Pluralism, Caution and Canadian-American Relations

Have you noticed that those leaders who are the least cautious (say, Jason Kenney) are the ones who actually never have to deal with international relations? It is easy, in other words, be extremist when you never have to live with the implications of your own suggestions. Kenney's demand for trade sanctions against the US is a case in point. By any stretch, suggesting trade sanctions -- in effect, suggesting that Canada begin a trade war with the US -- on the first day of a new administration is an extreme suggestion. Kenney can suggest an extreme response because he does not have to implement that response or live with it. He doesn't have to worry about fallout or the effects of, say, supply chain disruption during a pandemic. He can hand that ball off the federal government while urging them to do his bidding. 

There is something about extreme responses that grab public attention. The media love them. "The Premier of Alberta is urging ...X" what do you say Mr. Prime Minister? It the kind of controversial sound bite on which modern journalism thrives because they believe it somehow attracts viewers or listeners. It also fits well with a certain type of conservatism that sees "tough" responses as the way to get what one wants in international relations.   The difference between success and failure in IR, the point seems to be, is the PM's toughness and determination. 

Is it? Is, in this case, starting a trade war with the US on the first day of a new administration a good approach to Canadian American relations? Does it allow help Canada advance its agenda? I will argue "no." Canada's position in international affairs is determined by a range of criteria (its geography, economics, alliances, etc.) but the toughness or determination of the PM or the willingness to resort to extreme measures as a first step, "go to" move is not one of them. In fact, I'll argue that the discourse which presents extreme options as a first step is more for domestic political consumption than a reasoned assessment of an effective foreign policy. 

Canadian Foreign Policy

There are a number of considerations to bear in mind and an assumption I am making as part of this discussion. The assumption is this: the aim of foreign policy is to accomplish things. This can, should, and does include a range of things. Economic issues often grab the headlines but there are other objectives that range from education to scientific to environmental policy to the arts and athletics, the military, and much more. It includes things like border transport, cross-border production and media. The assumption I am making is that a key aim of Canadian foreign policy is to advance Canada's agenda.  (To be clear about my own perspective: I hope this is not the only goal. I hope that considerations of international fairness, equity in health and welfare, shared global concerns like ecological change, among others also weigh into the development of Canadian foreign policy.)

What are these goals? We can get back to them later, but one of them, at least, will be economic. Let's use this as an example because it is the issue Kenney is, in large measure, raising and the way he has chosen to frame the controversy over Keystone XL. In terms of economics, Canada's objectives are to maintain access to the American market for its (Canada's) products, expand that market, maintain border transit and cross-border production, share productivity improvements, protect Canadian intellectual property, ensure that a market for Canadian cultural products exists, maintain border security, and likely a range of other things. Said differently, our aim is to improve the Canadian economy. Taking actions that negatively affect the Canadian economy would be something to avoid. 

The other key thing to note about Canadian foreign policy -- a thing that affects it -- is that Canada is what used to be called a "middle power." People still use this term. To be honest, I'd need to look up the precise definition so let's just use it as a general place holder right now. What I mean is that Canada is a fully sovereign state (it has internationally recognized legal autonomy over its own affairs and relations with other countries) but it is not a great power. It is not one of the leading international powers in the globe. Nor, however, is Canada insignificant. Canada has -- or, can have -- characteristics that make its voice important on the international stage. A full list would take too long but Canada has advanced scientific capacity, a well trained and effective military, a high standard of living, a basically sound economy, a willingness to play a positive role in refugee re-settlement, few international enemies, a reputation for playing a positive and thoughtful role on the world stage, among other things. All of these things have, in my view, suffered in recent years and this suffering has occurred under a range of different PMs. I also don't want to look at Canada with rose coloured glasses and so I am not saying Canada (domestically and internationally) is not without serious problems. 

Because Canada is a middle power, a certain amount of caution is always in order in international relations. That is what it means to be a middle power and this is something that the key diplomats of Canadian history understood. Canadian foreign policy works most effectively when it involves discussion, the international rule of law, diplomacy, pluralism, and multilateralism precisely because Canada does not have the international scope and power to stomp its feet and get its way. Very few countries, in fact, do. China, for instance, spends its time using economic leverage as opposed to raw power and it would be considered a "great power." Likewise, for all that the previous US administration talked the talk of power, that talk did not accomplish a great deal. In fact, one could argue that US international authority has not been this weak since the interwar era. Before we jump to the conclusion that extreme measure are the way to go, we need to look at their success rate. Is there any reason to believe that they will be successful? If there is not, then implementing them is something that really does need a second thought. 

Extreme Measures and Foreign Policy

The point I am trying to make is not that extreme (or, more extreme) measures might not be needed. It is that it should not be the "go to" move and that its success rate might be far less than one imagines. It gambles a lot and it makes that gamble on an unequal playing field. In terms of Canadian/American relations, Canada plays on an unequal field. US power -- economically, culturally, scientifically, etc. -- is simply greater than Canada's and by a wide margin. Again, I am not saying that Canada is insignificant. But I am saying that the US is a great power with a broad and deep economic capacity that Canada lacks.  Economically, the US is Canada's most important market by far. It is not even close. Canada's trade with the US is greater than Canada's trade with the rest of the world combined, twice over.  Canada is an important US trading partner but no longer the most important and the importance of the Canadian market to the US economy is in the low single digits. What this means is that if Canada tries to go toe-to-toe with the US, we have a serious uphill battle. To use a military metaphor, we will run out of bullets before the US does and long before. The US might like to have the Canadian market. I am sure it does. It doesn't need it. Canada's need of the US market and US trade is ... well ... a need. 

