Labour's Mandate: Thoughts on the UK Election

I happened to be in the UK during the election and I was impressed by the overall dignity and decorum of British politics. It wasn't perfect. The Tories raised all kinds of false spectres in a vain effort to ward off the scope of their inevitable defeat. There was a scandal involving sitting politicians gambling on the election (one labour candidate seems to have tried to short himself, betting on his opponent), and the expected racist fiasco coming out of the new Reform UK. Overall -- and perhaps because the election was a foregone conclusion -- there was little of the Boris Johnston effect. Much of the commentary has focused both on the size of Labour's victory in terms of elected representation and its supposed absent mandate in terms of its popular vote. I think this was a good election for Labour and not simply because they won. I think it provides Labour with an opportunity to refashion Britain for what is now clearly a post-Brexit age along lines something other than the "new Labour" of Tony Blair. There are a number of significant points that follow from the election. 

First, the issue for Labour might not be the overall size of their popular vote (however important this can be), but the fact that they won in virtually all key geographic regions they needed to. The British electorate appears deeply divided, something that should not surprise us and something that is not a horrible thing.  I would argue that a divided electorate represents actual divisions in society and that an organized response to this on the part of Labour is preferable to a false sense of popular unity. For Labour, what was significant was not that they took advantage of a divided electorate but that they were able to defeat different opponents in different regions. They took Scottish central belt from SNP, retook the northern "red wall" from the Brexit Conservatives, and pushed back Reform UK in southern Wales and urban northeast. They drove the Tories out of urban London and recaptured the industrial/post-industrial northern and midlands. Moreover, they finished second in an impressive number of seats, suggesting that they have not exhausted their growth potential.  (Wikipedia has a map of second place finishes.) 

What this means is that Labour is, in important ways, the architect of its own victories. With the SNP on the run (despite what its proponents say), the Tories disorganized, and Reform largely kept off the board, the main opposition will come from moderate centrist Liberal Democrats. For Labour this not a horrible thing. Labour is not competitive everywhere and this is where their low popular vote really shows.  Rural southern England was a battle between the Lib Dems and the Tories; they have no real supporters in Northern Ireland, and the strongest Scottish unionists still prefer the Tories. What all this means, though, -- and this is why Labour should be in a good mood -- is that they fought a multi-front electoral campaign against different opponents and won the battle on the ground. 

Second, the Tories are left with a question and it is the same question that confronted American Republicans and Canadian Conservatives. Is an inclusive conservatism possible? In Canada, we are seeing something of a wave of nostalgia for Brian Mulroney's government, at least among political historians. I've been struggling to understand why. The answer, I think, is that Mulroney's PCs represented that last real effort to build a diverse and inclusive conservatism in Canada. At some future time I'll go back over that history to consider what ultimately made that project impossible. For now, however, we likely should take Mulroney at his word. He supported Charter rights, looked to build a big-tent conservatism that ditched its grass roots opposition to bilingualism and multiculturalism while respecting regionalism and promoting some kind of green politics. Let's not get too far ahead of ourselves. I don't think I share this nostalgia, but I think I see its appeal. Mulroney's government -- and the figures who tried to keep his form of conservatism alive -- believed a diverse, inclusive conservatism possible. 

In Canada, the Harper agenda pushed away this idea and Poilieve has -- and will, if elected -- go further. In the US and France, this connection of conservatism with intolerance is even more advanced (and, my list is not complete). The Tories under Sunak tried to position themselves differently than under Johnston and that positioning was a gamble. That gamble wasn't just unfavourable electoral conditions befalling a government that had been in power for an oddly long (and unstable) time. The gamble was that one could shift British Toryism away from name-calling and toward a broadly inclusive centre-right movement. I don't know what will happen next for theTories, but this gamble is not off to a good start. 

Third, Reform UK was Reform UK. A few of its candidates were shocked that there were racists in the party but no one should be. Reform represented a peal away from the Tories but it also represented something else: the creation of a new intolerant political movement. Some Tories seem to feel that this movement can be folded back into the Tories but it is not clear -- to me at least -- that Reform supporters were good Tories to begin with. I suspect, most found themselves into Reform through the fraying boundaries of the Brexit Party and the shadow of UKIP that still floats about British politics. Said differently, folding Reform UK into the Tories would likely mean -- ideologically at least -- the reverse: folding the Tories into Reform. In this case, it is not clear that one could simply add the two votes together (Reform and Tories) and see how many seats that might have won. 

Why? Well, like the Republican voter base in the US, I suspect that there are a heck of a lot of Tories who (1) accept intolerance as a good thing and won't jump ship because someone points out that their party is drifting to populism, but (2) there are voters who will not move to the Tories (say, Lib Dem or SNP voters) and that will continue a split electorate. There are moderate Tories who will sit on their hands or consider other options (like the Lib Dems). 

