Thought Police and Post-Secondary Education

The argument I have been trying to make so far is that the equation of "political correctness" with thought policing is misplaced. This can be qualified. There are people on every point on the political spectrum who are not particularly interested in open mindedness. But, that can be taken for granted. What I am interested in is demonstrating that the idea that asking people to think again about something is not wrong. I tried to argue that most of do this all the time. It is a normal part of conversation because we often talk to others about things about which we disagree. There is nothing wrong with saying to someone, you know, I thought X and here is why. Far from being thought policing, it is a normal part of discourse. It is the way we carry on conversations. Likewise with politics. Democracy requires people changing their mind. No mind changing ... no democracy.  Suggesting to someone, then, that they can and should look at an issue (the economy, health care, the environment, it does not matter what) in a different way is hardly thought policing. Likewise, there is nothing wrong with suggestion to someone that bigotry or insulting someone is wrong.

Post-secondary education is one ares where people are often accused of being PC. If you follow the logic of my argument, this will not come as a surprise because post-secondary education is about thinking differently. If it was not ... would it be education? I periodically hear this from critics of PC: "Professor So-and-So said that something I fundamentally believe was wrong and wants me to change my mind. That is so PC." If you are one of those people who has said that, can I ask: what were you paying for when you paid your tuition? Imagine a situation where you paid your tuition and spent the entire year being told only things you already knew. How would you feel. At the end of the year, you knew precisely and exactly and only the things you already knew at the start of the year. No one had challenged your thinking. No one presented data that refocused your attention. No one suggested a different methodology that might yield different results. Would you believe that your tuition was money well spent?

Education can and should be about many things. It should be about skill acquisition. It should be about some measure of cultural literacy. It should be about empirical knowledge. There is, in other words, not a single thing that higher education -- or any form of education -- is about. In my view, for instance, it should be about something we've called in the past "habits of mind": how you look at and think about how you will think about issue and interact with others and knowledge. But, if you completed your university degree and your views on anything that is important were never challenged, regardless of your political perspective, would you say that your education was complete?

Post-secondary education places a premium on critical thinking. To be sure, that can be -- and is -- defined in different ways. To be sure, what that means is approached through different research methods. And, to be sure, faculty hold different political perspectives. On my floor (which houses three different academic units), at Mount A, for instance, just about every perspective on the political spectrum (with the exception of the extreme ends) is represented.  [BTW: It might surprise people to know what we professors, in fact, spend shockingly little time talking about politics. We talk about it, perhaps more than other people in other jobs (I've never held a job where politics was not a subject of discussion at some point in the working day), but we spend the vast majority of our time talking about other things ... like our jobs (teaching strategies that worked or did not work, attendance issues, students who are struggling, departmental budgets, professional development, research) or .... ordinary life things like kids and household repairs and movies we like.] This is my point: despite these differences, we all get along. No one accuses someone else of being the thought police because we share a commitment to an ideal of post-secondary education that does many things: builds knowledge, conveys facts, promotes skills, and sustains different perspectives on the events or issues in question.

I want to be clear on this point: different faculty take different approaches to challenging student thinking. I had a colleague years ago who played devil's advocate, intentionally adopting the opposite perspective of his students. Most of us don't do that and can't really do that, say if you are lecturing to 100 students. What you can do is explain certain perspectives and challenge conventional thinking as a way to spur thought. In my classes, for instance, I ask students to think about what the mistreatment of First Peoples tells us about Canada or what we should think of contradictory tendencies in foreign policy or why we take wilderness icons for emblems of nationhood but produce so much pollution. Sometimes, I will confess, I don't have answers to these problems. I have my own views -- and this blog is a place where I articulate them -- but I don't have the answer to every issue or every problem that perplexes national public life.

But ... what if I did have answers? Well, it turns out that there are some things on which I do have some things that I think I can contribute to the general discussion. Most faculty are this way.  There are issues about which I have been teaching, or which I have been researching, for some time. I'm getting close to twenty years at Mount Allison, which means that some of my current students were not alive when I started here. I've done more reading on some subjects than my students and, in some cases, a great deal more reading. Where one of my students might have spent, say, hours reading about a subject they find interesting, I might now have spent 100 times that. I'm not bragging, just doing math. I've seen the evolution of scholarship over time (where students are often coming in half way through a story; not their fault, this is simply a product of age). I've see policies that have begun with much promise but resulted in failure. In other words, it is possible that I know more about something than one of my students and I might have ways of thinking about some matters that can help them. I do lecture in some of my courses and I lecture because I can use that forum to get students "up to speed" on an issue quicker than sending them away to read the dozen or several dozen books (let alone scholarly papers) that I have read on the same subject.

So, knowing that, what should be my approach as an instructor? As a faculty member, I am paid for many reasons. I am paid to teach classes, to administer an academic program, to provide effective collegial governance, to research, to edit, to advise. But, surely one of the reasons students pay to sit in my class is that they have something that they think they can learn from everything I've just wrote in the previous paragraph.

This is not arrogance. To be sure: some faculty are arrogant but arrogance has no single political home. It is not the sole provenance of the politically correct. And, in my view, the issue is not arrogance. We all agree that it is not a good mix with teaching. There is, though, a difference between arrogance and knowing something or having certain skills. My plumber knows a lot more about plumbing than I do. Is that arrogance on his part? My mechanic knows a great deal more about car engines than I do ... is he arrogant when he fixes my car? You see the point and the oddity of some of the accusations of thought policing or PC. When a faculty member corrects a mistake a student makes ... are they arrogant? Some people -- particularly but not exclusively, I suspect -- those in the anti-PC camp come very close to arguing that this is the case. But, imagine a different situation. What if I spotted a mistake and did not correct it? Would I be doing my job?

These are something more than rhetorical questions. What I am saying is that a reasonable conception of education involves thinking, changing your mind, learning new things and we expect instructors to guide us in that process. We don't expect them to sit on the sidelines while errors are made and ignore those so as to avoid becoming "thought police." The fact that someone who knows more about a subject than I do corrects me is not a horrible thing. It is not an insult to me, or a challenge to my moral worth or identity, as a human being. It is simple that: a correction.

Let me conclude: if you wondered why so much politically correct discourse (pro and con) is on campus, at universities, it is not an accident. It is not some sort of left wing academia. It is a product of the nature of the higher educational enterprise. Challenging people's thinking, correcting mistakes, asking people to look again at an issue, and recognizing that there are people who know more because that is their job, is not horrible. Yet, in hoopla that surrounds PC on campus, I think we have lost sight of those simple facts. The goal of education is *not* to remain the same. That is why we go to school: to develop, to change, to become better. If we assume that anyone who seeks to change us is involved in some sort of nefarious conspiracy or is some agent of the thought police, we are, in fact, condemning the very idea and purpose of education.

The Unreality of Free Speech: Toxic Environments that Might Not Exist

I don't like to blog on current events all that much because I like to have some distance from the subject at hand to gain perspective. Not everyone is like this but I hope it works for me and prevents me from saying things that I'd regret later. I'm going to break from this pattern because of the sur-reality that is starting to surround the Wilfrid Laurier-Lindsay Shepherd free speech/toxic environment discussion. You can find the latest information here and here and likely in other places as well. Here is the upshot. For those who need a refresher, a TA named Lindsay Shepherd who works at Wilfrid Laurier University (WLU) was reprimanded by panel consisting of her supervisory faculty member, another faculty member, and an administrator after, they said, a -- and potentially more -- student(s) had complained that she had created a toxic environment in a tutorial she ran by showing a short clip of a televised debate about gender-neutral pronouns. One of the debaters was an individual well-known for biased and, it appears, homophobic and transphobic views. This occasioned an extensive debate about free speech versus safe learning environments in which LGTBQ and other advocates urged WLU to take steps to support a safe environment and to ensure that marginalized individuals were not subject to harassment, threats, denial of identity, etc., and so-called free speech advocates who argue that free speech was paramount and that the rough equivalent of secret trials that censor people should not take place at universities. There was a certain level of extremism to this debate whereby alt-right groups came to support of the TA (despite her denial of their politics) and a series of others claimed that she was standing on white privilege, etc.

The surreality of this debate -- its oddity -- became more odd when a WLU investigation could find no complaint against the TA involved. That's right. It appears that the complaint that supposedly underscored -- and, in fact, supposedly triggered -- the hearing in which the TA was reprimanded never existed, even as a less-formal expression of concern (say, an inquiry or even a "gee ... that made me ...."). This, of course, begs a whole bunch of questions to which we will likely never have answers because it appears WLU does not want to release the report to the public and does not want to make its internal disciplinary procedures matters of public debate. (I kind of agree with this because of the heightened tensions that now surround this issue). We are left to wonder: did the faculty make up this complaint? Was it something that they, say, overheard and magnified? In other words, was there ever a shred of truth to the supposed complaint or was it constructed out of whole cloth? Were all members of the tribunal involved in a deception or only, say, one with the other two taking that person at their word? To whom are complaints supposed to be made and why were red flags not raised when a complaint -- on which disciplinary action was being taken -- was not in some way officially registered? In other words, why did it take an investigation to discover that there was no complaint? Who is supposed to check these things and why didn't they? If only one member of the tribunal claimed to have a complaint, and the others accepted that person at their word, why did they not ask to see the complaint before they began disciplinary proceedings and certainly before they made a decision to reprimand the TA?

