch of elections in the 1960s and 1970s (1963, 1965, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1980); the NDP lost even more if you add in 1979 (won by Clark's minority PC gov.). These defeats were not historic because the structure and nature of Canadian politics did not change as a result of these defeats. Being on the losing side in an election might demonstrate, for instance, a balance of forces in a particular historic bloc.

On the other hand, some electoral defeats (which, of course, are wins for others) do signal changes. The 1921 election of King's Liberals signaled a wider shift in the nature of Canadian liberalism and Canada, for instance.  

The Harper electoral victories, on the other hand, can be an historic change if they represent the development of a new historic bloc; that they signal a transition in the organization of Canadian society (both domestically and in terms of how Canada relates to the world). I have been suggesting that this is precisely the case. Mulroney's 1984 victory was of "historic proportions" but did not really change the character and nature of Canada. Indeed, his efforts to do so by and large failed in the face of opposition from Canadians who were willing to "turf out" the Liberals but who remained committed, with lot of caveats here, to liberal ideas. In effect, in 1984, Canadians tried to opt for liberalism without the Liberals. Mulroney's failure was that he misunderstood this and, wrongly, believed that his victory meant that Canadians were turning their back on Trudeauvian liberalism. They weren't. They turned their backs on the Liberal Party, but not the ideas and image of the country it inspired.

Harper's victories can be seen as something else. I don't think Canadians have ditched the ideals of liberalism but I do think that Harper and his crew are setting out, in a more thorough and careful way, to alter the fundamental conception of the country. Unlike Mulroney, Harper seemed to understand that he did not have a mandate to change Canada and that part of his job, as a Conservative, was to lead Canada in a new direction though without actually saying that was what he was doing. He understood, in other words, that there is a difference between wanting to change things and having a mandate to change things. You can change things, if you don't have a mandate, but it requires a different type of politics. This is what Harper is up to.

If this is the case, the Liberals and NDP face a number of possible options for the future. If they are facing an historic change, they may indeed want to reconsider the character and nature of their parties. If they are facing an historic change, their task in opposition, is to articulate a vision of Canada that can serve as a realistic option to Harper's conservatism. This might require a new party. Indeed, I'd be so bold as to suggest it will. But, if Harper's victories do not represent the development of a new era, as it were, in Canadian public life, then something less than a merger will work. Indeed, branding alone might be a good reason to maintain different parties. The Liberals, for instance, retain regional bases of strength (anglophone Quebec, middle class Ontario, parts of Newfoundland) that might not go for a new party. In this case, an electoral coalition of sorts that would allow each party to win seats without having to devote resources to competing with the other - useful in the face of the Tory war chest - would certainly have an appeal.

So … to conclude: losing an election is something that requires analysis. For neither the NDP, Liberals, nor the old PCs or Reform, is an election loss a reason to "jump ship." One needs to carefully analyse what is going on with that loss, why it occurred, etc. before one decides on a response to it. Abandoning an ideology one holds dear (say, liberalism or socialism or conservatism) is not easy. Precisely because it is not easy, no party can assume that its followers will, in fact, follow it into a new political party. We know that a lot of PCs did not follow their leaders. Losing an election might indicate simply that one lost an election. This happens in a democracy. It might, however, mean something else. I will bet we will only see a merger if members of the NDP and Liberals have decided that their loss in the last election means something else.

Liberals, NDP and the Polls

Would joint Liberal/NDP candidates defeat the federal Conservatives if an election were held today? Or, more pointedly and more importantly, in three or four years time? This is the question pundits are now asking. The long and the short of it is that we don't know. Comparisons with the earlier CA/PC merger suggest not while raw numbers suggest that, in fact, they would. According to the Globe's reporting of an Angus Reid poll close to 50% of Canadians who are decided voters and likely to vote, would vote for an NDP/Liberal joint candidate if they had the option while the Globe is right to point out that the PC/CA merger into the Conservatives Party of Canada did not bring with it everyone who had voted PC or CA. In other words, the total CPC vote was less than the two parties received separately in the previous election. Two plus two, in other words, ended up not equally four.