Fourth, what about the SNP? They took a real kick and find themselves in a position similar to the BQ in Canada. They are a party with a purpose but without a potential means to that purpose. The influx of Labour and Lib Dem MPs combined with the remaining Tories likely means that the SNP has no chance of winning another referendum and they may not want to even try. Losing a second referendum (as the PQ discovered in Quebec) deflected separatism for a generation and brought to light new political formations (like the CAQ). The SNP has also discovered what others separatist parties in government discover: that policies other than independence count. Said differently, if one is not a good government, getting voted back in because of independence is no guarantee of victory. 

Overall, then, it is easy to be critical of the Labour victory, but I'd rather have a victory than a defeat. I'd rather be Labour, than the SNP, Reform UK, or the Tories. Victory gives Labour a chance to build a different kind of Britain. I hope they take it. 

Not yet on Fire ... Or, Blue Jays corrective measures

The increasing media consensus is that the Jays are going to deal at the trade deadline.  This isn't clairvoyance. It simply makes sense. Ultimately deals are determined by both what one has to trade and what other teams want. Thus the Jays decision to DFA (in effect, to cut) Kevin Kiermaier, a player who I thought they could get something for, makes sense in this light: they couldn't. The Jays might have preferred to trade Kiermaier, even if the return would be slim, but if no one wants to offer even that slim return, the Jays are left with little option.

In a previous post, I suggested that the Jays should burn down the house, engage in a fire sale, and start a multiyear rebuilding process. That process has not yet started. The Jays have made a significant number of roster moves but these moves are more corrective measures. I'll complement Atkens and Shapiro for making them. Why? Because they are, in fact, admitting that earlier roster moves -- particularly building the team for this year -- were mistakes, have failed and they are in the process of trying to extradite themselves from that failure while, I suspect, hoping that some combination of players can be found to make a run at the expanded wildcard playoffs. Said differently, the roster moves we have seen so far do not necessarily presage a fire sale, although they well could. What have those moves been? 

Well, they actually started in Spring Training when the Jays front office conceded a point that had been evident for some time: Santiago Espinal was not a major league player and he was -- and had been -- taking a roster spot from players that were more talented. 

Move #2: Mitch White was sold to the Giants. Enough said except to note that Schneider had used White in crucial situations last year. 

Move #3: Designating Dan Vogelbach. The Jays media tried mightily to find a reason why Vogelbach was even on the team. He couldn't play defense and Turner was their FT DH, with plans to use Vladdy there as well to save the periodic embarrassments at 1B. Dan and Buck noted frequently about that Vogelbach brought something to the team because he "talked baseball" and, ergo, was supposedly a good clubhouse guy. They explained that his .186 batting average was not really his fault because he could not get consistent at bats. This was likely true but also irrelevant. What the Jays front office did not seem to calculate when they signed him  was where more consistent at bats were going to come from anyway. 

Move #4: trading Cavan Biggio. I thought Biggio was going to a good player. I never pegged him as a star but I thought he'd hit for an average average and that combined with above average defense, good plate discipline (which would put him on base), good base running skills and modest power would keep him in the starting lineup for, say, eight years. The Espinal fiasco ended that as the Jays tried to ride the hot hand and left Biggio's development to ... well ... no one, saddling him with a position (3B), he could not really play. The Jays, then, tried to convert him to a Ben Zobrist kind of "super sub" but playing that role is not a matter of will (which Biggio surely had) but a skill set (which he did not). They finally admitted that they had no place for him on the team and traded him to the Dodgers. 

Move #5: Giving up on Manoah's season. I don't know what is wrong with Manoah. The likely truth is that Jays don't either, but rather than suffer through another bad -- and potentially corrosive -- year, the Jays elected to sideline him early and see what could be done with his arm. 

Move #6: Designating Tim Mayza. Mayza has done a good job for the Jays but he was also a 32 year old pitcher who was getting no one out. A few years ago, Mayza might have hung on longer as a one-out lefty. That role no longer exists. The Jays don't really have any hot prospects but the idea that Mayza will ever again be a key part of the bullpen needed to be put to rest and someone else given a shot. 

Move #7: Kiermaier: the truth of the matter is that Kiermaier's offence has become so bad that no amount of defensive was going to save him. I suspect the Jays knew this when they signed KK, but gambled because they believed they needed outfielders (which they might) and were hoping he could post stats similar to last year in a limited role.  Keeping Kiermaier, however, was keeping Varsho in left field. In other words, it was keeping a better defensive outfielder in a traditional hitters position, where his own offensive weaknesses were becoming more and more evident as the season wore on (and for the second year in a row). Moving Varsho to a more defensively demanding position puts the best outfielder the Jays have in that position and better covers over his offensive limits. It also provides Schneider with playing time. Schneider does not look like an outfielder to me but he was not becoming one giving up playing time to players who are not the future. 

