Saguenay III: State, Society, Religion

If the Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 ruling is (as I have tried to argue) important for reasons that have been lost in public commentary and more ambiguous than it might seem, there remains one issue to consider: what do we think of it? It is likely not a surprising ruling, nor one that comes "out of left field." In my view, and however ambiguous it ultimately is, I'd suggest that this ruling is consistent with the general trajectory of individual liberal civil and human rights specified under the Charter. It makes a certain amount of logical sense that (1) non-believers should be accorded the same rights and protections -- the same benefits of the law -- as believers, and (2) that a close relationship between any one particular religious perspective and the state compromises equality and freedom of belief. On this level, I don't think there is any reason to have much concern with this ruling. It does not, on this level, as I've said before, break new ground. More significantly, the important implication of this decision -- that Christians cannot claim that Christianity is heritage and, ergo, not subject to the Charter in the same way as other religions -- is consistent with diversity, multiculturalism, individualism, and the neutrality of the state with regard to different beliefs. Those people who see diversity, individualism, the rule of law, etc., as important elements of a good society, then, don't have much reasons to be concerned about this ruling and some reason to celebrate it (whatever its specific limits might be).

What I have also tried to argue is that this decision is not just a decision, with which one can agree or disagree. It is part of a process through which the relationship between the state, civil society, and the church is being redefined. In this instance, the process of redefinition fell to the courts because key protagonists (the Secularism Movement of Quebec and the Saguenay city government) could not agree on a worthwhile compromise. In effect, they created a yes/no situation in which each side (for their own reasons) asserted that they were right, broached no opposition, and turned to a neutral third party (the courts, as one is want to do is society based on the rule of law) to adjudicate.

Whether or not this is the best way to work out a new relationship is, in my view, a matter of debate, but what we should note is that it is not the only way in which this relationship is being recast. The courts are, of necessity, involved in situations where there are intractable opposing views and, for one reason or another, we have had a few of those lately. The opposition of some Christians, for instance, to same-sex marriage/equality (or, at least the opposition of some people on the grounds of their understanding of Christianity) is another example, whereby activists needed to turn to the courts because, in this case, the route to other paths for change had been blocked (see A Quick Note on the Courts and Change at the end of this blog). But, and this is the important point, this relationship is being recast in many different ways over time. If the courts are being asked to adjudicate on some matters, others are being decided by groups of people working together to build relationships that they find fair, just and mutually respectful. Many people, for example, on a day-to-day level, see a role for the church I attend in the community in which I live. They may or may not like Christianity or organized religion or Baptists. Who knows? But, they hold birthday parties in the gym, play in the men's ball hockey league, go to badminton night, attend concerts, send their kids to youth groups, etc. They may have worries about my church, but they are willing to help us fund raise for cooperatives that look after disadvantaged members of society or take our donations to the food bank.

I say this because there is a temptation to focus on the Supreme Court ruling, the controversy over Christian doctors wanting to refuse service, and the development of explicitly Christian centres of post-secondary learning. These are all institutions where new relationships are being worked out as well. We should pay attention to them because they say something profound about the historical process through which we are moving. And, because, by paying attention to them we can contribute to that historical process. But, the process is broad and we might be involved in it whether we know it or not. It occurs, I think, all around us in a variety of different ways.

Whether we like this particular ruling or not might, then, be beside the point. What we need to understand is that liking it or disliking it is easy. It is, for instance, easy to demonize Christians or cast aspersions on them. For a liberal (based on individualism) society, that misses the point. The question is not "do I like or dislike Christianity" but "how can we assure equal rights protections for all?" I've said before, that I don't think there is a conflict of rights at work in these  types of conflict. The issue is freedom of belief (regardless of one's type of belief) and the degree to which the public sphere is open to different perspectives.

Most of the things in the public sphere in Canada will not change as a result of this ruling. Some towns or cities might modify the rituals that begin their council meetings but few people notice these or remark on them anyway. Far more attention is devoted to singing  the national anthem than to prayer at public events and I find it difficult to belief that public events that incorporate prayer (say, Remembrance Day and, for Christians, Christmas and Easter) will change significantly. My point here is that one should not over-react. Christianity has not been driven from public view. It has been "downgraded" to a position of equality at some town council meetings.

