Bromance? Canada-US Relations in the Post-Trump Age

I suspect Don Martin is right: Canada-US relations will be plagued with problems for years go come. Canadians should have no illusions about Biden and his commitment to addressing American domestic concerns. I also suspect he is right a second time. Better Biden than Trump. You can find his argument here. There is a great deal about which to be skeptical following the first Biden/Trudeau summit but also a great deal about which to be happy. While there are voices (see previous posts) that have tried to cast Biden as somehow anti-Canadian because of his opposition to Keystone XL, we need to recognize that those voices are intensely politicized and don't really reflect a solid and serious basis upon which Canadian/American relations can go forward.  I think this first meeting was a good start and, if I were Trudeau, I'd be reticent to start arguing about Keystone XL not because I was abandoning Alberta, but for a host of other reasons that I've already tried to explain. 

What are the positive signs? What are the potential bumps in the road and how are they to be addressed? And, what are the implications of this meeting for Alberta? 

The may be a long list of positive signs but some of the key ones I noticed from news coverage are as follows: 

• Canada and the US seem to have agreed upon a loose framework to work together on a range of matters.
• The US government is clearly signalling the importance with which it views Can/Am relations and its desire to be a good "friend" of Canada.
• There are issues on which Canada and the US need to work together, if for no other reasons than our shared geography.
• The US is flagging places where it believes Canada can be helpful. For instance, the Biden administration's desire to return to some sort of positive international role for the US guided, at least in part, by a re-engagement with multilateral institutions.  Here, the Biden administration is looking for Canada's support to help it re-establish itself on the international stage. 
• Twitter diplomacy seems to be at an end. Twitter diplomacy is not just about social media. It is actually a calculated political strategy that works on a number of fronts. In some measure, it worked through threat and uncertainty and looked to inculcate a measure of anxiety over potential consequences in order to push its agenda forward. In my view, Twitter diplomacy took the Canadian state aback because it was unexpected. 
• Keystone XL to one side, reading between the lines, the current Biden administration is not going to "give away the farm" but it appears willing to make compromises and it sees compromises as a natural part of a positive international relationship. 

What are the bumps in the road? From what I can see, there are a number but I also think we (as Canadians) need to have a good perspective on them.  I'll highlight a few key issues and then qualify them. 

First, this summit will not solve all problems. The loose framework upon which the leaders agreed is simply that: a framework. This needs to be remembered. Canada and the US are in the process of re-establishing a higher level of civility to their relations at the executive level. This in itself is a positive accomplishment but it does not mean that problems, conflicts, disagreements, and policy differences go away. In fact, it would be naive to believe that that could be the case. (Mark my words, someone -- an opposition politician, a journalist, a public commentator, etc. -- will in the near future note some sort of problem with Can/Am relations and declare that this means that the framework is a failure as if international relations were that simple.) Canada and the US have always have disagreements and always will. That is the character and nature of being different countries with different identities and different (albeit often shared) problems and different populations and histories. The issue is not that there are problems. The issue is how they are addressed. Recognizing that a single summit will not solve all problems -- including ones that we don't know about because they have not yet occurred -- will be, on the part of Canadians, their own good first step. 

What do we do about the problems, then? Here, Canadians might take a page from history or at least be familiar with some of the key works on the history of Canadian/American relations. I'd recommend the late Greg Donaghy's fascinating book Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968. History is not an inherent guide to the future, but Tolerant Allies reminds us that this is not the first tumultuous period through which Canadian/American relations have passed.  The period of Donaghy's study involves a particularly potentially disruptive time as both Canada and the US were moving through a significant number of deeply divisive internal conflicts. Moreover, the countries were moving in different directions.  There were conflicts over matters of trade (particularly in durable consumer goods), investment and "financial relations," military matters, and foreign policy, among other things. Finding ways through these differences required on-going and intense diplomacy.  Said differently, the issue is not does this one summit solve problems. The issue is this: does it establish the basis for a more regularized civil diplomacy that can address problems in the future? Donaghy's work shows how effective that regularized diplomacy can be in addressing issues and establishing a new and better framework for relations. 