This amounts to a fairly impressive list of moves but with next to zero return, which is the point, of course, to blowing up one's team: the goal is to trade established players for prospects. It appears, no one wants -- yet -- to deal with the Jays and they have found themselves forced to designate (the baseball equivalent of fire) players as opposed to trade them. 

Moreover, these moves don't clear salary. The Jays sent a bit of salary away with Biggio and Espinal and moving Manoah to the IL (one assumes) has implications for insurance. But the other moves don't alleviate salary. Kiermaier cost the Jays 10$ million this year.  Because he's been designated, the Jays will remain on the hook for that salary, as they will for Vogelbach and Mayza. In baseball terms, we are not talking a huge amount of money, but the point is that these moves have not brought in new prospects nor cleared salary that might allow for free agent signings in the future. 

I think more moves are coming. My view is that this is a preliminary step. The Jays are correcting bad decisions they made earlier this year and getting playing time for players for whom they should have been finding playing time already. I think they are hoping something will click (like Schneider last year) and they will be able to settle their lineup, and make a late season run. I don't think there is a long leash on that. Dan and Joe mentioned it during today's game. The Jays are going to have to deal bigger pieces soon. Will that be a burn down? I don't know but I'd rather have a management that makes that decision intentionally than one that is forced into by its own poor decisions. 

Burn the House II: Or, how you know when your team ain't good

How do you know when the baseball team for which you cheer is not good? Well, sometimes, teams just tell you. I was listening to Blair and Barker a few weeks ago and they interviewed one of the White Sox announcers. Perhaps to be nice, perhaps to generate some excitement, Blair (I think ... might be misremembering) complemented the Sox and asked what was ahead for that team, were they expecting a good second half as the team improved? Whomever he was interviewing immediately said "no" and went on to state the self evident fact that the Sox were not a good team. There was no chance that they would be even close to the mix this year. 

I liked it. With exceptions, the Jays media is only now coming around to this view about the Jays. They are not stating it outright (on Sportsnet this AM, there was talk about June being pivotal month!), but in retrospect there were signs and a lot of them. What were those signs?

Sign Number One: "if" syndrome. As the season started there were a lot of people talking in "if" language: if Manoah is back to form, if Vladdy plays better, if Jano is not injured, if Schneider can play even close to the way he finished the season, if Romano is healthy .... There is always an if or two for every team but if a team's season is depending on just about everything going right, that is too many ifs. The plexiglass principle (an old Bill James idea) suggests that luck evens out over the longer run. Thus, if some things go right, one needs to figure that other things are going to go wrong. 

Sign Number Two: hoping players are better than they are. There are a lot of seasonal ups and downs in baseball.  That is part of the game, but to begin the season counting on players who have not demonstrated an ability to play at a certain level is hope; not strategy. I cheer for Ernie Clement and Bowden Francis, too. I do. If one of them makes it, that is a good news story by itself. But, what are the realistic chances that they will be a core part of the team (say, an every day starter or playing third base)? Francis entered this year as a 28 year old rookie who had pitched a grand total of less than forty innings in the majors. Clement, likewise, is 28 with less than 500 career MLB plate appearances and an OPS (a measure of offensive ability) of 66. That is not good. What this means is that the Jays were counting on players who they had no reason to believe they could count on. I'd love them to succeed. I would. This is not about them. It is about something else: how we know our team is not good. And, counting on performance from players who have not demonstrated that they can play at an MLB level -- let alone a good MLB level -- is another of those ways. 

Sign Number Three: jargon. Baseball has its jargon and that jargon can be hard for new fans. "Protect the plate," "cutter," "turn two" ... there is a baseball language one learns as one watches the game. However, when commentators start using words as if they were magical weapons, that is a sign that "the owls are not what they seem." The year's jargon word was "flexibility."  With the ability of Biggio, Schneider, Clement, IKF, perhaps even Turner ... to play multiple positions, the team had a lot of "flexibility." 

You see the problem? Flexibility does not win games if your players aren't good. Flexible players -- players who play more than one position -- can be good. All teams are looking for them. But, there is a difference between Mookie Betts' flexibility and Craig Biggio's. The ability to move weak offensive players around does not score runs. 

What is more: this is a misunderstanding of flexibility. The Jays are actually not all that flexible. As I pointed out in another post, the way the Jays have designed their team is actually pretty standard and brings with it built-in constraints. The number of pitchers the Jays carry, for example, forces them to look for flexible fielders and to play players out of position (which carries a defensive downside). The Jays under Bobby Cox, back in the day, were flexible. Using an extensive platoon system, they were almost impervious to injury, for instance, while the smaller pitching staff allowed them to keep extra players to expand overall team flexibility. 