The other day, I was chatting with a friend about this matter -- before I had read this news -- and we agreed (and this has been the point of my other blogs on this subject) that there was more than enough blame to go around and that just about everyone who had commented one this issue was wrong in one way or another. That might have been an overstatement. If, there never was a complaint, if no LGBTQ person found what was going on in the tutorial to be of sufficient concern to complain ... then ... it is not clear that there was a substantive issue in the first place. In my previous blogs on this subject, I assumed, as a thought exercise, that the TA was guilty. That thought exercise was designed to serve a certain point. It was designed to show how problems such as this could have been avoided *if* greater attention were paid to establishing proper procedures to address complaints and impose discipline. I assumed that there was a complaint and that that complaint reflected a real sense of marginalization coming out of the classroom. It appears that that assumption was wrong. That thought, however, exercise is still valid. In fact, I'd contend that it is even more valid as a result of this revelation. 

Why? Because proper procedures would have show up the fact that there was no complaint. If you look over the list of procedures that I tried to argue were reasonable (and, by extension, tried to argue that the vast majority of people will find reasonable), you will see that I contended that someone accused of misconduct had a right to know:

1. The number of complaints against them
2. The specific rules that they violated
3. And the complaint itself. 

If these procedures had been in place (and, I had others but this is the short list with which I began), the matter would have stopped right then and there.

What would have happened? Well ... because there was no complaint, there could not have been a disciplinary tribunal (or, whatever the precise forum that was convened). Perhaps the faculty member involved might have said "gee, I heard that ... " and it would have provided an opportunity to chat with the TA about the matter. 

There are, I think, some real problems with this issue and I'll address that sometime in the future but for now, without being arrogant, I write this blog to maintain my point. Regardless of all the oddity of someone inventing a complaint, the basics with regard to free speech, education, and disciplinary action are exactly the same today as they were a week ago. I am as curious as the next person about why someone, as it were, fabricated a crime. But, that does not change the fact that the "debate" around free speech at WLU needed to move in a different direction. 

As An Addendum: 

In the same way that one might ask me -- as I did rhetorically in a previous blog -- are you not neglecting issues (in that case with regard to LGBTQ issues), one might ask "Should I not say strongly that the TA -- Lindsay Shepherd -- was innocent?" She is. But, I want people to understand that my point was not to enter into a debate about her and her teaching tools. I was using her situation as a real world example to illustrate another point and I think that point still stands. I feel bad that someone was accused of a made up crime. In the same way did a month or so ago, however, I feel odd and uncomfortable commenting on specific cases where I do not have all the details. Moreover, I don't think one's free speech should be contingent on one being "innocent." In fact, the substance of my argument -- I hope --  runs in a different direction: toward a procedural mechanism that protects free speech by ensuring the rule of law, as it were, as opposed to ad hoc decision making processes. I'd stand by that. 

Marginalization and Free Speech: Steps Beyond a Toxic Environment

To recap: WLU dropped the ball on the free speech issue, even if we assume that the TA is guilty.  I mean not to single out WLU. I'm sure most institutions have similar problems, perhaps even my own, because we don't often think about procedures until we actually need them.

What about the people who have been affected by a toxic environment? What about those whose identities are denied by Transphobia? These are good questions. Surely, someone reading my blog might say that I have spilt a great deal of text laying out procedures to defend someone who I am assuming is guilty. I've explained why and why the rule of law, as it were, is so important to democracy, transparency, and, I'd argue, post-secondary education, among other things. Procedures are not add-ons. They are not things we should discover after the fact as a way of addressing issues that arise from situations such as what happened at WLU. If we only use these procedures after the fact to ensure that the alt.right were given their day in court but that was all ... then that would be a pretty poor use of procedures, even if it would, I am saying, still be a necessary one.

Those who ask: what about the other side? What about the LGBTQ community? Why are you not saying anything that protects them, affirms their identity, provides a positive learning environment for them? I think these are necessary questions and I think addressing these issues is necessary as well. If we simply stopped with procedures that protected those who discriminated but not those who suffered from discrimination (in my example, I assume the guilt of the individual involved), members of marginalized communities would have a very similar complaint and concern to the one I outlined in my last blog.

I want to belabour this point because I think that the response to this question has, in fact, been pretty poor. It amounts to various elements of one of the following:

• That's life, grow up. People these days are just too sensitive. Back in my day, no one took offense. 
• That is too bad but it is the price we pay for living in a free society. I don't agree with discourse that marginalizes someone but the fact is that we have to accept it or we don't have free speech.
• Good education will be disturbing because thinking is disturbing, challenging, it takes us to new places and by challenging our preconceptions necessarily makes us uncomfortable. 

None of these standard responses -- which, I freely concede could be said in a way that sounded more sophisticated -- really, in my view, is an effective response to why historically marginalized communities must accept continued marginalization so that I -- as mainstream a Canadian as you are going to get -- can enjoy free speech. Said differently, if we are going to protect speech, we also need to be well aware of the power relations and inequalities that can infuse that protection. To do otherwise would be naive and academic. If we pretend that conflicts over speech occur only in idealized situations where there are no victims, there is no marginalization, there is no violence against marginalized communities ... then, we are not really discussing a real issue, are we? We are making up a hypothetical situation and applying it to the real world *as if* that hypothetical situation were the real world and it just is not. I will, in fact, go so far as to argue that a failure to address real world issues is disingenuous and irresponsible. I think each of these positions are flawed and I'd like to take this blog to address them. 

The first point is simply empirically wrong. Back in the day, people did take offense to being called names, to being denied equality, to being subjected to marginalizing behaviour, to having the legitimacy of their identities denied. The difference was that they lacked the power to do anything about it. Thus, LGBTQ people did not walk about happy about the denial of their equality, the rejection of their voice, the contention that their identities were illegitimate. In often small but profound ways, in fact, they attempted to assert themselves into politics but it was dangerous. Violence was a normal part of their lives. They could not turn to authorities for help. And, they might even have been rejected by parents and loved ones if the truth about who they were came to be publicly known. The silence of the past is not indicative of acceptance. It is indicative of power inequalities that denied voice to the LGBTQ community. 

Regarding the second point, a fairer question to ask is this: who pays the price? If I (Andrew Nurse) pay the price for my (Andrew Nurse) own free speech that is one thing because that is fair. If I ask someone else to pay the price for my rights and benefits ... well ... that can be fair in some instances but it is not inherently fair. Imagine if I want to buy a car. I do and so I get to drive it. If, however, you (reader) are forced to buy a car with your money that I get to drive ... is that fair? One of the concerns I have about the whole "free speech" debate is that Canadian society seems to be asking marginalized groups (LGBTQ, Black Canadians, First Peoples) to pay the price for White Settler Canadians free speech. Put in this way, you can see the issue that I am having and why I think this idea is problematic.  It is made even more problematic because historically marginalized groups are being asked to pay the price for the free speech of historically non-marginalized groups. This is odd. We are asking someone else to have *their* identity denied or to be insulted with racialized epitaphs so that *I* can enjoy free speech.

Let me spin this point out one step further: you can actually see how upsetting this issue is when we see right-wing intellectuals complaining about what the so-called "radical left" teaches and researches and complains against tenure and research grants.  Many of my friends who are moderates or center-right in their politics complain vociferously when someone says Canada is illegitimate or that Canadians should be asking First Peoples for permission to live on Indigenous land. Why? Interestingly for reasons similar to the concerns expressed by LGBTQ activists regarding the incident at Wilfrid Laurier: it denies the legitimacy of their identity. Said in other words, many of those arguing that it is a drag but marginalized minorities just have to pay the price for the free speech others enjoy, actually become quite upset when they are asked to pay the price. At the most extreme, they then start to argue against tenure and that research grants be canceled. In the US, I gather, some political right-wingers have gone even further and setup web sites where one can report supposedly unfair treatment by leftists and radicals.

As to the third point: maybe. I will confess that I don't really understand this point. There are many things in the world I find disturbing: homelessness, global warming, violence against women are three. But, exactly why learning, say, that there is a solution to homelessness is disturbing is not at all clear to me. Moreover, as a faculty member of long-standing, I work to develop a positive educational environment as does just about every other instructor I know. So, exactly why we have to upset people to educate them is not clear. Yes, history is upsetting when we teach the holocaust or the genocide in Rwanda or Jim Crow. Hence, when I teach similar things -- say, about residential schools -- I work doubly hard to promote a positive environment: to telegraph my intentions, let students know in advance about the disturbing character of the lesson that is coming, to find good news stories to integrate into the lesson (say, stories of healing and recovery), to use appropriate artistic representations (say, from artists who were in the schools and which they have made available in the public sphere), to be available to talk to students after class (say, having a discussion sessions), to provide resources for those who might need them, and the like.

