Saguenay II: Or, why details are important

The recent ruling regarding prayer before city council meetings (news of which you can find here) is important,  I tried to argue in my last blog, but not because it actually does anything to further advance the idea of freedom of conscience or belief. These ideas are already well advanced in Canadian culture, largely uncontroversial, and subject to only periodic infringement. I'm not trying to minimize this ruling because I do think it is important but consumerism (as I suggested a number of blogs ago) along with a more clear sighted understanding of the problems of prejudice killed off the close relationship between state-church-and civil society in Canada a while ago. This ruling is, in this sense, *not* a victory for freedom of conscience because that victory has already been won, celebrated, and implemented over and over again. Let us be clear: there are some annoying Christians "out there" and I started to write a series of blogs, in part, to try to understand them. Some of the folks at TWU and the so-called Christian doctors and dentists who want the right to deny care are examples. But, they are few and far between. They have some influence on the federal Conservative Party but not as much as people would think and no influence on the NDP, Liberals, or Greens. To celebrate this ruling, then, as something akin to a first recognition of freedom of conscience is, then, to be historically ignorant. Sorry, I sounded harsh there. It comes not from being a Christian but from being an historian.

Instead, I argued, this ruling is important for two reasons (1) it more expressly recognizes the absence of religion as a right that should be protected under the constitution. I would argue that this right was already protected but it is good to have this clarified. And, more significantly (2) it closed off one of the legal/discursive defences used to try to maintain the privileged position of Christianity in the public sphere: heritage. What was being protected, so this argument ran, in maintaining prayer was not Christianity but history. The court (I ultimately think rightly) said "no". And, I explained what I thought were the problematic elements of this argument in my last blog.

There are other reasons, however, to see this "victory" as more limited than it might at first appear, at least for the proponents of secularism. These reasons are partly legal and technical but they are important to overall balance that the court is trying to find in Canada with regard to religion. This balance is important, in turn, because the court is made up of smart people who recognize that Canada is a complex society. The white and black of news stories or Phil 101 (do you support freedom of religion?) debate does not apply as easily to actually existing societies with all their nuances and complexities. Indeed, asserting simple straight forward points of principle, rights, etc., can quickly become ideological (as opposed to legal, constitutional, or useful). What we need to understand when we look at this decision (referenced as: Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015) is that the SCC is trying very hard to both uphold a right it views as fundamental (freedom of conscience) and recognize the complexity of the society and culture in which we live. What I would like to do in this blog entry is to look at some of these complexities precisely because they are important.

First, some of the commentators (particularly those in the CBC new story I cited) were quick to attribute to this ruling a national significance because, they said, decisions of the SCC bind lower courts and interpret law for the nation. This is true: SCC rulings do establish precedent and Canadian judges are far more loathe to violate precedent than American courts (who will issue oddly contradictory rulings depending on legal philosophy ... something which serves to politicize American jurisprudence far more than its Canadian counterpart). This is not really the time or place to discuss differences in Canadian and American jurisprudence (although I think that is a worthwhile endeavour). Instead, what we should note is that Canadian judges are far more conservative in their application of the law than American judges ... most of the time ... and that Canadian judicial review operates by a different set of principles (which, naturally, make more sense to Canadians).

All this is true but it is the very character and nature of judgement that is important and which limits this ruling. This ruling was not a Charter case but rather based on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. The federal Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is broadly similar in the rights it protects, but the case did not come forward on Canadian Charter but the Quebec Charter. The degree to which we can easily assume, then, that this ruling applies to all of Canada is not clear. I personally find it difficult to see a ruling coming from a different province going a different way but, at this point, it is, in effect, a case of Schrödinger's cat. We simply don't know how the SCC would rule on, say, a Canadian (federal) Charter case or a case emerging out of another provincial human rights act. At the least, we should not assume the broader applicability of this ruling.

Second, the ruling does not ban prayer per se. What it bans is religious practices that are exclusivist and made into, at it were, the price of admission. Said differently, the local state (in the form of a municipal government) cannot force participation in a religious ritual on citizens who wish to participate in local government. Why? Because the right of citizens to participate in government (heck, let's make up a fancy name for this ... let's call it "democracy") is a right. It is not contingent on a religious means test. A state orchestrated religious ceremony (however brief) could alienate citizens, marginalize others, or create a circumstance in which citizens opt out of participating rather than violate the religious ritual. This is, this ruling says, not acceptable.