Finally, flexibility is not just something to have, it needs to be a strategy. I will confess that I don't see that strategy, other than to try to ride the hot hand and ... well ... you can see how well that is working. 

Sign Number Four: hope and patience. As the Jays limped through the first quarter of the season, commentary from coaches, team official, commentators, went something like this: we know our team is good. We just have to wait until we get hot. The key to a really good team, of course, is to win when they are not hot. But, hoping to get hot is the baseball equivalent of praying for rain. 

There may be other signs, too. But, when we hears these things being said and see these decisions being made, they suggest that the team we're cheering for may not be as good as predicted. We heard these things and saw these decisions.

PS: Confidence

One thing I find personally annoying is the talk about confidence as the key to success. I don't doubt that confidence is better than insecurity. And, a sense that you are going to fail is a recipe for stagnation (why try if you are not going to succeed?). But listening to the game last night, it struck me that this is another point of confusion. Dan and Buck, in commenting on Baltimore, mentioned over and over again that they were "confident" and "free and easy" (or, words to that effect). The intimation was that this was the root of their success (this was linked to a discussion about Turner and supposed lack of confidence right now). It seems to me that this is actually the reverse of what is going on. Baltimore is confident because they are winning; not winning because they are confident. 

Burn Down The House? The Jays Can't Win and Should Start Over

 I was watching my morning sports show and the announcers were at great pains to explain that the Jays were a defense first team. This was, I think, to partially excuse what has been (a few recent games excepted) a pretty anemic offence. In fact, this has become the company line. It is repeated on Jays Central, during games, and hyperbole abounds when someone does make a fine defensive play. The only problem with the company line: it just isn't true. A quick look at dWar (a metric that measures defensive) shows that only Dalton Varsho and Kiner-Falefa are having really good years. Alejandro Kirk is putting up good defensive numbers but his offence is so bad, his defensive just can't compensate. Bo Bichette -- whose improved defence is supposedly the result of hard work -- is break even. Springer, Schneider, Guerrero and Turner  have negative dWars. They are not horrible but they are playing defense in a way that is not helping the team. 

No one should be particularly surprised buy this. Schneider has been asked to learn a new position. My own view is that he plays outfield about as well as the average infielder. No one really thought Geurrero was a defensively good. I've explained in an older post that his gold glove did not represent defensive ability but rather changes in the game and the fact that -- that year -- he was the best of a bad lot. As for Turner and Springer ... Turner was not brought in for his defense and Springer is a 34 year old outfielder who is playing like a  34 year old outfielder. What is more ... Springer's defense was never particularly good. His primary value lay elsewhere.

Let me add that I am not saying this to shoot these players down. I watch the Jays. I cheer for them. I have my own favourites, like all fans. That is not going to stop. The point I want to make is this: there is no particular reason to be upset at what is being cast as the Jays sub-standard play. If this was supposed to be team that led with defense (which is a legitimate approach to winning baseball games), this is not the team to do that and we all know that. The Jays media need a good news story because it is impossible to disguise the weak offence through the first quarter of the seasons. I watched Blair and Barker's show one time last week and they were apoplectic. OK, fair enough. I was, too. But, in thinking about it later, I thought ... why? Why was I upset? I was upset because I held out hope that the Jays were good enough. I was skeptical of Turner but ... he might play good enough. If Vladdy and Bo take even half-a-step forward from last year and Varsho takes a step. Biggio plays better and Schneider is ... well half the real deal ... we're not in bad shape, I reasoned, with a strong starting staff and good bullpen. 

There were so many "if"s in that sentence ... you can see the problem right away: having a good season was not a matter of playing to potential. A whole bunch of things had to go right that had an equally plausible chance of going wrong. Bo might take a step forward, or he might injure himself with that wild swing of his and spend half the season on the bench. In my view, it is time to face two facts: (1) this team is not as good as advertised and even with a hot streak (something their loses to Detroit don't suggest that is coming down the tube), and (2) is not good enough to win it all.  The way forward, in my view, has to be something other than what the Jays have been doing. 

What have the Jays been doing and what is the alternative? In 2020, the Jays played unexpectedly well in the Covid shortened season. The offence looked good. The Jays had strong OPS+ (a measure of offence ability in relationship to the rest of the league) numbers and the problems they had -- pitching -- were clear and could be addressed. The Jays core was also young. Biggio, who had a fine season, was the oldest of the potential stars at 24, but only one starter (Shaw at 3B) was 30. The Jays didn't really improve in 2021 in terms of their place in the standings but they had three players score 100 runs and four drive in 100. Shaw was gone and Marcus Semien brought in. He was the second oldest player with the addition of Spring, now 31. But the core remained young. 