This said, I find the idea that religion should be confined the private sphere both odd and anathema to the concept of diversity I support. For what it is worth, here is my perspective. Before you line up too quickly behind this idea (that religion should be kept purely in the private domain) -- because it does sound appealing and have the beauty of simplicity -- remember that this is what the so-called "secular charter" in Quebec was about. There were odd things going on with that idea, to be sure, and it hardly represented the nuanced and sophisticated views of the vast majority of Quebecers, but understand that the idea of a secular (no religion) public sphere can and will be used to reinforce the marginalization of those who are not Christians. In fact, I suspect (for reasons I've explained elsewhere) that Christians would do rather well by private sphere secularism. The calendar already follows (more or less) Christian holidays; private institutions respect Christian rights and maintain prayer as part of their ritual, minor sports associations accommodate Christian worship times, there is a network of churches and well-to-do benefactors, a host of magazines, TV networks, radio shows, music, novels, and the like. Heck, if Christians want to vacation, all they have to do is go across the border to the US to find Christian theme parks. If the public sphere is stripped of religion, it will likely be Muslims and Sikhs who suffer for it. The effort, in this regard, to control Christianity's relationship with the state might end up with ironic results. It could become a tool mobilized against ethnic and religious minorities and I doubt that that is what the proponents of secularism want.

This might be a bit too simplistic but the idea that equality means no religion in the public sphere is actually not equality. It favours a particular perspective. This is not a religious perspective but the absence of religious perspective. In effect, it makes the public sphere atheist. Whether we like this or not is beside the point. The point is -- as the SCC said -- to not favour a particular defined perspective. Would not a completely secular public sphere be, in fact, a form of favouritism, maintained, as it were, by law? (I am honestly not sure. The question is not rhetorical. Feel free to comment.)

What is the alternative? The alternative, I think, is a public space that becomes more vibrant by embracing diversity. It eschews singular and too simplistic views (religion over there; other things over here) in favour of diversity and dialogue between different perspectives. There are practical steps that could be taken to promote this kind of public sphere. Consider, for instance, the Saguenay issue of prayer before city council meetings. One city about which I read addressed this issue by inviting people to reflect in silence (as opposed to telling them what to pray). Hence, a ritual was modified and diverse views were accommodated.  If asked, I'd favour that approach because it accords the choice to the individual (in a way that forced prayer or forced no prayer) does not.

As Canadians rebuild the relationship between state, civil society, and religion, we will need to think about issues on a fundamental level. Simple answers will lead us in the wrong direction, almost certainly. We will need to respect individual rights, of course, but also understand that doing so might lead us to respect the rights of people with which we disagree. It might lead us to embrace diversity, rather than trying to avoid it. It might lead us to see diversity as a sign of vibrancy and not a problem for heritage, tradition, or rights. Who knows? What I do know is that this process is likely not at an end and so, if you want, you still have time to contribute to it.  You should, it will affect your life.


PS: A Quick Note on the Courts and Change

We periodically heard people say, particularly during the debates about same-sex marriage and equality for gay and lesbian Canadians that gay and lesbian Canadians were doing something wrong by pursuing their agenda, as it were, through the courts. They could not get what they wanted through Parliament, so this story ran, and so used the courts. The implication, here, is that using the courts is (a) illegitimate and (b) a sneaky way to subvert democracy.

I've argued before that this is not the case and I see no reason to change my mind. In a society -- like Canada -- whose central philosophy is supposedly the rule of law, pursuing matters through the courts is normal, natural, and legitimate. It is what you are supposed to do so that the rule of force or the rule of individuals does not prevail. It is a right of citizenship. Moreover, the courts are not a "soft touch"-- as implied by this discourse -- where one can get things denied by the more reasoned, democratic, Parliament. In fact, it is clear that Parliament -- and not the  courts -- was in this case thwarting the will of democracy. The majority of Canadians believed that equality rights should be extended to all Canadians regardless of sexual orientation. A significant well-organized and vocal minority did not and this minority succeeded in convincing federal governments that it would become their political suicide to take them on. So, they didn't. Those who opposed equality for gay and lesbian Canadians continued, in fact, to say "this should be addressed by Parliament", I suspect precisely because they reasoned that a politically scared Parliament would be loathe to address this issue regardless of what the majority of Canadians felt.

