Recent efforts to the NDP to define and mobilize what we might call a "progressive" political coalition is not simply politics. It is not, for instance, just a political party looking to find some way to appeal to voters. I am sure that there are a few NDP partisans whose intentions might be less than noble but, by and large, the NDP is both part of and helping to organize a redefinition of the Canadian left, or what Ian McKay once called a "left formation." This begs two questions: what is a left formation and how does it affect Canadian public life?
A left formation represents an effort to define an alternative politics. It mobilizes a certain language the identifies problems and ways of responding to them. It involves political education: asking people to think about particular issues and raising questions for them. It involves political organization in an effort to win election (or, at least secure representation) that is intended to build a coalition that can challenge socially, economically, and politically powerful interests that otherwise organize state policy in their interests or, at the least, ignore issues that need to be addressed if the country is to improve.
There can - and should -- be a debate about what the word "improve" means. I have come of late to understand it means radically different things to different people and different political perspectives. (This is an important issue that I will address later.) But, in the case of the NDP and other "progressive" thinkers, there are specific considerations they take into account.
1) Society is riddled with inequalities that break down on a number of lines: gender, race, class, sexual orientation, disability, etc. These inequalities translate into various forms of social, economic, and political marginalization that deprives people of an equal voice in public affairs, imposes undue restrictions on equality of opportunity, and impedes the natural growth and development of people. For instance, it serves to perpetuate poverty over time. One goal of government is to address these inequalities in ways that break cycles of poverty or marginalization and which broaden access to the public sphere.
2) Inequalities also affect the character and scope of democracy. Because some people have an undue influence (by virtue of inequalities) on government, they misdirect government policies away from their proper end. Government should, for instance, be assuring high quality education, living and improving wages for workers, proper access to health care, and other like matters. It should not be providing tax cuts to already wealthy corporations or cutting needed and necessary public goods in order to balance the books.
3) The environment is important and we cannot have a false "jobs versus the environment" debate. The effect of this debate is to lead us to make decisions as a society that are not in the public interest. In particular, it leads us to continue to pollute the environment when there are alternatives that don't cost jobs. Canada needs to plan its move away from a carbon-based energy economy and toward a greener economy that provides for the future.
4) Canada is not playing a constructive role in international affairs. It used to. Its blind support of Israel, come what may, for instance, has led it away from its former ability to play the role of the honest broker and get a few things done. Canada did not bring peace to the middle east, but it is not doing that now. In fact, its stance is more of an impediment to peace. But, its older approach was more humane and did positively affect people's lives. We need to find a way to regenerate that positive role.
5) There is a place for public goods in our economy. Whether it be roads, schools, science, or R and D, the state can and should play a role in society because it evens out the inequalities. There are financial constraints; no one says that there are not. But, we need to also acknowledge that there is more than one way to get things done and that some ways might have more social benefits than others. Everyone, for instance, benefits from higher levels of formal education, better roads, less waiting time for health care, and the like.
Now, we need, as always, to be careful. Conservatives, for instance, might not disagree that there are problems with health care wait times. What they disagree with is solution to this problem. Their solution is (more or less) to expand privatization. We reduce health care wait times not by providing hospitals with the funding they need, but by allowing some people to buy their way to the head of the cue. This is a philosophical point. One either agrees with it or disagrees with it. Those who agree will say "why should I wait in line when ....?" Those who disagree say "why should a rich person have a small problem addressed, say plastic surgery, before a poor person's life is saved?" In other words, the "progressive" perspective favours need over wealth. It is, oddly, a very Christian perspective because it is about an ethics of care and priorities. Christians are (supposedly, at least) to be "their brother's keeper." One is supposed to be concerned about other people, their lives, their futures, their children, etc. One does not go in and boss them around, but one should help out if one has the chance. If it comes to a choice between the convenience of the wealthy and the health of the poor, we need (Christians say) to side with the poor.
What the NDP is part of, then, is an effort to build a specific vision of the country that will, in the event of a successful federal election, be implemented through policy. This is what the NDP is trying to do right now in Alberta. Where it does not do this -- develop ideas that can be implemented as policy as part of a vision for the future -- the NDP runs into problems, if it wins elections. It was, for instance, successful in Saskatchewan for a fair piece of time precisely because it knew what it was doing and where it wanted to go. Same thing in Manitoba (although there seems to be a bit of a loss of direction of late). In Ontario under Bob Rae and more recently in NS, the opposite was the case. The NDP won elections, but actually did not have a direction in which it clearly wanted to move. It had a bunch of ideas, philosophies, etc., and there were complicating factors (in the case of Ontario, an international economic downturn), but in both of those cases the party ended up alienating its own supporters.
I am not certain that these points I have articulated above amount to a "revolutionary" philosophy although I do think they are a reform agenda of serious importance that merits consideration. I can think of worse things that redefining Canada's role on the world stage to make the country more relevant. I can think of worse things that lower health care wait time as opposed to providing wealthy people with easier access to services that the rest of us will not be able to afford. What the NDP is attempting to do is to build a basis of support for these ideas by talking to people who, more or less, already favour them ... the ideas; not the party. The NDP, to be sure, reaches out to all types of voters as we saw provincially in Alberta. But, it particularly is interested in people who might share these ideas but who don't vote or don't support the NDP. The language of progressiveness is a rubric that both represents their ideas and defines a philosophy, a way to approach policy and public life.
This is, in my view, not socialism. Let me say that clearly: progressive politics is not socialism. If the CCF and the NDP were once socialists, the current NDP no longer is. A capitalist economy will continue to exist under the NDP. There will continue to be big business; markets will function. The stock market will not close down. If the CCF called for capitalism to replaced by the cooperative commonwealth, that was a long time ago. Those were ideas articulated as part of a transition to an industrial society and in the midst of a the great depression. If the NDP once thought about "industrial democracy," it gave up on that idea (for good or ill) over a generation ago. The type of progressive politics is different. And, that is not a bad thing. As I said in a previous blog, politics changes over time. Political philosophies and visions of nation should not be creatures of fad, but they also have to be right for the times. No one would hold any political movement to the ideas of the 1920s and rightly so because we do not live in the 1920s.
Other groups are attempting to politically organize "progressive" people as well. Here in NB, and also from what I can tell in PEI, the Green Party fishes in the same lake. While many Green supporters are people who, in fact, were not previously politically active, their message is a message that NDP supporters also like (particularly, in NB, owing to changes in the provincial party). In Quebec, QS supporters are more leftish, to be sure, but also reach out to a similar demographic. I do not know for sure, but I suspect the BQ will, as well, in the next federal election in Quebec. NGOs, coalitions, lobby groups, and others may also be operative in the same political space. This is not unusual, but it does raise questions about how to proceed and whether or not people are willing to cross political boundaries or form temporary political alliances.
I do not know. What I do know is that the NDP has been far more successful so far than I imagined it would be, say, a number of years ago. Four years ago, in fact, NDP success was more or less laid at the feet of Jack Layton and, no doubt, he deserved a lot of credit. Regardless of what one thinks of progressive politics, his commitment should be admired. But, it is also clear that something other than a "we love Jack" movement was going on. It is evident that the success of the NDP represented a new coalescences of leftism, a potentially evolving new left formation. Where it goes from here ... is something that remains to be seen.
Showing posts with label NDP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NDP. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 15, 2015
Monday, July 13, 2015
Reconfiguring Progressive Politics Part II: Something Other than Socialism
Last blog I argued that it would be a mistake to see the NDP and Liberals, historically, as the "left" and that the discursive linking of socialism with liberalism is, in fact, politics and bad analysis. I think, however, that the chances of a greater connection between the NDP and the Liberal Party is better now than it has ever been. This is not a product of learning to cooperate. This is the result of a political reconfiguration through which both parties and Canada have passed. The Conservative Party of Canada was, in fact, a product of this reconfiguration. Whatever conservatism has come to mean, what became evident some time ago is that the variants of conservatism that had existed historically in Canada did not work in the sense that neither had the capacity to create a national political movement that could challenge an ascendant liberalism. Does the same thing apply to the NDP and to the Liberal? Are we in a different historical moment?
I will argue yes. This does not mean that the parties will merge. I actually think that unlikely. But, it does mean that both parties are working on a very similar policy groundwork. The NDP's movement -- which has been underway for some time -- away from socialism and toward "progressive" politics is a case in point. Likewise, the Liberals have not abandoned civic nationalism but find that last generation's reform agenda is no longer a winning formula. The issue, however, involves more than winning. Political parties want to win. Let's take that as an assumption. But, political parties (as I've explained before) are not just vote getting machines. Yes, there are people in parties who don't really care too much about ideology. (I have a theory that these increase over time and I'll articulate that in a different blog.) But, by and large there are reasons why some people are Liberals and others Conservatives; some people are NDPers; others Bloc or Green. And that reason, I as suggested in my last blog, is that the ideological space of each party is not the same as the others. There may be moments compatibility or spaces of commonality, but by and large parties are different because the people who organize, staff, and maintain them are think differently about public issues. Hence, the supporters of political parties want to win but they are also drawn together out of common cause. Political re-organization occurs when that common cause is rethought. It could fracture a party (the PCs in the 1990s); broaden it (the CCF's transformation to the NDP). See its demise (the movement of progressive into the Liberals, what became the CCF, and the Tories) or its project defeated (Labour-Farmer in NS). Often, however, parties retool internally, shifting their focus through policy congresses, leadership, the weight of circumstances. This, I would argue, is what has gone on with the NDP over a fairly long period of time.
Retooling the NDP
The NDP has retooled at different point in its history ... and failed to retool. Originally, the NDP started as the CCF, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, a social gospel inspired form of socialism that called for the democratic displacement of capitalism and the development of a different type of government and economy ... you guessed it: the cooperative commonwealth. The CCF was only one of a series of leftist political parties in Canada at the time it emerged in the 1930s and, in fact, was fairly late on the scene. There is a great deal of very good scholarship on this subject so we don't need to go into it in detail but socialist parties and movements of various sorts had existed in Canada for a couple of generations by the time the CCF arrived on the scene. Some of these were revolutionary; others milder, but all believed that capitalism was an odd an a-moral economic system that created deep social divisions, economic dysfunction (poverty), and social conflict. In other words, a capitalist economy was a socially bad type of thing that promised conflict, divisions, dysfunction, and social harm. What the CCF did was pick up on this idea, firmly link the displacement of capitalism to democratic processes, and connect the problems of farmers and other small producers to working class conflicts. In effect, if you worked ... you were in the same boat. Being a socialist did not require one to be revolutionary, except perhaps in one's vision of the future. Fundamental reforms could be won through the regular institutions of electoral democracy by contesting and winning elections.