The Jays management continued to tinker with the team, canning their manager and replacing him with his bench coach (a move I didn't like), and bringing in older players to address weaknesses to the point where in 2023, the Jays were old. Five starters were older than 30 (Belt was 35 and Merrifield 34) and their youngest starter (Berrios) was 29 (let's leave Manoah aside because of his odd season). The oldness continued this year: Ernie Clement, who is getting a chance to play 3B is actually 28 and Biggio is now 29. What all this means is this: the strategy which was to see the core as solid and add the veteran pieces to win, didn't work. And, the Jays have now reached the point of no return, or what economists call diminishing marginal utility.  Adding more veteran pieces can't produce wins. And there is precious little help on the farm. This was a solution that was touted last year. I'd give Schneider a chance to play but he was a 24 year old rookie. That is about average and does not really project out as player around whom one builds a team (although, with the right development he could be valuable). Of the other AAA players periodically discussed: Barger is 24, Lukes is 29, and Horwitz is 26. Only Martinez, at 22, could be considered a legitimate star prospect. 

The alternative for the Jays is to burn down the house. And, this is what I think they should do. While the Jays can't win, they have a lot of potentially valuable trade pieces. This might be a case where the parts are greater than the sum of the whole. The Jays should be willing to trade just about everyone they have to rebuilt what is, in fact, a weak minor league system. Baltimore, by contract, a team already playing considerably better than the Jays also has a much better farm system.  For the Jays, this does not bode well for the future. 

The Jays should be willing to unload just about all their starters, with the exceptions of Berrios -- because of the long-term contract-- and Manoah (because he's under control for a number of years). Despite the unevenness of their pitching, teams will be interested in Bassitt and Gausman once we get closer to the trade deadlines and perhaps even now. Kikuchi has pitched well and he's a lefty so he will draw interest.  Springer, Kiermaier and Turner might be harder sells but it is a question of matchups. No one other than the Jays wanted to offer Kiermaier a job as a starter (and we can see why), but he might appeal to a team looking for a fourth or fifth outfielder defensive sub, pinch runner, occasional start verse a righty.  I'd trade Jansen, too. His value will not get higher.  And, I'd trade anyone from the bullpen I could. 

Finally, I'd be willing to trade Vladdy and Bo as well. That might not be popular and I suspect they will both land on their feet elsewhere, play well, and be named to several all-star teams each.  The Jays seem to have taught Vladdy pitch selection, but since the Jays are years away from winning, I think it is an even bet that he'll hit the free agent market after next season, as will Bo. The Jays can maximize the return ... getting a number of prospects and likely top-notch prospects ... by trading them now.  Said differently, since there is a good chance that the Jays will lose both of these players, the logical thing is to maximize their value now. That value can be maximized by getting good younger players around whom the Jays will built for the future. 

Another finally: I think it also goes without saying that the current coaching staff is almost certainly not the team to bring up a new team.  John Schneider does not seem to really have a good feel for the game. He makes odd decisions -- some of which I've ranted about before -- the logic of which is lost on me. He seems to make a habit of yanking a pitcher one pitch too late. Pete Walker works best tinkering with veterans and has not shows any ability to work with younger pitchers. Ask Nate Pearson how his career is going.

I was listening to commentators say that it is not the coaches fault. That the players have to be accountable. I do think there is something in that but, the Jays also pay those coaches a lot to do things and the thing they were supposed to do is figure out how to win. It is rotten but if you pay someone to do a job and they don't do it ... do you stick with them? 

The same goes for upper level management. The truth of the matter is that Ross Atkins let the Jays enter the season without a lead off batter. Few teams win without one. He decided what the Jays needed was a bunch of players who could not play the field (Turner, Vogelbach, Votto, Vladdy). And, their player development is just messed up. What position does Biggio actually play? 

In short, it is time for a fire sale. 

Blue Jay Way II: A Real Gamble

I don't want to be mistaken for an old baseball fuddy-duddy. Last year I complained about analytics, but I did so as a fellow traveler. I was an early devotee of Bill James and still feel many of the points he made represented an advance in baseball thinking. I've continued to read him on and off over the years and believe there is an important role for analytics in baseball. If I can reframe my concern, the problem is not that it has "gone too far." The problem is that it is being misapplied. Analytics refers to the use of advanced statistical analysis to make decisions in baseball. Baseball managers have been using stats for a long time (think Earl Weaver and his recipe cards), as have players. The problem occurs when statistical evidence is misapplied. I'll give you an example. 