But, even if this were not the case, there is nothing wrong with taking matters to court when one has a disagreement with others or the law or the state. It is what mature societies do when confronted with conflicts that admit no compromise. When each side "digs in," we take matters to court as opposed to, say, fighting over them or manipulating government. The courts have become so common in Canada that we forget that other places do not operate this way. There is nothing wrong with going to court, as well, because Charter cases are about rights and rights are, by definition, not subject to democratic sanction. If they were, they would not be rights, would they?

Rights are a complicated issue but, generally, Canadians agree that some things are too important to be left to the will of the majority or Parliament. Some important things must be protected. Why? (1) To protect democracy. Rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and like matters, are necessary for a democratic order (however much that order may or may not be respected). The equation here is actually pretty straight forward: societies that lack free speech, equality, rule of law, are not democratic because they are subject to arbitrary authority. Some people are favoured over others for no good reason; alternatives to policy cannot be discussed; the state can jail you without cause, etc. (2) Because they are important to the self-fashioning of individuals (expression, belief, for instance). Here, what we decide is that some things are so important to individuals that the majority should not be able to coerce alternative behaviours or beliefs. Your spirituality, for instance, is your business and vitally important to you, so important, in fact, that I should not be allowed to mess with it. Courts, for good or ill, protect rights.

This is not a long discussion but you can, I am sure, see the point: the idea that using the courts is somehow bad form is misplaced. It is consistent with democracy and the rule of law and our conception of rights and protection from arbitrary authority. In taking matters to court, one is doing nothing wrong but instead, playing by the rules of the game as they have been set out by others.

Saguenay II: Or, why details are important

The recent ruling regarding prayer before city council meetings (news of which you can find here) is important,  I tried to argue in my last blog, but not because it actually does anything to further advance the idea of freedom of conscience or belief. These ideas are already well advanced in Canadian culture, largely uncontroversial, and subject to only periodic infringement. I'm not trying to minimize this ruling because I do think it is important but consumerism (as I suggested a number of blogs ago) along with a more clear sighted understanding of the problems of prejudice killed off the close relationship between state-church-and civil society in Canada a while ago. This ruling is, in this sense, *not* a victory for freedom of conscience because that victory has already been won, celebrated, and implemented over and over again. Let us be clear: there are some annoying Christians "out there" and I started to write a series of blogs, in part, to try to understand them. Some of the folks at TWU and the so-called Christian doctors and dentists who want the right to deny care are examples. But, they are few and far between. They have some influence on the federal Conservative Party but not as much as people would think and no influence on the NDP, Liberals, or Greens. To celebrate this ruling, then, as something akin to a first recognition of freedom of conscience is, then, to be historically ignorant. Sorry, I sounded harsh there. It comes not from being a Christian but from being an historian.

Instead, I argued, this ruling is important for two reasons (1) it more expressly recognizes the absence of religion as a right that should be protected under the constitution. I would argue that this right was already protected but it is good to have this clarified. And, more significantly (2) it closed off one of the legal/discursive defences used to try to maintain the privileged position of Christianity in the public sphere: heritage. What was being protected, so this argument ran, in maintaining prayer was not Christianity but history. The court (I ultimately think rightly) said "no". And, I explained what I thought were the problematic elements of this argument in my last blog.

There are other reasons, however, to see this "victory" as more limited than it might at first appear, at least for the proponents of secularism. These reasons are partly legal and technical but they are important to overall balance that the court is trying to find in Canada with regard to religion. This balance is important, in turn, because the court is made up of smart people who recognize that Canada is a complex society. The white and black of news stories or Phil 101 (do you support freedom of religion?) debate does not apply as easily to actually existing societies with all their nuances and complexities. Indeed, asserting simple straight forward points of principle, rights, etc., can quickly become ideological (as opposed to legal, constitutional, or useful). What we need to understand when we look at this decision (referenced as: Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015) is that the SCC is trying very hard to both uphold a right it views as fundamental (freedom of conscience) and recognize the complexity of the society and culture in which we live. What I would like to do in this blog entry is to look at some of these complexities precisely because they are important.