This is important because this is something different from "banning" prayer, which is how a number of new reports phrased the implication of the decision. Prayer is not banned. In fact, I have a right to prayer. The same document that protects might right to be free from coerced religion protects my right to practice my religion. I just cannot force someone else to participate. There has been some discussion already of the implications of this judgement. Could town councils, for instance, begin with a few moments of reflection, say, conducted in silence, that allow people to reflect on whatever they want to reflect on. I'd argue yes. That is not outlawed or impeded by this ruling. Again, what this ruling prevents is the town council (or, city council, or mayor, etc.) saying "and now everyone we will pray in this way."

Third, this ruling does not affect -- so far as I can tell -- acts of devotion conducted as part of membership in voluntary organizations or by private institutions. Thus, for instance, the Legion, the Lion's Club, the University, can preserve prayer as part of its ritual. The University at which I work -- Mount Allison -- does have a brief prayer as part of its commencement and convocation ceremonies. There is, as far as I can tell, nothing in this ruling that makes that prayer off limits.

The importance of this matter requires that I spell out the logic here in a bit more detail. The ruling does not mean that Mount A can and should use prayer or that Mount A's use of prayer is consistent with the Charter. It might be; it might not be. We would need a ruling on that to determine that case. Mount Allison is a private institution but it takes money from the state and falls, I would therefore argue, into an odd para-public grey area between the state and civil society. The fact that it does take money from the state (on an on-going operating cost basis > again this wording is important, I told you there was a fair amount of technical stuff in this blog entry), it is bound by the Charter. This is why universities like Crandall do not take operating grants from the state: so they can  avoid the Charter. Mount A's prayer might, then, violate the federal Charter of Rights and Freedoms or some NB human rights statue. I don't know. But, and this is my point, this ruling does not require Mount Allison to change its ceremonies and rituals. In and of itself, Mount Allison is not affected.  Mount Allison could, of course, change its rituals itself but a further court case would be needed to force it to change.

The big point I want to make here is that we should be careful about what we see as the scope of this ruling. It is, I think, right that we hold the state (including the municipal state) to a higher level  than we hold private or semi-private or para-public institutions. Why? Because the state is for everyone. Even para-public institutions are not. There is, to be sure, a public benefit to things like post-secondary education; hence the reason that there is public support for it. But, Mount Allison is not a branch of the state even if it is connected to it in ways that commit it to upholding certain principles and which bind it to respecting certain rights. Thus, its prayers are not affected by this ruling (regardless of what we happen to think of prayer).

Fourth, as news stories have noted, it is not clear that this ruling applies to legislatures at the provincial and federal level. Parliament is, in other words, another kettle of fish. There have been moves to do away, for instance, with prayer in the federal Parliament and I suspect that those will continue. But, it appears right now, at least, that the federal Parliament and likely provincial legislatures as well are not affected by this ruling. It addresses, in other words, municipal governments.  Exactly why this should be the case is not entirely clear to me but I think it relates to the fact that municipalities have no independent constitutional status. They are creatures of law (in this case provincial law) and this makes them different from federal and provincial legislatures who have autonomous constitutional standing. This does not mean that they are not bound by the constitution. Indeed, that is the point of having a constitutions (or, one of them) but it does parliaments, in the British tradition do have a measure of privilege and sovereignty. Courts are reticent to intrude on this sovereignty without what they feel is a clear and pressing reason and, in the Canadian case, even then.

We periodically here that the courts have thrown out law X or Y. I've said before that that is rarely the case. I don't have space to get into a discussion of judicial review in Canada but I urge you to look it up before you make a comment on it. It is usually misreported. Instead, of simply throwing laws out, the courts usually "fire warning shots" and try to limit "collateral damage." For instance, the judicial "activism" on same-sex marriage was pretty slow moving activism. The courts warned the state at least twice that its laws violated the constitution and each time gave time for the feds to fix up the problem (with the feds by and large ignoring it but that is a story for another day). In this case, a ruling that affected the federal government would have to (a) be based on something other than a provincial statute (however important that statute), (b) deal with a matter of law under federal jurisdiction, (c) be related to the federal Charter. In addition, the court would likely not issue a ruling that says "no, you cannot do X." Instead, it would likely say "practice X contravenes provision Y of the Charter. The government has Z amount of time to remedy this situation by making a chance in the law." IOW, Canadian courts have been remarkably reticent to tell legislatures what to do.  This case, from what I can tell, was not sufficiently grave to to warrant intrusion of legislative practice. Hence, the practices of legislatures can be changed by legislatures (they could always do that), and they might be, but they are not compelled to do so (or, at least so it seems) by this ruling.