Exactly what a non-capitalist economy looked like is challenging to both describe and, in this day and age, to envision. For CCFers, however, it took the form of de-commodification. The objective was to progressively expand the range of services and goods, etc., that were not subject to the logic of the market. This is an important consideration because the logic of the market is different than most people think it is. We live, today, with a feel good view of capitalism that is not really what capitalism is all about (which is why people are often dissatisfied with it). If you want a quick refresher about the character and nature of capitalism as an economic system, you might want to have a look at the "myths of capitalism" series of blogs I penned a while ago. A good example of commodification might medical care, because it is one with which Canadians are familiar.
De-commodification does not mean that no one gets paid. People still do. What it means is that the value of the product and its provision is not determined by the market. Thus, for instance, in a market-driven health care system, one pays for a service by negotiating a price. Don't like the price demanded by the provider, you don't get the service. From the perspective of health-care providers, the issue is who offers more for the service. You could, for instance, treat person X but since they can't pay, you treat person Y and person X goes without care, regardless of the relative severity of the illness in question. A de-commodified service organizes payment differently and prioritizes care differently. It prioritizes care, for instance, not be ability to pay but by need. It organizes payment not through a market by via non-market mechanisms. Underlying this system is a basic value: the a-morality of capitalism (whoever pays the most gets first in line) is not good enough in dealing with people's lives. Individuals should not be bankrupted after a lifetime of hard work because they, their partner, or child becomes ill. The lives of poor or middle class children are just as valuable as the lives of children who happen to be born into rich families.
We de-commodify other things in our society, too. This does not make them perfect. Attaining a de-commodified non-market basis for the provision of goods and services does not mean that history ends. We can still improve things, but we have found that some things are better provided on this basis. Education, for instance, is less expensive to provide on a de-commodified basis and fairer. Most roads do not charge fees or public parks or beaches. We don't have the competitive provision of police services or fire protection. In other words, there are many things that, over time, we have agreed to a socialist logic for. The objective of the CCF was to extend this logic by using the stage to organize the provision of goods and services.
How far would the CCF have gone? That is not clear. The CCF, for instance, does not seem to have harboured any animosity toward small business people (particularly but not exclusively farmers) who, it believed, were harm by the logic of capitalism, too. There were, then, matters of debate and discussion. The cooperative commonwealth was likely never intended to displace all market transactions but to ensure fairness, impede conflict, and promote an alternative idea of a de-commodified approach to goods and services where this saved money, ensured higher levels of fairness, and improved society.
The NDP
The development of the NDP, which replaced the CCF in 1961 by linking it more directly to organized labour, represented an effort to broaden the base of the CCF. In addition to a more direct connection to organized labour (which it hoped would provide votes for the party), the NDP also hoped to made inroads into progressive members of the middle class. Exactly how this would be attained, however, was not clear. The most innovative idea was industrial democracy. Exactly what this entailed is difficult to specify and whether it ever would have worked in practice is unknown. But, it was an effort to rethink the economy and what a leftist economy would look like. If de-commodification addressed issues of the provision of goods and services, industrial democracy approach the economy from the other direction. Was it possible to organize a workforce in a large industry on other grounds. Could one create workers control, a long-time ideal of socialism, by having the same people work and run the business in which they work?
For one reason or another this idea just did not fly. As I will indicate, later, I think it might be time to rethink it. But, its failure left the NDP with good rhetoric, popular leaders, but something less than a platform that could appeal broadly in Canadian society. The NDP periodically garnered support for opposition to globalization, but had less success in translating that support into an agenda that they could carry into government. They also fell afoul of the identity politics that plagued Canada in the late 1980s and 1990s. Generally, NDPers were sympathetic to the concerns of Quebecers, but this sympathy harmed them in the charged atmosphere that produced the Reform and the Canadian Alliance. Likewise, NDP support for tolerance, diversity, and immigration did not "play well" in that climate. Moreover, those who opposed reactionary policies tended to rally under the banner of the Liberals, viewed as the only party that could actually maintain national unity and maintain traditional values (such as support for diversity), in the face of rising intolerance in other sectors of society.
Finally, the NDP did not necessarily score well with the general population on economic issues. This was not just anti-leftist ideology. The truth of the matter was that the NDP had a strong record of opposition to neo-liberal economic "reforms" that reintroduced some seriously harmful economic measures, but they actually had little idea of how to proceed if they were to attain power. The recent NDP government in NS is a good example. I don't think the NS NDP represents national trends. I think, in fact, they represented an older iteration of the NDP. After winning election ... they simply did not know what to do with the economy. Their policies, to be sure, were better than some of the alternatives but their inability to forge a leftist direction for the economy led them back into a peace alliance, of course, with the same large scale enterprises they were elected to oppose. In other words, in the absence of a clear policy, the NS NDP fell back on the ideas of other political parties.
Progressivism Today
The federal NDP is, I think, different because it has had longer to rethink its direction and longer to plan its and the country's future. I won't necessarily be voting NDP. OK, who am I kidding, we all know I won't be voting NDP, but the current shift to a language of progressivism -- again, a while in developing -- represents a step toward formulating a serious alternative to neo-liberalism. What does progressivism entail? Well, this blog is getting too long, to be sure. There are, I think a number of parts to it and so I'll save those for the next entry I make.
I will argue yes. This does not mean that the parties will merge. I actually think that unlikely. But, it does mean that both parties are working on a very similar policy groundwork. The NDP's movement -- which has been underway for some time -- away from socialism and toward "progressive" politics is a case in point. Likewise, the Liberals have not abandoned civic nationalism but find that last generation's reform agenda is no longer a winning formula. The issue, however, involves more than winning. Political parties want to win. Let's take that as an assumption. But, political parties (as I've explained before) are not just vote getting machines. Yes, there are people in parties who don't really care too much about ideology. (I have a theory that these increase over time and I'll articulate that in a different blog.) But, by and large there are reasons why some people are Liberals and others Conservatives; some people are NDPers; others Bloc or Green. And that reason, I as suggested in my last blog, is that the ideological space of each party is not the same as the others. There may be moments compatibility or spaces of commonality, but by and large parties are different because the people who organize, staff, and maintain them are think differently about public issues. Hence, the supporters of political parties want to win but they are also drawn together out of common cause. Political re-organization occurs when that common cause is rethought. It could fracture a party (the PCs in the 1990s); broaden it (the CCF's transformation to the NDP). See its demise (the movement of progressive into the Liberals, what became the CCF, and the Tories) or its project defeated (Labour-Farmer in NS). Often, however, parties retool internally, shifting their focus through policy congresses, leadership, the weight of circumstances. This, I would argue, is what has gone on with the NDP over a fairly long period of time.
Retooling the NDP
The NDP has retooled at different point in its history ... and failed to retool. Originally, the NDP started as the CCF, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, a social gospel inspired form of socialism that called for the democratic displacement of capitalism and the development of a different type of government and economy ... you guessed it: the cooperative commonwealth. The CCF was only one of a series of leftist political parties in Canada at the time it emerged in the 1930s and, in fact, was fairly late on the scene. There is a great deal of very good scholarship on this subject so we don't need to go into it in detail but socialist parties and movements of various sorts had existed in Canada for a couple of generations by the time the CCF arrived on the scene. Some of these were revolutionary; others milder, but all believed that capitalism was an odd an a-moral economic system that created deep social divisions, economic dysfunction (poverty), and social conflict. In other words, a capitalist economy was a socially bad type of thing that promised conflict, divisions, dysfunction, and social harm. What the CCF did was pick up on this idea, firmly link the displacement of capitalism to democratic processes, and connect the problems of farmers and other small producers to working class conflicts. In effect, if you worked ... you were in the same boat. Being a socialist did not require one to be revolutionary, except perhaps in one's vision of the future. Fundamental reforms could be won through the regular institutions of electoral democracy by contesting and winning elections.
Exactly what a non-capitalist economy looked like is challenging to both describe and, in this day and age, to envision. For CCFers, however, it took the form of de-commodification. The objective was to progressively expand the range of services and goods, etc., that were not subject to the logic of the market. This is an important consideration because the logic of the market is different than most people think it is. We live, today, with a feel good view of capitalism that is not really what capitalism is all about (which is why people are often dissatisfied with it). If you want a quick refresher about the character and nature of capitalism as an economic system, you might want to have a look at the "myths of capitalism" series of blogs I penned a while ago. A good example of commodification might medical care, because it is one with which Canadians are familiar.
De-commodification does not mean that no one gets paid. People still do. What it means is that the value of the product and its provision is not determined by the market. Thus, for instance, in a market-driven health care system, one pays for a service by negotiating a price. Don't like the price demanded by the provider, you don't get the service. From the perspective of health-care providers, the issue is who offers more for the service. You could, for instance, treat person X but since they can't pay, you treat person Y and person X goes without care, regardless of the relative severity of the illness in question. A de-commodified service organizes payment differently and prioritizes care differently. It prioritizes care, for instance, not be ability to pay but by need. It organizes payment not through a market by via non-market mechanisms. Underlying this system is a basic value: the a-morality of capitalism (whoever pays the most gets first in line) is not good enough in dealing with people's lives. Individuals should not be bankrupted after a lifetime of hard work because they, their partner, or child becomes ill. The lives of poor or middle class children are just as valuable as the lives of children who happen to be born into rich families.
We de-commodify other things in our society, too. This does not make them perfect. Attaining a de-commodified non-market basis for the provision of goods and services does not mean that history ends. We can still improve things, but we have found that some things are better provided on this basis. Education, for instance, is less expensive to provide on a de-commodified basis and fairer. Most roads do not charge fees or public parks or beaches. We don't have the competitive provision of police services or fire protection. In other words, there are many things that, over time, we have agreed to a socialist logic for. The objective of the CCF was to extend this logic by using the stage to organize the provision of goods and services.
How far would the CCF have gone? That is not clear. The CCF, for instance, does not seem to have harboured any animosity toward small business people (particularly but not exclusively farmers) who, it believed, were harm by the logic of capitalism, too. There were, then, matters of debate and discussion. The cooperative commonwealth was likely never intended to displace all market transactions but to ensure fairness, impede conflict, and promote an alternative idea of a de-commodified approach to goods and services where this saved money, ensured higher levels of fairness, and improved society.
The NDP
The development of the NDP, which replaced the CCF in 1961 by linking it more directly to organized labour, represented an effort to broaden the base of the CCF. In addition to a more direct connection to organized labour (which it hoped would provide votes for the party), the NDP also hoped to made inroads into progressive members of the middle class. Exactly how this would be attained, however, was not clear. The most innovative idea was industrial democracy. Exactly what this entailed is difficult to specify and whether it ever would have worked in practice is unknown. But, it was an effort to rethink the economy and what a leftist economy would look like. If de-commodification addressed issues of the provision of goods and services, industrial democracy approach the economy from the other direction. Was it possible to organize a workforce in a large industry on other grounds. Could one create workers control, a long-time ideal of socialism, by having the same people work and run the business in which they work?