I will likely now jinx myself, but in the twenty years I have been teaching about residential schools, I have not had a single complaint. I am sure students were upset. I was. Who could not be? But, no one has been upset to the point of complaining about me. No one said that I created a toxic environment. And, I think that says something ... not about me but about students. It says students are willing to accept upsetting learning if there is a point to that learning and that point is clear. In other words: if the instructor has done their job. And, this seems to me to be something different from saying "let's debate the legitimacy of someone else's identity" or "let's get a bunch of straight people together to determine whether gay people are equal."

The difference might be subtle but it is important. One can create an education that challenges students and one should, but that is different from upholding marginalization or legitimizing violence.  It is one thing to teach a difficult subject matter (wars, violence, etc.) but another thing to teach in a disturbing way, particularly as there are steps one can take (other than not teaching material) to address the matters one might want to address.

Finally, in this regard, one might ask a foundational question: what is the aim of teaching and how is it best accomplished. If one's aim is encourage, say, "critical thought," (which is a pretty standard aim), then the question one has to answer is: how is this best accomplished. Is it best accomplished in a positive and supportive learning environment or in one strewn with controversy, with upset, and disturbed students? I don't know about you folks, but I am actually at my lowest in terms of learning potential when I am frustrated and angry or when I feel marginalized.

To conclude: more needs to be said. What I have tried to do here is to contest three standard arguments used for upsetting/disturbing students that are often connected to pro-free speech arguments. I find they have few merits and many problems. They ask others, as it were, to pay our bills; they don't provide an environment conducive to critical thought, and they tend to replicate problems rather than providing solutions.

Procedures and Free Speech (Part III)

Let's backtrack. Free speech is a misreported issue and it is a politicized issue. It might have to be because it cuts to the heart of a number of important issues in modern society: democracy, various forms of expression (artistic, self, cultural), the ability to resist or name oppression and so to promote equality, the character of scholarship and education. These are, of course, all laudable goals and, I strongly suspect, they are goals to which the vast majority of Canadians aspire.

Free speech, however, as I have said a number of times, is not the right to say whatever one will whenever one wants. There are a variety of limits, which are broadly and generally accepted and should be because they make sense. Those people who argue for free speech at any cost are actually making a fake argument because they have turned an important matter of public policy, essential for democracy, art, education, into an academic debating club in which the objective is to make one's opponent look bad (I suspect often for political reasons) as opposed to seriously thinking about what free speech is and its legitimate boundaries and having a conversation about that. One-liners don't help us, in other words.

I don't want to go over the reasonable limits (contract, for example) because I've blogged on these points so many times I assume anyone who has any interest in what I am saying can google it. I'll put up a blog that reviews this point sometime in the future.

What is important here is procedure. I've been blogging about procedures because they are essential to free speech, they are essential to fairness, and they are ways of resolving problems or conflict potentially before they began. I believe that the situation at Wilfrid Laurier that I have been using as an example to illustrate my point is a case in point. You might use another term to describe my point -- say, due process -- but the point is simple: in instances where a sanction of some sort (say, a reprimand) is going to be applied in a speech situation (where the defense is going to involve a claim to free speech) (there might be other instances, but I am dealing with speech), there are rules we have to follow and if we breach these rules, the legitimacy of the sanction -- the limit to free speech -- is cast into doubt.  So far I have said that the procedures (or, processes) involve:

• Proper orientation that establishes limits to pedagogical aids in advance of teaching
• The tribunal (or, committee) adjudicating the case must get the rules the accused is accused of breaking correct
• If someone is accused of an offense (say, creating a toxic environment), they must be informed of this in advance of a hearing (or committee meeting or whatever it is called), which includes reference to the specific rule (say, university rule) that they have broken
• In cases of new faculty or teaching assistants, etc., there must be an orientation that fully informs them of institutional rules
• The accused has the right to read the complaint in advance of the proceedings so that they  can prepare a counter argument 
• The accused does not have the right to know the complainant, but does have the right to know the number of complaints and the process through which complaints are made in advance of the proceedings 
• The accused has the right to counsel 
• The judges in the case cannot also be the prosecutors 

In the case of the Wilfrid Laurier incident, there may have been enough blame to go around, as it were. I don't know and, as a thought exercise, I am assuming the guilt of the individual involved. What I am trying to say is that these rules apply regardless of an individual's guilt or innocence. 

Someone might now say: why? If someone has created a toxic environment, why do we have to go to such lengths to protect their rights? What about the rights of the people they have marginalized or whose security has been threatened? Good questions and these are not issues -- let me say this clearly -- that anyone should pass over quickly. In fact, it is of such importance that I will devote another blog to it. 

What is important here are two things. First, when imposing a limit on free speech we need to be careful in how that limit is imposed. It cannot be arbitrary and the process by which those limits are enforced needs to fair and just and must be seen to be fair and just. Because what is it stake is -- in part -- the rules by which limit boundaries are imposed on speech. If the procedures that provide for  limits -- even, I am assuming, reasonable and legitimate limits -- are themselves potentially unfair, the reasonable limits will be seen in the same light. 

Said differently, procedures of enforcement are not just an add on to a good policy. They are part and parcel of the way the policy is enforced. If our policies are meant to set a high standard -- say, the provision of an effective and positive teaching environment -- then the procedures that enforce that standard must set the same standard. If they don't, the standard itself will be called into question. 

I'll give you an example. Imagine that you go to a meeting to discover that you are accused of speeding. You are not allowed to see the record of your speeding, you were not told in advance of the meeting when and where you were speeding, you are not told by how much, you are not given the opportunity to consult a lawyer, and the crown prosecutor is the person who will make the decision as to whether or not you are guilty ... in that instance, the legitimacy of a guilty verdict -- and I would argue rightly -- be in question regardless of whether or not you were speeding. And, it would be thrown out on appeal by a higher court, calling into question the rule that had been imposed against speeding. Now, note this: there is nothing wrong with a law against speeding. I agree with it. I had young children and I didn't want people speeding through my neighbourhood. It was not safe.  Hence, I reject the "I should be allowed to drive at whatever speed I want" argument. But, the fact that I reject it does not -- and cannot -- legitimize bad procedure in enforcing speeding and, in fact, will result in court challenges that call the speeding law itself into question (potentially making speeding more frequent). 

Second, we also need to remember that rules are not about the person on trial, as it were. Or, rather, they are not only about the person on trial. They are also about you and me. They are about the innocent. We cannot assume that simply because a person is accused of something that they did that thing. This is not, I want to add, the same thing as disbelieving the victim. This is an issue in which it is vitally important to avoid a binary yes/no type of logic. How one both maintains procedures and respects, believes, and supports complainants is a seriously tricky question but it is made more tricky by a binary that gives us only two options: yes or no. If these are the only options we have, then protecting rights of accused is indeed saying "I disbelieve you" to victims, as it were. What I don't see is why these need to be the only two options. This is important because I don't see a way around maintaining proper procedures. I don't see a way to avoid the points I've suggested above and maintain the legitimacy of any sanction, even if that sanction is done with the best of intent.

I do believe that there will be conflicts around issues of speech because people will intentionally misuse free speech. They will use it to insult people, to organize hate, to call others' identities into question, to marginalize and to oppress and we cannot -- if we want to be a good and democratic society -- accept these things. Thus, avoiding all conflict cannot be out objective in establishing policy because we will not be able to meet that objective. But, I do think we can take steps to minimize conflicts and to find ways to carry on conversations that bring people together into communities of interest. One way to do that is to avoid binaries. Or, at least this is what I think.

Free Speech and WLU (Part II)

In my last blog, I offered a bunch of qualifications: I am not taking sides, nor should my comments be read as doing so, in the debate at Wilfrid Laurier over free speech and hate speech. The argument that I am making is procedural and, to be clear, I am not trying to single out WLU. I suspect that many post-secondary institutions have similar procedural issues. I'll try to get to the issue of why we have these procedural issues in another blog (because I don't think it is out of evil intent or neglect).

In my last blog, though, I argued several key points:

• Faculty employing TAs must ensure proper orientation so that their TAs understand the rules of their courses, what is acceptable as teaching aids and what is not, so that everyone is working toward creating a positive learning environment (the precise meaning of which might differ from prof to prof and course to course, for legitimate reasons). In this case, this seems not to have been done. 
• That committees sanctioning individuals for breaches of the rules have a responsibility to get the rules right, as it were. If a committee is contending that there has been a breach of Canadian law, for example, they must ensure that their interpretation of the law can hold up because the law is not, of course, simply a matter of opinion and we want to avoid "well, I think X is wrong" types of argument in which there is not way to determine the accuracy of given statements. It appears the committee interviewing the TA fell down on this point. 
• That the committee sanctioning the TA (Lindsay Shepherd) also neglected other important matters of procedure that are essential for the effective construction of what we could argue is rule of law but which I would also argue is essential for the most effective free speech situation. These include: informing the accused in advance of the rules they had violated and allowing time to respond. Said differently, a person accused of something should not be forced to "think on their feet" during their defense. 

Moreover, I argued, these procedural points must apply regardless of our view of a person's guilt or innocence. This is elementary I recognize but the persistency of procedural rules cannot apply only in cases where we favour one or another party. That is, to say again, I am saying they must apply even if I am assuming the TA's guilt. 