I mention this to ask a different question: does Jason Kenney think the US is in the business of letting other countries take either (a) free shots at it without retaliation or (b) in the business of indicating to the world that it will quickly back down if confronted with middle power trade sanctions. If you were running the US (regardless of which party you might represent), would you be interested in establishing either precedent? Even if we leave aside the problematic contention that Canada's trade sanctions against the US would be powerful enough to force a reversal of policy, would the US be interested in letting the world know that it will ditch its policies and principles that easily? And, if not, what will be the response? 

We might get -- and have, in the past, gotten -- to the place where trade sanctions are needed but, to the best of my knowledge, Canada has imposed sanctions in the US only in a set number of circumstances:

• Canadian sanctions have been proportional. That is, they have not tried to escalate trade disputes but indicate to the US government that we will not be pushed around. That is, they were not intended to "win" the dispute but to establish the idea that discussion is the way to resolve the dispute. 
• They have been in response to US sanctions on Canada. The sanctions Canada imposed on the US under the Trump administration were not a first strike. They were a response to what Canada contended were illegal American sanctions. 
• They were not intended to affect American domestic policy but to address Canada/US trade issues. 
• They were part of an overall strategy designed to advance Canada's trade agenda with the US.

To be clear, what Kenney is suggesting is the exact opposite. He is suggesting that Canada undertake trade sanctions against the US without any idea of proportionality. How can you calculated supposedly lost future revenue from Keystone XL? Who would even make this calculation? How would it be assessed by independent dispute settlement mechanisms? I don't think any of these points were considered. Moreover, the sanctions Kenney suggests applying would be a first strike. There is no comparable sanction against Canada. They would be aimed at influencing American domestic policy. And, they would be taken without regard to the other foreign policy tools Canada will use to try to address Keystone XL. Before anyone too easily says "I still think we need to try to do something" (a point I will address below) imagine that the situation were reversed? Imagine, for instance, that the US used sanctions to try to get Canadians to change a matter of Canadian domestic policy. How would Canadians feel about that? 

Canada will try to reverse the US decision on Keystone XL. I will leave it up to others to determine what they think about that. We will use a range of policy tools that include direct communications with the US leadership, lobbying, finding allies in the US to carry the argument forward. Canadian interaction with the US is not limited to trade sanctions.  These are all strategies Canada has used before. They don't tend to bring instant results but over time they have, I would argue, succeeded in creating generally win-win situations. Before jumping to an extreme measure, I'd argue that we should at least try strategies that have been proven successful in the past. If we wanted, then, to introduce sanctions as some part of that strategy, I'd suggest that we find out whether or not those sanctions would be legal under Canada's current trade agreement with the US and I'd urge people to consider the precedent we are establishing. After all, what is good for the goose .... And, while I don't expect the Biden administration to try to use sanctions to coerce changes in Canadian domestic policy, are we really so confident that a less friendly government might not jump on the opening we would have given them in the future? After all, that is what we would be saying: sanctions are a legitimate way for other. countries to force Canada to change its domestic policy. 

What About Alberta

There is, I am arguing, good reason to be cautious in Canada's response to the Biden administration's decision with regard to Keystone XL. I am trying to argue that those views hold regardless of one's political perspective if one is interested in having a foreign policy that advances Canada's interests. Kenney's argument is that regional equity in Canada demands that Canada act because it would have if US decisions affected Ontario or Quebec or Atlantic Canada.  I don't know the issue to which Kenney was referring with regard to Atlantic Canada and so I'll leave off consideration of that. The issues to which he referred with regard to Ontario and Quebec were completely different. There, the federal government acted proportionally as part of an overall strategy against US (and others) decisions with regard to trade, the legality of which (on the US side) was questionable.  To repeat: the federal government did not use sanctions as a first strike weapon to alter a decision made by a US administration on a matter that falls within the sphere of American domestic policy. 

However, the fact that the situation is different does not mean that the federal government should ignore Alberta. It should not. Not ignoring Alberta, however, does not mean transforming trade policy into a shill for big oil. It means finding ways to help Alberta transition away from the carbon economy. We will continue drill for oil. That is going to happen, but the idea that the economy of Alberta should be based on oil to the detriment of other options is far from clear to me. Oil is affected by a broad range of other factors. The US took the decision with regard to Keystone XL not just for environmental reasons. Environmental considerations are, in my view, a legitimate consideration for state policy. But, in this case, a range of other factors (including alternative energy supplies) weighed into the consideration. What this means is that even if the Keystone decision were reversed, the days of massive carbon energy exports to the US are ending. The federal government cannot and morally should not abandon Alberta. The best way to do this however -- to *not* abandon Alberta -- does not lie in sanctions in what will be a losing effort to force the US to buy Canadian oil against its wishes.