For one reason or another this idea just did not fly. As I will indicate, later, I think it might be time to rethink it. But, its failure left the NDP with good rhetoric, popular leaders, but something less than a platform that could appeal broadly in Canadian society. The NDP periodically garnered support for opposition to globalization, but had less success in translating that support into an agenda that they could carry into government. They also fell afoul of the identity politics that plagued Canada in the late 1980s and 1990s. Generally, NDPers were sympathetic to the concerns of Quebecers, but this sympathy harmed them in the charged atmosphere that produced the Reform and the Canadian Alliance. Likewise, NDP support for tolerance, diversity, and immigration did not "play well" in that climate. Moreover, those who opposed reactionary policies tended to rally under the banner of the Liberals, viewed as the only party that could actually maintain national unity and maintain traditional values (such as support for diversity), in the face of rising intolerance in other sectors of society.
Finally, the NDP did not necessarily score well with the general population on economic issues. This was not just anti-leftist ideology. The truth of the matter was that the NDP had a strong record of opposition to neo-liberal economic "reforms" that reintroduced some seriously harmful economic measures, but they actually had little idea of how to proceed if they were to attain power. The recent NDP government in NS is a good example. I don't think the NS NDP represents national trends. I think, in fact, they represented an older iteration of the NDP. After winning election ... they simply did not know what to do with the economy. Their policies, to be sure, were better than some of the alternatives but their inability to forge a leftist direction for the economy led them back into a peace alliance, of course, with the same large scale enterprises they were elected to oppose. In other words, in the absence of a clear policy, the NS NDP fell back on the ideas of other political parties.
Progressivism Today
The federal NDP is, I think, different because it has had longer to rethink its direction and longer to plan its and the country's future. I won't necessarily be voting NDP. OK, who am I kidding, we all know I won't be voting NDP, but the current shift to a language of progressivism -- again, a while in developing -- represents a step toward formulating a serious alternative to neo-liberalism. What does progressivism entail? Well, this blog is getting too long, to be sure. There are, I think a number of parts to it and so I'll save those for the next entry I make.
Friday, July 10, 2015
Reconfiguring Progressive Politics Part I: Something Other than Socialism
In Reds, Rebels, Radicals, Ian McKay argues that there are a variety of ways to be a leftist in Canada. Leftism is less a specific and unchanging set of doctrines than an historically evolving political philosophy that moves to address different issues at different times as these gain importance because of changed circumstances. This much, one supposes, might be said about all political movements but McKay's point is a useful reminder because of the tendency in the media to treat the left as a single perspective that never changes: once a socialist, always a socialist. Exactly what it means to be "on the left" these days is, however, a matter of discussion (although not necessarily debate), the changed historical circumstances in which the political left finds itself operating, and its own efforts to define a meaningful politics and set of public policies that can produce stable alternatives to what it sees at the misguided policies that have reigned over Canada for longer than a decade.
A few blogs ago, I tried to address the confusing mish-mash of Canadian conservatism and what it means as a political option for Canadians. In this blog, I'd like to look more directly the NDP, and to some extent the Liberal Party, to try to engage the other options Canadians will have before them when they turn to the polls this fall. One of the mistakes that the political right has made, has been to assume that the Liberals and NDP are basically the same. Taking a page from American conservatives, Canadian conservatives got into the habit of referring to everyone who was not conservative as "left." Indeed, there was even some discursive connection of the liberalism with socialism. No less a figure that Stephen Harper, in fact, made such statements. It would be difficult to overstate how wrong this perspective actually is. What I want to do here is trace the development of what I will ultimately call "progressive" politics to set the stage for a further consideration of its current manifestations, which I'll likely address in a blog after this one.
Socialism and Civic Nationalism
Part of this connection of liberalism with socialism (the Liberal Party with the NDP) was political. It was a cheap effort to get votes by calling opponents names. Deployed against liberals, it became an odd sort of red baiting. Another part of it was political blindness. For a variety of reasons, commentators on the left simply did not understand the distinctions between post-WW II Canadian liberalism and the socialism (or, social democracy, if one prefers that term) of the NDP. There were, in fact, important and appreciative difference on the level of policy and philosophy even if individual supporters of one party or the other could periodically move fluidly between them. The distinction between liberals and socialists was not who was more progressive (or, who was the "real" progressive, or words to that effect) but distinctions of ideology that were, on some level, fundamental.
In the past, I have called the liberalism that came to dominate Canada after WW II "civic nationalism" and the name remains as good as any name. It was organized around a series of beliefs that focused on the individual and its protection in society. This included equality of opportunity, Charter rights, regional development programmes, a commitment to accepting diversity, and other measures, such as bilingualism. I am not saying that all these different policies fit together seamlessly, but they were, more or less, a coherent policy framework that was implemented in a reformist measure with the broad support of middle-class Canadians and which served to re-tool Canada. Voting Liberal, in other words (and I will have more to say on this later), meant something specific. It meant supporting a specific vision of the country and its future.
Voting NDP (or, for a socialist or social-democratic option) meant something else. Again, for purposes of analysis, we should put our views as to which perspective is better on hold. In other words, we should not be partisan and array a hierarchy of ideological perspectives. Canadian socialists -- who by and large inhabited the NDP -- did not reject diversity politics or oppose bilingualism or Charter rights, but were, simply, interested in different matters. These included labour codes, workplace health and safety, industrial democracy, limiting connections between the state and big business, finding mechanisms to address the social inequalities of power in Canadian society, working-class wages. In other words, they were different; not better; not worse. Different.
The confusion between the NDP and Liberals, between socialism and civic nationalism, then, arose from a variety of factors including: conservative politics and an effort to win votes by lumping their opponents together; an inability of right-wing commentators to understand the distinction between civil nationalism and socialism; an imported American rhetorical framework that divided all politics up into "left" and "right" in a way that broached no further diversity. And, I would also argue that they NDP confused matters themselves because they fished off the same pier, as it were, as the Liberals. For example, they were passionate defenders of minority groups. Indeed, they were likely more passionate than the civic nationalists who looked to find means to protect minorities as individuals who faced discrimination. And, they could use the same mechanisms (Charter rights) as liberals to make their defence. Economically, Canadian socialists -- sometime after WW II -- stopped talking about supplanting capitalism, made their peace with it, and looked to modify and manage it. There were important differences between the civic nationalist and socialist view of the economy but both believed in some form of management via the state. If liberals continued to believe in capitalism (which they did) ... oddly, so too did the NDP in practice. Theoretically, Canadian socialists argued against capitalism; in practice they accepted it and used liberal economic management tools.
Progressive Politics in Practice
What did this mean? A number of things:
1. Canadians who were looking to cast non-conservative, more progressive (for lack of a better word) votes had different options and those options were not a question of who was more progressive than the other. They were different visions of the future.
2. In practice, however, this difference could be confused and compromised both because of the politics of manipulation and because of some degree of convergence on means (even if the ends remained distinct).
3. Long-term success for the federal Liberal Party of Canada. As is well known, the federal Liberals ruled the roost for most of the last half of the twentieth century. If we begin after WW II, we have Liberal governments in power from 1945-57; 1963-84 (with the Clark interregnum), and 1993-2006. We don't need to get into this history. Civic nationalism did not "win over" Canada. It was clearly buoyed by the idiosyncrasies of the First Past the Post System. This allow it translate its support among a plurality of Canadians ... into majorities of working minorities in Parliament.
4. NDP -- socialism -- remained a minority option for Canadians. While drawing committed support from an not insignificant number of people, the NDP tended to succeed provincially in areas where liberalism was weak, class politics increased political polarization, and the middle class tended to look to conservatism (as opposed the liberalism) as its political home.
Implications
I mention all of these points because, for a long time, I was rather down on the idea that the NDP and the Liberals could be anything other than temporary allies, which, historically, has been precisely the case. Even when they might have competed over the same voters, they saw the world differently. They could cooperate, now and then, because they each saw the politics of conservatism as something to be avoided, but this did not mean that they parties could or would merge or even work together (say, via strategic voting). The reason for this was patently evident to most of the activists in both parties: they could not merge because they were different. Resistance to abandoning the NDP, for instance, was not just a dislike of Liberals (say, Martin or Chretien, each of whom could talk a progressive game) or personal political ambition. It was a sense that there was a fundamental incompatibility to the parties.
And, I think, by and large this was right. This is what I have tried to explain above. Supporting the NDP meant something different form supporting the Liberals.
A question that we have to ask, I think, and an important one, is this: is this any longer the case? If there was, say, a fundamental incompatibility between, say, industrial democracy and civil nationalism, does this type of incompatibility still exist today. Is the NDP a socialist political party any longer or ... if it is ... what is 21st century Canadian socialism? Can -- will? -- the civic nationalism of the Trudeau-Chretien era still appeal to Canadians? Are the political circumstances of today so different that its appeal might be more or less moot, as the need to address other issues and different problems becomes more pressing for the electorate?
There are no easy answers to this question. I will argue in my next blog, however, that the NDP is moving toward trying to address them by defining what we might call (and, what they do call) a "progressive" agenda for Canada. What this entails, is what I'll next address.
A few blogs ago, I tried to address the confusing mish-mash of Canadian conservatism and what it means as a political option for Canadians. In this blog, I'd like to look more directly the NDP, and to some extent the Liberal Party, to try to engage the other options Canadians will have before them when they turn to the polls this fall. One of the mistakes that the political right has made, has been to assume that the Liberals and NDP are basically the same. Taking a page from American conservatives, Canadian conservatives got into the habit of referring to everyone who was not conservative as "left." Indeed, there was even some discursive connection of the liberalism with socialism. No less a figure that Stephen Harper, in fact, made such statements. It would be difficult to overstate how wrong this perspective actually is. What I want to do here is trace the development of what I will ultimately call "progressive" politics to set the stage for a further consideration of its current manifestations, which I'll likely address in a blog after this one.
Socialism and Civic Nationalism
Part of this connection of liberalism with socialism (the Liberal Party with the NDP) was political. It was a cheap effort to get votes by calling opponents names. Deployed against liberals, it became an odd sort of red baiting. Another part of it was political blindness. For a variety of reasons, commentators on the left simply did not understand the distinctions between post-WW II Canadian liberalism and the socialism (or, social democracy, if one prefers that term) of the NDP. There were, in fact, important and appreciative difference on the level of policy and philosophy even if individual supporters of one party or the other could periodically move fluidly between them. The distinction between liberals and socialists was not who was more progressive (or, who was the "real" progressive, or words to that effect) but distinctions of ideology that were, on some level, fundamental.
