The Bills Are Due

Or, re-reading Andrew Cohen's While Canada Slept. For those who don't know this book, it was a bit of a hit "back in the day." Released in 2003, it was one of a series of texts that lamented the demise of Canada's standing on the international stage that were published in what we can now recognize as the dying days of perhaps Canada's last Liberal administration. Much of the literature on Canada's international standing was produced -- as Ian McKay's Warrior Nation intimates -- by more extreme elements of the right wing who were overtly militarist. Cohen's text is more nunanced and subtle. He was a firm believer in re-militarization but his position was more mixed and he argued strongly, as well, for anti-poverty untied aid programmes. I don't mean to laud this work. There are problems with it (he clearly romanticizes Canada's Pearsonian "golden age," for instance) but he also harbours no beefs against the liberal welfare state, like so many other critics of Liberal foreign and military policy.

We don't need to go through all the problems with While Canada Slept. Despite the fact that I think this book is the best of the critiques that were written (excepting perhaps Jennifer Welsh's  At Home in the World), it would be a long list. In addition to romancitizing Pearson and his cohort, Cohen stacks the deck in favour of re-militarization in his historical consideration of it. He also focuses a great deal on "will," as if "will" (whatever that might be) were the key to politics. The pros of this book would not be as long but they are considerable as well (his warning against seeing the US as the be-all-and-end-all of Canadian foreign policy is something that others writing in this line might have paid attention to). My goal here is not to re-review this text almost a decade after it was published but instead to consider it from a different perspective. Where did all this concern about Canada's declining status on the world stage come from?

Over and over again in the text, Cohen laments the demise of Canadian spending on foreign affairs (on the diplomatic service, on the military, and on development aid). Fair enough. Like others writing along this line he suggests that this decline was the result of a number of factors but, most importantly, the indifference of governments to things diplomatic and military and the general invisibility of foreign aid for most Canadians (making it an easy target for cost cutting governments). He intimates that, in the context of the first years of the new millenium that Canada did indeed have the money to spend on such things. But, and this is a very important question, did it? At whose feet should we lay the spending cuts of the Martin as finance minister era?

This is a question that is important for two reasons. First, the surpluses -- now exhausted -- of the waning years of the Chretien government and first years of the Martin government -- have caused a great many people to forget what the economy was like before that time. A great many commentators, for instance, seem to have forgotten that when Chretien took office, Canada was running budget deficits in the $ 40 billion/year range. They seem to forget the huge accumulated deficit and the weight of service charges against it that we sucking down the federal budget. Indeed, service charges were one of the largest items on the federal budget and that is simply a dead loss in  terms of government revenue because it is money that is going to produce nothing. It is simply paying interest on an accumulated debt. Service charges build no new hospitals or road or educate no children or provide no health care. Carrying a debt might be needed from time to time. I have one, it is called a mortgage. But, by the early years of the 1990s, the debt was a serious problem that was hampering the federal government's ability to do anything.

What is more, the debt had become intensely politicized. The right wing (in the guise of the Reform Party) made the debt and what to do about it a national political priority. Any political party, in this context, had to address for both economic and political reasons. Canada could not go on accumulating a debt and no party that wanted to stay in power could ignore it. It might have been possible to ignore it a bit more then the Liberals did without the Reform Party but such is life and even if this is doubtful because there were a slew of think-tank reforms and ominous predictions from Canada's business class about the state of the debt and short and long range effects on the ability of Canadians to keep their economy moving.

There is much to debate about the way in which the Liberal regime tackled the debt but, and this is important to note, everyone was tackling the debt. The NDP government in Saskatchewan felt compelled to address it as did the Progressive Conservative government in Alberta. Even sections of the PQ leadership were talking about the need to address the provincial debt in Quebec and, of course, we had the Harris government in Ontario cutting the public service with a chainsaw. In other words, the Liberal government did not act alone. The speed with which they acted, their ruthlessness in cutting social spending, was a product of the politicization of the debt as a result of the Reform activism and the pro-business lobby, but they could not fail to address it and to do so would have been irresponsible.

This context is erased from consideration of Canada's declining military and foreign spending during the Chretien regime. What is more, the books had been tight for some time (back to the Trudeau era). A failure to consider this context means that we don't understand why the Liberal government did a lot of the things they did. Again, I think we can debate -- and constructively -- the details of how things were done but the argument that cutting military and foreign service spending was wrong is actually an effort to re-write history. It is like saying "these branches of government should have been exempt from spending cuts." The bills will have to paid by everyone else (aka taxpayers) but not them.

I will suggest that this approach -- to exempt one section of government from cuts that all other sections had to address -- would have been irresponsible because it would have placed an even greater burden on the social welfare state. It would have forced tax increases -- thus cutting spending in the economy -- and drastically reduced the standard of living of the poorest Canadians through cuts to social welfare services that had already been cut. It would have drastically increased the cost of postsecondary education (and, thus, further hampered Canada's international competitiveness) and reduced the quality of health care available to Canadians even further. In other words, to exempt the military, aid, and foreign service from cuts (or, perhaps to even increase spending on these branches of government) was not just a matter of "will" or poor government choices. Everyone had to pay their share and a failure to recognize this would have reduced the standard of living of Canadians, decreased health care, reduced accessibility to education, and hampered economic growth.