I want to take this argument a step further but not by way of extrapolation. In other words, I am not going to try to get you to believe and interpretation built on your acceptance of the above contentions (if you accept them, even if for the sake of argument). I am going to try to lay three other important procedural matters that seem, as well, to have been neglected in this case. 

First, the accused must have the right to council. In my workplace, I have at right to have a union rep with me if an administrator is accusing me of something. I have the right to go to my union, to have them provide legal council, and to have them provide representation for me (have a grievance officer, in my case, take the lead in addressing the situation for me). The specifics, however, are less important that the idea. Someone accused of a serious violation of the rules (and, btw, creating a toxic environment in an educational setting is a serious violation of the rules) should not look across the table at three people unless they have their own council who can provide independent advise with regard to rule and procedure. If three people can come together to form an argument against a person ... we again have a power imbalance that is disturbing not because the TA was correct or incorrect, but because it can lead to a situation where a person who has not done anything wrong is deprived of their ability to formulate their own position through independent advise. Again, under Canadian law, we have a right to council. If a person is not unionized, it seems to me that this right is even more important because the union is not there to provide advise and support. 

Second, the accused needs to have the right to know the basis of the complaint against them independently of the person making the accusation. I understand the argument against releasing the name of the complainant. This can be a discussion for another day. But, that is different from seeing the complaint. According the recording (or, at least this is my understanding), Shepherd (the TA involved) was told she did not have the right to know who complained, could not know the number of the complainants, and was not informed of the process through which complaints were made. There is, again, an orientation problem here for TAs, and a potentially significant one, but the identity of the complainant can be protected while other important information -- information necessary for transparency and the legitimacy of decisions to sanction -- is made known in advance of the proceedings. At the least, an accused really does have to have a right to know the following:

• The number of complainants
• The complaint itself 
• The process through which complaints are made

These are procedural matters. Remember, I am assuming for the sake of this argument that the TA is guilty. I am not trying to defend this person. What I am asking is this: as a thought exercise, what is the minimum requirement for a procedure to have legitimacy; that is: to be fair to all concerned. 

Think about it this way, imagine the situation were different. Imagine you were charged with created a toxic environment on campus and you were to be sanctioned by your supervisor (who was also responsible for your orientation to your job). How do you feel -- person reading this blog -- that this process should proceed? Do you have the right to know in advance of the complaint (or, will you be required to defend yourself by "thinking on your feet")? Do you have a right to know the number of complainants? Do you have a right to know the process by which complaints are made? Do you have a right to counsel? 

Third, and there are others I will address in a future blog, your prosecutors cannot also be the people deciding on your sanction. In this case, the committee that was prosecuting the TA were the exact same people who were to adjudicate the legitimacy of the complaint and determine the sanction. You can see the problem in terms of procedure, I trust, immediately. Here is an analogy. What if you went to court to discover the that the prosecutor was also the judge? What would you think your chances of a fair trial might be?

Let us take a step back. What I am saying is that the procedures followed by the committee that determined the TA's sanction were so out of whack that they were going to create problems. If not in this case (and, again, assume guilt if you want in this case), then in some future case. If we have a situation where sanctions can be leveled without people knowing the complaint against them, where prosecutors are also judges, where accused are denied right to counsel, where orientation (an explanation of boundaries and limits) does not seem to have been effectively conducted (that is, a person is being accused of breaking rules and the person who was supposed to explain the rules to the rule breaker didn't) ... well ... in this instance, we have a situation that becomes what has happened at WLU.  The issue, on the one hand, has something to do with free speech, but on the other hand, that something is different than people think.

In my next post, I will try to draw the connection between procedures and free speech. 

Can We Speak to Each Other? Who Can, Should, Is ... Able to Speak on Public Issues

The recent controversy over BLM-TO and Pride raised an issue about the character and scope of political action and who can, and should, speak to certain issues, particularly as they take racialized or gendered or class, etc., forms. There is one school of thought which suggests that only those who come from that background -- be it its racialized markers, gender, orientation, etc., -- can speak to those issue. Class tends to get a bit lost in this discussion for reasons that are, to me, both deeply telling and intensely problematic, but that might be a subject for another day.

The first thing we should note is that this issue -- who can speak? -- is, in fact, not new. I don't know when it first surfaced but I've been listening to it, engaging it, disagreeing with it, supporting it, since I was an undergraduate. So, we are talking about at least the late 1980s as a starting point. What is interesting to me is that in that time -- a span of a generation -- we have not really advanced in our discussion. There are people who still say "person X cannot speak to issue X" and people who quickly, then, accuse the first person of censorship or bigotry or something like that. This is, in other words, not an issue that becomes politicized but an issue that is always already political because it deals with questions of power, marginalization, identity, respect, equality, and the like. The fact that we have been discussing this issue without resolution for such a length of time suggests that it is either (a) an intractable problem (which I don't think) or (b) that we have not made the level of social progress we might like in addressing issues of marginalization and inequality in society (which is what I think).

This leads to the first thing that we should learn about this discussion: there is a need to listen as well as speak. Some people -- say, BLM-TO -- are saying things. They are saying that they face inequality, marginalization, disrespect, and institutionalized and personalized violence. For those of us who do not fall into the identity/subject position that they represent, one thing we might do, rather than ask if we, too, can now speak ... is to listen. After all, if Canada with its systemic inequalities and power relations has failed to resolve this issue up to now ... maybe some new voices can indeed offer some hope for the future.

The second thing is that after listening, those of us who are not part of the group speaking (be it LGBTQ, gendered, racialized, etc.), should look to find way of supporting movements for equality if we truly support equality. I find it rather odd that there are those who claim to support equality but who quickly say "I can't support X or Y because I believe in equality for everyone." This is a bit of a linguistic trick that really has nothing to do with equality. It is, in fact, a way of avoiding supporting a movement for equality. It is a way of saying that Black or gay activists or women are not actually interested in equality, or linguistically marginalizing them and treating them a group that has some sort of nefarious agenda. If one were interested in inequality and addressing it, one would support  those movements that address that problem. If you're not interested ... you won't. Is it is as simple as that ... maybe not ...  but it is also not a lot more complicated.

Support, in the case of these groups, takes a variety of forms. Many groups are looking for people to be allies as opposed to leaders. They generate their own leaders, their own ideology, their own politics and don't need advise or direction from those outside the group. One need not even go to the protests and as long as one does not oppose the movement, one avoids becoming part of the problem. There may, too, be things that people can do in their own lives, whether it is making space in class (say, using my job as an example) to discuss issues or raising uncomfortable questions at work.

I make these points because I think people are often too quick to demand that their voice needs to be heard as part of a movement that does not really involve them. They complain that Black activists are silencing *them* or that feminists aren't listening to *them.* I am arguing that they can speak to these issues (and others) but that they should do so with caution and only after they have tried other things, like listening or not contributing to the problems that these groups mean to address.  Said differently, a desire to join in the discussion and start telling activists what they should be doing or how they should modify their demands or politics is a premature step. Other steps should be taken first.

With this in mind ... can someone speak to issues or politics or problems that stand outside their identity group? The short answer is yes. Why? There are, as far as I can tell, a three reasons.

First, because communication is a powerful tool to share ideas, feelings, politics, activism, etc. Said differently, I -- Andrew Nurse -- as a white middle-aged middle class straight man simply do not share the experiences of others as part of my identity. This should be acknowledged. But, we can talk about issues with those people who do have those experiences, read their words, listen to what they have to say. We do not have to share experiences as the only way of knowing about an issue.  If we pause and think about it, we can see that this is true. Communication allows us to know about more than our own experiences. We often relate stories that happened to other people about which we find out by talking to them. We can convey their emotional state (how they felt), the facts of the matter (what happened to them). We convey information to others that we learnt from reading (say, about the past) or from social or other media. Said differently, we communicate every day and in the process of communication we learn from the experiences of others.

Most political movements, in fact, count on this communicative active as a means to meet their goals, whether they articulate this perspective or not. Again, pause. If I -- as Andrew Nurse -- could never understand what it meant to suffer discrimination or violence as a gay or Black Canadian ... then, why would I ever sign on to support their agenda? If I knew only my own experiences, then there would be no reason for protests, for social media, for signs, for books or songs, etc. If political movements are interested in change, they are interested in communicating to people outside their own movement and group. Thus, far from doing something unusual, speaking to an issue with which one might have limited or no direct experience is, in fact, something that we do all the time. There can be problems; there can be confusions, but it is not an odd or unusual thing.

Second, while we need to recognize that some people may indeed have problems speaking to an issue -- that they might need to look things up or listen -- we also want to be careful about limiting who can speak to an issue because it sets a precedent that people might not want to set. What if, people could only speak to issues with which they had direct personal experience? That might work if we think on a broad level. I, Andrew Nurse, could speak to middle-class, white, straight, anglophone, able bodied, etc., issues but not others. But ... could I really speak to those issues that seem to be consistent with my identity? I am, for instance, a Christian. Can I speak to an issue of a middle-class, white, straight, anglophone, able bodied atheist? Some of my friends who are atheists don't think so. Can I speak to issues of people who are white, straight but in different social classes? Or people who have different family structures?