First, some of the commentators (particularly those in the CBC new story I cited) were quick to attribute to this ruling a national significance because, they said, decisions of the SCC bind lower courts and interpret law for the nation. This is true: SCC rulings do establish precedent and Canadian judges are far more loathe to violate precedent than American courts (who will issue oddly contradictory rulings depending on legal philosophy ... something which serves to politicize American jurisprudence far more than its Canadian counterpart). This is not really the time or place to discuss differences in Canadian and American jurisprudence (although I think that is a worthwhile endeavour). Instead, what we should note is that Canadian judges are far more conservative in their application of the law than American judges ... most of the time ... and that Canadian judicial review operates by a different set of principles (which, naturally, make more sense to Canadians).

All this is true but it is the very character and nature of judgement that is important and which limits this ruling. This ruling was not a Charter case but rather based on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. The federal Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is broadly similar in the rights it protects, but the case did not come forward on Canadian Charter but the Quebec Charter. The degree to which we can easily assume, then, that this ruling applies to all of Canada is not clear. I personally find it difficult to see a ruling coming from a different province going a different way but, at this point, it is, in effect, a case of Schrödinger's cat. We simply don't know how the SCC would rule on, say, a Canadian (federal) Charter case or a case emerging out of another provincial human rights act. At the least, we should not assume the broader applicability of this ruling.

Second, the ruling does not ban prayer per se. What it bans is religious practices that are exclusivist and made into, at it were, the price of admission. Said differently, the local state (in the form of a municipal government) cannot force participation in a religious ritual on citizens who wish to participate in local government. Why? Because the right of citizens to participate in government (heck, let's make up a fancy name for this ... let's call it "democracy") is a right. It is not contingent on a religious means test. A state orchestrated religious ceremony (however brief) could alienate citizens, marginalize others, or create a circumstance in which citizens opt out of participating rather than violate the religious ritual. This is, this ruling says, not acceptable.

This is important because this is something different from "banning" prayer, which is how a number of new reports phrased the implication of the decision. Prayer is not banned. In fact, I have a right to prayer. The same document that protects might right to be free from coerced religion protects my right to practice my religion. I just cannot force someone else to participate. There has been some discussion already of the implications of this judgement. Could town councils, for instance, begin with a few moments of reflection, say, conducted in silence, that allow people to reflect on whatever they want to reflect on. I'd argue yes. That is not outlawed or impeded by this ruling. Again, what this ruling prevents is the town council (or, city council, or mayor, etc.) saying "and now everyone we will pray in this way."

Third, this ruling does not affect -- so far as I can tell -- acts of devotion conducted as part of membership in voluntary organizations or by private institutions. Thus, for instance, the Legion, the Lion's Club, the University, can preserve prayer as part of its ritual. The University at which I work -- Mount Allison -- does have a brief prayer as part of its commencement and convocation ceremonies. There is, as far as I can tell, nothing in this ruling that makes that prayer off limits.

The importance of this matter requires that I spell out the logic here in a bit more detail. The ruling does not mean that Mount A can and should use prayer or that Mount A's use of prayer is consistent with the Charter. It might be; it might not be. We would need a ruling on that to determine that case. Mount Allison is a private institution but it takes money from the state and falls, I would therefore argue, into an odd para-public grey area between the state and civil society. The fact that it does take money from the state (on an on-going operating cost basis > again this wording is important, I told you there was a fair amount of technical stuff in this blog entry), it is bound by the Charter. This is why universities like Crandall do not take operating grants from the state: so they can  avoid the Charter. Mount A's prayer might, then, violate the federal Charter of Rights and Freedoms or some NB human rights statue. I don't know. But, and this is my point, this ruling does not require Mount Allison to change its ceremonies and rituals. In and of itself, Mount Allison is not affected.  Mount Allison could, of course, change its rituals itself but a further court case would be needed to force it to change.