This is an interesting academic puzzle and makes some fun as a discussion point. It is likely, however, no more than that because it treats political parties and ideologies in too broad and vague a way. I've complained about this before but I'll say it again: political parties are not like clothes that one puts on because on happens to like their look. There were significant ideological differences between the PCs and the CA; that is why they were two separate parties. They were not distinct political entities because their leaders disliked each other or because one or the other set of insiders clung to the nattered belief that they could win without the other. They were different and distinct from each other because they were different from each other. Their hard core supporters believed different things, thought about Canada in different ways, self-identified differently, and had different political heritages.

This is the problem with reporting political ideologies in broad strokes "centre-left" or "centre-right." It fails to capture the nuances of different ideological perspectives and different conceptions of the future of Canada, indeed, even different conceptions of Canada's past. To those who are outside of a particular ideology (or, political perspective), the views of others look like variations on a theme. If one is not particularly well informed about politics, then they differences can look very much less like differences. After all … right wing parties believe right wing party like things … do they not? If you want to understand the difference between the CA and the PCs read Bercusson and Cooper, Deconfederation and compare it to Grant's Lament for a Nation.  

These are dramatically different ways of thinking about Canada and its future, the nature of the economy, the place of morality in politics, the role of the state. This is what makes Harper's ability to forge an alliance between the PCs and the CA an event of historic importance. He did not bring together like minded people. Any dimwit can do that. He brought together people who saw eye-to-eye on some things but not on others. He built, in other words, a new historic bloc that was neither CA nor PC. He drew on provincial conservative parties and ideologues. In the process, he lost some PCs (Danny Williams anyone) but attracted others (Bernard Lord). He marginalized some old Reformers but drew in others and brought in new people who were neither Reform, CA, or PC. He did not just simply ask for compromise (in the manner of Mulroney) but -- along with many others -- forged a new political movement whose goal was to do more than win an election, whose goal was to refashion Canada (drawing heavily on the Republican election handbook in the process).

The NDP/Lliberals face the same types of issues. The truth of the matter is that the NDP and the Liberals are not and should not be the same political party. They are different because one (the NDP) is a socialist political party that, theoretically at least, aims -- like the CPC -- to build a different type of country. The other (Liberals) are civic nationalists who, in fact, built the country Harper and his crew are trying to dismantle. Civic nationalists have had a significant influence on Canadian socialists (and, oddly, on Conservatives as well) but they hold different views (civic nationalists are, for instance, capitalists who look askance at ethno-linguistic nationalists). Socialists, theoretically at least, want to replace capitalism with something else and are willing to discuss the merits of ethno-linguistic nationalism if it represents an oppressed people.

What pushed the CA and PCs together was like mindedness. Indeed, as the numbers show, a lot of PCs stayed away from the new CPC (a number joining the Liberals and some dropping out of politics all together). Instead, what contributed to the merger and its eventual success were two things. First, the spectre of electoral destruction. It is hard to remember this but the pre-sponsorship scandal Liberals looked like they were poised (under Martin) for a victory of historic (Mulroneyesque) proportions. the PCs, in particular, were faced the possibility of being finally wiped out. The CA was going to be rolled back to a rural rump with extremist views. It was only in the face of this type of massive defeat that merger was seriously considered, that the PCs and the CA were willing to put some water with their wine and modify their ideological positions. Second, times changed. The PCs no longer represented what we can think of as a broad ideology. Toryism had long been in opposition in Canada but it represented the views of a significant minority of Canadians, perhaps 25% perhaps 30%. By the early 2000s, this was no longer the case. The number of committed Tories -- people committed to Toryism as a way of seeing the country -- had shrunk to perhaps 10-15%. And, new ideological perspectives (neo-conservatism) that had only a loose connection to Toryism had popped up.

For the Liberals and the NDP, the question is do these same circumstances apply. One reason that I'd suggest that a Liberal/NDP merger might be successful is that the ideological perspectives represented by each of these parties have changed. Their opposition to Harperesque neo-conservatism does not make them mirror reflections of each other (the centre-left is a big, big, big political space occupied by the Greens and the Bloc as well). But, the old battles of Trudeauvian liberalism are no longer battles and Canadian socialism, as I've pointed out before, is not really socialism. It's sort of a vague progressive reformism. What this means is that there is an opening for some type of electoral cooperation in the sense that what divided the parties in the past has been, in part, overcome by history. We have, right now, a civic nationalist Liberal Party led (comfortably it seems) by a former socialist and socialist NDP led (perhaps slightly less comfortably) by a former Liberal civic nationalist. Both are pragmatists (unlike, say, Trudeau and Broadbent or Pearson and Douglas) who are committed to the Canada that Trudeau and company built (multiculturalism, bilingualism, charter rights, regional equalization, autonomy in foreign affairs) with some twists and turns. Moreover, the Liberals face the same question the PCs faced a decade ago: is our ideological perspective relevant any longer in the sense that Canadians are willing to commit themselves to it. I don't know for sure, but my guess is that the number of true believers is considerably less than it was. For most people civic nationalism is the background of Canada; the goal. Hence … a merger of some sort just might work.