In the past, I have called the liberalism that came to dominate Canada after WW II "civic nationalism" and the name remains as good as any name. It was organized around a series of beliefs that focused on the individual and its protection in society. This included equality of opportunity, Charter rights, regional development programmes, a commitment to accepting diversity, and other measures, such as bilingualism. I am not saying that all these different policies fit together seamlessly, but they were, more or less, a coherent policy framework that was implemented in a reformist measure with the broad support of middle-class Canadians and which served to re-tool Canada. Voting Liberal, in other words (and I will have more to say on this later), meant something specific. It meant supporting a specific vision of the country and its future.
Voting NDP (or, for a socialist or social-democratic option) meant something else. Again, for purposes of analysis, we should put our views as to which perspective is better on hold. In other words, we should not be partisan and array a hierarchy of ideological perspectives. Canadian socialists -- who by and large inhabited the NDP -- did not reject diversity politics or oppose bilingualism or Charter rights, but were, simply, interested in different matters. These included labour codes, workplace health and safety, industrial democracy, limiting connections between the state and big business, finding mechanisms to address the social inequalities of power in Canadian society, working-class wages. In other words, they were different; not better; not worse. Different.
The confusion between the NDP and Liberals, between socialism and civic nationalism, then, arose from a variety of factors including: conservative politics and an effort to win votes by lumping their opponents together; an inability of right-wing commentators to understand the distinction between civil nationalism and socialism; an imported American rhetorical framework that divided all politics up into "left" and "right" in a way that broached no further diversity. And, I would also argue that they NDP confused matters themselves because they fished off the same pier, as it were, as the Liberals. For example, they were passionate defenders of minority groups. Indeed, they were likely more passionate than the civic nationalists who looked to find means to protect minorities as individuals who faced discrimination. And, they could use the same mechanisms (Charter rights) as liberals to make their defence. Economically, Canadian socialists -- sometime after WW II -- stopped talking about supplanting capitalism, made their peace with it, and looked to modify and manage it. There were important differences between the civic nationalist and socialist view of the economy but both believed in some form of management via the state. If liberals continued to believe in capitalism (which they did) ... oddly, so too did the NDP in practice. Theoretically, Canadian socialists argued against capitalism; in practice they accepted it and used liberal economic management tools.
Progressive Politics in Practice
What did this mean? A number of things:
1. Canadians who were looking to cast non-conservative, more progressive (for lack of a better word) votes had different options and those options were not a question of who was more progressive than the other. They were different visions of the future.
2. In practice, however, this difference could be confused and compromised both because of the politics of manipulation and because of some degree of convergence on means (even if the ends remained distinct).
3. Long-term success for the federal Liberal Party of Canada. As is well known, the federal Liberals ruled the roost for most of the last half of the twentieth century. If we begin after WW II, we have Liberal governments in power from 1945-57; 1963-84 (with the Clark interregnum), and 1993-2006. We don't need to get into this history. Civic nationalism did not "win over" Canada. It was clearly buoyed by the idiosyncrasies of the First Past the Post System. This allow it translate its support among a plurality of Canadians ... into majorities of working minorities in Parliament.
4. NDP -- socialism -- remained a minority option for Canadians. While drawing committed support from an not insignificant number of people, the NDP tended to succeed provincially in areas where liberalism was weak, class politics increased political polarization, and the middle class tended to look to conservatism (as opposed the liberalism) as its political home.
Implications
I mention all of these points because, for a long time, I was rather down on the idea that the NDP and the Liberals could be anything other than temporary allies, which, historically, has been precisely the case. Even when they might have competed over the same voters, they saw the world differently. They could cooperate, now and then, because they each saw the politics of conservatism as something to be avoided, but this did not mean that they parties could or would merge or even work together (say, via strategic voting). The reason for this was patently evident to most of the activists in both parties: they could not merge because they were different. Resistance to abandoning the NDP, for instance, was not just a dislike of Liberals (say, Martin or Chretien, each of whom could talk a progressive game) or personal political ambition. It was a sense that there was a fundamental incompatibility to the parties.
And, I think, by and large this was right. This is what I have tried to explain above. Supporting the NDP meant something different form supporting the Liberals.
A question that we have to ask, I think, and an important one, is this: is this any longer the case? If there was, say, a fundamental incompatibility between, say, industrial democracy and civil nationalism, does this type of incompatibility still exist today. Is the NDP a socialist political party any longer or ... if it is ... what is 21st century Canadian socialism? Can -- will? -- the civic nationalism of the Trudeau-Chretien era still appeal to Canadians? Are the political circumstances of today so different that its appeal might be more or less moot, as the need to address other issues and different problems becomes more pressing for the electorate?
There are no easy answers to this question. I will argue in my next blog, however, that the NDP is moving toward trying to address them by defining what we might call (and, what they do call) a "progressive" agenda for Canada. What this entails, is what I'll next address.
Wednesday, May 06, 2015
The Bones of Conservatism
Before picking over the bones of the Alberta PC Party, we might pause to think about what this election means from a broader perspective. The easy issue is the demise of the PC dynasty ... but that is the easy issue and it was going to happen, one way or the other, sometime because the PCs have been on shakier popular ground than a lot of people realize ... for a long time. Looking at the electoral map (or, party standings) and stating that this is an "historic" vote because does not, then, tell us anything that we do not already know. The more important question that follows from this -- how? -- might also be self-evident. What it implies, however, is worth reflecting on.
The character and nature of Alberta politics have long been a matter of scholarly interest. As everyone knows, the province has been subject to long terms of one-party rule (Liberal, United Farmers, Social Credit, PC) in which the party in power dominates the legislature and is eventually replaced by another party. Because the Social Credit ended its days as vibrantly right-wing party and because conservatives in Canada have been drifting further to the left over the years, this is often viewed as a right wing province. This is reflected federally, as well, where the Conservatives (and before them Canadian Alliance, Reform, and PCs) dominated the province: the Liberals and NDP getting little traction outside of urban Edmonton, and even here ... not a lot (most of the time).
This political dominance gives rise to a mythology: let's call it Alberta the right. The idea here is that Alberta is somehow culturally right wing in a way that other provinces are not. On the surface, this holds up (particularly when Klein was premier and because Harper and Co are based, more or less, in the province). But, the myth disguises considerable political diversity. In other words, there is no singular Alberta political culture or ideological drift. There are a range. The myth of Alberta the right gained hold because (a) it seemed self-evident looking at the political map (and so could be easily repeated without the trouble of actually having to investigate Alberta politics), (b) it was in the interests of conservatives in the province (whether PC, or Reform, or Cons., etc.) to state that because it helped to solidify their popular base and allowed them to lay claim, as it were, the heart and soul of the province (separatists in Quebec try a similar strategy), and (c) it was in the interest of opposition parties (Liberals, NDP, etc.) because they could console themselves on their losses and explain them away. It allowed them to avoid the tough work of thinking about what Alberta politics were all about and building alternatives to conservatism in the province.
These ideological underpinnings of this myth were reinforced, at different points in history, by material and social patterns. Harry Hiller's fabulous book Second Promised Land, for example, indicates that Alberta attracted a broad range of migrants from other provinces, over time, but the myth of a right wing Alberta became a bit of a self-perpetuating myth because it could attract people who were ideologically disposed to right wing values; those who rejected unions and/or disliked diversity, for example. Further in the past, the character of Alberta's social structure -- while by no means monolithic -- served to create a broad social class linked to primary commodity production and dependent on it. This dependency was first evident in the triumph of the United Farmers, then Social Credit, and then, in modified form, the PCs. Said differently, there is nothing odd or metaphysical about Alberta political culture. It has been subject particularly strong mythologizing discourses that build on some socio-economic foundations. But, we should not allow that to distract from a deeper consideration of Alberta politics that can clear away some of this myth.
The first thing that is important to note is that Alberta governments have been moving into the centre of the political spectrum in a halting way for some time. Lougheed -- the first Alberta PC Premier in the early 1970s -- was right wing but he represented a centre-right mirror of the federal Liberals centre-left technocracy. There were significant divisions between Lougheed PCs and Trudeau Liberals, but each drew support from the same broad pool of middle class, university educated voters. Lougheed relied on rural (former Social Credit) voters for support, too, because he had to, but he was no redneck. Lougheed's successor (Getty) was a centrist, the trajectory, however, was interrupted by Klein who was representative of North American neo-conservatism at its most vehement. Stelmach and Redford, though, were centre right and Redford (for all her problems) was moderate on a range of issues (including -- more or less -- making peace with unions).
Likewise, at the federal level, right-wingers have long dominated Alberta politics but there is a mate of diversity among them. Diefenbaker was a Red Tory who would hardly fit with the right wing agenda of today; Clark was a moderate centre-right Tory who supported progressive causes at different points in his career. The Reformers were right wing, to be sure, as was the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party.
What this means, however, is this: one party (or, more exactly, one label) dominance does not mean that there everyone who fell under that label thought and acted the exactly the same way.
The second thing that is important to note is that Alberta has, traditionally, had a very low voter turnout rate. What does this mean? Likely, it means a range of things but I suspect it meant that those who were opposed to the government were not voting. In other words, what we were getting was not support for conservatism in Alberta but ... support for conservatism mixed with diversity and alienation. The voter turnout in this last election was the highest it has been (correct me if I am wrong) since 1993. I'll get back to this in a minute, but here are the voter turnout rates for the last several elections in Alberta:
YEAR %
2012 54.4
2008 40.6
2004 44.7
2001 52.8
1997 52.8
What we have here is something less that a popular embrace of conservatism. What we have here, in fact, is a situation where the popular view is alienation (whatever that precisely means). The largest vote getter, in other words, in all provincial elections in Alberta since 1993 was "none of the above." It is amazingly difficult to know what "none of the above" means in practical voting terms but what we can say with some certainty is that it is something less than core conservative vote. It might be indifference; it might be apathy; it might be frustration; it might be all matter of things, but core vote ... votes.
It is interesting that in 1993, there was a (by current standards) relatively high voting turnout and the Alberta political spectrum looked ... more normal. The Liberals won almost 40% of the popular vote (of those who voted) and over 30 seats; the NDP got no seats but about 11% of the vote. The higher the voter turnout, it seems, the more diverse the political spectrum. This election, with about 60% turnout, has created the broadest political spectrum (in terms of presentation) in the Alberta legislature in a very long time, with five different parties (it appears) having won seats and three with reasonable to solid to good numbers.
What changed? My argument is that there was no sudden change in Alberta but rather a series of processes going on at the same time. These include, the fracturing of conservatism (evident in the old Reform/PC federal split after 1993) . In office, it is easy to cover over these the divisions in political parties. Once they run into problems, however, those divisions start to pop up. This is because all Canadian political parties are coalitions of one sort or another (some stronger; some weaker) that, to be successful, must appeal to diverse constituencies. (There is nothing wrong or horrible or corrupt about this.) Coalitions or voting blocks or diverse supporters (or, whatever you want to call them) will try to find common ground on which to meet for a variety of reasons and one of those reasons is to maintain power. Out of power -- or, if a party is failing or if the interests of one part of the coalition is coming to dominate versus others -- in these circumstances, maintaining solidarity in diversity is more difficult to do.