And, can other people speak to my issues? For instance, can someone who is Black or gay or a woman speak about issues in my life? Said differently, identities are fundamental, important, and political but they are complicated and overlapping. We have some identities at some points in time but not at others. Sometimes, for instance, I am a father; at others, a son. The assumption that person X cannot speak to issue Y assumes (a) that they cannot transcend their lack of experience through communication and (b) that their identity as X stable and encompassing. If, however, we take (b) to its extreme, what we discover is that people can, in fact, speak only about themselves because there is no one else who fully shares your personal and individual identity. I might be white but I don't live in Ontario, have a gay uncle, been unemployed recently, or any myriad of a number of different factors that can and do affect my identity.

(As a digression: this is particularly true and important for historical study. No one, to the best of my knowledge, makes this argument any more, but back in the day there were those who argued that, say, white scholars could not speak to the historical experience of Blacks of Original Peoples or men write about women, etc. You can, I am sure, see the immediate flaw in this argument. It is twofold: (a) one could write history only about one's own group and thus the elite white men who wrote only about elite white men were, in fact, doing nothing wrong by ignoring the rest of humanity since they could not speak about them in the first place and (b) it assumed that experiences -- as the basis of knowledge -- are consistent over time. Thus, a person living in the eighteenth century had a great deal in common -- so this argument necessarily assumed -- with someone of, say, the same colour living in the twentieth or twenty-first century. This is a problematic assumption. People might be marginalized or suffer violence [and my point is not to minimize the violence and repression of the past or the present] but no one living today experienced the Irish potato famine at first hand or the highland clearances, to be just a couple of examples. Thus, if no one has these experiences ... no one can speak to them. This, then, became the irony. An argument -- only X can speak to Y -- when transposed onto the past because an argument that, in effect, said "no one can speak to this history." It became an argument for historical silence and that is clearly not what was wanted.)

Finally, I might not -- do not -- share the experiences of Black Canadians but I might  be able to contribute to resolving the problems that affect Black Canadians and do we want to stop that possible contribution. To be sure, I don't solve the problems in the manner of the movie where the white male protagonist solves the problems for Natives for Blacks or women becoming  a supposed "hero" in the process. But, if we can create multi-vocal dialogues about the problems that affect our society ... then, my view is, we have a better chance of building that multi-vocal society that seems to be the goal of much current protest. Said differently, there is, in my view, a benefit in people talking to each other.

To conclude: I am not arguing that any time an activist raises concerns about voice that they are doing something wrong. I think they are not. I think that those people who are quick to call activists bigots because of their concerns about voice should pause and think about their own perspectives. Have they stopped and listened to what activists or marginalized groups have said? Do they have anything to contribute to equality by speaking or would a different role be better and more useful? Do they simply assume that they have a right to speak to any and all issues and ... when did they start believing that? And, are they speaking honestly and in good faith? Do they really want to contribute to addressing the problem or do they, say, just like being a leader or a speaker?

Marginalized groups have had their voices quieted for too long. It would be a shame if, upon reclaiming them, their speech was challenged by those who would deny their concerns.

Journalism, Defamation and Free Speech

This just came across my twitter feed: Climate Scientist Andrew Weaver Wins $50,000 in Defamation Suit Against National Post, Terence Corcoran 

It is one of two important court decisions that came out today (Friday). The one that has attracted all the attention is the right to die decision by the SOC. Fair enough. This is an important decision. I don't actually have a lot to say about it and so it might be wise if I thought about it before saying anything. I do, however, have something to say about the BC SOC in which Green MLA Andrew Weaver was awarded  damages because of untrue and inaccurate comments published by The National Post. Personally, I am glad Weaver won but not because I support the Green Party (which I do) but because I think it is vitally important to maintain accuracy in journalism and a certain level of decorum. The fact that The National Post has been faulted here is almost unfortunate because its politics are more overt than, say, The Globe. There may be those who will argue that this dampens free speech but I don't think so. Let me quickly explain why.

First, the issue is accuracy. In Canada, it has never been legal -- for journalists or anyone else -- to lie publicly about someone. In this regard, the Court is not breaking new ground but affirming old ground. Truth is its own defense; public untruths by responsible parties are not defensible.

Second, journalists and, one assumes, other public commentators (recently Sun commentator Ezra Levant lost a suit, too, if I am not mistaken) (perhaps including me) have a duty to be accurate when commenting on someone in a way that can create material harm to them. Again, there is nothing new. What the court is saying is the fact that one says something publicly is not a defense of inaccuracy.

Third, many of the comments were not arguments but insults. Preventing insults is, of course, not easy and it might be something that we, rightly I think, view with a certain amount of caution. But, I would argue that public commentators should not look to make their case by calling down others. Said differently, those who write for important periodicals or who comment on TV or the radio, etc., should look to make arguments in reason. Polemics, of course, are not arguments in reason and insulting someone instead of addressing their evidence is not a an argument. In fact, it distracts from reasoned dialogue.

Thus, what this ruling does -- I hope -- is to affirm distinctions that are vitally important to free speech. There is a difference between fact and opinion; public commentators should make arguments about facts; insulting and belittling people in ways that create material harm for them remains out of bounds. No serious journalist, in my view, no serious public commentator, is threatened by these criteria. Only those who can't make arguments in reason or marshal facts will find this ruling a threat to their speech.

Free Speech and Misogyny

I suppose it was only a matter of time until someone trotted out this old -- and in appropriate -- saw: the dentistry students who created the "gentlemen's club" are protected by free speech. The story is here. In fact, I'm surprised that this argument has not been made earlier. A supposed free speech advocate at Saint Mary's has made this case. According to a CBC news story. His argument can be condensed to the following: 

“One of the things that a university should be concerned with is that everyone feels able to say what they want, that there’s candour and openness,” says Mercer. “Only in the context of candour and openness can views be explored fully and criticized fully."

“It doesn’t matter how ugly, how vile it is," Mercer said. "Any rules against speech have the potential of blocking the road of inquiry, of preventing us from being candid and examining what we want to say.”

Rather than simply calling this argument silly, let us take this self-defined advocate of free speech at his work and assess his argument.  There are actually several serious problems with this argument. By the way, before beginning, I would define myself as an advocate of free speech as well. In fact, I take free speech so seriously that I don't like to waste time defending sexism, racism, homophobia, and other such things because they detract from the importance of free speech. Free speech is a noble and important right in society that preserves the rights of citizens to question government and power structures, form alternative governments, and ensure artistic integrity. I've said this before: when free speech is reduced to defending bigotry, we debase its nobility and lessen its importance. Because it is about important things, because it is vital for democracy and the rule of law, we should not use free speech as a shield behind which people doing rotten things should be allowed to hide. If we do, we somehow draw an odd equivalent: that criticizing, say, trajectories of foreign policy is on the same level as suggesting that sex with an underaged babysitter is a good thing. Does any serious person think that? 

What are the problems with this argument? 

Well ... that is the first: let us call it the logic of misplaced equivalencies. In effect, Mercer is saying that there is some sort of merit to sexually rating classmates, joking about knocking female classmates out, or suggesting that lesbians can be fixed by heterosexual sex. The whole idea is odd and rather postmodern, in fact, in the sense that it makes no effort to differentiate what is important from what isn't. Are we happy with that? Do we feel that jokes about having sex with a babysitter is the equivalent of a great work of art? Or, a serious debate about trade or immigration policy? If not -- and, I don't -- let us not pretend that that is the case. Let's not, in other words, draw a false equivalency. We all agree that foreign policy and immigration policy or legal reform are important and require free consideration of the issue at hand. In fact, they stand for themselves. One never has to use a free speech argument to defend interventions about these issues (or, other measures) because we all know that they are important. If the misogyny of these dentistry students were that important, we would recognize it and say "yes, let us have a discussion of these issues."  We don't because ... well ... it is a retrograde step and not one that should be justified by such an argument. 

But, let's go even further. Free speech protects debate about important public issues because there are important issues that need to be considered. The proponents of, say, restrictive visas for Mexicans coming to Canada never argue that their opponents should be silenced; nor do those of us troubled by visa restrictions argument that their proponents should be silenced because they are making an argument. These students were not making an argument about anything. Hence, we need to ask: what would we be protecting if free speech allowed them to elide taking responsibility for their actions? Are they arguing that sex with underaged girls is good? If so ... stand up and make that argument. Are they arguing that it is legitimate to use a gas to knock a woman out to have sex with her? If so, be an adult about it and stand up and make that argument. 

They were not. In fact, these men made every effort -- as I discussed in a previous blog -- to disguise what they were doing. They were not debating admissions policies (where I might disagree with them but which would be a legitimate subject protected by free speech). They were not debating licensing of dentists (again, agree or disagree, room to debate and protected by free speech). They were making no argument whatsoever. Instead, they were engaged in actions that they knew were wrong and tried to disguise them. Said differently, we are dealing with apples and oranges here. There are many arguments with which I disagree (pro-fracking, for instance) on which I will not simply defend the rights of fracking advocates to speak publicly but I will, in fact, encourage them to do so for the sake of public debate. In this case, since there were no matters under debate but instead simple misogyny ... well ... what are we protecting?  

This is an important point because the argument in defence of free speech is intended to protect interchange in the public sphere; that is: arguments. What is there here, however, to be "fully explored?" Nothing. Hence, the argument that it should be protected by free speech is weak. 