Second, the problems in front of us are significant. I'll address Keystone and energy policy separately, but we should have no illusions that Canada and the US (along with other countries) have a series of serious issues that need to be addressed. These include Covid-19 economic recovery, re-opening the international border in as safe a way as possible, and addressing climate change and its implications. In my view, the scope and character of these problems likely will need to be addressed on an international level. What is more, there are serious and important humanitarian and equality considerations that need to be born in mind. The US, Canada, and other western nations need to consider exactly how they can effectively work with poorer countries to promote Covid safety, economic recovery and mitigate climate change in ways that don't offload this problem onto those people least able to afford it. Said differently, the price of Covid safety in Canada cannot be health uncertainty in poorer countries, a matter that is already the subject of controversy in Canada. Put in other words, the key problems that emerge out of our current context are difficult to address not necessarily because Canada and the US will disagree on them but because of their size, scope, and international ethical and democratic implications. My own view is that Canada and the US have a better chance of effectively addressing these problems working together than they did under the previous administration because any solution must necessarily involve the US. This is not to exonerate Canada or say Canada is not important. It is simply to recognize that inequalities (in power, capacity, economics, etc.) between Canada and the US. 

It might even be possible to add in some other nagging issues. Could Canada and the US use optimism generated by this first summit (the "bromance" as Martin called it) to address other issues. I'd put Arctic drilling and the Northwest Passage on my list of problems that could be effectively addressed through good will and good, creative diplomacy. Human trafficking is another. 

The third potential problem is that the regeneration of Canadian/American relations will take place in a particular and politicized context. What is that context? It involves a number of considerations: Canada's minority government, Canada's deep federal/provincial divisions, Biden's tenuous support in the American Senate and fragile support in the House of Representatives, and deep political divisions in the US. Each of these issues can be subject for discussion but I'll conclude by consider the ways in which Canada/US relations effect regionalism in Canada as a potential issue and more specifically, the importance of Keystone XL to the current government of Alberta. 

It is easy to say that the Prime Minister has to address "the national good" in the conduct of international relations. Indeed, there is a whole school of thought that argues precisely that. In this regard, one could, then, say, "look, we know that there can be negative implications for Alberta in the refashioning of Canada/US relations but that is the way it is because it is the fed's job to look after the national interest and not specific regional interests. The US is not interested in Keystone XL so we are not going to bring it up." 

I think this approach would be wrong but I also don't think that making Keystone XL the test of Canada/US relations serves any good either. I'd urge Canada to avoid public diplomacy and I'd urge Canada and Canadians to respect decisions made by the US government. For a range of reasons, Keystone XL is not a hill on which Canada should want Canadian/American relations to die. I am sure, behind the scenes, significant diplomacy is going on. I am sure the government of Canada is trying to find out what could be done not to resuscitate the Keystone (because that is likely not possible) but what are the alternatives to it. After all Keystone is only one way in which energy could be moved from Canada to the US. 

But, I don't think the Canadian government should leave the matter there. I think removing Keystone as a problem in Canadian/American relations is complex but one way to do it might be to develop economic alternatives for Alberta. To be sure, I believe Alberta will benefit from addressing Canadian/American common agenda issues (say, border transit and Covid). And, I am not convinced Albertans (any more than other Canadians) are opposed to addressing the problems of climate change. What I think is that we have a particularly committed provincial government that has (for one reason or another) linked its own fate and sense of the province to the oil industry.  What we need to do is provide alternatives to that sense of identity and link. We need a go-forward strategy that must begin from the assumption that a resumption of Keystone is unlikely but that should not be reason to do nothing. I am not sold on the idea that the current Premier of Alberta would accept this. In fact, I expect the exact opposite and I expect that to come out in opposition to Biden and demands that the federal government alter its approach to Canada/US relations. I'm also not sold, however, on the idea that this is what the people of Alberta want. I think provided with alternatives, they would take them and that, in itself, would be good for Canada/American relations. 