Finally, this ruling deals only with prayer. It does not address what in Quebec -- but not really elsewhere -- has been the thorny issue of symbols. This was not a matter of consideration in the lower court decisions -- even though it was brought  forward by the complainant -- and so the higher court did not deal with it. This is exactly how judicial review works. The higher courts deal with issues that come up through the lower courts; they don't create new issues (however legitimate those issues might be). Hence, the issue of Christian public symbols -- say, crucifixes in public places -- still awaits judicial adjudication ... if that ever happens. I suspect that the courts were, in fact, happy to not have to rule on the question of symbols because they are central to important public events (Remembrance Day) and long and broadly recognized public holidays (Christmas and Easter). The history of those holidays is, again, important but not something that can be addressed here. Obviously, they are the product of a time when there was a close connection between state, church and civil society. And, just as obviously, this relationship and these holidays are changing. But, the truth is that without the at least some of the symbolism of Christianity, we don't have a very good reason for Christmas and Easter as public holidays. In fact, to change the symbolism would be to ... well ... ditch the holiday. After all, you're not going to give kids four days off school for, say, "Chocolate Egg Day." Instead, something more approximating Valentines Day (a few minutes in class to give our cards) would be more appropriate. I don't want to sound like an idiot but telling someone not to put a cross out at Easter is ... well ... denying what Easter is all about. It would be the equivalent of not showing a maple leaf on Canada Day. It would make no sense.

OK, so ... where does this leave us? It leaves us with an important but limited judicial decision. The courts -- I think ultimately rightly -- defended freedom of belief and the idea that the state cannot unduly discriminate against any particular religious view, including those who do not believe. Exactly what this means is something that Canada will need to work out. The courts -- rightly -- do not give us a ready made solution but instead say "the way you have done things -- forcing everyone down a single path -- is not right. Find another way." Equally importantly, we should note what this ruling does not do. It is not clear that it is a broad and expansive precedent. The ruling is based on a Quebec provincial constitutional statute and not the federal Charter. It deals with municipal governments (and, potentially, only municipal governments in Quebec, although its implications are broader). Federal and provincial legislatures and para-public institutions that can make some claim to being private institutions are not affected. This ruling deals with prayer and not other symbols.

This is, in other words, a far more ambiguous ruling that it first appears. The courts are, with this ruling, addressing issues that are emerging from a new historic context: the context of post-Christianity. In so doing they are being cautious and taking tentative steps ... suggesting which practices are not acceptable but providing limited guidelines on what might actually be done because, they reason, that is not there job. They are their to interpret law; not make it. Put together, then, this ruling is more complicated than it first seems.  And, that might be appropriate.

Saguenay, or Freedom of Religion and Belief

I've not had the chance to review the recent Supreme Court decision regarding prayer before city council meetings, but you can find a copy of it here. Like most legal decisions, I'd suspect that the devil, as it were, is in the details. Reporting on it has been generally vague, but you can find more news coverage: here, here, and here. Some of the coverage (all of which basically says the same thing and little of which reviews the details of the decision), makes this decision out to be significant. I am not at all sure. It is significant and vitally important for some people. For instance, those who see organized religion as a serious problem and a pressing threat to their freedoms will be, I think, very happy with this ruling. Conversely, those looking to find some way to maintain Christianity's historically privileged position in Canadian society will view this decision with chagrin. I ultimately suspect this ruling may not be  quite as significant as people think it is, or that its importance is largely symbolic, but I'm going to hedge my bet. I'm going to argue that this ruling is both remarkably important and not really that important at all. I want to discuss it because I think it fits well with the general narrative I have been trying to work out in this series of blogs about what I'm calling a "post-Christian Canada," or the evolving relationship between Christianity and the Canadian state and civil society.  The burden of this blog is to explain these perspectives by setting them in the context of this historical transition.