Mercer also says that any regulations that prevent expression -- no matter "how vile" --  are wrong. To which I say "really?" If I used free speech to encourage attacks on himself and his family ... this would be vile. And, wrong. Is he prepared to allow that speech? I am not. The line is clear and hte fact I don't need my vileness (in this example) to be fully explored to say "no. This is not a legitimate use of free speech." 

Let's use another example: Does Mercer regulate his class in any way or does he allow students to say whatever they want, whenever they want regardless of its appropriateness or pertinence? If not, if he provides one bit of regulation -- telling a student, for instance, to not interrupt another -- then this argument is not an argument but hypocrisy. One either defends what is vile or one doesn't. One can't say "personal attacks that encourage violence are not allowed because they are vile" but "general attacks that encourage sexims are vile and allowed." Why can't one say this? Because one would be using a sliding scale that allows some things that are vile (misogyny) but not others (say, one student refusing to be quiet during another's presentation and loudly swearing at the presenting student). The issue is a matter of consistency: You either support some restrictions on free speech -- in which case we can have a discussion because as an advocate of free speech I do support some restrictions -- or, one cannot make the argument that some vile things are OK but others are not. Consistency is a hallmark of intellectual integrity ... at least in my book. 

Let's recap. I don't know Mercer. He might be a great guy, award winning teachers, and grade-A scholar. He might also be being misquote in the news story I cited. I am arguing that the arguments attributed to him by CBC do not apply. These students are not protected by free speech because (a) they were not making an argument by recycling misogyny  and fully understood that their actions were wrong (hence, their cover up efforts) (b) free speech is an important right and we should not draw equivalences where there is none, (c) one either defends "vileness" or one does not. If one restricts speech in some instances but not in others (on the grounds of its vileness) then one is inconsistent in the application of one's own doctrines. By the way, and anyone who follows my blog should know this, I reject the idea that free speech can defend attacks on individuals that cause them harm. I also believe that a bit of a regulation -- simply politeness is what I ask of my students -- is a good thing that can, in fact, broaden and organize discussion. In other words, serious inquiry and a full discussion of the issues at hand is helped -- not hurt -- by regulating speech. 

There are other points that need to be made here as well. I'll hit these quickly because they seem to me self evident:

1. Free speech cannot allow people to avoid taking responsibility for their actions. In other words, if you knowingly do something that is wrong, you cannot hide behind a right. You have to accept responsibility for your actions. If one does not believe in responsibility ... well ... that is a matter we will need to discuss. My defense of the rule of law, however, is, I believe, consistent with the idea of responsibility. It appears -- I say "appears" -- because of the actions of the men involved; not because I have spoken to them -- that these men were actually looking to find ways to avoid responsibility. They were dumb (as I've said before) in believing that an internet social media club could ensure privacy ... but should they have to take responsibility for their actions -- in this case the violation of the University's code of conduct? Indeed, I'd argue that responsibility can be complicated but that the rule of law actually requires it. 

2. Dalhousie is not a public institution and as a private institution (or, semi-private; semi-public), it has the right to self-regulate. I don't always agree with the self-regulation of private institutions. I disagree, for instance, with some supposedly Christian universities that impose sexual orientation tests on employees. But, for good or ill, they have the right to self regulate (as I have the right to argue that they should change). Will Kymlicka deals with this matter much better than I do and so I'd refer you to him, particularly his discussion on communities and cultural regulation under multiculturalism. It can get complicated, but the point is that there are different standards. These standards must be legal, they can change, and they should be humane and fair, but a private institution has the right to exercise its authority over me if I go to participate in that private institution (even while I might argue that it should change). For instance, the local Legion can tell me to remove my hat as a sign of respect to war dead and if I don't ... they can remove me. I can argue against that but you see my point. The Legion justly exercises authority over me. Likewise, minor sports associations often have codes of conduct. Players are not allowed to say whatever they want whenever they want. They are bound by rules of sportsmanship which encourage good and fair play. Likewise, fans can be removed from, say, hockey rinks for what they say. And, no one doubts the fairness and appropriateness of this. A fan at a minor hockey game -- say, an Atom or PeeWee game -- encouraging violence against other players will be removed. And ... rightly so. 

Finally, a quick question ... why do the self-appointed defenders of free speech seem to waste so much time defending sexism, racism, homophobia and other such things. Can't they find progressive things -- things that make society more safe, broaden democracy, encourage public participation in politics -- to defend? I will confess I am confused about this.

To sum up: the argument for protection on the basis of free speech fails. It fails because it is being used not to advance argument on important matters of public policy or protect artistic integrity, but because it is being used to protect ... well ... no argument at all. Just misogyny. It fails because it claims a regulatory right over a private (or, semi-private) institution with a defined code of conduct about which these men knew and which they deliberately violated. I might have disagreed with these men but I would have defended their rights under free speech to make this argument "can we have a discussion of the University code of conduct?" But, that was not the argument they made. Instead, they knowingly violated rules to which they voluntarily agreed as a condition of their membership in this scholarly community. I believe that they should have to take responsibility for their actions. The free speech argument is also weak because it fails to consider context and consistency. Instead, it simply asserts absolutes that, if violated, expose one to the charge of hypocrisy. 

Now, I don't know if expulsion is the best option in this case. I honestly don't. But, if we want to have serious discussion of what these men did, let's do that. Let's not, however, have a fake one where we ignore potential hypocrisy (say, even my own), issue absolutist moral injunctions and pretend that anyone who thinks differently is wrong, or pretend that some great point of principle with regard to what these men said is at stake. It ain't. 

Why is Free Speech Important?

So far, I have been arguing that a great deal of current discourse on free speech is misguided. It is misguided because it treats free speech as always absolute (rather than recognizing the contextually necessary and good limits to it) and misguided because it misjudges the importance of free speech to the academy. Free speech is important to the academy, but it is not the only thing that is important and stating that it is does not actually get us very far unless with also acknowledge the importance of other things, like hard work. I have also implied the free speech should not be used as an excuse to disguise or cover over individual responsibility. If I take actions that harm others I should (a) learn from these actions, and (b) address them. Free inquiry, I have argued, is different from free speech without explaining exactly what I mean by this term, but I have implied that people should have to "show their math." In other words, the right to speak is important but speaking on something about which one knows nothing or one is wrong is not good and we should not pretend that it is.

So ... why is free speech important? One could legitimately ask this question and add to it: Andrew, you've taken a lot of space to show limits, misjudgements, errors. And, someone might also say "you know, I can accept much of what you say. Yes, providing a forum for racists is not good and yes, you are right, simply stating that one supports free speech really does not get us very far. But, you're short selling free speech. You are not telling us why it is important." This is a fair critique of this blog to this point so let me address this matter because I later want to argue that free speech confronts a different series of challenges than those identified by its supporters.

Free speech is important for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps ... perhaps most importantly, there is a connection between how we express ourselves and who we are. In other words, our language, social and political views, opinions, ideas, etc., are not something that is somehow different from who we are. They are intimate to us, vital to our sense of who we are, and perhaps even -- to some degree -- constitutive of who we are. When we deny a right to freedom of speech and/or expression we are denying the right of articulating the self. This is not something about which the defenders of free speech talk a great deal but I think it is one of the reasons that so many people view free speech as vitally important. When we tell someone to "be quiet" we are not simply making a statement about their views (whatever those might be). We are making a broader statement about our assessment of their value. They are not worth listening to and they are saying something so bad or silly or dumb that no one else should listen to them either. Don't believe me ... go tell some folks to be quiet when they are making what they think is an important point and watch what happens.

It is precisely for this reason that limits to free speech need to be introduced with care, with appeal procedures, and only on reasonable grounds. Limits to free speech may be reasonable, they may be good, they may be necessary but we need to be very careful that we are not damaging other individuals. This is why I tend to support contextual limits to free speech. Thus, I never suggested (as in the example in my previous blog) that I did not have the right to discuss my summer vacation. I said I did not have the right to discuss my summer vacation instead of the lesson I was supposed to be teaching my students. My summer vacation is important to me and my friends and talking about it is fun and an act of community. It expresses who I am and allows people to share my experiences. I have every right to speak about it. I just need to do so in the right context.

This is also the reason why the protection of artistic or cultural expression is guaranteed in Canada and other countries. I am not an artist but I know how important art, music, poetry, fiction, etc., is to family and friends. Many people, for instance, identify strongly with certain songs. Good. If we censor that song ... we limit their mode of identification, the communities that build around culture, and the human interaction that develops out of it. This does not mean "anything goes in culture" but it does suggest that we should be particularly careful in censoring cultural expression: that there should be a particularly important and pressing reason. For instance, during the Rwanda genocide the US thought about blocking radio signals from RTLM and a radio station that urged the massacre of Tutsi civilians, gave directions as to where they were (so that death squads could find them). They also played songs that praised the killing of Tutsi, recycled racist stereotypes. Censoring this music and this expression, I would argue, would have been legitimate (even though it took place in another country) because there was a pressing and particularly important reason to do.  In other contexts, we might find this music distasteful, and might even suggest that it not be played on the airwaves, but we might talk about it in class. I suspect most people agree with me. Context is important, we should be very careful about censorship, we should provide appeal mechanisms for censored material, and we should make sure that we censor only in pressing and important situations. Other than that, we might find that the price of censorship is too high precisely because it is so bound up with one's sense of self.