Keystone Redux: Biden, Environmentalism, and Energy Policy

Why did Biden cancel US commitments to Keystone XL? In Canada, Jason Kenney tried to brand this as an attack on Canada that deserved the a swift and extreme response. It wasn't an attack on Canada and, as I will explain, even if there were a swift and extreme response, the chances that the decision can be overturned are slim. Why? There are a large number of reasons and these reasons are worth considering as we think about the character and nature of the Canadian response. Here are what I see as some of the key factors that weighed on Biden's mind before he took office. 

• Biden is committed to establishing better American environmental policies. There is a scientific consensus on the problems of carbon-based energy for the environment, particularly but not exclusively with regard to climate change. 
• I don't think we should see this as a shallow commitment, but if we did -- even if you argued that Biden's commitment to the environment is cynical politics -- you'd still have to ask why his made this decision. The answer is that his voters at best lukewarm to Keystone XL and at most in opposition to it. Said differently, a different government if it were behaving cynically, might talk the talk but ignore Keystone. Biden can't because his supporters won't. They want him to take action and so he will take it. 
• Taking action is made easier because the US is awash in energy. Back in the 1980s, when Canada and the US were negotiating free trade, a key goal of the American negotiators was to secure access to Canadian energy. There could be all sorts of reasons for this but the key reason is that the American government was concerned about the state of American energy reserves and with the "oil shock" and the Iranian revolution still fresh on American minds, making sure that the US had easy access to Canadian energy was particularly important. Hence, the proportionality clause which, in effect, forces Canada to sell oil to the US. How different things now are. A series of changes means that the US has less need of Canadian energy than at any time since, say, the 1980s. The factors include:  
• Green energy will continue to develop as a viable alternative to carbon energy.
• The US reversed policy under Trump and brought back older forms of carbon-based energy production (coal) that are in competition with oil.
• Other countries have pushed production of oil to new levels. Increased political stability in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Libya will likely see continued advances in production. Despite cut production cut backs by some countries in order to try to maintain higher energy prices, there will likely continue to be increases in energy supply.
• The US has increased its own supply thanks to widespread fracking in Montana, the Dakotas, and Oklahoma. 
• There are some short term measure that can be included as well. Covid-19 has depressed all sorts of travel lessening the demand for oil and thus lowering prices and need. 
• A wild card is the American commitment to cleaner energy. I don't know how significant this factor is, although I suspect it much more significant among Democrats who voted for Biden than Republicans. If American are taking steps to use less energy as part of their personal commitment to the environment, that will have an effect as well. 
• I suspect American oil companies are not sad to have less competition from Canadian oil. While the oil (bitumen) moved through Keystone may never have been for American domestic consumption (which raises another issue), why would American energy producers elect to negatively effect their own bottom lines by encouraging the US government to facilitate the shipment of Canadian oil to the US? Does it not make more sense that they would, at the least, say nothing and at most actually encourage Keystone's cancelation? 
• There are shockingly limited spinoff effects in the US for Keystone. The jobs that were to be created by it were largely in construction. Once the pipeline is up and running, the number of permanent jobs it creates in the US is limited. There is, thus, no groundswell of "Keystone will get us jobs" in the US because ... people know it is not true. 
• There are other issues that the Biden administration also wants to address that are tied up with Keystone, not the least of which is relate to the Standing Rock protests and the opposition of American Indigenous peoples to the pipeline. Going forward with Keystone would have forced the Biden government into on-going confrontations with Indigenous peoples and their allies and likely ended costing millions of dollars in legal fees as battles waged in the courts. 