Why is this ruling not that significant? Significant might not be the right word. Obviously, the SCC thought this issue was legally and constitutionally important, or they would not have heard the appeal. And, to the individual who brought the original case forward and the Quebec Secularism Society, this ruling can be construed as nothing short of a victory. The message is pretty clear: local governments cannot force citizens or elected representatives to participate in a prayer that relates specifically to one religious perspective or another before a meeting. Doing so, discriminates against those who do not hold to that religious view or who hold no religious views at all. In short, forcing prayer on government or people creates an entrance requirement, as it were, the burden of which falls unevenly across the population. As a result, town and city councils cannot include specific opening (or, one assumes, closing) prayers as part of their agenda. This ruling, as one of the stories I've noted above suggests, is not simply about religion but about "freedom from" religion; that is: it is not the state's business to sustain or support or maintain one religion to the exclusion of others.  More pointedly and more exactly: the state must respect the rights of those who do not subscribe to any religion and a failure to do so is *not* constitutionally acceptable. According to news stories, a number of other municipalities are examining their open ceremonies, as it were, as are at least two provinces.

There is something more in this ruling as well. The City of Saguenay, or their mayor, tried to use a particular defence in order to preserver prayer before its council meetings. The defence went something like this: even if there is some manner of discrimination in reciting a specific and evidently Christian prayer, while making evidently Christian symbols (the cross) does seem to favour one religious perspective over others, this is OK because Christianity is part of Canada's history and heritage. Thus, even if there might be problems with regard to freedom of conscience, specific rituals that reflect religious practices can be maintained if they are part of national, religion, ethnic, or linguistic heritage.

This is an interesting argument that deserves a fuller treatment than it has so far been accorded. It is interesting in that it smack of the same stuff that the so-called "secular charter" (ironically) was made of. Those supporting the secular charter in Quebec suggested that Christianity would be exempt from its requirements because (a) Christian symbols can be worn rather ... what small-ly --  and not in a disruptive way and hence are not the overt threat to secular values as is, say, veiling for some Islamic women, and (b) at least some Christian symbols are exempt from the secular charter because they are part of heritage. Their importance, in other words, is not religious but historical. This being the case, they do not pose -- in themselves -- a threat to freedom of conscience or belief because they are about our fidelity to the past; not to a specific spirituality.

There might be something to this argument. I'd need to think about for a long time or someone reading this could explain it to me in the comments sections. But, it has always struck me as so much semantics. Why? Two reasons: (1) symbols never convey a singular meaning. One cannot read a cross *just* as a symbol of the past. It is always already a symbol of Christianity and to deny that reading is engage in a shockingly simplistic level of analysis. (2) It is reading the symbol (in this case a cross) from a specific perspective. Exactly what we might call this perspective can be a matter of debate. I'd say it is read from a semi-Christian moderately secularish-type of perspective. From the perspective of a person who may or may not attend church but who does self-identify as a Christian even if that self-identification is complicated by other things and honoured in the breach. The precise details of what I am saying are beside the point because the real point is this: it does not read the cross as a symbol of heritage from a non-Christian perspective. From a non-Christian perspective (even those perspectives that respect diversity, etc.), the cross is a Christian symbols that marks space in a specific way. The defence of religion as heritage, in this sense, tried to avoid reading the cross (or, other Christian symbols such as prayer) from non-Christian perspectives in order to assert their validity as heritage but not religion. This type of reading is both partial and antithetical to a diverse society.

And, this gets us, I think, to the real importance of this ruling. In effect, it says "no, you cannot use this type of logic to smuggle Christianity in through the back door." And, you have to read symbols from the perspectives of people other than those in whose name the symbol speaks. This ruling was about prayer and not about the cross (and, this is so for interesting legal reasons). But, the point is the same. Said differently, the courts have closed off one line of argumentation that some people had used to try to maintain the symbolic privileged presence of Christianity in the Canadian public sphere.

Should we be glad about this? That is a question I will leave off for another day because there are still other important issues that we should address. If this is the historic importance of this ruling, we should also be clear about what this ruling does not do. I'll likely take the time to go over some picky legal details at another time (because those picky legal details are important). Let me focus on the big issues. First, and most importantly, this ruling does not actually bring with it any significant changes in practice other than for a few towns and cities. It is part of a transition -- part of an historic process -- and not the cause of the process in itself. It attracts attention (and, rightly so) because it is a SCC ruling, but it does not either advance or detract from the right to practice one's religion or lack thereof. I suspect, in fact, that few people will notice the difference. I honestly don't know whether or not Sackville, NB (the town in which I live) opens its meetings with a prayer. Private institutions (clubs, churches, the range of social services supported by churches, universities) can maintain whatever rituals they want to maintain. That will be an internal debate. Schools in NB at least don't have prayer; few business that I know do; nor are families affected in their daily devotionals (or, lack thereof). Important public rituals -- say, Remembrance Day -- will, I am certain -- remain unaffected as well.