NDP keeps door open for merger talks with Liberals - The Globe and Mail

NDP keeps door open for merger talks with Liberals - The Globe and Mail

Is there a good reason for the NDP to merge with the Liberal Party? My gut level reaction is no for three reasons. First, the NDP and the Liberal Party historically occupy different positions on the political spectrum and with regard to political ideology. There is some overlap between so-called "social liberals" and what we might call a "reformist" wing of the NDP. Both would be based in the middle class and both would look to address issues relating to poverty, inequality, social justice, and the environment. But ... well ... who doesn't believe in these things. The Conservatives? OK, yes, but is a broad agreement on common sense issues (say, the need to protect the environment) enough for a merger. Traditionally, there have been significant differences in the ways in which Liberals and NDP have looked at Canada. Traditionally, they have had different views on federalism, capitalism, and the national debt as well as national defence. For a merger to go forward, these differences would need to be addressed. Traditionally, for instance, Liberals have subscribed to a federalism in which their is a more pronounced role for a strong central government and little interest in "special status". The NDP argues for a strong role for the state but has had less interest, frankly, in a strong central government since the mid 1980s. They have also supported "special status" (or, whatever we call it). Liberals have show that on this issue, at least, there are sizeable numbers of them who are willing to "fight to the death."

Are these technical issues that disappear? I don't think so. I don't think the constitution and the division of powers -- however dry it may be to some people -- is a silly issue or so much academic talk. It was, according to some studies, the root of the divisions between Turner and Trudeau and Chretien and Martin and those divisions end up polarizing what was then a functioning party. Moreover, I would argue (I won't here!) that they are important and likely should not be dismissed. My point, of course, is this. Those people who see no differences between the NDP and the Liberals don't know very much about either.

Second, the NDP are in competition with the Liberals on the provincial level in a number of places. The ties between the federal and provincial Liberal Parties are not hard and fast, unlike the federal and provincial NDP parties. Officially, in fact, federal and provincial Liberal Parties are usually (always?) separate parties. Yet, there is an appreciable overlap. (This is the reason right wingers are trying to change the name of the BC Liberal Party, precisely because there is an overlap and they are trying to break it). The NDP and the Liberals are in competition provincially in NS (the NDP seems to have won for now reducing the Liberals to a rump but not necessarily a disappearing one), ON, and BC. The NDP has no provincial precise in QC, PEI, NB and Newfoundland so there is no real competition there. And the Liberals are dead in the water in MN and SK so no trouble there. And, of course, neither does very well in AB.  Even in those areas where the NDP does not have a strong traditional vote (NB, Newfoundland, for instance, and AB), my bet is that they will be looking to increase their vote, bringing them into direct competition with provincial Liberals.

Why mention this? Well, this is reason two why the NDP might not want a merger: that merger would be difficult. The Liberals have little interest in signing onto an NDP in NS and ON, PEI and likely NF and NB, among other places. They have a reasonable chance of doing well politically by themselves and even winning (I don't expect the NS Liberals to win the next election but ... perhaps the one after that?).

Finally, why would the NDP want to merge with the Liberals if they had to take over the federal Liberals record? Why would they want, in other words, to take over part (even a small part) of a bad brand? This does not make sense. At the federal level one has to ask: do the benefits outweigh the costs of absorbing some bad history? I won't make that calculation right now but that is not my point. My point is that it is not a lock sync that it does.

So, put all this together and a merger  does not look all that smart from an NDP perspective. The NDP needs to take on people with whom they have ideological disagreements, who will support provincial parties with which they are in competition, and who have a bad brand. This does not mean that there will not be a merger. It means that I'd recommend a different strategy to growth for the NDP.