This is what happened to the PCs. The moderating centre and the rural populist right pulled away from each other.
This happened because of social changes. If, in the past, back in the days of the United Farmers and Social Credit, the social structure of Alberta created conditions favourable to one-party dominance, this is no longer the case. Edmonton and Calgary are modern large cities populated by working and middle class citizens. These are centres of research and development, HQP places, with vibrant cultural scenes. In other words, the social structure has diversified. A diversified social structure does not ipso facto make a more diversified political spectrum but it does broaden the collective range of options for which people are prepared to seriously consider voting. In other words, it does not make an NDP government but, in Alberta, it made an NDP government a possibility.
What happens next? Who knows? Those reading this blog will notice I have not talked about political leadership and that is a consideration that really does merit attention. Personally, I think it gets a bit too much press in the popular media because it is an easy thing to talk about that does not require too much careful research (although there is good work on this via Nanos). But, leadership will be a consideration for the Alberta NDP and how far and long they can go in government. They might ask their colleagues in the NS NDP about this. But, I doubt the province is in for one-party NDP government. I suspect that the changing dynamics of its social structure, the character of urban and rural life, the issues that a resource economy needs to address in the 21st century, and other matters will ensure diversity in representation in the legislature. In other words, Alberta politics will more closely approximate those of other provinces.
The character and nature of Alberta politics have long been a matter of scholarly interest. As everyone knows, the province has been subject to long terms of one-party rule (Liberal, United Farmers, Social Credit, PC) in which the party in power dominates the legislature and is eventually replaced by another party. Because the Social Credit ended its days as vibrantly right-wing party and because conservatives in Canada have been drifting further to the left over the years, this is often viewed as a right wing province. This is reflected federally, as well, where the Conservatives (and before them Canadian Alliance, Reform, and PCs) dominated the province: the Liberals and NDP getting little traction outside of urban Edmonton, and even here ... not a lot (most of the time).
This political dominance gives rise to a mythology: let's call it Alberta the right. The idea here is that Alberta is somehow culturally right wing in a way that other provinces are not. On the surface, this holds up (particularly when Klein was premier and because Harper and Co are based, more or less, in the province). But, the myth disguises considerable political diversity. In other words, there is no singular Alberta political culture or ideological drift. There are a range. The myth of Alberta the right gained hold because (a) it seemed self-evident looking at the political map (and so could be easily repeated without the trouble of actually having to investigate Alberta politics), (b) it was in the interests of conservatives in the province (whether PC, or Reform, or Cons., etc.) to state that because it helped to solidify their popular base and allowed them to lay claim, as it were, the heart and soul of the province (separatists in Quebec try a similar strategy), and (c) it was in the interest of opposition parties (Liberals, NDP, etc.) because they could console themselves on their losses and explain them away. It allowed them to avoid the tough work of thinking about what Alberta politics were all about and building alternatives to conservatism in the province.
These ideological underpinnings of this myth were reinforced, at different points in history, by material and social patterns. Harry Hiller's fabulous book Second Promised Land, for example, indicates that Alberta attracted a broad range of migrants from other provinces, over time, but the myth of a right wing Alberta became a bit of a self-perpetuating myth because it could attract people who were ideologically disposed to right wing values; those who rejected unions and/or disliked diversity, for example. Further in the past, the character of Alberta's social structure -- while by no means monolithic -- served to create a broad social class linked to primary commodity production and dependent on it. This dependency was first evident in the triumph of the United Farmers, then Social Credit, and then, in modified form, the PCs. Said differently, there is nothing odd or metaphysical about Alberta political culture. It has been subject particularly strong mythologizing discourses that build on some socio-economic foundations. But, we should not allow that to distract from a deeper consideration of Alberta politics that can clear away some of this myth.
The first thing that is important to note is that Alberta governments have been moving into the centre of the political spectrum in a halting way for some time. Lougheed -- the first Alberta PC Premier in the early 1970s -- was right wing but he represented a centre-right mirror of the federal Liberals centre-left technocracy. There were significant divisions between Lougheed PCs and Trudeau Liberals, but each drew support from the same broad pool of middle class, university educated voters. Lougheed relied on rural (former Social Credit) voters for support, too, because he had to, but he was no redneck. Lougheed's successor (Getty) was a centrist, the trajectory, however, was interrupted by Klein who was representative of North American neo-conservatism at its most vehement. Stelmach and Redford, though, were centre right and Redford (for all her problems) was moderate on a range of issues (including -- more or less -- making peace with unions).
Likewise, at the federal level, right-wingers have long dominated Alberta politics but there is a mate of diversity among them. Diefenbaker was a Red Tory who would hardly fit with the right wing agenda of today; Clark was a moderate centre-right Tory who supported progressive causes at different points in his career. The Reformers were right wing, to be sure, as was the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party.
What this means, however, is this: one party (or, more exactly, one label) dominance does not mean that there everyone who fell under that label thought and acted the exactly the same way.
The second thing that is important to note is that Alberta has, traditionally, had a very low voter turnout rate. What does this mean? Likely, it means a range of things but I suspect it meant that those who were opposed to the government were not voting. In other words, what we were getting was not support for conservatism in Alberta but ... support for conservatism mixed with diversity and alienation. The voter turnout in this last election was the highest it has been (correct me if I am wrong) since 1993. I'll get back to this in a minute, but here are the voter turnout rates for the last several elections in Alberta:
YEAR %
2012 54.4
2008 40.6
2004 44.7
2001 52.8
1997 52.8
What we have here is something less that a popular embrace of conservatism. What we have here, in fact, is a situation where the popular view is alienation (whatever that precisely means). The largest vote getter, in other words, in all provincial elections in Alberta since 1993 was "none of the above." It is amazingly difficult to know what "none of the above" means in practical voting terms but what we can say with some certainty is that it is something less than core conservative vote. It might be indifference; it might be apathy; it might be frustration; it might be all matter of things, but core vote ... votes.
It is interesting that in 1993, there was a (by current standards) relatively high voting turnout and the Alberta political spectrum looked ... more normal. The Liberals won almost 40% of the popular vote (of those who voted) and over 30 seats; the NDP got no seats but about 11% of the vote. The higher the voter turnout, it seems, the more diverse the political spectrum. This election, with about 60% turnout, has created the broadest political spectrum (in terms of presentation) in the Alberta legislature in a very long time, with five different parties (it appears) having won seats and three with reasonable to solid to good numbers.
What changed? My argument is that there was no sudden change in Alberta but rather a series of processes going on at the same time. These include, the fracturing of conservatism (evident in the old Reform/PC federal split after 1993) . In office, it is easy to cover over these the divisions in political parties. Once they run into problems, however, those divisions start to pop up. This is because all Canadian political parties are coalitions of one sort or another (some stronger; some weaker) that, to be successful, must appeal to diverse constituencies. (There is nothing wrong or horrible or corrupt about this.) Coalitions or voting blocks or diverse supporters (or, whatever you want to call them) will try to find common ground on which to meet for a variety of reasons and one of those reasons is to maintain power. Out of power -- or, if a party is failing or if the interests of one part of the coalition is coming to dominate versus others -- in these circumstances, maintaining solidarity in diversity is more difficult to do.
This is what happened to the PCs. The moderating centre and the rural populist right pulled away from each other.
This happened because of social changes. If, in the past, back in the days of the United Farmers and Social Credit, the social structure of Alberta created conditions favourable to one-party dominance, this is no longer the case. Edmonton and Calgary are modern large cities populated by working and middle class citizens. These are centres of research and development, HQP places, with vibrant cultural scenes. In other words, the social structure has diversified. A diversified social structure does not ipso facto make a more diversified political spectrum but it does broaden the collective range of options for which people are prepared to seriously consider voting. In other words, it does not make an NDP government but, in Alberta, it made an NDP government a possibility.
What happens next? Who knows? Those reading this blog will notice I have not talked about political leadership and that is a consideration that really does merit attention. Personally, I think it gets a bit too much press in the popular media because it is an easy thing to talk about that does not require too much careful research (although there is good work on this via Nanos). But, leadership will be a consideration for the Alberta NDP and how far and long they can go in government. They might ask their colleagues in the NS NDP about this. But, I doubt the province is in for one-party NDP government. I suspect that the changing dynamics of its social structure, the character of urban and rural life, the issues that a resource economy needs to address in the 21st century, and other matters will ensure diversity in representation in the legislature. In other words, Alberta politics will more closely approximate those of other provinces.
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
Electoral Cooperation (or, the NDP and the Liberals Part Two)
A blog or two ago I suggested that electoral mergers are not flags of convenience. They occur for specific historic reasons that involve more than people in opposition saying "hey, let's get together to win an election." Instead, they occur because the differences that organized people into different political perspectives are no longer relevant, because people come together for a new reason (say, as did Harper and his crew to fundamentally alter Canada). There may be other reasons but my point is that we need to treat politics seriously. We can't see it just as bunch of win-the-election by hook or by crook; the one is the same as the other Ottawa soap opera. (Spin doctoring is important for politics, to be sure, but spin doctoring is part of how an historic bloc functions and has changed over time.)
The possibility of an NDP/Liberal merger or electoral coalition, I suggested, might be one of those "time is right" ideas not in the sense that it would ensure defeat of the Conservatives. It wouldn't. I won't predict who will win the Stanley Cup next year; I'm not going to predict who will in an election in three years time! Instead, the time is right because of historic changes. There has been a great deal of talk about these historic changes and, frankly, my own view is that they are easy to overestimate. In all the talk about changes (communications, technology, education, jobs, media), we might think about the things that have remained the same. We might get an oddly long list.
Historic change, then, is not some vague type of thing ("everything changes"). Instead, it is specific set of changes in the organization of society, the place of Canada in the global capitalist order, gender relations, etc. The rise of the CPC is one element of this change. It represents the views of a particular set of ideologues (what Gramsci called "organic intellectuals") and a specific organization of society. It signals the rise to power of a specific historic bloc (a particular formation of social classes) that imagines Canada's future in a specific way and looks to use government to attain that imagined future. It involves the articulation of the aspirations of subject classes through a dominant class. I need to do more work on this to be even more specific but you get the point. The rise of the CPC both is and is not the historic change to which the NDP and the Liberals need to respond. It is not an historic change in the sense that losing an election is not necessarily an historic change. The PCs lost a bunch of elections in the 1960s and 1970s (1963, 1965, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1980); the NDP lost even more if you add in 1979 (won by Clark's minority PC gov.). These defeats were not historic because the structure and nature of Canadian politics did not change as a result of these defeats. Being on the losing side in an election might demonstrate, for instance, a balance of forces in a particular historic bloc.