Said differently, this ruling makes an important statement but it is a statement that will have a limited affect on most people's lived experiences. Why? Because religious freedom is already so widespread and, by-and-large uncontested, in Canadian society. I suspect that most of those people listening to the town prayer in Saguenay were ignoring it anyway (it was, after all, what, only 20 or 30 seconds long?).  I can, for instance, and I suspect you can too, go about my entire day and not really notice anything religious. Leaving aside the things I do myself, my workplace observes no religious rites, we have no special ceremonies before meals or meetings, no one comes in my door to get me to prayer, there are no dietary restrictions, no symbolic hand washing, nothing. I know we use a Christian calendar but how many people really worry about that or even know about it?

I noticed that I often end blogs by saying "there is more to say on this subject" and this ruling is not an exception. In the interests of length, however, I'll end here and pen a bit more another day. Let me summarize, this ruling is important and not. It does very, very little (as far as I can tell) in changing the overall balance between church, state, and civil society in contemporary Canada. But, it does cut off one line of in the defence of Christianity: the Christianity as heritage argument. It will change the practice of open council meetings at some towns and cities in Canada but I suspect few will notice those changes and they might, as I'll intimate later, be less "out there" than we might think.

Veils in Court

I find this story interesting and one that might be important to comment on:

First test of Supreme Court's new face-veil rules imminent - Canada - CBC News:

The issue is one that I find a bit odd, to be honest, in the sense that I do not understand why some people oppose accommodating women who wear veil for religious reasons. I understand that some of the opposition to veils is driven by bigotry and some by ignorance. But exactly why this is even a matter of debate is something that confuses me -- unless there are far more ignorant and bigoted people out there than I think -- because, frankly, it does not seem like much of an issue. 

Why is not not much of an issue: what do I care whether or not a person wears a veil? Seriously ... I'm asking: why should I care? I am not trying to be flippant here. The bigger point is this: if the action another person takes is of no trouble or consequence to me, what right do I have to say something about it?  This is, I think, a basic tenant of liberal democracy, is it not? If my neighbour wears a Montreal Canadiens jersey to bed ... what trouble is that to me? I might not like the Canadians but ... so what? Surely my neighbour has the right to wear his jersey around his house or out in the street or on the bus or to class, should he so desire.  

Bear with me because I am trying to make a point and not just sound like I am ranting. The point is actually twofold:

1. In a free and democratic society, surely how another person chooses to dress is not a matter of my concern. It is a matter of individual concern, as is, I think, their rationale for dressing a certain way. In a liberal democratic society, the choice of clothing defaults to the individual as much as possible (I do recognize that there are exceptions such as dress codes at some places of employment that might be required for safety or health reasons).

2. Surely, this is a principle that we want to defend (as opposed to question). Surely, we do not want the state in the regulation of people's dress business. Surely, allowing for those important exceptions such as police officers who are on the job, we don't want the government telling us how to dress. Surely, in fact, that is a sign of totalitarianism on many science fictions shows! 

Now, allowing that this issue might be more complicated then I am making it seem, I want to direct attention to my key point: the argument that I am making in defense of veils has nothing to do with religion. This is the problem I often have with many of these discussions. They are often framed as the "religious rights of newcomers" versus ... well .... I don't know what but ... something. A lot of people make that point -- this is about religious rights -- but, by and large, it is not. An individual's rationale for how they dress can be religious. I've met a many people in my life who dress a certain way for religious reasons. But, I've met many many many more people who dress the way they do because of their personal taste. Both sides in this debate get this wrong: those who defend veils and those who oppose them. To say again ... this is not a matter of religion but rather a question of whether or not we want the government telling us how to dress. I strongly suspect most people do not. 