This is particularly important when it comes to other matters as well. This includes, for instance, the expression of one's spiritual believes, heritage, values, traditions, and other like manner. Hence, the so-called "Secular Charter" in Quebec was a problem. It did not prohibit criticism of government or policy (see point two below) but it did limit the scope of personal expression to a significant manner. In effect, it made the expression of spirituality illegal (or, rather, would have if it had been implemented) in the public sphere. The result is a direct attack on self-expression and hence on the self and going with this (point four below) an impoverishment of the public sphere.

Second, it is also particularly important to protect citizens ability to criticize government policy. In general, this right can be protected through the Parliamentary privilege of opposition parties, through a free media, and through free speech. Let me use an analogy to illustrate what I mean. Advertisers have to be honest. If they are not, they are engaged in fraud. But, I'd suggest a lower bar for critique of political and governmental leaders. Honesty should -- as I will talk about later -- still prevail but that is self evident and a parenthood-type statement. What is important is that citizens need be free to not simply state their differences with government policy but to constitute through communications alternative policies and governments.

Why? Because government policies impinge directly on life matters and the constituents of a good society. Pollution is dangerous and so ensuring that citizens can criticize, in this example, policies that might produce more is important. Ensuring a responsive government is important and so ensuring that citizens retain the means to hold governments to account between and during elections is important. Political organization is about more than who is in power and who is out. It is about how we organize our society, the values we carry forward, the opportunity for individuals to lead full and meaningful lives. If we limit the ability of citizens to criticize government, we are, de facto, limiting their abilities to define for themselves the constituents of a good life. I am loathe to that. On an individual level, I have no troubles telling someone -- usually a friend -- that they are making a bad decision that has negative implications for their life. I hope I can help them out. But, I don't have the power (nor should I) to force them to do what I want to do. I have only the power of free speech. On a political level, however, the state can impose obligations on citizens. Hence, because of this, a high bar with regard to speech needs to be maintained.

Third .... as I just intimated, free speech can be about my ability to contribute in an effective and -- hopefully -- in a caring way to others' lives. In other words, it is important on both a micro level -- my ability to talk to another person in a way that is designed to improve his or her life -- and on a macro level -- my ability to draw attention to problems that are negatively affected the lives of others. If I (or, someone else, or some group of people) cannot, say, criticize educational policies that might, say, impede education or environmental policies and practices that pollute the environment, then others lives are harmed.

Fourth, limiting free speech impoverishes (as I said above) the public sphere. If we limit how one can express one's self in the public sphere, we limit the range of voice in that sphere. We reduce the spirituality evident in it, the range of views, the culture, the traditions and the heritage. In other words, we make the public sphere bland, but bland in a way that is dangerous as well as culturally limiting. Dangerous: consider again the proposed Secular Charter. In effect, this law if it had been implemented would have had a marginalizing effect. It would have said certain forms of spirituality (secularism) can be legitimately expressed in public but others (say, certain forms of Islam) cannot. The effect, in this sense, is not simply to prescribe certain modes of self expression but to make indicate to the people practices those modes of expression that their self-expression, their spirituality, traditions, heritage, etc., are not welcome. Thus, it creates a hierarchy that has very real human effects. One person (me, for example) is welcome to express themselves in a spiritual sense. Another, is not.

Bland: one does not need to believe in an "everything goes" philosophy to be troubled by a public sphere that limits self expression. Why? Because everyone benefits from diversity. Diversity in Canada is "opt in." The fact that, say, I express myself as a Christian does not mean that anyone else needs to accept what I am saying or my spiritual beliefs. This is, of course, just an example, but you see the point. My expression -- my speech -- does not compel anyone to follow it but it does make it available to those who might want to, or might want to know more about it, or might simply appreciate its aesthetics. If we reduce or eliminate that expressions, I am harmed (point one above) but so are others who cannot now take advantage of what I might be offering them. Because it is opt in, to say this again, the fact that Bob doesn't like what I am saying and ignore me is fine. But if Bob tries to stop me from expressing myself, he limits Mary's opportunity to know more about what I am saying, to engage my traditions, to find a spiritual home for herself (should she desire).

Bland might not be the right word here -- and fix it up for me if it is not -- but I trust the point is made. The vitality of the public sphere is important and add cultural richness and the like and I agree with these points. But, they are also difficult to empirically demonstrate. What we can demonstrate, however, is the effects on others. If one does not know about something ... how can one make up one's mind on it?

This list is not exhaustive. There are many other good reasons to support free speech (one could, for instance, talk about the advances in scholarship as I've already indicated even while noting that scholarship is about much more than free speech) but I again trust that the point is made. What I want us to note, however, is that free speech and expression have important purposes that might be more complex than we first think. They are certainly more complex than the quick soundbites we hear at the time of some controversy about free speech. Their importance is worth thinking about because it can easily be confused. Joseph Heath makes the case somewhere that rights can have a certain nobility about them. That is, that they advance causes that we find noble; that we deeply respect.

The defence of free speech that I have offered here is intended to "get at" that nobility in a way that is both reasoned and serious. Free speech is not a me, me, me, I have this right-type of thing. It is not right that should be defended in the manner of children fighting over toys in the playground. Instead, most of the reasons should defend free speech relate to something more important:

• the ability of people to self-articulate, expressing who they are but recognizing the close connection between our sense of who we are and our culture, values, traditions, spirituality, and self-expression
• the protection of citizens from bad policies (we don't even have to dislike a government to find one or another policy misguided) and the ability to organize alternative forms of governance or alternative governments that more accurately meet the needs of citizens
• our ability to contribute to the meaningfulness of the lives of others and the richness of their lives. 
• the promotion of equality in ways that elide the marginalization of citizens on the basis of their self-expression (in terms of religion, heritage, traditions, etc.). 

When we look at this list, what we see is that free speech is important not as a me, me, me, I want to speak-type of right, but rather as a right that has an important series of social consequences. In other words, the individual right to free speech, at its most noble, is about our connections to other people and our abilities to work together to produce a better world. Free speech at its most nobel is about the other. It is about the self in the sense that it is our expression that enriches and protects others. Moreover, as you will also notice, all of these key important aspects of free speech and expression I have noted are compatible with reasonable limits on it. There is not space in this blog to address this matter in a sustain way but you can see the differences between articulating one's concerns over an educational policy and planning a crime. The one helps others; the other harms. Understanding this might help us understand why most people find limits to free speech not onerous and legitimate and exactly where the barrier between legitimate speech and expression and that which we restrict lies. 

Free Speech ... One More Time Part II (Bastions of Free Speech)

In my last blog entry, I repeated some arguments I have been making for some time about what I see as the reasonable limits on free speech. If they are a tad repetitive, then, I apologize, but I did want to set out what I see as an important consideration with regard to free speech both in itself and because I believe that much of the current discourse simply lacks a connection to reality and so lacks the ability to have a positive effect on Canada.

The key points I was making were that free speech is not the right to say whatever one wants whenever one wants. There can be reasonable limits on it and those reasonable limits to not give a lie to support for it. I can support free speech and also recognize that there are some things that should not fall under its rubric (by virtual of the criminality, danger, violation of contractual obligations). This is, largely but not exclusively, contextual. One is perfectly fine for me to say in one context becomes problematic in another. It is fine for me  to product people by alerting them to a danger. Indeed, I'd view that an an obligation. It is another thing for me to endanger people for my own amusement.

Let me pick up this line of discussion to address what I see as some of the problems with the current crop of free speech advocates. These problems are several:

• Their discussion is not inherently wrong but largely irrelevant because it is so distanced from reality as to be meaningless 
• They fail to recognize the importance of context and treat everything as it it were an absolute
• They are involved in a performative contradiction (their defence of free speech, I will argue, is actually and oddly a rejection of it, for some people)
• They make silly -- not wrong but silly -- claims

I've already commented on the first point and so I won't go over it again. The second point, it seems to me, is largely self-evident and is captured by the "fire in a crowded building" illustration. But, there is an odd ethical point that strikes me as problematic in the discourse of current crop of free speech advocates. I don't want to get their argument wrong and I don't want to insult. Indeed, to do so would be a contradiction on my part and subvert the argument that I am trying to make. If I err, then, please correct me. Everyone stands to benefit from that. 

It seems to me, however, that the ethics of the current crop of free speech activists are about yelling fire in a crowded building. The ethical problem with this might relates to some of the cause celebres in the media over the last few years. Why cannot person X get on stage and insult Muslims or be racist or homophobic? Free speech, I will explain in more detail later, is as Rosa Luxemburg once said, is "freedom for the other." This is a complicated term -- more complicated than it appears -- that deserves a fuller discussion and I'll try to give it that later. Right now, what we need to understand is that Luxemburg is saying this: free speech is not egotistical. It is not about what I (Andrew Nurse) can say but about building a good society for the benefit of others. Much of the discourse of current crop of free speech advocates is egotistical in the sense that it is asks this question "why can't I say whatever I feel like?"