The big point I want to make here is that we should be careful about what we see as the scope of this ruling. It is, I think, right that we hold the state (including the municipal state) to a higher level  than we hold private or semi-private or para-public institutions. Why? Because the state is for everyone. Even para-public institutions are not. There is, to be sure, a public benefit to things like post-secondary education; hence the reason that there is public support for it. But, Mount Allison is not a branch of the state even if it is connected to it in ways that commit it to upholding certain principles and which bind it to respecting certain rights. Thus, its prayers are not affected by this ruling (regardless of what we happen to think of prayer).

Fourth, as news stories have noted, it is not clear that this ruling applies to legislatures at the provincial and federal level. Parliament is, in other words, another kettle of fish. There have been moves to do away, for instance, with prayer in the federal Parliament and I suspect that those will continue. But, it appears right now, at least, that the federal Parliament and likely provincial legislatures as well are not affected by this ruling. It addresses, in other words, municipal governments.  Exactly why this should be the case is not entirely clear to me but I think it relates to the fact that municipalities have no independent constitutional status. They are creatures of law (in this case provincial law) and this makes them different from federal and provincial legislatures who have autonomous constitutional standing. This does not mean that they are not bound by the constitution. Indeed, that is the point of having a constitutions (or, one of them) but it does parliaments, in the British tradition do have a measure of privilege and sovereignty. Courts are reticent to intrude on this sovereignty without what they feel is a clear and pressing reason and, in the Canadian case, even then.

We periodically here that the courts have thrown out law X or Y. I've said before that that is rarely the case. I don't have space to get into a discussion of judicial review in Canada but I urge you to look it up before you make a comment on it. It is usually misreported. Instead, of simply throwing laws out, the courts usually "fire warning shots" and try to limit "collateral damage." For instance, the judicial "activism" on same-sex marriage was pretty slow moving activism. The courts warned the state at least twice that its laws violated the constitution and each time gave time for the feds to fix up the problem (with the feds by and large ignoring it but that is a story for another day). In this case, a ruling that affected the federal government would have to (a) be based on something other than a provincial statute (however important that statute), (b) deal with a matter of law under federal jurisdiction, (c) be related to the federal Charter. In addition, the court would likely not issue a ruling that says "no, you cannot do X." Instead, it would likely say "practice X contravenes provision Y of the Charter. The government has Z amount of time to remedy this situation by making a chance in the law." IOW, Canadian courts have been remarkably reticent to tell legislatures what to do.  This case, from what I can tell, was not sufficiently grave to to warrant intrusion of legislative practice. Hence, the practices of legislatures can be changed by legislatures (they could always do that), and they might be, but they are not compelled to do so (or, at least so it seems) by this ruling.

Finally, this ruling deals only with prayer. It does not address what in Quebec -- but not really elsewhere -- has been the thorny issue of symbols. This was not a matter of consideration in the lower court decisions -- even though it was brought  forward by the complainant -- and so the higher court did not deal with it. This is exactly how judicial review works. The higher courts deal with issues that come up through the lower courts; they don't create new issues (however legitimate those issues might be). Hence, the issue of Christian public symbols -- say, crucifixes in public places -- still awaits judicial adjudication ... if that ever happens. I suspect that the courts were, in fact, happy to not have to rule on the question of symbols because they are central to important public events (Remembrance Day) and long and broadly recognized public holidays (Christmas and Easter). The history of those holidays is, again, important but not something that can be addressed here. Obviously, they are the product of a time when there was a close connection between state, church and civil society. And, just as obviously, this relationship and these holidays are changing. But, the truth is that without the at least some of the symbolism of Christianity, we don't have a very good reason for Christmas and Easter as public holidays. In fact, to change the symbolism would be to ... well ... ditch the holiday. After all, you're not going to give kids four days off school for, say, "Chocolate Egg Day." Instead, something more approximating Valentines Day (a few minutes in class to give our cards) would be more appropriate. I don't want to sound like an idiot but telling someone not to put a cross out at Easter is ... well ... denying what Easter is all about. It would be the equivalent of not showing a maple leaf on Canada Day. It would make no sense.