On the other hand, some electoral defeats (which, of course, are wins for others) do signal changes. The 1921 election of King's Liberals signaled a wider shift in the nature of Canadian liberalism and Canada, for instance.
The Harper electoral victories, on the other hand, can be an historic change if they represent the development of a new historic bloc; that they signal a transition in the organization of Canadian society (both domestically and in terms of how Canada relates to the world). I have been suggesting that this is precisely the case. Mulroney's 1984 victory was of "historic proportions" but did not really change the character and nature of Canada. Indeed, his efforts to do so by and large failed in the face of opposition from Canadians who were willing to "turf out" the Liberals but who remained committed, with lot of caveats here, to liberal ideas. In effect, in 1984, Canadians tried to opt for liberalism without the Liberals. Mulroney's failure was that he misunderstood this and, wrongly, believed that his victory meant that Canadians were turning their back on Trudeauvian liberalism. They weren't. They turned their backs on the Liberal Party, but not the ideas and image of the country it inspired.
Harper's victories can be seen as something else. I don't think Canadians have ditched the ideals of liberalism but I do think that Harper and his crew are setting out, in a more thorough and careful way, to alter the fundamental conception of the country. Unlike Mulroney, Harper seemed to understand that he did not have a mandate to change Canada and that part of his job, as a Conservative, was to lead Canada in a new direction though without actually saying that was what he was doing. He understood, in other words, that there is a difference between wanting to change things and having a mandate to change things. You can change things, if you don't have a mandate, but it requires a different type of politics. This is what Harper is up to.
If this is the case, the Liberals and NDP face a number of possible options for the future. If they are facing an historic change, they may indeed want to reconsider the character and nature of their parties. If they are facing an historic change, their task in opposition, is to articulate a vision of Canada that can serve as a realistic option to Harper's conservatism. This might require a new party. Indeed, I'd be so bold as to suggest it will. But, if Harper's victories do not represent the development of a new era, as it were, in Canadian public life, then something less than a merger will work. Indeed, branding alone might be a good reason to maintain different parties. The Liberals, for instance, retain regional bases of strength (anglophone Quebec, middle class Ontario, parts of Newfoundland) that might not go for a new party. In this case, an electoral coalition of sorts that would allow each party to win seats without having to devote resources to competing with the other - useful in the face of the Tory war chest - would certainly have an appeal.
So … to conclude: losing an election is something that requires analysis. For neither the NDP, Liberals, nor the old PCs or Reform, is an election loss a reason to "jump ship." One needs to carefully analyse what is going on with that loss, why it occurred, etc. before one decides on a response to it. Abandoning an ideology one holds dear (say, liberalism or socialism or conservatism) is not easy. Precisely because it is not easy, no party can assume that its followers will, in fact, follow it into a new political party. We know that a lot of PCs did not follow their leaders. Losing an election might indicate simply that one lost an election. This happens in a democracy. It might, however, mean something else. I will bet we will only see a merger if members of the NDP and Liberals have decided that their loss in the last election means something else.
The possibility of an NDP/Liberal merger or electoral coalition, I suggested, might be one of those "time is right" ideas not in the sense that it would ensure defeat of the Conservatives. It wouldn't. I won't predict who will win the Stanley Cup next year; I'm not going to predict who will in an election in three years time! Instead, the time is right because of historic changes. There has been a great deal of talk about these historic changes and, frankly, my own view is that they are easy to overestimate. In all the talk about changes (communications, technology, education, jobs, media), we might think about the things that have remained the same. We might get an oddly long list.
Historic change, then, is not some vague type of thing ("everything changes"). Instead, it is specific set of changes in the organization of society, the place of Canada in the global capitalist order, gender relations, etc. The rise of the CPC is one element of this change. It represents the views of a particular set of ideologues (what Gramsci called "organic intellectuals") and a specific organization of society. It signals the rise to power of a specific historic bloc (a particular formation of social classes) that imagines Canada's future in a specific way and looks to use government to attain that imagined future. It involves the articulation of the aspirations of subject classes through a dominant class. I need to do more work on this to be even more specific but you get the point. The rise of the CPC both is and is not the historic change to which the NDP and the Liberals need to respond. It is not an historic change in the sense that losing an election is not necessarily an historic change. The PCs lost a bunch of elections in the 1960s and 1970s (1963, 1965, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1980); the NDP lost even more if you add in 1979 (won by Clark's minority PC gov.). These defeats were not historic because the structure and nature of Canadian politics did not change as a result of these defeats. Being on the losing side in an election might demonstrate, for instance, a balance of forces in a particular historic bloc.
On the other hand, some electoral defeats (which, of course, are wins for others) do signal changes. The 1921 election of King's Liberals signaled a wider shift in the nature of Canadian liberalism and Canada, for instance.
The Harper electoral victories, on the other hand, can be an historic change if they represent the development of a new historic bloc; that they signal a transition in the organization of Canadian society (both domestically and in terms of how Canada relates to the world). I have been suggesting that this is precisely the case. Mulroney's 1984 victory was of "historic proportions" but did not really change the character and nature of Canada. Indeed, his efforts to do so by and large failed in the face of opposition from Canadians who were willing to "turf out" the Liberals but who remained committed, with lot of caveats here, to liberal ideas. In effect, in 1984, Canadians tried to opt for liberalism without the Liberals. Mulroney's failure was that he misunderstood this and, wrongly, believed that his victory meant that Canadians were turning their back on Trudeauvian liberalism. They weren't. They turned their backs on the Liberal Party, but not the ideas and image of the country it inspired.
Harper's victories can be seen as something else. I don't think Canadians have ditched the ideals of liberalism but I do think that Harper and his crew are setting out, in a more thorough and careful way, to alter the fundamental conception of the country. Unlike Mulroney, Harper seemed to understand that he did not have a mandate to change Canada and that part of his job, as a Conservative, was to lead Canada in a new direction though without actually saying that was what he was doing. He understood, in other words, that there is a difference between wanting to change things and having a mandate to change things. You can change things, if you don't have a mandate, but it requires a different type of politics. This is what Harper is up to.
If this is the case, the Liberals and NDP face a number of possible options for the future. If they are facing an historic change, they may indeed want to reconsider the character and nature of their parties. If they are facing an historic change, their task in opposition, is to articulate a vision of Canada that can serve as a realistic option to Harper's conservatism. This might require a new party. Indeed, I'd be so bold as to suggest it will. But, if Harper's victories do not represent the development of a new era, as it were, in Canadian public life, then something less than a merger will work. Indeed, branding alone might be a good reason to maintain different parties. The Liberals, for instance, retain regional bases of strength (anglophone Quebec, middle class Ontario, parts of Newfoundland) that might not go for a new party. In this case, an electoral coalition of sorts that would allow each party to win seats without having to devote resources to competing with the other - useful in the face of the Tory war chest - would certainly have an appeal.
So … to conclude: losing an election is something that requires analysis. For neither the NDP, Liberals, nor the old PCs or Reform, is an election loss a reason to "jump ship." One needs to carefully analyse what is going on with that loss, why it occurred, etc. before one decides on a response to it. Abandoning an ideology one holds dear (say, liberalism or socialism or conservatism) is not easy. Precisely because it is not easy, no party can assume that its followers will, in fact, follow it into a new political party. We know that a lot of PCs did not follow their leaders. Losing an election might indicate simply that one lost an election. This happens in a democracy. It might, however, mean something else. I will bet we will only see a merger if members of the NDP and Liberals have decided that their loss in the last election means something else.
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
Liberals, NDP and the Polls
Would joint Liberal/NDP candidates defeat the federal Conservatives if an election were held today? Or, more pointedly and more importantly, in three or four years time? This is the question pundits are now asking. The long and the short of it is that we don't know. Comparisons with the earlier CA/PC merger suggest not while raw numbers suggest that, in fact, they would. According to the Globe's reporting of an Angus Reid poll close to 50% of Canadians who are decided voters and likely to vote, would vote for an NDP/Liberal joint candidate if they had the option while the Globe is right to point out that the PC/CA merger into the Conservatives Party of Canada did not bring with it everyone who had voted PC or CA. In other words, the total CPC vote was less than the two parties received separately in the previous election. Two plus two, in other words, ended up not equally four.
This is an interesting academic puzzle and makes some fun as a discussion point. It is likely, however, no more than that because it treats political parties and ideologies in too broad and vague a way. I've complained about this before but I'll say it again: political parties are not like clothes that one puts on because on happens to like their look. There were significant ideological differences between the PCs and the CA; that is why they were two separate parties. They were not distinct political entities because their leaders disliked each other or because one or the other set of insiders clung to the nattered belief that they could win without the other. They were different and distinct from each other because they were different from each other. Their hard core supporters believed different things, thought about Canada in different ways, self-identified differently, and had different political heritages.
This is the problem with reporting political ideologies in broad strokes "centre-left" or "centre-right." It fails to capture the nuances of different ideological perspectives and different conceptions of the future of Canada, indeed, even different conceptions of Canada's past. To those who are outside of a particular ideology (or, political perspective), the views of others look like variations on a theme. If one is not particularly well informed about politics, then they differences can look very much less like differences. After all … right wing parties believe right wing party like things … do they not? If you want to understand the difference between the CA and the PCs read Bercusson and Cooper, Deconfederation and compare it to Grant's Lament for a Nation.
These are dramatically different ways of thinking about Canada and its future, the nature of the economy, the place of morality in politics, the role of the state. This is what makes Harper's ability to forge an alliance between the PCs and the CA an event of historic importance. He did not bring together like minded people. Any dimwit can do that. He brought together people who saw eye-to-eye on some things but not on others. He built, in other words, a new historic bloc that was neither CA nor PC. He drew on provincial conservative parties and ideologues. In the process, he lost some PCs (Danny Williams anyone) but attracted others (Bernard Lord). He marginalized some old Reformers but drew in others and brought in new people who were neither Reform, CA, or PC. He did not just simply ask for compromise (in the manner of Mulroney) but -- along with many others -- forged a new political movement whose goal was to do more than win an election, whose goal was to refashion Canada (drawing heavily on the Republican election handbook in the process).
The NDP/Lliberals face the same types of issues. The truth of the matter is that the NDP and the Liberals are not and should not be the same political party. They are different because one (the NDP) is a socialist political party that, theoretically at least, aims -- like the CPC -- to build a different type of country. The other (Liberals) are civic nationalists who, in fact, built the country Harper and his crew are trying to dismantle. Civic nationalists have had a significant influence on Canadian socialists (and, oddly, on Conservatives as well) but they hold different views (civic nationalists are, for instance, capitalists who look askance at ethno-linguistic nationalists). Socialists, theoretically at least, want to replace capitalism with something else and are willing to discuss the merits of ethno-linguistic nationalism if it represents an oppressed people.