Generally, most managers today carry large bullpens (a minimum of 7, sometimes 8) relievers. The idea is to bring in a reliever at the start of an inning so that the bases are "clean" and to have the reliever pitch no more than one inning. And, this is true. If you limit any given pitcher's exposure while creating as favourable as possible situation in which they pitch ... that pitcher will do better. It does not, however, mean (1) that they are a better pitcher than they were. It just means that stats are disguising their ability because they've been pitching in favourable conditions, and (2) it doesn't necessarily save runs because someone had to pitch in an unfavourable situation and that is usually the previous pitcher. Imagine this situation, a starter labours into the fifth where there are runnings on second and third with one out. What should you do? If you bring in a reliever, you are asking the reliever to pitch in an unfavourable situation. If you leave in the starter, they are pitching in an unfavourable situation, And, you are running the risk of leaving that pitcher in one batter too long. Anecdotally, this seemed to be one of the Jays problems. In order to create a favourable situation for the bullpen, they seemed to be leaving the starter in -- particularly near the end of the season when they needed wins -- one batter too long. And, because they burned through so many pitchers, they often turned to the wrong pitcher in the pen to get them out of trouble.  Sometimes, those pitchers just were not up to the job. 

You see the situation: analytics is not solving the problem. It is redistributing the problem. Said differently, I am not certain -- as I posted last year -- that analytics is doing much to help the Jays win.  So, what should the Jays do this year? In my last post, I intimated that the Jays front office gambled last year. They downgraded the offense to bring in potentially short-term solutions to their defensive problems. The problem with that gamble was that: (1) it did not work, and (2) it created the need for more personal gambles down the road (aka, this off-season). 

The Jays do need to address the holes in their lineup, but how they do it depends on the nature of the gamble that they want to take. For instance, for me, I'd like to find out if Schneider really can play second base. That's a gamble because one is gambling on player development. A safer solution would be the cast of the thousands we saw last year which is actually a way of avoiding a decision while hoping someone catches fire (last year, it turned out to be Schneider but too late in the day to substantively affect the kind of team the Jays were). 

A different kind of gamble might be to make use of their team in a different kind of way. I don't know if that is possible. For instance, I'd love to see starters go deeper into games, lessening the need to carry so many arms in the bullpen and making more space on the bench for platoon players, defensive subs, pinch runners, and the like. In other words, rather than trying to make analytics work like everyone else in the league -- something I don't think we have any reason to believe the Jays can do -- I'd like to see a real gamble that involves doing something different. Tampa Bay, a team that makes heavy use of analytics, has also been a team that innovated. Analytics was, in fact, an innovation at one point in time, as was an opener, as was the one-inning bullpen pitcher, as was the supersub. TB has stayed in the hunt because they have confidence in their own ability to judge talent (they don't need to turn to free agency to find good players), because they have tended to have really good player development, and because they have not been afraid to take chances. This may be the result of Tampa being Tampa. They might have to take chances because their small market does not allow them to do anything else.  

The Jays have been oddly the opposite. They have turned to free agency because they have not developed the talent they need. They have been indecisive and cost players (like Biggio) the kind of playing time they needed to develop. And, they have not taken chances but rather followed other's lead (their organization of the pitching staff mirrored Tampa's, for instance).  Will the Jays break from their established routes? I don't think they will this year, but another subpar season and they may have no choice. And, for my buck, that would not be a horrible thing. 

Blue Jay Way ... Ramblings on a weird off season

Most of the time, I can figure out what the Jays front office is doing. I might agree with it; I might not, but I can usually see what they're attempting to do. Last season, for instance, was a gamble. It is the logical thread that runs through problematic roster decisions. The Jays front office knew a number of things going into last season. They knew, for instance, that the starting staff they had put together was going to be good. They (and I) might have gotten the reasons why it was good wrong (just for the record, changing park effects might also have played a role), but they had reason to believe it was good. Likewise their bullpen and defense. These were supposedly the missing pieces to the puzzle that would put them over the top. The gamble that they took was that their offense was "good enough." They were removing key offensive pieces to bolster the D and bullpen, while guessing that Vladdy, Bo, Kirk, Springer (who, shifted to a less demanding defensive position, might be able to play a full year) and others would contribute enough offense to push the team into the playoffs, particularly in the light of expected off seasons in Boston and NY. If it had worked, everyone would have been happy and this off-season would look differently.  In fairness, they may not have been wrong. They just weren't right enough. 

It didn't work and the Jays front office has been in pursuit of even bigger gambles. Press reports seem to suggest that they are in the game, but they're not winning. They have been unable to land the big names --  Ohtani and Soto -- who would have helped them. In the meantime, their team aged dramatically, Chapman apparently wants a large multi-year contract to return, and it is not clear who is going to play second base, third base, and either centre or right field, depending on where Varsho ends up. The Jays could try re-signing Chapman but I'm not certain I'd want to pay 100 mil $ over multiple years to find out whether the decline in his offensive ability is real or not. 

So ... what happens this year? The problem with gambling is that it leads to more gambles. Look at what has happened to San Diego over the last several seasons as an object lesson. When a gamble goes wrong it can really go wrong. And, what is worse, it limits your options for the future. San Diego, for instance, found themselves in a place where their front office decided that their gambles had failed. Their high-priced players were not capable of winning and so they had one choice left: blow up the team.  The Jays are not in this situation ... but they are close and that is, I think, the reason for the oddities of this off-season and an inability to figure out what their front office is doing. 