OK, so ... where does this leave us? It leaves us with an important but limited judicial decision. The courts -- I think ultimately rightly -- defended freedom of belief and the idea that the state cannot unduly discriminate against any particular religious view, including those who do not believe. Exactly what this means is something that Canada will need to work out. The courts -- rightly -- do not give us a ready made solution but instead say "the way you have done things -- forcing everyone down a single path -- is not right. Find another way." Equally importantly, we should note what this ruling does not do. It is not clear that it is a broad and expansive precedent. The ruling is based on a Quebec provincial constitutional statute and not the federal Charter. It deals with municipal governments (and, potentially, only municipal governments in Quebec, although its implications are broader). Federal and provincial legislatures and para-public institutions that can make some claim to being private institutions are not affected. This ruling deals with prayer and not other symbols.

This is, in other words, a far more ambiguous ruling that it first appears. The courts are, with this ruling, addressing issues that are emerging from a new historic context: the context of post-Christianity. In so doing they are being cautious and taking tentative steps ... suggesting which practices are not acceptable but providing limited guidelines on what might actually be done because, they reason, that is not there job. They are their to interpret law; not make it. Put together, then, this ruling is more complicated than it first seems.  And, that might be appropriate.

Saguenay, or Freedom of Religion and Belief

I've not had the chance to review the recent Supreme Court decision regarding prayer before city council meetings, but you can find a copy of it here. Like most legal decisions, I'd suspect that the devil, as it were, is in the details. Reporting on it has been generally vague, but you can find more news coverage: here, here, and here. Some of the coverage (all of which basically says the same thing and little of which reviews the details of the decision), makes this decision out to be significant. I am not at all sure. It is significant and vitally important for some people. For instance, those who see organized religion as a serious problem and a pressing threat to their freedoms will be, I think, very happy with this ruling. Conversely, those looking to find some way to maintain Christianity's historically privileged position in Canadian society will view this decision with chagrin. I ultimately suspect this ruling may not be  quite as significant as people think it is, or that its importance is largely symbolic, but I'm going to hedge my bet. I'm going to argue that this ruling is both remarkably important and not really that important at all. I want to discuss it because I think it fits well with the general narrative I have been trying to work out in this series of blogs about what I'm calling a "post-Christian Canada," or the evolving relationship between Christianity and the Canadian state and civil society.  The burden of this blog is to explain these perspectives by setting them in the context of this historical transition.

Why is this ruling not that significant? Significant might not be the right word. Obviously, the SCC thought this issue was legally and constitutionally important, or they would not have heard the appeal. And, to the individual who brought the original case forward and the Quebec Secularism Society, this ruling can be construed as nothing short of a victory. The message is pretty clear: local governments cannot force citizens or elected representatives to participate in a prayer that relates specifically to one religious perspective or another before a meeting. Doing so, discriminates against those who do not hold to that religious view or who hold no religious views at all. In short, forcing prayer on government or people creates an entrance requirement, as it were, the burden of which falls unevenly across the population. As a result, town and city councils cannot include specific opening (or, one assumes, closing) prayers as part of their agenda. This ruling, as one of the stories I've noted above suggests, is not simply about religion but about "freedom from" religion; that is: it is not the state's business to sustain or support or maintain one religion to the exclusion of others.  More pointedly and more exactly: the state must respect the rights of those who do not subscribe to any religion and a failure to do so is *not* constitutionally acceptable. According to news stories, a number of other municipalities are examining their open ceremonies, as it were, as are at least two provinces.

There is something more in this ruling as well. The City of Saguenay, or their mayor, tried to use a particular defence in order to preserver prayer before its council meetings. The defence went something like this: even if there is some manner of discrimination in reciting a specific and evidently Christian prayer, while making evidently Christian symbols (the cross) does seem to favour one religious perspective over others, this is OK because Christianity is part of Canada's history and heritage. Thus, even if there might be problems with regard to freedom of conscience, specific rituals that reflect religious practices can be maintained if they are part of national, religion, ethnic, or linguistic heritage.

This is an interesting argument that deserves a fuller treatment than it has so far been accorded. It is interesting in that it smack of the same stuff that the so-called "secular charter" (ironically) was made of. Those supporting the secular charter in Quebec suggested that Christianity would be exempt from its requirements because (a) Christian symbols can be worn rather ... what small-ly --  and not in a disruptive way and hence are not the overt threat to secular values as is, say, veiling for some Islamic women, and (b) at least some Christian symbols are exempt from the secular charter because they are part of heritage. Their importance, in other words, is not religious but historical. This being the case, they do not pose -- in themselves -- a threat to freedom of conscience or belief because they are about our fidelity to the past; not to a specific spirituality.