But, some people might say, there are instances where a woman's face needs to be seen. Perhaps. Let us not dismiss that out of hand but ... how many? The argument that she needed to remove her veil when testifying so that they confused could have a fair trial is bumpkis. According to the story I linked above: "he lawyers for the accused say they cannot get a fair trial unless they, and the court, can see her facial expressions as she testifies." What utter crap. Anyone who is making up their minds in a legal  case on the basis of someone's facial expression is an idiot and should not be involved in the trial. I know what I am speaking of: my wife is a crown prosecutor and I call you that neither she nor the police officers with which she works rely on something as easy to manipulate as a facial expression (trained experts might be able to tell the difference but how many of you reading this blog have training in this. The guy on _Lie to Me_ had a Ph D, remember). My wife relies on evidence. This can create problems. Sometimes if there is not enough evidence, she will elect not to prosecute a case even if she believes that the accused in guilty. That is the nature of our system and a discussion for another day. The point being that she does not look at someone and say "ah ... your facial expression is X so we will prosecute you." The judge does not look at a witness and say "your facial expression was Y so I will disregard your testimony." A judge might disregard testimony because it was contradictory, because it was not believable (say contradicted by facts in evidence), because the witness was a known liar, because the witness changed their story. But, they do not disregard testimony because of facial expressions. Don't believe me ... go look it up. These judgments are actually written down. You can get a lot of them online or, if you live in a larger place that has a law library, in law reports. You will hunt in vane, I promise you, for a judge who writes in his or her reason for judgement that they made a decision because of a facial expression. 

But, someone might now be saying, we know facial expressions influence people so surely it must influence judges. Do we know that? In extreme cases, sure. But we also know that a whole bunch of factors influence people's perceptions from hair colour to lack of sleep. Yet, we do not make them reasons for judgement in legal proceedings. No matter how tired a judge is, he or she must judge on the basis of evidence and  the law, not because they want to get out and take a nap. The fact that you or I am influenced by something in our daily life does not mean that it is a good reasons to introduce that influence as a legal principle or ... more importantly, that we cannot elide that influence -- if, say, a member of a jury -- and make a reasoned judgement on the basis of evidence. It does not always happen. Juries make mistakes; that is why we maintain due process and appeals. That is why one should not engage in a rush to judgement. But, think of all the trials held in Canada every day and think of how many decisions are actually overturned. I might like hamburgers but I will not acquit someone of a crime because he or she liked hamburgers too. 

My point, of course, is that there the argument that this woman needed to remove her veil so that the accused could have a fair trial is simply not true. I don't fault the lawyer for making the argument. His or her job is to make the best argument for their client that they can within the boundaries of the law. Lawyers will try all kinds of things. The silly thing her is not that a defense lawyer made up some way to try to help his clients. The silly thing is that others have taken his or her argument seriously. 

According to the CBC article, the Supreme Court sets out a test with regard to trials and whether or not a woman will have to remove her veil when offering testimony. The article specifies the test as follows:

• Does she have a sincere belief in her religion?

• Does wearing a veil create a serious risk to trial fairness?

• Is there any other way to accommodate her?

• If no, does what the court called the "salutary" effects of ordering her to remove her niqab outweigh the "deleterious" effects of doing that?

This strikes me as a reasonable test. Point 1 ... sure, if a person is engaged in a shame ... then why not have them remove their veil. Wearing it is not an exercise in any right or freedom but, in fact, makes a mockery of those who wear veils for serious and deeply felt religious reasons.  

Point 2 is the point I just made. I might be able to think up a counter example to the one I gave above but I don't want to prolong this blog. The vast, vast, vast majority of the time there is no issue of fairness at stake in a woman wearing a veil. 

Point 3 and if there were ... what can we do to accommodate her concerns. This might be something that someone does not like: "why should we accommodate her? Why should she not be like us?" Because we live in a democratic society. Democratic societies always look to accommodate individual differences where they can. Most people, in fact, as for accommodations in one or another all the time. Person X needs to get off work early to go to the dentist. Person Y needs to get off early to volunteer for his kids school field trip. I asked for accommodation a month ago. I was asked to do something at work (perhaps a bit more then a a month ago) over the weekend. I and others were given a task on Friday which we were asked to have completed by Monday. I protested to my boss stating that I worked 9 to 5. Saturday was family day and I did not see why I should have to give that up. I'm Christian and so for religious reasons Sunday was out. My boss did not complain but instead said "you're right. We'll get that changed to later in the week." He might have thought I was a cry baby. I don't know but he earned my respect by responding in a fair and reasoned and even way looking to accommodate differences while getting work done. So, before we are too quick to condemn accommodation ... think about how many times you have asked someone for a favour. That is accommodation. You are, in effect, saying "treat me differently" and there is nothing wrong with that. 

The last point is a balance argument: if forcing the removal of a veil serves no good purpose  ... why do it. 

So, to sum up, the SCC has set out a reasonable test. If we pause and think this is not an issue that really deserves the time and effort that has been put into it. There really is no good reason most of the time to compel a person to not wear a veil so .... why would we?