When one puts this all together and what is evident is that Keystone was dead anyway.  It was only the Trump administration's ideological commitment that kept it alive. Canadian oil is also expensive, compared to its alternatives. The Canadian oil patch had begun to experience series problems several years ago that date back to the time of the previous NDP government in Alberta and stand at the root of Alberta's pipeline conflicts with BC and Canadian First Nations. What is interesting, of course, is that Kenney's response to the concerns in BC were basically similar to what he is suggesting now.  BC, the UPC and even members of the NDP argued, should be forced to let Alberta transport oil over its territory. Now what we have is the Premier of Alberta saying that Canada should find a way to force the US to accept Canadian oil that it does not want, does not need, creates internal conflicts in the US, and stands in the way of other domestic policy initiatives. What would we, as Canadians, think if the US adopted this approach to Canada? 

This is the point where I say "I get it" and ... I do. I understand and sympathize with people wanting jobs and good jobs. The problem with the approach taken by Kenney is that it can't provide precisely the thing he is promising. The carbon economy is past its best before date. That does not mean that there will not be energy production and that Canadians won't drill for oil. What it means is that we need to think about what the next stage for the Alberta economy is and begin to work on that. Biden's rejection of Keystone XL was not an attack on Canada. It was a policy decision overdetermined by a broad range of factors and it is unlikely that that broad range of factors will change in even the medium term. Rather than trying to find a way to revive a dead project and a flagging economic sector, we need to find ways to promote alternative economies. 

Pluralism, Caution and Canadian-American Relations

Have you noticed that those leaders who are the least cautious (say, Jason Kenney) are the ones who actually never have to deal with international relations? It is easy, in other words, be extremist when you never have to live with the implications of your own suggestions. Kenney's demand for trade sanctions against the US is a case in point. By any stretch, suggesting trade sanctions -- in effect, suggesting that Canada begin a trade war with the US -- on the first day of a new administration is an extreme suggestion. Kenney can suggest an extreme response because he does not have to implement that response or live with it. He doesn't have to worry about fallout or the effects of, say, supply chain disruption during a pandemic. He can hand that ball off the federal government while urging them to do his bidding. 

There is something about extreme responses that grab public attention. The media love them. "The Premier of Alberta is urging ...X" what do you say Mr. Prime Minister? It the kind of controversial sound bite on which modern journalism thrives because they believe it somehow attracts viewers or listeners. It also fits well with a certain type of conservatism that sees "tough" responses as the way to get what one wants in international relations.   The difference between success and failure in IR, the point seems to be, is the PM's toughness and determination. 

Is it? Is, in this case, starting a trade war with the US on the first day of a new administration a good approach to Canadian American relations? Does it allow help Canada advance its agenda? I will argue "no." Canada's position in international affairs is determined by a range of criteria (its geography, economics, alliances, etc.) but the toughness or determination of the PM or the willingness to resort to extreme measures as a first step, "go to" move is not one of them. In fact, I'll argue that the discourse which presents extreme options as a first step is more for domestic political consumption than a reasoned assessment of an effective foreign policy. 

Canadian Foreign Policy

There are a number of considerations to bear in mind and an assumption I am making as part of this discussion. The assumption is this: the aim of foreign policy is to accomplish things. This can, should, and does include a range of things. Economic issues often grab the headlines but there are other objectives that range from education to scientific to environmental policy to the arts and athletics, the military, and much more. It includes things like border transport, cross-border production and media. The assumption I am making is that a key aim of Canadian foreign policy is to advance Canada's agenda.  (To be clear about my own perspective: I hope this is not the only goal. I hope that considerations of international fairness, equity in health and welfare, shared global concerns like ecological change, among others also weigh into the development of Canadian foreign policy.)

What are these goals? We can get back to them later, but one of them, at least, will be economic. Let's use this as an example because it is the issue Kenney is, in large measure, raising and the way he has chosen to frame the controversy over Keystone XL. In terms of economics, Canada's objectives are to maintain access to the American market for its (Canada's) products, expand that market, maintain border transit and cross-border production, share productivity improvements, protect Canadian intellectual property, ensure that a market for Canadian cultural products exists, maintain border security, and likely a range of other things. Said differently, our aim is to improve the Canadian economy. Taking actions that negatively affect the Canadian economy would be something to avoid. 