I am not trying to defend Chretien and Martin. I have my beefs with them. What I am trying to say is that much of the "increase spending on the foreign service and military arguments) are predicated on either a lack of historical knowledge or a willful erasure of the past. The bills, as it were, were due. And, those arguing for militarization, in effect, say "yeah, but we won't pay them." In the 1990s, the bills were due; Canada needed to address its deficit and it needed to do so in a way that was fair and that maintained economic and social stability. The military had to take a hit, just like education, health care, etc. A failure to do so would have been irresponsible on the part of any government and a failure to acknowledge this -- as if people just cut the military and foreign service and aid because they didn't like them -- presents Canadians with a false sense of their own history and a false understanding of the choices they have before them today.

Spin Off Benefits

DND apparently argued that one reason to support the F-35  contract was regional economic benefits. This is an argument that I hear periodically by those in favour of military spending. I'm not opposed to military spending, btw, but I am opposed to arguments that don't make  sense. Periodically, people in favour of military spending argue that there are a bunch of ancillary benefits that accrue to militarization. I get what they are trying to do. They are trying to make the strongest argument they can for their case.  Fair enough. I suppose we all do this.  The problem with this type of argument regarding the military, however, is that it is wrong. Let me be clear, I have no doubt that those who make the case for a stronger military firmly believe what they are saying. Firm belief, however, does not equal fact.

I can see why other might believe the advocates of militarization, too. They often sound good. They are smartly dressed when interviewed on TV. They sound remarkably reasonable and logical. And, they speak a sort of insider code, as if they were insiders in the capitals of the world, that assures us of this "you may not think this way but other governments do." What I want to do is to explain why we should resist this kind of argument and this kind of PR packaging of militarization.  Let's use regional economic spin offs as an example.

When we investigate any subject, we also need to investigate the witnesses. I tell my students to do this with me. I'm about to tell you something but why should you believe me? Well, on some things there is good reason to believe. I've spent a long time investigating certain subjects, I've read more, perhaps been to more conferences, talked to more people, perhaps even insiders. On other things ... not so much. This is the first question we have to ask about regional spin off benefits. Doe the people making the case have any reason to know something more then we do. Do civil servants in DND or military officials (however much we respect them for what they do) have any reason to know anything more about regional economic development then we do? If not... why would we take their word for it?

The second thing we need to ask "what are those benefits and to whom to they accrue?" If you read the linked story, you'll discover that there are a set of code words in it (my favourite is "traditionally"). Here is  a quote: "Traditionally, regional benefits on major military contracts in Canada have been equal to the purchase price. For example, a company that received a contract of $1-billion had to guarantee that it would spend that same amount in Canada, either on the actual contract or on other projects, subject to approval by Industry Canada."

Note, no sources are cited and the example given is purely hypothetical. No specific examples are listed. And, what does the word "traditionally" mean? Does it mean normally? Does it mean: this is a rule? Is this an average over time or does every contract function that way? There is an amazing lack of information in this piece.

And, you will notice this about most arguments for the spin off  benefits of militarization.  As another example, I recently had my students read an old piece by a number of noted scholars arguing that mlitarization won respect. They never specified from whom? In what context? How that respect translated into the realization of foreign policy goals? The implication is there: if people respect you, you will more easily get what you want. But, since no examples are given, we can never check this out. We have a vague promise delivered by serious-sounding individuals without a shred of evidence supporting it (excepting that vague "we are insiders so trust us" tone).

I am old enough to remember that these types of arguments were used by those who advocated maintaining fairly large infantry and air forces in Europe on a permanent basis. The Europeans won't trade with us, a very intelligent looking man dress properly in a three piece suit, told us night after night on TV.  Well, it turned out, of course, that European trade with Canada had nothing to do with the military and everything to do with economics. It is hardly shocking but business leaders base exchange decisions on the bottom line. They don't take a loss because of an air force base. Mercedes does not suddenly say "gee, if Canada keeps some interceptors in Europe, we'll lower the price of cars that Canadians buy." If anyone doubts me, go ask a business person on what they base their decisions. I'll wait.

But, we could take this further, did Canada's remilitarization and hard power hard line discourse win Canada respect at the UN? Gee. .. how did that get on the Security Council vote go again?   

Finally, spin off benefits are not a good way to promote regional development. Regional development is not the military's job; they won't be good at it because they have other jobs to do.They protect citizens, engage in disaster relief, provide expertise in developing countries, etc. Looking to military spending to stimulate the regional economy is like saying that you will improve the furniture in your bedroom by hiring someone to protect your shed. Having a safe shed might put you in a good mood and so you buy new furniture ... or, it might not. There is no connection between the two.

Any good economist will tell you that there "spin off benefits" to any public spending. (We can debate how much they are another day.) That is not the issue; the issue is the volume and the targeting of effects. If you want regional development, spend your money on that. If you spend it on something else and hope for regional development, you are adding another step in the process , another step that can create uncertainty, and another link in a chain as a place for something to go wrong. Because of these extra steps, it is, in fact, more then likely that military spending is less valuable for regional development than spending directed solely for that purpose.

If there are serious problems with the "spin offs to military spending" argument, why do people make it? Are they just trying to trick us into spending money on something that we would otherwise not spend money on. Perhaps. I think the advocates of military spending think their argument is weaker then they let on and so do indeed try to fortify it by drawing in other points (economics, international respect). I also think that some of these advocates talk about things that they do not really understand and so make mistakes. The fact that someone knows a lot about the military (the point I made above) does not mean that they know a lot about the economy or international relations.

But, more importantly, I think there is a will to believe. I think this is the same will that said things like "if you don't support the war in Afghanistan you are not supporting the troops." I think the advocates of military spending want this to be true. I think they desperately want to believe that increased military spending solves IR and economic problems and so they state confidently that it does ... all the while never actually investigating whether what they said was true. There is, after all, a reason why these claims are not documented.