What pushed the CA and PCs together was like mindedness. Indeed, as the numbers show, a lot of PCs stayed away from the new CPC (a number joining the Liberals and some dropping out of politics all together). Instead, what contributed to the merger and its eventual success were two things. First, the spectre of electoral destruction. It is hard to remember this but the pre-sponsorship scandal Liberals looked like they were poised (under Martin) for a victory of historic (Mulroneyesque) proportions. the PCs, in particular, were faced the possibility of being finally wiped out. The CA was going to be rolled back to a rural rump with extremist views. It was only in the face of this type of massive defeat that merger was seriously considered, that the PCs and the CA were willing to put some water with their wine and modify their ideological positions. Second, times changed. The PCs no longer represented what we can think of as a broad ideology. Toryism had long been in opposition in Canada but it represented the views of a significant minority of Canadians, perhaps 25% perhaps 30%. By the early 2000s, this was no longer the case. The number of committed Tories -- people committed to Toryism as a way of seeing the country -- had shrunk to perhaps 10-15%. And, new ideological perspectives (neo-conservatism) that had only a loose connection to Toryism had popped up.
For the Liberals and the NDP, the question is do these same circumstances apply. One reason that I'd suggest that a Liberal/NDP merger might be successful is that the ideological perspectives represented by each of these parties have changed. Their opposition to Harperesque neo-conservatism does not make them mirror reflections of each other (the centre-left is a big, big, big political space occupied by the Greens and the Bloc as well). But, the old battles of Trudeauvian liberalism are no longer battles and Canadian socialism, as I've pointed out before, is not really socialism. It's sort of a vague progressive reformism. What this means is that there is an opening for some type of electoral cooperation in the sense that what divided the parties in the past has been, in part, overcome by history. We have, right now, a civic nationalist Liberal Party led (comfortably it seems) by a former socialist and socialist NDP led (perhaps slightly less comfortably) by a former Liberal civic nationalist. Both are pragmatists (unlike, say, Trudeau and Broadbent or Pearson and Douglas) who are committed to the Canada that Trudeau and company built (multiculturalism, bilingualism, charter rights, regional equalization, autonomy in foreign affairs) with some twists and turns. Moreover, the Liberals face the same question the PCs faced a decade ago: is our ideological perspective relevant any longer in the sense that Canadians are willing to commit themselves to it. I don't know for sure, but my guess is that the number of true believers is considerably less than it was. For most people civic nationalism is the background of Canada; the goal. Hence … a merger of some sort just might work.
This is an interesting academic puzzle and makes some fun as a discussion point. It is likely, however, no more than that because it treats political parties and ideologies in too broad and vague a way. I've complained about this before but I'll say it again: political parties are not like clothes that one puts on because on happens to like their look. There were significant ideological differences between the PCs and the CA; that is why they were two separate parties. They were not distinct political entities because their leaders disliked each other or because one or the other set of insiders clung to the nattered belief that they could win without the other. They were different and distinct from each other because they were different from each other. Their hard core supporters believed different things, thought about Canada in different ways, self-identified differently, and had different political heritages.
This is the problem with reporting political ideologies in broad strokes "centre-left" or "centre-right." It fails to capture the nuances of different ideological perspectives and different conceptions of the future of Canada, indeed, even different conceptions of Canada's past. To those who are outside of a particular ideology (or, political perspective), the views of others look like variations on a theme. If one is not particularly well informed about politics, then they differences can look very much less like differences. After all … right wing parties believe right wing party like things … do they not? If you want to understand the difference between the CA and the PCs read Bercusson and Cooper, Deconfederation and compare it to Grant's Lament for a Nation.
These are dramatically different ways of thinking about Canada and its future, the nature of the economy, the place of morality in politics, the role of the state. This is what makes Harper's ability to forge an alliance between the PCs and the CA an event of historic importance. He did not bring together like minded people. Any dimwit can do that. He brought together people who saw eye-to-eye on some things but not on others. He built, in other words, a new historic bloc that was neither CA nor PC. He drew on provincial conservative parties and ideologues. In the process, he lost some PCs (Danny Williams anyone) but attracted others (Bernard Lord). He marginalized some old Reformers but drew in others and brought in new people who were neither Reform, CA, or PC. He did not just simply ask for compromise (in the manner of Mulroney) but -- along with many others -- forged a new political movement whose goal was to do more than win an election, whose goal was to refashion Canada (drawing heavily on the Republican election handbook in the process).
The NDP/Lliberals face the same types of issues. The truth of the matter is that the NDP and the Liberals are not and should not be the same political party. They are different because one (the NDP) is a socialist political party that, theoretically at least, aims -- like the CPC -- to build a different type of country. The other (Liberals) are civic nationalists who, in fact, built the country Harper and his crew are trying to dismantle. Civic nationalists have had a significant influence on Canadian socialists (and, oddly, on Conservatives as well) but they hold different views (civic nationalists are, for instance, capitalists who look askance at ethno-linguistic nationalists). Socialists, theoretically at least, want to replace capitalism with something else and are willing to discuss the merits of ethno-linguistic nationalism if it represents an oppressed people.
What pushed the CA and PCs together was like mindedness. Indeed, as the numbers show, a lot of PCs stayed away from the new CPC (a number joining the Liberals and some dropping out of politics all together). Instead, what contributed to the merger and its eventual success were two things. First, the spectre of electoral destruction. It is hard to remember this but the pre-sponsorship scandal Liberals looked like they were poised (under Martin) for a victory of historic (Mulroneyesque) proportions. the PCs, in particular, were faced the possibility of being finally wiped out. The CA was going to be rolled back to a rural rump with extremist views. It was only in the face of this type of massive defeat that merger was seriously considered, that the PCs and the CA were willing to put some water with their wine and modify their ideological positions. Second, times changed. The PCs no longer represented what we can think of as a broad ideology. Toryism had long been in opposition in Canada but it represented the views of a significant minority of Canadians, perhaps 25% perhaps 30%. By the early 2000s, this was no longer the case. The number of committed Tories -- people committed to Toryism as a way of seeing the country -- had shrunk to perhaps 10-15%. And, new ideological perspectives (neo-conservatism) that had only a loose connection to Toryism had popped up.
For the Liberals and the NDP, the question is do these same circumstances apply. One reason that I'd suggest that a Liberal/NDP merger might be successful is that the ideological perspectives represented by each of these parties have changed. Their opposition to Harperesque neo-conservatism does not make them mirror reflections of each other (the centre-left is a big, big, big political space occupied by the Greens and the Bloc as well). But, the old battles of Trudeauvian liberalism are no longer battles and Canadian socialism, as I've pointed out before, is not really socialism. It's sort of a vague progressive reformism. What this means is that there is an opening for some type of electoral cooperation in the sense that what divided the parties in the past has been, in part, overcome by history. We have, right now, a civic nationalist Liberal Party led (comfortably it seems) by a former socialist and socialist NDP led (perhaps slightly less comfortably) by a former Liberal civic nationalist. Both are pragmatists (unlike, say, Trudeau and Broadbent or Pearson and Douglas) who are committed to the Canada that Trudeau and company built (multiculturalism, bilingualism, charter rights, regional equalization, autonomy in foreign affairs) with some twists and turns. Moreover, the Liberals face the same question the PCs faced a decade ago: is our ideological perspective relevant any longer in the sense that Canadians are willing to commit themselves to it. I don't know for sure, but my guess is that the number of true believers is considerably less than it was. For most people civic nationalism is the background of Canada; the goal. Hence … a merger of some sort just might work.
Thursday, June 10, 2010
NDP Liberal Merger
An NDP/Liberal merger?
I'm sure everyone is blogging on this so ... why bother? Well, because I think talk of this merger tells us something about Canada and so I'll break from my promised next installment on censorship (which might be a relief to some) to address this.
This merger -- or, talk of or potential merger -- is important for two reasons:
First, note the way some journalists have addressed this issue: almost as if it were a scandal (I found The Globe's coverage particularly interesting in this regard). So and so denies ... sworn affidavits; so and so confirms .... Why address this issue in this way? It is no secret that the Liberals have "picked off" some NDPers over the years or that parties try to make allies in the case of a minority government. Indeed, I would be shocked if the left wing of the Liberal Party and the right wing of the NDP had not been in some level of communication over the years. Why present this story as an almost scandal? Perhaps a journalistic proclivity to see everything as misinformation and scandal in which the journalist becomes the hero of the story by uncovering the truth? If so, this type of presentation is a tad self serving, no? More darkly, one might see this mode of presenting this story as a continuity of leading media outlets anti-Liberal bias. I'm not certain of that and some analysis would need to be done, but I also would not discount the possibility out of hand.
Second, and I think more importantly, a Liberal-NDP merger would be something different then some sort of electoral alliance in which the parties looked for common ground that would allow them to form a reasonable governing bloc that could address matters of importance to themselves and a large section of the Canadian population (although certainly not all Canadians). This might include environmental issues, reversing some Conservative policies re funding for Status of Women or developing a realistic plan to address the economic morass that is federal finances.
A merger, however, would speak of something different. For a number of years I have been hypothesizing that the Liberal project for Canada, let's follow Ignatieff and call it civic nationalism, has reached its end. This end is not that it has been rejected by Canadians because we know that large parts of this project are now broadly supported. Canadians, by and large, accept the idea of equality of citizens, Charter rights, multiculturalism, and official bilingualism. Whether or not these things can be treated as part of an evolving project for Canada is, I think, an open question. Aside from the extreme edges of Canadian society, these things might almost be seen as status quo.
In this sense, the ending of the Liberal project for Canada might signal the development of a transition to something else. And, that transition might signal a political re-alignment. In this sense, an NDP-Liberal merger might be something more than a "get the Tories out" coalition. It might be part of a process through which a different type of Canada is evolving into being.
I'm sure everyone is blogging on this so ... why bother? Well, because I think talk of this merger tells us something about Canada and so I'll break from my promised next installment on censorship (which might be a relief to some) to address this.
This merger -- or, talk of or potential merger -- is important for two reasons:
First, note the way some journalists have addressed this issue: almost as if it were a scandal (I found The Globe's coverage particularly interesting in this regard). So and so denies ... sworn affidavits; so and so confirms .... Why address this issue in this way? It is no secret that the Liberals have "picked off" some NDPers over the years or that parties try to make allies in the case of a minority government. Indeed, I would be shocked if the left wing of the Liberal Party and the right wing of the NDP had not been in some level of communication over the years. Why present this story as an almost scandal? Perhaps a journalistic proclivity to see everything as misinformation and scandal in which the journalist becomes the hero of the story by uncovering the truth? If so, this type of presentation is a tad self serving, no? More darkly, one might see this mode of presenting this story as a continuity of leading media outlets anti-Liberal bias. I'm not certain of that and some analysis would need to be done, but I also would not discount the possibility out of hand.