The other key thing to note about Canadian foreign policy -- a thing that affects it -- is that Canada is what used to be called a "middle power." People still use this term. To be honest, I'd need to look up the precise definition so let's just use it as a general place holder right now. What I mean is that Canada is a fully sovereign state (it has internationally recognized legal autonomy over its own affairs and relations with other countries) but it is not a great power. It is not one of the leading international powers in the globe. Nor, however, is Canada insignificant. Canada has -- or, can have -- characteristics that make its voice important on the international stage. A full list would take too long but Canada has advanced scientific capacity, a well trained and effective military, a high standard of living, a basically sound economy, a willingness to play a positive role in refugee re-settlement, few international enemies, a reputation for playing a positive and thoughtful role on the world stage, among other things. All of these things have, in my view, suffered in recent years and this suffering has occurred under a range of different PMs. I also don't want to look at Canada with rose coloured glasses and so I am not saying Canada (domestically and internationally) is not without serious problems. 

Because Canada is a middle power, a certain amount of caution is always in order in international relations. That is what it means to be a middle power and this is something that the key diplomats of Canadian history understood. Canadian foreign policy works most effectively when it involves discussion, the international rule of law, diplomacy, pluralism, and multilateralism precisely because Canada does not have the international scope and power to stomp its feet and get its way. Very few countries, in fact, do. China, for instance, spends its time using economic leverage as opposed to raw power and it would be considered a "great power." Likewise, for all that the previous US administration talked the talk of power, that talk did not accomplish a great deal. In fact, one could argue that US international authority has not been this weak since the interwar era. Before we jump to the conclusion that extreme measure are the way to go, we need to look at their success rate. Is there any reason to believe that they will be successful? If there is not, then implementing them is something that really does need a second thought. 

Extreme Measures and Foreign Policy

The point I am trying to make is not that extreme (or, more extreme) measures might not be needed. It is that it should not be the "go to" move and that its success rate might be far less than one imagines. It gambles a lot and it makes that gamble on an unequal playing field. In terms of Canadian/American relations, Canada plays on an unequal field. US power -- economically, culturally, scientifically, etc. -- is simply greater than Canada's and by a wide margin. Again, I am not saying that Canada is insignificant. But I am saying that the US is a great power with a broad and deep economic capacity that Canada lacks.  Economically, the US is Canada's most important market by far. It is not even close. Canada's trade with the US is greater than Canada's trade with the rest of the world combined, twice over.  Canada is an important US trading partner but no longer the most important and the importance of the Canadian market to the US economy is in the low single digits. What this means is that if Canada tries to go toe-to-toe with the US, we have a serious uphill battle. To use a military metaphor, we will run out of bullets before the US does and long before. The US might like to have the Canadian market. I am sure it does. It doesn't need it. Canada's need of the US market and US trade is ... well ... a need. 

I mention this to ask a different question: does Jason Kenney think the US is in the business of letting other countries take either (a) free shots at it without retaliation or (b) in the business of indicating to the world that it will quickly back down if confronted with middle power trade sanctions. If you were running the US (regardless of which party you might represent), would you be interested in establishing either precedent? Even if we leave aside the problematic contention that Canada's trade sanctions against the US would be powerful enough to force a reversal of policy, would the US be interested in letting the world know that it will ditch its policies and principles that easily? And, if not, what will be the response? 