You see the difference? Luxemburg is saying that we need free speech to build a good and free society from which everyone will benefit. I can, and should, be first of all concerned with others and free speech is a mechanism that is good in itself but it is good in itself precisely because it is concerned with other people. It is not about getting more for me, as it were, but promoting conditions of freedom for society. The new advocates, distort this ethic and so tie free speech to a sort of individualized consumerism transposed onto culture. I want to say what I want to say and I want to say it now and ... damn others because simply having me talk is good. I might be making that point to harshly and apologies if I am but I do want to make the point. Where Luxemburg defended others rights to freedom, current free speech advocates don't. It is about what they can say; not whether or not their speech serves the public good. 

To me, this is a problem, but it is not a huge problem. In fact, I might say "fair enough" and move on if it were not for other problems. I just want to note this point because it illustrates the difference between Luxemburg and the classic defenders of free speech and those defending it (or, claiming to) today. There are other more serious problems that we should address.

First, current advocates of free speech quite oddly don't actually defend free speech. Indeed, they often oppose it. Thus, for instance, they are more than willing to defend the right of a racist or homophobe to say racist and homophobic things in the public forma, but criticize those who oppose racism and homophobia. But ... you say, they don't. They all say that they are not racist. 

Good point and true enough. But, again, it is easy to say "I am not racist."  My academic training was in social history and one of the injunctions of social history was, in effect, people vote with their feet. We need to see what people did and not just what they said. If one says one is not racist but defends the ability  of racists to make racist statements ... and then argues that is a good thing ... exactly how not racist is one? 

I'd argue this is a problem. In this case, defending the ability of racists (or, whomever) to make racist (or, whatever) comments is actually facilitating that discourse. It is providing it with a forum and ensuring a safe space from which those comments can be made. In other words, it is not a neutral political position that is simply defending free speech. It is a politically charged activity that facilitates disturbing, dangerous, and anti-humanistic discourses. 

Moreover, there are other options. Rather than simply defending free speech (and ignoring the facts of what this discourse carries with it), there are other options. One could, for instance, argue against racism, rather than simply asserting that one does not agree with it. One could say "OK, so and so just spoke, let me now tell you what was wrong with what they said." In other words, the defence of free speech, in this case, not only facilitating disturbing discourses but ignores other options to counter that discourse (which, make use of free speech) and instead looks to find some neutral political perspective -- some supposedly high moral ground -- that does not exist in the real world. 

But, the current crop of defenders of free speech often go further than this and here is where I think they have serious problems. In addition to facilitating a disturbing discourse and ignoring the options they have to do something good in that context, they actually castigate those who oppose racism. If one unreservedly supports free speech ... why not defend the ability of protestors to state what they want to state. Those who argue that racists (or whomever) should be able to say whatever they want, rarely make this same concession to protestors. But, think about this: why shouldn't they? 

Follow this line of argument. A defender of free speech says "yes, racism is destructive and wrong but I defend their right to say it because free speech is a right that must be defended." They then say something like "and so all you people who are protesting should be quiet and let that racist speak." Hmmm ... you see the contradiction. If free speech is unreservedly good and one should be able to say whatever one wants .... why draw the line at protestors? Why not defend their right to say what they want in whatever forum they want? Why only defend racists and homophobes?  

In this example, the defender of free speech will then say "but these people are trying to stop the racist from speaking and that is wrong because free speech is good." This argument doesn't work because this defender of free speech has already made the case that the propriety of what one is saying is irrelevant to free speech because it is an unreserved good. Thus, he or she, readily concedes that the racist is bad, but they can speak. The protestor is doing something that is also bad but ... they cannot? This is the key ethical problem. It is not that one facilitates dangerous discourses (which, can happen inadvertently to be sure) or fails to stand up the marginalization (which is tough and requires more courage than a lot of us have on a day to day basis), but they use a double standard. People saying negative things either (a) get a free pass or (b) are told to be quiet and let the others speak. The current group of defenders of free speech, in other words, find themselves in a contradictions. Defending the rights of racists but not anti-racists (while giving mouth service to anti-racism0.

The other concern -- my last point above -- is what I called "silliness." Perhaps that is not the right word. Perhaps a better word would be inappropriate, or ill-considered, or lacking evidence. My current pet peeve relates to commentators who say something like "a university should be bastion of free speech." What is wrong with this statement. It seems so self-evidently true that no one could possibly disagree with it unless they are an imbecile. 

The problem is actually multifold:

1. I've already explained that there are reasonable limits on free speech and these limits extend to the academy. Indeed, on of my examples of reasonable limits (teaching) was drawn specifically from my job. But, are we going to allow terrorists to organize on campus? Are we going to allow people to lie about others or falsely advertise because they are on a  campus? Of course not. These laws and these limits apply as much on campus as they do off campus. I can't go on campus and sell snake oil and say "gee, I filched these people but you can't arrest me for fraud because I'm on campus." Indeed, the thought that one could is ... silly.

2. If universities are supposedly "bastions" of free speech ... what about other institutions? Are they not. If universities ... what of public schools? My daughter's high school has a dress code (it is minor but it is there. Clearly a violation of freedom of expression and speech but ... should they not be a bastion and allow anything to go? What about courts of law? Parliament? the media? art galleries? museums? archives? libraries? hospitals? What about ... restaurants? 

Do you think I'm being silly? You see my point, I trust. The idea that universities should be "bastions" of free speech misses the fact that the burden of the university is not any different than many other social institutions. There may be institutions where it is necessary to limit free speech. The military strikes me as a good example, but the "culture of silence" in police forces, on the other hand, seems to have created a great number of problems. 

The word "bastion" in this case is part of a discourse that is attempting to say that the university has a special burden. Perhaps but it misses the point that a whole bunch of other institutions have the same burden and some more so. For instance, I can say things in a court of law or in Parliament (this is called "privilege") that I cannot say in other circumstances. If we were to investigate, we might find that this claim is not silly but it is odd and misplaced and misses the point. 

3. Finally, the idea that universities should be "bastions" of free speech is a confusion of terms. I'd argue that universities should bastion of free inquiry and scholarship. Whether these are the same thing as free speech -- and whether or not they might be more important -- is something that we could investigate. My point for now is that they are different. 

Here is an example: I tell my students who to speak all the time. I am supposed to. I correct their grammar; fix vocabulary; suggest redefined theses. And, as long as one believes in the rules of the English language (and, I concede one might not), this is all fine. By correcting them I am redirecting their speech. I am moving it away from what they said to something else. But, in the process, I am supposedly improving their inquiry and scholarship. I do not limit what they  are investigating, say, in a paper, but I am helping (I hope) to make their language more precise, deepen their analysis, have them consider alternative perspectives. I paper I cannot read because the English is so bad is going to fail and one cannot justify that paper on the grounds of "free  speech" (who are you to fail me for what I said?). 

Scholarship is about evidence. A student who argues that racism is right ... has to prove that. They also, by the way, have to prove that "race" is a fact and not a social construct, but let's leave that complicated point off. If they can't, well ... their grade is again in trouble and free speech does not save it.  Why? It is not that one cannot say X or Y or write X or Y in my courses. It is that the academy is about something more than free speech.

I make this point because I periodically hear people saying "free speech is needed for learning." It might be. But, free speech by itself does not guarantee learning. Simply attending a lecture and listening to a person talk does not make anyone better educated. It helps, but it also might not because, as  I said, so much more is involved. Scholarship, to be clear, is not just about the "free exchange of ideas." It is about rigorous research, commitment, logic, diligence. In short, if learning were just about listening and saying what you thought ... we would not bother to have classes.  Scholarship is about refining ideas, properly presenting those ideas, nuance, sophistication, documentation and evidence.

Take a look at a scholarly journal. I don't care which one: Journal of Canadian Studies, Canadian Historical Review, Studies in Political Economy ... it does not matter. You will notice that the authors have perspectives but you will also notice a lot of source citations. Those source citations are not window dressing or, at least, they should not be. They are supporting evidence. Without them, it does not matter what scholar X or Y said. They might write something with which the editors of, say, the CHR completely agree and that is in sync with what the peer reviewers believe. The piece will still be rejected because it fails the first tests of scholarship: documentation and evidence.

What does this have to do with free speech in the academy? Two things:

1. Those who reduce the academy to free speech as if free speech by itself were the key to learning are just plain wrong. Listening and talking without research, thought, reconsideration, documentation, is little more than an op-ed. There is nothing wrong with op-eds. I read them all the time, but they are not the work of the academy. Its focus lies elsewhere.  In other words, it presents a misguided idea of what my job is all about (including the justifiable limits that are placed on my free speech).

2. It sells students a bill of goods. It does not tell students about the hard work that needs to go into being a good academic. It tells that that simply offering one's opinion is valuable in itself and deserves a stage. It might. But, it might not. No one wants to hear (or, should want to hear) me speak on Chinese history, horticulture, NMR spectroscopy, or a range of other subjects. Even if I can, it would be a waste of your time. Before speaking on these subjects, I'd need to do my homework. I'd need to have something meaningful to say and that comes not from free speech but from doing my homework!