The front office gamble last season had several effects. First, it made the Jays older. They shipped out a young and very promising catcher, kept Merrifield to play 2B and sometimes in the outfield, signed a veteran starter, and brought in veteran outfield help. The Jays still have young talent (Vladdy and Kirk are 24, which is about the age most players make it to the majors, Bo is 25 and Varsho is 26). Biggio, Espinal, and Jansen are all 28 (established in prime players), Springer is 33, Berrios is the youngest starter at 29. The others are all 32+ except Manoah, about whom we don't know much (except a lot of trade bait rumours). What is more, the decision to not play Biggio has likely cost him development time. Biggio has not necessarily made it difficult to keep him out of the lineup but one has to wonder. He was benched, first, for Espinal based on a good half season; then relegated to playing out of position in a backup/platoon role. Said differently, he's 28 but with an unknown future. His defence was never great to begin with and with all the missed time ... it hasn't improved. My guess is that he is at best a break-even defender at second and less than average at third. 

Where does all this leave us? With the same bunch of questions we had at the end of the season and a ticking clock. In the not-too-distant future, the Jays will start to lose their talent to free agency, particularly, I think, if this team does not do more to win. With Spring training just around the corner -- which is amazing to think about -- this kind of indeterminacy can't be good. What is more, because the Jays are not a young team, their window is closing. And, I might be missing it but there doesn't seem to be a tonne of talent in the minor league system and little that seems major-league ready.  With a small core of young talent moving toward free agency, an older starting staff, and holes in the lineup, the Jays will enter Spring training and, I suspect, the upcoming season on edge. Certainly, the ongoing media speculation on just about every possible free agent or trade indicates that the media, at least, will be looking for answers.

Are there any? I have little desire to engage in idle speculation since there are so many rumours so I'll content myself with just one: Cody Bellinger. I like him and he had a good season last year, but his value is likely higher than it ever will be again. He is going to want to be paid and the market for outfielders has been pushed sky high in recent years. If you were getting a guarantee, that is OK, but Bellinger is not a guarantee. His year, last year, was good, but it was not great.  He has some flexibility because he can play first base or the outfield but he is an average defender.  Over the span of his career, his dWar (a common measure of defensive ability) is OK to average.  At 27, he is younger than Biggio or Jansen, but he is also injury prone and has been remarkably inconsistent. Like Chapman, I am not sure I'd want to pay what I'm going to have to pay to find out what is coming next. 

Yet, these are the decisions the Jays have to consider and that is really my point. The Jays may elect to gamble again because, like San Diego, they feel they have to. A veteran team, looming free agency costs to secure the young core, an unspectacular farm system, and line-up holes all point in that direction. 

Will the Jays gamble again? ... it remains to be seen. They are also in dog fight of a division. The Yankees will be better next year as will Boston (who seems to have a core of good younger players), Baltimore should continue to improve and Tampa Bay is ... well ... Tampa Bay. Sooner or later they have to fall to earth or have an off season but they are likely the best managed team in the AL and that works in their favour. 

Will the Jays gamble? I don't know but the logic I've tried to lay out suggests that they will. There is a different kind of gamble they could take, one that does not involve blowing up their team to start again or venturing too deeply into the market for the remaining free agents. It involves rethinking their analytics-based approach to baseball. This is a gamble I'd really like to see them take but here, at least, I wouldn't recommend holding your breath. 

Well ... this was predictable: More on Analytics, Boredom, and Baseball

I had set out to write post on the way analytics had made baseball boring.  And, I wanted to do that without sounding like an old timer railing against change for not other reason that he railed against change. Instead, it is boring because each team follows nearly exactly the same strategies. MLB is fighting against those strategies (expanding the bases, introducing pitch clocks and rules about pitcher disengagement). This is not because analytics failed. It is because it succeeded. Analytics worked, or at least seemed to. One could use massive amounts of data to position defenders, organize the pitching staff, and change the "launch angle" on swings to gain an edge on other teams. Tampa Bay might be the new poster child for this approach to baseball and it is hard to argue with success. The Rays are almost always in contention and almost always with a team that is among the least expensive (in terms of overall salary) in the majors. They have worked ideas such as the now outlawed shift, the starter+bulk pitcher, multiple substitutions, and pitch limits harder than just about any other team. 

The very problem is their success. Every team now has an analytics department and every team is using the same data. The result is that there is precious little variation in baseball strategy between teams. For instance, no one lets starters pitch deep into games any more. In fact, deep into games has been virtually redefined as getting through the fifth inning, the minimum number of innings a pitcher can pitch to record a win. The Jays have four starters who have been basically uninjured this year (I know Gausman has missed a couple of starts) and it is not clear any of them will get to 200 IP.  The point is not that the Jays are doing anything different or unusual. They are doing exactly what everyone else is doing. The only starter in the AL who looks like he will make it to 200 IP is Cole (as always data from Baseball Reference).  In the NL, three or four might make it. 