We might get -- and have, in the past, gotten -- to the place where trade sanctions are needed but, to the best of my knowledge, Canada has imposed sanctions in the US only in a set number of circumstances:

• Canadian sanctions have been proportional. That is, they have not tried to escalate trade disputes but indicate to the US government that we will not be pushed around. That is, they were not intended to "win" the dispute but to establish the idea that discussion is the way to resolve the dispute. 
• They have been in response to US sanctions on Canada. The sanctions Canada imposed on the US under the Trump administration were not a first strike. They were a response to what Canada contended were illegal American sanctions. 
• They were not intended to affect American domestic policy but to address Canada/US trade issues. 
• They were part of an overall strategy designed to advance Canada's trade agenda with the US.

To be clear, what Kenney is suggesting is the exact opposite. He is suggesting that Canada undertake trade sanctions against the US without any idea of proportionality. How can you calculated supposedly lost future revenue from Keystone XL? Who would even make this calculation? How would it be assessed by independent dispute settlement mechanisms? I don't think any of these points were considered. Moreover, the sanctions Kenney suggests applying would be a first strike. There is no comparable sanction against Canada. They would be aimed at influencing American domestic policy. And, they would be taken without regard to the other foreign policy tools Canada will use to try to address Keystone XL. Before anyone too easily says "I still think we need to try to do something" (a point I will address below) imagine that the situation were reversed? Imagine, for instance, that the US used sanctions to try to get Canadians to change a matter of Canadian domestic policy. How would Canadians feel about that? 

Canada will try to reverse the US decision on Keystone XL. I will leave it up to others to determine what they think about that. We will use a range of policy tools that include direct communications with the US leadership, lobbying, finding allies in the US to carry the argument forward. Canadian interaction with the US is not limited to trade sanctions.  These are all strategies Canada has used before. They don't tend to bring instant results but over time they have, I would argue, succeeded in creating generally win-win situations. Before jumping to an extreme measure, I'd argue that we should at least try strategies that have been proven successful in the past. If we wanted, then, to introduce sanctions as some part of that strategy, I'd suggest that we find out whether or not those sanctions would be legal under Canada's current trade agreement with the US and I'd urge people to consider the precedent we are establishing. After all, what is good for the goose .... And, while I don't expect the Biden administration to try to use sanctions to coerce changes in Canadian domestic policy, are we really so confident that a less friendly government might not jump on the opening we would have given them in the future? After all, that is what we would be saying: sanctions are a legitimate way for other. countries to force Canada to change its domestic policy. 

What About Alberta

There is, I am arguing, good reason to be cautious in Canada's response to the Biden administration's decision with regard to Keystone XL. I am trying to argue that those views hold regardless of one's political perspective if one is interested in having a foreign policy that advances Canada's interests. Kenney's argument is that regional equity in Canada demands that Canada act because it would have if US decisions affected Ontario or Quebec or Atlantic Canada.  I don't know the issue to which Kenney was referring with regard to Atlantic Canada and so I'll leave off consideration of that. The issues to which he referred with regard to Ontario and Quebec were completely different. There, the federal government acted proportionally as part of an overall strategy against US (and others) decisions with regard to trade, the legality of which (on the US side) was questionable.  To repeat: the federal government did not use sanctions as a first strike weapon to alter a decision made by a US administration on a matter that falls within the sphere of American domestic policy. 

However, the fact that the situation is different does not mean that the federal government should ignore Alberta. It should not. Not ignoring Alberta, however, does not mean transforming trade policy into a shill for big oil. It means finding ways to help Alberta transition away from the carbon economy. We will continue drill for oil. That is going to happen, but the idea that the economy of Alberta should be based on oil to the detriment of other options is far from clear to me. Oil is affected by a broad range of other factors. The US took the decision with regard to Keystone XL not just for environmental reasons. Environmental considerations are, in my view, a legitimate consideration for state policy. But, in this case, a range of other factors (including alternative energy supplies) weighed into the consideration. What this means is that even if the Keystone decision were reversed, the days of massive carbon energy exports to the US are ending. The federal government cannot and morally should not abandon Alberta. The best way to do this however -- to *not* abandon Alberta -- does not lie in sanctions in what will be a losing effort to force the US to buy Canadian oil against its wishes.