Second, and I think more importantly, a Liberal-NDP merger would be something different then some sort of electoral alliance in which the parties looked for common ground that would allow them to form a reasonable governing bloc that could address matters of importance to themselves and a large section of the Canadian population (although certainly not all Canadians). This might include environmental issues, reversing some Conservative policies re funding for Status of Women or developing a realistic plan to address the economic morass that is federal finances.
A merger, however, would speak of something different. For a number of years I have been hypothesizing that the Liberal project for Canada, let's follow Ignatieff and call it civic nationalism, has reached its end. This end is not that it has been rejected by Canadians because we know that large parts of this project are now broadly supported. Canadians, by and large, accept the idea of equality of citizens, Charter rights, multiculturalism, and official bilingualism. Whether or not these things can be treated as part of an evolving project for Canada is, I think, an open question. Aside from the extreme edges of Canadian society, these things might almost be seen as status quo.
In this sense, the ending of the Liberal project for Canada might signal the development of a transition to something else. And, that transition might signal a political re-alignment. In this sense, an NDP-Liberal merger might be something more than a "get the Tories out" coalition. It might be part of a process through which a different type of Canada is evolving into being.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
The Left and Liberal Hypocrisy
ﾠLiberals get blamed for a lot these days, at least in the circles I frequent. Conservatives, of course, have never been fans of l/Liberals. That is why they are c/Conservatives in the first place. We might expect, then, conservative ideologues, thinkers, politicians, etc., to unleash a continual stream of anti-liberal vendictive. This tendency is, of course, magnified by the fact that the Conservative Party has a well-stocked war chest. They can afford to take out anti-Liberal adverts whenever they perceive a slight shift in the polls.
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Neither is NDP vindictive particularly surprising either. What is, of course, surprising, at least a little bit is the degree to which the NDP leadership seems to have decided that their best course of action is to be the Official Opposition's self-declared Official Opposition. The NDP leadership seems to spend more time attacking the Liberals than the Conservatives. In fact, at times -- as in the last federal election when the NDP helped to bring down the Liberal government of Paul Martin -- the NDP seemed almost blindly unconcerned with the Conservative policies. An example is seeming NDP shock that a Conservative government has abandoned the federal commitment to aboriginal rights enshrined in the Kelowna Accord, environmentalist commitments indicated by the Kyoto Accord, and the semblance of a national day-care programme worked out by the Liberals. Only a leadership unconcerned with Conservatism could be shocked by what the Conservatives have done. The NDP's lack of concern seems to relate to a political tactic: displace the Liberals as the national alternative to Conservatism. It appears that the NDP perspective is that only by taking down the Liberals will they be able to mobilize opposition to Conservatism "under their banner", as it were, and have a chance of attaining power. I'm not certain this is a good strategy and here is why.
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First, in order to fulfill its plan, the NDP has adopted a Conservative anti-Liberal discourse: "by nature Liberals are hypocrites and incompetent." This discourse works well with Conservatives because it is how they see the world. They ascribe to Liberalism a series of moral weaknesses that have opened to the door to such supposedly nasty things as gay rights, de-criminalized pot, strong anti-harassment laws, a commitment to equality of opportunity through national child care, and the like. By contrast, the NDP actually does not see support for child care and gay rights, etc., as signs of moral weakness. On all these policy areas they much closer to the Liberals than the Conservatives. Like the Liberals, the NDP supports equality for gays, national child care, equality of opportunity for women, as well as gun control, regional economic development strategies, and a host of other things. There are -- or there should be -- points of opposition between NDPers (as socialists) and Liberals (as liberals). The NDP needs to spell these out. It hasn't done that. Instead, it has justified and rationalized a Conservative discourse that only ends up strengthening Conservativism in Canada. The first big problem with the NDP's anti-Liberal rhetoric, then, is that it ends up sounding very Conservative and, as such, ends up rationalizing a Conservative perspective.
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Going along with this, NDP anti-Liberal discourse also misses the point. Listening to it, or reading it, one would get the feeling that the Liberals were a bunch of thieves and liars, morally decrepit people who can't do anything right. Again, this is the Conservative perspective but it should not be the NDP's perspective. It should not be the NDP's perspective because it fails to engage policy. What the NDP are saying, through their discourse, is, in effect, don't vote for them because they are morally bankrupt. Vote for us because we are honest and upright. Perhaps, but what is missing from this discourse is any reference to policy. In fact, the whole discourse of "vote for us because we are honest" is politically neutral. I'm a socialist politically but I have no illusions that socialists are any more honest then anyone else. Many of my friends are Liberals and Conservatives and they are good, well-meaning, hard-working and honest people. My concerns with Conservativism do not relate to any belief on my part that Stephen Harper is somehow dishonest. I don't think he is. (I do think he is a politician, which is something I will address in a future blog.) By focusing attention, then, on honesty, the NDP's discourse actually misses a chance to differentiate itself from Liberalism on key policy issues.
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My point is this: the NDP's on-going war against Liberalism will necessarily fail to accomplish its ends. Its ends seem to be to displace the Liberals as the national official opposition to Conservatism and, from there one assumes, to make a run at becoming a governing party. It can't work because it ends up re-inforcing Conservatism and because it misses opportunities to actually do something that would allow Canadians to understand what voting NDP actually means. By adopting a Conservative rhetoric, what the NDP does is actually help Conservatives maintain power. This is a problem for the NDP -- regardless of what goes on electorally with regard to the Liberals -- because Conservative policies are antithetical to NDP policies. By re-inforcing Conservatism, the NDP actually succeeds in making Canada into precisely the type of country they do not want it to be. Likewise, it casts support for the NDP into the politically neutral realm of honesty that actually has nothing to do with policy or with our visions of what the future might should look like. In this regard, the NDP misses a chance to actually displace the Liberals through policy differentiation.
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I'd suggest that the NDP has to follow a different route. It is supposed to be a different type of political party. It needs to take seriously the idea that political education is a fundamental aspect of a political party's work and that education is much more then saying "vote for me." It seems to engage society and articulate a different vision of the future. It cannot content itself with talking about Liberal hypocrisy and incompetence. It has to talk about society, political-economy, and itself. If it doesn't do that ... well ... its future will end up being more of the same old third party status, the very thing the party is now trying to desperately (but in such a misdirected way) to escape.
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Neither is NDP vindictive particularly surprising either. What is, of course, surprising, at least a little bit is the degree to which the NDP leadership seems to have decided that their best course of action is to be the Official Opposition's self-declared Official Opposition. The NDP leadership seems to spend more time attacking the Liberals than the Conservatives. In fact, at times -- as in the last federal election when the NDP helped to bring down the Liberal government of Paul Martin -- the NDP seemed almost blindly unconcerned with the Conservative policies. An example is seeming NDP shock that a Conservative government has abandoned the federal commitment to aboriginal rights enshrined in the Kelowna Accord, environmentalist commitments indicated by the Kyoto Accord, and the semblance of a national day-care programme worked out by the Liberals. Only a leadership unconcerned with Conservatism could be shocked by what the Conservatives have done. The NDP's lack of concern seems to relate to a political tactic: displace the Liberals as the national alternative to Conservatism. It appears that the NDP perspective is that only by taking down the Liberals will they be able to mobilize opposition to Conservatism "under their banner", as it were, and have a chance of attaining power. I'm not certain this is a good strategy and here is why.
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First, in order to fulfill its plan, the NDP has adopted a Conservative anti-Liberal discourse: "by nature Liberals are hypocrites and incompetent." This discourse works well with Conservatives because it is how they see the world. They ascribe to Liberalism a series of moral weaknesses that have opened to the door to such supposedly nasty things as gay rights, de-criminalized pot, strong anti-harassment laws, a commitment to equality of opportunity through national child care, and the like. By contrast, the NDP actually does not see support for child care and gay rights, etc., as signs of moral weakness. On all these policy areas they much closer to the Liberals than the Conservatives. Like the Liberals, the NDP supports equality for gays, national child care, equality of opportunity for women, as well as gun control, regional economic development strategies, and a host of other things. There are -- or there should be -- points of opposition between NDPers (as socialists) and Liberals (as liberals). The NDP needs to spell these out. It hasn't done that. Instead, it has justified and rationalized a Conservative discourse that only ends up strengthening Conservativism in Canada. The first big problem with the NDP's anti-Liberal rhetoric, then, is that it ends up sounding very Conservative and, as such, ends up rationalizing a Conservative perspective.
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Going along with this, NDP anti-Liberal discourse also misses the point. Listening to it, or reading it, one would get the feeling that the Liberals were a bunch of thieves and liars, morally decrepit people who can't do anything right. Again, this is the Conservative perspective but it should not be the NDP's perspective. It should not be the NDP's perspective because it fails to engage policy. What the NDP are saying, through their discourse, is, in effect, don't vote for them because they are morally bankrupt. Vote for us because we are honest and upright. Perhaps, but what is missing from this discourse is any reference to policy. In fact, the whole discourse of "vote for us because we are honest" is politically neutral. I'm a socialist politically but I have no illusions that socialists are any more honest then anyone else. Many of my friends are Liberals and Conservatives and they are good, well-meaning, hard-working and honest people. My concerns with Conservativism do not relate to any belief on my part that Stephen Harper is somehow dishonest. I don't think he is. (I do think he is a politician, which is something I will address in a future blog.) By focusing attention, then, on honesty, the NDP's discourse actually misses a chance to differentiate itself from Liberalism on key policy issues.
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My point is this: the NDP's on-going war against Liberalism will necessarily fail to accomplish its ends. Its ends seem to be to displace the Liberals as the national official opposition to Conservatism and, from there one assumes, to make a run at becoming a governing party. It can't work because it ends up re-inforcing Conservatism and because it misses opportunities to actually do something that would allow Canadians to understand what voting NDP actually means. By adopting a Conservative rhetoric, what the NDP does is actually help Conservatives maintain power. This is a problem for the NDP -- regardless of what goes on electorally with regard to the Liberals -- because Conservative policies are antithetical to NDP policies. By re-inforcing Conservatism, the NDP actually succeeds in making Canada into precisely the type of country they do not want it to be. Likewise, it casts support for the NDP into the politically neutral realm of honesty that actually has nothing to do with policy or with our visions of what the future might should look like. In this regard, the NDP misses a chance to actually displace the Liberals through policy differentiation.
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I'd suggest that the NDP has to follow a different route. It is supposed to be a different type of political party. It needs to take seriously the idea that political education is a fundamental aspect of a political party's work and that education is much more then saying "vote for me." It seems to engage society and articulate a different vision of the future. It cannot content itself with talking about Liberal hypocrisy and incompetence. It has to talk about society, political-economy, and itself. If it doesn't do that ... well ... its future will end up being more of the same old third party status, the very thing the party is now trying to desperately (but in such a misdirected way) to escape.
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