The addition of the universal DH has also created a a higher degree of homogeneity in baseball strategy across MLB. The absence of a DH forced NL teams in the past to adopt different strategies than AL teams (greater pinch hitting and using more small-ball, one base strategies).  I know we need to guard against nostalgia, but there were appreciable divisions of strategy between the baseball teams of my youth. Some were based on speed (KC, Oakland, the Expos, St. L). Some were based on power (Milwaukee). Some where based on platooning (the Jays, Orioles, and Tigers under Sparky). Some managers were quick hooks (Alou). Others expected their starters to work for their living (Vernon).  Said differently, when different teams played each other it was often a conflict of strategies as it was a conflict of players and teams. 

This is no longer the case. I was watching a Jays/Reds game a week or so ago and each team managed its pitching staff in exactly the same way. The only difference was that the Jays starter (Berrios) pitched 5.2 innings. The Reds (Kennedy), 5. There then followed a stream of pitchers pitching one inning (or, in the case of the Jays, the final out of the 6th).  The next game was as close to a repeat as you could get. The Jays needed to yank Richards faster than they wanted to because he was a bit off his mark, but that was it.  What minor differences there are, are a product of talent (Cleveland has to run because it lacks home run power) or taking advantage of particular situations (the Rockies were running on us because our catching is weak at throwing out runnings). Other coaches take advantage of situation but the overall strategies aren't varying. The result is that baseball fans basically know what is going to happen before it does and that does not make for a particularly exciting game, at least from a strategy perspective. 

Analytics have created two effects on the way baseball teams are organized. First, there has been an expansion of the bullpen. Most teams carry eight bullpen pitchers and five starters, taking up 13 roster spots, or half the team. Because there is almost no such thing as a complete game anymore (Lyles looks like he will lead the AL with 3; the Jays have a total of one complete game -- Bassitt -- this year), and because no one uses a reliever for more than an inning, more pitchers are needed. This leads to point two: because roster sports are needed for pitchers,  no one carries a dedicated DH any more (there are no Edgar Martinez, of Big Papi's, or Hal McRae's ... with the notable exceptions of the Dodgers but is anyone surprised Roberts is doing things differently? And, Phil as they try to get Harper into games). And, players are prized by the degree to which they can play more than one defensive position. 

For the Jays, the effect is periodically shaky outfield defence because we play infielders in the outfield (our backup or platoon outfielders are Biggio and Merrifeld, both infielders).  Throughout much of the year, our backup third basement and shortstop was Santiago Espinal, a player who was so not reliable as a short stop that the Jays traded (we really traded nothing so I am not all that concerned) for Paul DeJong.  I actually think Merrifield has done the job the Jays asked him to do this year and it has not an easy job. He makes the odd really good catch as an outfielder if he is moving forward but he has problems with balls over his head and tends -- as we would expect of an infielder -- to misjudge them. There were plays I've watched where Biggio, likewise, seemed completely miscast for the role he was asked to play. 

Is this a management issue? I'm argue that the heavy use of analytics creates this problem. Because the Jays are using up so many roster sports on pitchers, they can't carry a real back up outfielder. 

Likewise, the Jays have to suffer with Vladdy at first. I'll grant him Vladdy due. He did not come up playing first base, defence is not his primary value, and he does make some good plays. But, overall, his defence is hurting the team (it even hurt the team last year in his Gold Glove winning year, its just that all other first basement were worse).  The Jay would improve if they had even a break-even defensive first baseman and moved Vladdy F/T to DH. But, they can't because no one -- exceptions noted above -- carries an F/T DH anymore. Instead, it is used as place holder to give a player a rest. Because benches are so thin, there are just not a lot of backup players to fill in and so the DH spot is used to spell a player from fielding for a game. Or, for the same reason, to keep a player with a minor injury in the game. 

Not only does this homogenize strategies but, with regard to the Jays, it has made them a worse team. I am not saying Vladdy could be the Jays Big Papi, but I actually don't see any reason why he could't be. 

And, I have not even mentioned what "max effort" is doing to pitchers arms. 

In short, it is hard to complain about the Jays. I have and will. But, we also need to see that the problems with which the Jays grapple are inherent to this era of baseball (for instance, I know Hernandez had horrible defence. I said it. But, the response to that does not need to be to trade him, even while I think the trade worked out. Another alternative, would have been to teach him how to be an outfielder but, for whatever reason, that die not happen). 

I find myself drifting from baseball and have been trying to figure out why. This post, I guess, is in that spirit.