There might be something to this argument. I'd need to think about for a long time or someone reading this could explain it to me in the comments sections. But, it has always struck me as so much semantics. Why? Two reasons: (1) symbols never convey a singular meaning. One cannot read a cross *just* as a symbol of the past. It is always already a symbol of Christianity and to deny that reading is engage in a shockingly simplistic level of analysis. (2) It is reading the symbol (in this case a cross) from a specific perspective. Exactly what we might call this perspective can be a matter of debate. I'd say it is read from a semi-Christian moderately secularish-type of perspective. From the perspective of a person who may or may not attend church but who does self-identify as a Christian even if that self-identification is complicated by other things and honoured in the breach. The precise details of what I am saying are beside the point because the real point is this: it does not read the cross as a symbol of heritage from a non-Christian perspective. From a non-Christian perspective (even those perspectives that respect diversity, etc.), the cross is a Christian symbols that marks space in a specific way. The defence of religion as heritage, in this sense, tried to avoid reading the cross (or, other Christian symbols such as prayer) from non-Christian perspectives in order to assert their validity as heritage but not religion. This type of reading is both partial and antithetical to a diverse society.

And, this gets us, I think, to the real importance of this ruling. In effect, it says "no, you cannot use this type of logic to smuggle Christianity in through the back door." And, you have to read symbols from the perspectives of people other than those in whose name the symbol speaks. This ruling was about prayer and not about the cross (and, this is so for interesting legal reasons). But, the point is the same. Said differently, the courts have closed off one line of argumentation that some people had used to try to maintain the symbolic privileged presence of Christianity in the Canadian public sphere.

Should we be glad about this? That is a question I will leave off for another day because there are still other important issues that we should address. If this is the historic importance of this ruling, we should also be clear about what this ruling does not do. I'll likely take the time to go over some picky legal details at another time (because those picky legal details are important). Let me focus on the big issues. First, and most importantly, this ruling does not actually bring with it any significant changes in practice other than for a few towns and cities. It is part of a transition -- part of an historic process -- and not the cause of the process in itself. It attracts attention (and, rightly so) because it is a SCC ruling, but it does not either advance or detract from the right to practice one's religion or lack thereof. I suspect, in fact, that few people will notice the difference. I honestly don't know whether or not Sackville, NB (the town in which I live) opens its meetings with a prayer. Private institutions (clubs, churches, the range of social services supported by churches, universities) can maintain whatever rituals they want to maintain. That will be an internal debate. Schools in NB at least don't have prayer; few business that I know do; nor are families affected in their daily devotionals (or, lack thereof). Important public rituals -- say, Remembrance Day -- will, I am certain -- remain unaffected as well.

Said differently, this ruling makes an important statement but it is a statement that will have a limited affect on most people's lived experiences. Why? Because religious freedom is already so widespread and, by-and-large uncontested, in Canadian society. I suspect that most of those people listening to the town prayer in Saguenay were ignoring it anyway (it was, after all, what, only 20 or 30 seconds long?).  I can, for instance, and I suspect you can too, go about my entire day and not really notice anything religious. Leaving aside the things I do myself, my workplace observes no religious rites, we have no special ceremonies before meals or meetings, no one comes in my door to get me to prayer, there are no dietary restrictions, no symbolic hand washing, nothing. I know we use a Christian calendar but how many people really worry about that or even know about it?

I noticed that I often end blogs by saying "there is more to say on this subject" and this ruling is not an exception. In the interests of length, however, I'll end here and pen a bit more another day. Let me summarize, this ruling is important and not. It does very, very little (as far as I can tell) in changing the overall balance between church, state, and civil society in contemporary Canada. But, it does cut off one line of in the defence of Christianity: the Christianity as heritage argument. It will change the practice of open council meetings at some towns and cities in Canada but I suspect few will notice those changes and they might, as I'll intimate later, be less "out there" than we might think.